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Abstract 
 
Land ownership in post-apartheid South Africa carries a powerful symbolic 
charge for both black and white citizens. Under apartheid, state legislation 
denied black South Africans access to landownership rights, and confined 
them to 13 per cent of the available agricultural land. The election of the 
ANC government in 1994 marked the formal end of this process. Policies to 
provide access to land ownership to black South Africans were developed, 
raising widespread expectations for radical agrarian reform. The land 
reform policies of successive post-apartheid governments have, however, 
been unsuccessful in achieving any significant change to the overall 
proportions of land owned by black and white farmers, and the small 
amounts of land that have been transferred have failed to improve the lives 
of beneficiaries. In fact, the land ownership regime created under apartheid 
continues unchallenged in the post-apartheid era. This thesis seeks to 
investigate why successive democratically-elected governments with a 
mandate for reform have done so little to redress the entrenched inequality 
in land ownership.  
 
Informed by an anti-foundationalist ontology and an interpretive 
epistemology, this study focuses on processes of institutionalisation as they 
relate to both patterns of land ownership and the wider institutions of 
government inherited from the apartheid era that have continued to frame 
the policy process in South Africa. More specifically, the study adopts a 
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‘constructivist institutionalist’ approach to capture the way these 
institutions have been driven by a dominant discourse informed by 
apartheid-era values. It undertakes a multi-level institutional analysis, 
seeking to clarify the ideas underpinning the institutions and the discourses 
influencing the actors at the constitutional, national policy and provincial 
levels.  
 
The research involved examining key constitutional and policy documents 
and analysing interviews with key policy actors in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal provinces.  The analysis identifies the international 
discourses on development and land reform that constructed what South 
African policymakers understood as ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ after 1994, 
and it traces how these discourses went on to inform the development of 
the property clause in the post-apartheid Constitution. The analysis also 
reveals how the shifting assumptions, silences and focuses of policymakers 
implicitly constructed the beneficiaries of such policies – the black landless 
– as incapable and undeserving. Finally, this study reveals a tacit agreement 
among the majority of the most powerful stakeholders that land 
redistribution policy cannot be allowed to fundamentally disturb the 
agrarian system created by apartheid policies.  
 
The research extends understanding of the South African land reform 
programme by identifying the discourses that inform contemporary policy 
and practice, with specific focus on the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant 
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(SLAG) policy, the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD) policy, and the recently adopted Proactive Land Acquisition 
Strategy (PLAS). There has been little scholarly analysis of PLAS, which 
seeks to provide leasehold access to approved beneficiaries who have the 
potential to purchase land at some point in the future. This research 
deepens scholarly understanding of PLAS, and the way the dominant land 
reform discourses continue to support the position of white large-scale 
commercial farmers and the emerging black bourgeoisie, at the expense of 
the interests and aspirations of the rural landless. It demonstrates why land 
reform has thus far failed to make meaningful changes to the agrarian 
system created by apartheid policies, and therefore failed to improve the 
lives of the rural landless. 
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Chapter One  
Land in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
South Africa today is one of the most unequal societies in the world, with a 
Gini coefficient1 of 57.8% (Ross, 1999; Vegter, 2011). This is largely as a result 
of the policies of the colonial, segregation and apartheid governments, in 
power from 1652-19942. In addition to the political subjugation of black 
South Africans through physical force, these governments also 
systematically denied access to economic resources. Importantly, black 
South Africans were barred from owning land in legally designated ‘white’ 
areas (van Zyl & Kirsten, 1997), and were confined to 13 per cent of South 
Africa’s agricultural land, creating a reservoir of cheap African migrant 
labour (Adams, Cousins, & Manona, 1999) for the mining and industrial 
sectors. 
 
In 1990, various factors combined to convince the apartheid authorities that 
the time for change had arrived. Nelson Mandela, leader of the African 
National Congress (ANC), was released from prison to begin negotiations 
towards a new political order. The ANC took power four years later after 
winning the country’s first multiracial elections (Hague & Harrop, 2007). 
After years in exiled opposition (Herbst, 2005), the ANC faced the 
gargantuan task of reshaping the apartheid economy, so that for the first 
                                                 
1
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of economic inequality in a country, with 0% indicating perfect 
economic equality, and 100% indicating perfect economic inequality (Statistics New Zealand, 
2014).  
2
 All dates used are in the Common Era (C.E.)  
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time in its history South Africa might provide more equally for all its 
citizens, regardless of skin colour.  
 
The way in which the ANC hoped to achieve this soon became clear. Marais 
(2011) comments that the new governing party sought to reach a mutually 
beneficial accommodation with established economic interests domestically 
and internationally, and engineer the rise of a new black ‘patriotic 
bourgeoisie’. Much as apartheid had been a project of the aspirant Afrikaner 
bourgeoisie, post-apartheid South Africa would be a project of the aspirant 
black bourgeoisie. To pre-empt social and political rebellion from the 
majority of black South Africans who would be excluded from this new 
class, a system of social grants and gradual improvements to health and 
educational facilities was introduced. As was made clear at Marikana on 16 
August 2014, where 34 striking mineworkers were killed and 78 injured by 
the South African police (IOL, 2012), those outside the black bourgeoisie 
who did not accept this arrangement would be dealt with harshly.  
 
Within this broader strategy of accommodation with established capital, 
one of the many negative economic legacies of apartheid which the new 
government needed to address on taking power was the critical imbalance 
in access to land between white and black South Africans created by 
apartheid policies. When the ANC took power, about 16 million (black) 
people were concentrated in the limited areas allocated to them by 
apartheid and colonial policies, having no legal ownership of land, and 
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engaged in low-input, labour-intensive subsistence production, mostly to 
supplement other forms of income (Hall, 2004a). The rest of the agricultural 
land in South Africa was owned by around 45, 000 capital-intensive, large-
scale, mostly white commercial farmers (DAFF, 2012) who employed about 3 
million black South Africans (Hall, 2004a). Given promises made by the 
ANC as early as 1955 that “… the land shall be shared among those who work 
it …” (Congress of the People, 1955), it was clear that the injustice of this 
agrarian system needed immediate attention from the new post-apartheid 
government.  
 
In 1996, the approach to this problem became clear when a new 
Constitution was adopted, part of which enshrined the basic principles of 
the South African land reform policy. The policy consisted of three ‘pillars’. 
The first, land tenure reform, aimed at giving secure access to land through 
legislation to black workers on white large-scale commercial farms, and 
occupants of the areas allocated for black occupation by apartheid policies. 
The second pillar, land restitution, aimed at restitution (financial or 
otherwise) for black title-holders who were forced off their land by the 
apartheid state (Hall, 2004a). The third pillar, land redistribution, was aimed 
at providing access to land to black people who had never previously had 
secure claims to landed property (James, 2007).  
 
The objectives of the land tenure reform and land restitution programmes 
are not to change the agrarian structure created by colonial and apartheid 
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policies. Rather, they were created to ease the plight of those forced into 
landlessness and poverty by colonial and apartheid policies. In contrast, the 
land redistribution policy has the objective of changing the landownership 
regime forced on black citizens. Rather than providing relief to the rural 
landless, it seeks to change the agrarian structure causing their poverty and 
distress, to permanently improve their socio-economic situation. For this 
reason, this thesis concentrates on the third pillar of the South African land 
reform programme, which began in 1994 with a focus on assisting the rural 
landless poor gain access to property rights through the market. In 2000 the 
emphasis of the redistribution programme shifted to creating an African 
commercial farmer class (Cousins, 2009) alongside the existing white 
commercial farming class, still through the market.  In 2009 the emphasis of 
land redistribution changed once again, still aimed at the creation of an 
African commercial farmer class, but through intensive government support 
rather than the market (DRDLR, 2011a). Progress in the implementation of 
this policy through all three of these policy iterations has been poor. By 
2009 only 6.9 per cent of the agricultural land in South Africa had been 
transferred from white to black ownership through this policy (Greenberg, 
2010), and no updated figures are available. In addition, the small amounts 
of land that have been transferred have failed to improve the socio-
economic conditions of the beneficiaries (Valente, 2011).  
 
The results of an opinion survey carried out in South Africa after the ‘fast-
track’ land reforms of 2000 in Zimbabwe emphasise the importance of land 
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redistribution to many South Africans. Sixty-eight percent of black 
respondents to the survey approved of events in Zimbabwe in 2000, and 
agreed with the statement, ‘Land must be returned to blacks in South 
Africa, no matter what the consequences are for the current owners and for 
political stability in the country’ (James, 2007). Dr Piet Meiring, a member 
of the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, agreed that “… there’s no way by 
which you can have … reconciliation without justice seen to be done and 
experienced to be done” (Meiring, 2012).  
 
Land reform is in this light one of the most important tasks in post-
apartheid South Africa. ‘Land’ is discursively significant and carries a 
powerful symbolic charge for many black South Africans, both because of 
memories of the racialised dispossession of their land under colonialism 
and apartheid, and because inequalities in land ownership evoke the 
broader economic inequalities which post-apartheid policies have yet to 
undo. “Land, in this sense, is an idiom for the citizenship once denied to 
South Africa’s black majority” (James, 2007, p. 10).  
 
Simultaneously, land ownership symbolises wealth and security to many 
white South Africans in an era when they no longer wield political power 
(Kepe, Hall, & Cousins, 2008). The large-scale commercial agricultural 
sector also contributes about 4.5 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Restructuring the large-scale commercial agricultural 
6 
 
sector, while obviously necessary, will clearly have large consequences for 
the economy and for many people, black and white (Mather & Greenberg, 
2003). It is therefore vitally important to fully understand the various 
discourses informing the debate around land redistribution in South Africa. 
 
The South African land redistribution programme, therefore, has great 
potential as a topic for study — the poor performance of the programme in 
transferring land and in improving the socio-economic conditions of its 
beneficiaries prompts enquiry of the factors contributing to these failures. 
This is particularly important given that much of the existing scholarship on 
land redistribution has failed to address the causes from a critical discursive 
perspective that would allow an exploration and understanding of the 
values and worldviews of those making and implementing land 
redistribution policy.   
 
Background 
While the extent of the dispossession suffered by black South Africans is 
perhaps unprecedented, the agrarian structure created in South Africa by 
colonial, segregation and apartheid policies is not uncommon in the 
developing world. Although land is the main productive asset of many poor 
people living in developing countries, many do not have access to 
productive farmland (Lipton, 2009). A ‘dual agricultural’ system of large-
scale commercial farms juxtaposed against small-scale subsistence units is 
often present in these countries. The consequences of maintaining such 
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agrarian systems have been noted, in most cases, as leading to wasted 
economic potential (El-Ghonemy, 2010) and long-term, often violent rural 
unrest (Binswanger & Deininger, 1993). Efforts to avoid or reverse these 
situations have been made in many countries through land reform 
programmes. These programmes are typically aimed at “… substantially 
increasing the proportion of farmland controlled by the poor, and thereby 
their income, power or status” (Lipton, 2009, p. 1). For example, successful 
land reform programmes were carried out in South Korea, Taiwan and 
Japan after the Second World War, leading to greater access to land and 
economic opportunities for the landless poor (El-Ghonemy, 2010), and so 
were a part of the policy mix which set the stage for the subsequent 
spectacular economic development trajectories of these countries. The 
success or failure of land reform programmes in developing countries can, 
therefore, have significant development implications.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is no consensus on the best approach to land 
reform in the scholarship. One of the major divisions is between those 
advocating large-scale government intervention and those advocating a 
reliance on the market to achieve a more just distribution of land (El-
Ghonemy, 2010). Those preferring the market as an institution for achieving 
land reform argue that asset distribution and the agricultural sector are 
secondary development factors. From this perspective, it is important to 
allow the formal market to operate freely over time to achieve an 
economically optimum redistribution of farmland (Bandeira & Sumpsi, 
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2009). While land reform policies that ignore markets usually fail, so too do 
policies that assume markets automatically resolve conflicts and eliminate 
costs. If they did, markets alone would remove land inequality, without the 
need for land reforms, which has never happened. Markets can only go part 
of the way towards fair land distribution (Lipton, 2009). Case studies from 
Brazil, Egypt, India and the Philippines, where market-led land reform 
policies have been implemented, have found them to be less than successful 
in creating new farmers (Bandeira & Sumpsi, 2009). The main problem 
outlined in these studies was a high rate of default among beneficiaries, who 
were unable to repay the large amounts of borrowed money required to buy 
the land on the market. Many scholars therefore argue in favour of state-led 
institutional responses to redistribute resources, advocating extensive 
(sometimes coercive) land reforms (Bandeira & Sumpsi, 2009).  
 
Irrespective of whether a state-led or a market-led approach to land reform 
is taken, such a programme constitutes a public policy — public policy 
being actions or inactions by the state on an issue of public importance (Hill, 
2009). The institutions of government inherited from the apartheid era, 
although modified through the process of constitutional review between 
1990 and 1996, continue to frame the policy process in South Africa. This is 
apparent in the area of land reform, with strong implications for the 
potential success of this programme. A theoretical perspective that provides 
opportunity to take account of this is ‘new institutionalism,’ which makes 
the point that the institutional context that frames the policy process is 
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important (Polski & Ostrom, 1998b). From this perspective, then, land 
redistribution policy will be strongly influenced by the broader institutional 
context within which the policy is formulated and implemented. In 
addition, ‘constructivist institutionalism’ adds the insight that institutions 
themselves are underpinned and maintained by discourses, as are the actors 
working around and within these institutions (Hay, 2006). This means that 
an in-depth understanding of the institutional context of land reform will 
provide insight into factors leading to the success or failure of land reform 
initiatives. However, despite the vital importance of this aspect of land 
reform, there is a significant gap in the scholarly literature in this regard.   
 
A large and varied body of literature focuses on land redistribution in South 
Africa, in which the debate is generally framed as a “… tension between the 
objectives of ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’” (Hall, 2010b, p. 175). This split 
generally mirrors that found in the international literature around land 
reform and development. Those emphasising ‘equity’ see land redistribution 
as best used to create changes in social, economic and political relations a 
greater equality in access to resources, especially land. As a result they 
favour government intervention in land reform to improve access to land 
for black South Africans (Binswanger & Deininger, 1993; Bradstock, 2005; 
Eastwood, Kirsten, & Lipton, 2006; Hall, 1998; Hargreaves, 1996; Lahiff & 
Cousins, 2005; Lipton, 1993a; McEwan, 2001; Mokgope, 2000; Valente, 2011; 
van Zyl & Kirsten, 1997; Walker, 2005b, 2009; Zimmerman, 2000). Those 
emphasising ‘efficiency’ advocate using land redistribution as one of many 
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ways to improve overall output and productivity in South African 
agriculture, and generally support the market-led land redistribution policy 
adopted by the South African government (Du Toit, 2004; Lyne & Darroch, 
2003; Lyne, Knight, & Roth, 2006; Mbatha, Antrobus, & van Rooyen, 2010; 
Neto, 2004).  
 
The studies on both sides of this divide take the equity/efficiency division 
for granted, and do not question where this division comes from, or how it 
arises. Attempts have been made to step outside of this debate. Bernstein 
(2003) for example, situates the South African land redistribution policy in a 
global world-historical perspective, as part of what he describes as the 
development of capitalism and the fragmentation of the labouring class, 
and Hall (2004b) sees the changes in the land redistribution policy over 
time as indicative of shifting class alliances in the country. These studies 
assume the existence of ‘classes’ with fixed and unchanging interests and 
motivations, and no attempt is made to ascertain what ‘class’ actually means 
in the contemporary South African agrarian sector.    
 
Despite an extensive scholarship on the South African land redistribution 
policy, comparatively few studies approach it from a perspective which does 
not assume fixed interests and motivations. There has been, with a few 
exceptions, little to no examination of the deeper assumptions, the ideas, or 
the discourses that inform policy actors in the South African land reform 
arena (Cousins & Scoones, 2010; Du Toit, 2013; MacDonald, 2003; 
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Weideman, 2004). If we base our actions on the ideas we have about the 
world around us, it is crucially important to understand the ideas post-
apartheid policy makers have about land, agriculture and land reform in 
order to understand the course that land redistribution policy has taken 
since 1994. To this point, there has been no serious and sustained effort to 
do this in the research into land reform in South Africa. This study applies a 
hitherto ignored theoretical approach to the South African land 
redistribution arena, namely constructivist institutionalism, to offer new 
insights and a deeper understanding of developments in land redistribution 
policy.   
Key Research Focus 
This study seeks to analyse the deeper assumptions underlying post-
apartheid land reform policy in South Africa. The central focus of this thesis 
is, therefore, on worldviews, ideas and discourses around land reform in 
South Africa. This comes from the assumption that language shapes our 
view of the world — not only the language we use in daily situations, but 
the worldviews and ideas inherent in the language we use which shape 
social relationships and institutions (Fairclough, 1992; Gee, 2011; Hajer, 1995; 
Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).    
 
Theoretical Framework 
The ‘new institutionalism’ approach points to the importance of institutions 
in policy analysis — by presenting policy actors with a limited set of policy 
choices, they make certain policy outcomes more likely than others 
12 
 
(Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). Within this broad approach, 
constructivist institutionalism puts ideas or social constructions at the 
centre of the ‘new institutionalism’ analysis, assuming that ideas 
simultaneously form the basis of institutions and guide the actions and 
strategies of policy actors (Hay, 2006). Crucially, the ideas manifested in 
institutions and the ideas motivating actors do not always match each other. 
Different groups of actors who subscribe to different sets of ideas may 
therefore work to reshape institutions to more closely embody the ideas or 
discourses to which they subscribe (Hay, 2006). 
 
Constructivist institutionalism focuses attention on the ideas underlying 
institutions and the actors working within them. Policy arenas are 
characterised by a variety of institutions and actors, leading to questions 
about where to begin an analysis of the ideas underlying them. Polski and 
Ostrom (1998a) suggest a multi-level system of analysis, where institutional 
arenas are divided into the constitutional, the collective choice and the 
operating levels. Where the constitutional level sets the general boundaries 
for land reform in South Africa, the collective choice level creates national 
policies around land reform, which are implemented at the operating or the 
provincial level. This study concentrates on the discursive construction of 
land reform policy at each level. It focuses on the discourses drawn on by 
actors contributing to the debate around the property clause in the 1996 
Constitution at the constitutional level, the implicit discourses apparent in 
policy documents around land redistribution policies at the national policy 
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level, and on the discourses drawn on by land policy participants at the 
local level in two of South Africa’s provinces — the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. To understand better the success or failure of post-
apartheid land redistribution policy in South Africa, therefore, this study 
seeks to clarify the ideas underpinning the institutions and the discourses 
driving the actors at each of these three levels.    
 
Note on Method 
In focusing on the analysis of ideas and discourses in the South African land 
redistribution policy arena, this study is informed by an anti-foundationalist 
ontology, and an interpretive epistemology. Following from that position, it 
adopts a qualitative methodology, assuming that the meanings we attach to 
the physical world are socially constructed, and cumulatively embedded in 
formal institutions as preferences, techniques and policies (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011).  
At the constitutional and policy levels the study focuses on the section of 
the South African Constitution addressing land reform, and key policy 
documents detailing the various iterations of land redistribution policy 
between 1994 and 2012. Research data at the provincial level was generated 
in this study through semi-structured qualitative interviews with a number 
of groups involved in land redistribution policy in both the Eastern Cape 
and KwaZulu-Natal.   
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Limitations and Delimitations 
The social constructionist approach adopted in this study recognises that 
the researcher and the researched exert influence over each other. This 
means that as the researcher in this study, I cannot claim privilege of 
knowledge or interpretation. The research I produce here will have been 
affected by my socially dominant position in South Africa society as a white, 
English-speaking male. Given the continued concentration of economic, 
social and cultural power in the white population in the post-apartheid 
context (De Kock, 2011), this will most especially have affected my 
interactions with the black respondents in my study. This study is not 
aimed at outlining an external reality as neutrally and rigorously as possible 
— I acknowledge that the research and the knowledge produced here is 
historically and culturally contingent. However, it is presented in the hope 
that it adds new insights to the debate around land redistribution in South 
Africa, and ultimately contributes to the creation of a land redistribution 
programme that provides greater access to land for black South Africans.  
Financial, geographical and temporal constraints during the research phase 
of this study mean that research at the provincial level for this study has 
been focused on the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces of South 
Africa. These two provinces were selected as being reasonably 
representative of the rest of the country climatically, politically, 
demographically and in terms of agrarian structure.   
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Chapter Organization 
This study begins by tracing the history of land in South Africa. The 
institutions created to further the value of white supremacy during the 
colonial, segregation and apartheid eras are introduced, as are the resulting 
policies around land allocation and land use (Chapter 2). Having set out the 
broad historical events resulting in the mass dispossession of black South 
Africans, this study turns to the development of a theoretical approach 
appropriate to a discourse- and institution-sensitive analysis of the efforts of 
post-apartheid governments to reverse this mass dispossession. I developed 
an adapted form of ‘constructivist institutionalism’, focused on the 
discourses underpinning institutions and motivating actors at the 
constitutional, national policy and the provincial levels (Chapter 3). From 
this theoretical foundation, I then developed an anti-foundationalist, 
interpretivist and qualitative approach, to allow the creation of the 
discourse analysis method used in this study (Chapter 4).   
 
Before concentrating on the discourses found in the South African land 
reform policy arena, the thesis examines broader global narratives around 
development and land reform (chapter five). The development of the South 
African land reform policy from 1994 onwards did not occur in a vacuum — 
at least five broad narratives about what ‘development’ is, and where land 
reforms fit into this process, are present in the literature on land reform and 
have exerted some influence on at least the initial stages of land reform in 
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South Africa through the World Bank (Williams, 1996). These international 
discourses around land reform form the focus of this chapter (Chapter 5).  
 
At the constitutional level, this study draws on the punctuated equilibrium 
theory developed by Baumgartner and Jones (2009) (positing that settled 
states of ‘policy equilibrium’ are periodically punctuated by periods of 
‘policy crisis’) to frame an analysis of the creation of the property clause in 
the South African constitution. Two discourses are identified among 
participants in the process of creating this section of the constitution. The 
interactions of the actors drawing on these two discourses are analysed to 
understand the clash of ideas that resulted in the property clause of the 
final Constitution, setting the broad boundaries of land redistribution in 
South Africa thereafter (Chapter 6).   
 
In terms of national policy this thesis analyses policy documents pertaining 
to the three main iterations of land redistribution policy developed by the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA), which was renamed the Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) in 2009 (Jacobs, 2012). The 
problem representation, the deeper assumptions, the history and the 
silences in each of these three policies are analysed in order to create a clear 
picture of what each policy aimed or aims to achieve, and for whom 
(Chapter 7). This same set of policy documents is used in the next chapter 
to understand the implicit views held by post-apartheid policymakers of the 
beneficiaries of land redistribution (Chapter 8).  
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The final section analyses the ideas and beliefs about land reform held by 
those policy actors involved in the implementation of the policies developed 
at the national level. Thirty-five interviews were carried out in the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces of South Africa in the course of this 
study. Three primary discourses arise from these interviews. Analysis of 
these discourses provides another part of the answer to the question of why 
land redistribution policy has achieved so little since 1994 (Chapter 9), 
before the final concluding chapter (Chapter 10). Having set out the 
structure of this thesis, I turn to the history of land policy in South Africa.  
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Chapter Two 
History of Land Ownership in South Africa 
The issue of land reform in post-apartheid South Africa arises out of the 
country’s long history of dispossession and oppression. This chapter sets out 
the broader currents in the history of the country, along with their effects 
on the distribution of land between whites and blacks. Beginning with 
precolonial arrangements around the distribution of land, this chapter 
moves on to outline the land tenure regime introduced with the settlement 
of Europeans in the region, which focused on giving formal ownership of 
land with full rights of disposal to whites only. As European settlers 
extended control over what would become South Africa in 1910 (Thompson, 
1990), and the economy became focused on mining, the black population 
was gradually confined to small areas and denied ownership of land, forcing 
them to seek work on white farms and industries at artificially low wages 
(Marais, 2011).  
 
Through the apartheid era this system was maintained and intensified, and 
focused on aiding white farmers to become large-scale, mechanized and 
‘modern’, as seen in the agricultural sectors of the US and the UK (Cousins 
& Scoones, 2010). By the late 1980s a combination of external and internal 
pressures made it clear to the authorities that the apartheid economic and 
political system would need to be changed to ensure the continued 
prosperity of white South Africans. This put the extant system of land 
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ownership into question. Through this history of land ownership in South 
Africa, the chapter provides greater depth and understanding to the 
discourses examined in later chapters.  
The precolonial period   
Humans have lived in the southern African region since almost the very 
beginnings of the species (Bandeira & Sumpsi, 2009). There is, therefore, a 
long history of human occupation. This section focuses on human 
occupation in the region just prior to the first permanent European 
settlement. In the eastern areas, Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists both 
herded livestock and grew crops. In the southern and western areas the 
Khoikhoi tended herds of livestock, while San hunter-gatherers lived in the 
mountains and semi-deserts where agriculture and pastoralism were risky 
(Ross, 1999). A rough egalitarianism was maintained in these societies, 
especially in relation to land. In all three social groupings individual rights 
in property were not recognised — to the San, Khoikhoi and Bantu-speakers, 
the idea of the exclusive possession of a piece of land was literally 
inconceivable (Le May, 1995). Among the agro-pastoralists a system of 
communal land ownership was practised (Bundy, 1979). Families could use 
land in the villages as building sites and kitchen gardens. Women 
controlled the fields in the growing seasons, and the rest of the land was the 
property of the community as a whole throughout the year. Anyone could 
use it to pasture livestock, hunt game or gather plants (Thompson, 1990). 
The only form of accumulable wealth in this system was cattle, which could 
be loaned out, allowing individuals to build networks of power and 
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dependence (Bundy, 1979; Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). However no 
individual could become overly powerful in this system, as there was always 
vacant land available for settlement — emigration to new areas was an ever-
present option to groups who felt themselves oppressed (Thompson, 1990).  
 
Crucially important for all groups living in the region3 are the climatic 
conditions. Figure 2-1 shows that in the west of the region, the average 
annual rainfall is less than 100mm, resulting in desert conditions along the 
western coastline. In the east the average rainfall reaches 1000mm a year, 
producing subtropical vegetation along the eastern coastline. A transitional 
zone receives about 500mm per year. To the east of that zone, the rainfall is 
generally sufficient for intensive arable agriculture. To the west, the rainfall 
is scarce and variable, and so generally suitable for extensive grazing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The Union of South Africa was first created in 1910 (Thompson, 1990) with the borders that 
exist today. In this chapter then, discussions of the area prior to 1910 will refer to the southern 
African region.  
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Figure 2-1: Rainfall distribution in South Africa   (Source: M. Oulton) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This division of the country into dry and wet areas is a result of an extensive 
plateau in the centre of the country, averaging around 1 500m to 2 000m 
above sea level. The escarpment is highest in the east, in the form of the 
Drakensberg range. These break rain-bearing weather systems from the 
Indian Ocean in the summer, causing the high rainfall along the east coast 
where the Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists lived. These groups also settled 
the plateau behind the Drakensberg, where average rainfall reduces and the 
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thick savannah of the north gives way to grasslands on what is known as the 
Highveld. West of this transitional zone average rainfall dwindles drastically, 
and the grasslands give way to the semi-desert of the Karoo and the 
Kalahari (Ross, 1999), where the San hunted and the Khoikhoi herded their 
livestock.  
 
Most importantly, these rainfall figures are long-term annual averages. In 
these regions rain is only possible in the summer — winters are uniformly 
dry. In addition, from summer to summer, total rainfall can in fact vary 
greatly from season to season. Summer droughts are relatively frequent, 
varying in range and intensity — some are recorded as having lasted for a 
decade (Thompson, 1990). There are rivers in the country, making some 
irrigation possible. However, most regularly shrink to trickles in the rainless 
winter months, and to nothing during the periodic summer droughts (Le 
May, 1995). As a rational response to these unpredictable conditions, the 
San, Khoikhoi and the agro-pastoralists shifted their activities from season 
to season in response to climatic conditions. In relatively wet years cropping 
was successful, while in comparatively dry years the emphasis shifted to 
herding and hunting (Bundy, 1979).  
 
Colonial period 1652-1910  
The first recorded European contact was in 1487, when a Portuguese 
expedition rounded the Cape of Good Hope in search of new routes to Asia 
(Thompson, 1990). They were soon followed by other European nations, 
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and while the Portuguese avoided landing in southern Africa, the Dutch 
East India Company4 (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or the VOC) 
realised the potential advantages of establishing a permanent settlement at 
the Cape of Good Hope (Parthesius, 2010; Ross, 1999). In 1652 a small party 
of VOC employees arrived in Table Bay, intending to establish a trading 
post (Le May, 1995). The settlement was never meant to be more than a 
small fortified base, where annual fleets to and from Batavia could take in 
fresh water, fruit, vegetables and grain, and land their sick for recuperation 
(Thompson, 1990). It was soon apparent, however, that the local Khoikhoi 
would not be able to supply all that was needed, and the VOC considered it 
had no option but to transform the trading post at the Cape into a genuine 
colony (Ross, 1999).  
 
The Cape peninsula, where the Dutch5 settled, experiences different 
climatic patterns to the summer rainfall areas which cover the majority of 
the country. In the south-west of the country around the Cape peninsula, 
the summers are dry and the winters dominated by heavy rainfall, which is 
regular and sufficient enough to allow intensive arable agriculture 
(Thompson, 1990). This regional micro-climate had specific implications 
when additional settlers from Europe arrived. When the VOC began 
distributing parcels of land amongst its employees, they did so in the 
                                                 
4
 The VOC was a private company granted extensive powers by the Dutch government of the 
time, including a monopoly on Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope, the right to make 
treaties with rulers and states in Asia, to build fortifications, and to undertake military operations 
(Parthesius, 2010).  
5
 Similar to most commentaries, in this study the Dutch settlers in the region and their 
descendants are referred to as the Trekboers, the Voortrekkers, the Boers and the Afrikaners.  
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winter-rainfall areas of the Cape peninsula. Regular rainfall meant the new 
formal and defined freehold farming units were able to be farmed using 
agricultural methods and systems developed in the Mediterranean. These 
farmers began to produce wheat and wine regularly and successfully, and 
over time became a prosperous landed gentry (Miller & Pope, 2000a; Ross, 
1999). The type of land tenure practised today in South Africa’s large-scale 
commercial farming sector has its origins in the bureaucracy of the VOC 
(Miller & Pope, 2000a). These prosperous farms were developed on the back 
of slave labour, and by 1659 non-European slaves outnumbered white 
settlers. Thus, from the very beginnings of European settlement in the 
region, colour and inferiority were conflated in the minds of whites (Le May, 
1995), and racism (rationalised by reference to both the Bible and to science) 
was used to rationalise the exploitation of non-whites by Europeans 
(Rodney, 1972).  
 
As the Dutch colony expanded beyond the confines of the winter-rainfall 
areas, a distinct group of European settler-farmers, or trekboers, came into 
being (Le May, 1995). As settled plots of land cultivated under European 
agricultural systems were not viable in the summer-rainfall semi-deserts of 
the interior, these farmers raised and sold livestock, following the grazing 
from season to season like the Khoikhoi (Ross, 1999). In keeping with the 
ideal of white supremacy, the VOC assumed the lands in the interior of the 
country were its own. Thus legally the trekboers loaned the land they used 
from the VOC for the payment of a nominal rent, and later a tithe on 
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agricultural production (Miller & Pope, 2000a). The trekboers extended the 
idea of white supremacy to the Khoikhoi they encountered (Ross, 1999), 
dispossessing them and the San of their land and stock, and slaughtering 
the survivors or forcing them into bonded servitude (Le May, 1995; Ross, 
1999). The effects of these actions on the San and Khoikhoi were of no 
concern to the authorities, and the nomadic trekboers were not censured for 
their actions. Territorial expansion had never been part of the Company’s 
purpose, but in a land without natural frontiers it was impossible to prevent 
the eastward movement of the trekboers (Le May, 1995). By the end of the 
18th century they had reached the lands of the agro-pastoralist Xhosa, and 
begun a long-term war over land access that would last over a century (Ross, 
1999).  
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Figure 2-2: Trekboer expansion from the Cape   (Source: M. Oulton) 
 
 
 
For almost 154 years the Cape Colony was a Dutch possession, but on the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe in 1806, the British took 
control (Le May, 1995; Thompson, 1990). The new rulers opted to create an 
alliance with the major Dutch landowners of the colony (Ross, 1999), only 
bringing in gradual changes over time. In 1808 the slave trade to all British 
colonies was forbidden, in 1828 legal disabilities previously applying to free 
people of colour were removed, and on the 1 December 1834 all slaves in the 
Cape were freed (Le May, 1995; Ross, 1999). Superficially these were major 
changes, seriously challenging white supremacy in the Cape, and causing 
anger among many of the Dutch. However, most slaves remained on farms 
as paid labourers, and their conditions of labour after 1841 were determined 
by the Masters and Servants Ordinance, which was heavily weighted in 
27 
 
favour of employers (Ross, 1999). The net effects of these changes did not 
radically change the social position of non-Europeans in the Colony, and 
the idea of white supremacy remained dominant.  
 
Alongside these measures, in 1813 the British began the process of surveying 
and registering the loan-farms of the trekboers. Slowly, loan-based tenure 
was eliminated in favour of more formal forms of tenure (Miller & Pope, 
2000a), and in 1820 new British colonists were brought into the Cape 
Colony, and settled on land recently taken from the Xhosa (Thompson, 
1990). Thus in the earliest days of what would come to be South Africa, the 
principle of the private ownership of land with full rights of disposal was set 
— but only for people of European origin (Miller & Pope, 2000a; Thompson, 
1990). As British and Afrikaner settlers expanded their control over the 
interior, the process of unequal apportionment of land between blacks and 
whites began on a major scale (Miller & Pope, 2000a).  
 
Outside the limits of the Cape colony, by the end of the 18th century, the 
agro-pastoralist societies underwent a period of violent change. A series of 
political consolidations culminated in the creation of the Zulu kingdom. A 
number of reasons have been suggested for these consolidations, including 
the introduction of maize, the limits of the prevailing systems of production, 
and the increased possibilities of trade that arose with the Portuguese 
settlement at Delagoa Bay in what would become Mozambique. Whatever 
the causes, from the 1820s the new Zulu kingdom embarked on annual 
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campaigns against neighbouring chiefdoms, prompting endemic warfare in 
the region in a period which has become known as the uMfecane (Ross, 
1999; Thompson, 1990).  
 
Figure 2-3: Migrations of the uMfecane   (Source: M. Oulton) 
 
 
 
Within the Cape Colony, by the 1830s a combination of the changes made 
by the British to the social position of non-Europeans, the demand for more 
land, and the effects of war with the Xhosa agro-pastoralists prompted 
several thousand of the Dutch-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Colony to 
emigrate to the interior of the region. Between 5 000–10 000 ‘Voortrekkers’ 
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(later known as the Boers or the Afrikaners) left the colony, taking their 
livestock into the interior in what came to be known as the ‘Great Trek’. 
Due to the effects of the uMfecane, the Voortrekkers moved into mostly 
unpopulated areas which led them to conclude that the land was 
uninhabited and unclaimed. Where the Boers encountered resistance from 
survivors of the uMfecane, their firearms proved far more effective than 
African spears and shields. When this advantage was negated through the 
use of guerrilla tactics, the Voortrekkers forced these survivor groups into 
submission by destroying their food supplies. The success of the Afrikaners 
in this conflict reinforced their belief in white superiority. Eventually, the 
Voortrekkers split into three groups to form the new republics of the 
Orange Free State and the Transvaal on the Highveld, and Natal on the 
well-watered eastern coastline, which was controlled by the Zulu (Le May, 
1995; Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990).  
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Figure 2-4: The southern African region on the eve of the South African War 
(Source: M. Oulton) 
 
 
  
The Afrikaners of the Highveld were able to create their new farms and 
force those survivors of the uMfecane they encountered into subservience in 
the pattern established by the trekboers with the Khoikhoi and the San. In 
contrast, those Afrikaners who crossed the Drakensberg faced the might of 
the Zulu kingdom. After an initial setback, the Natal Boers defeated the 
Zulu at Blood River in 1838 (Thompson, 1990), replaced the Zulu king 
Dingane with his more pliable brother Mpande, and took all the land 
between the uThukela and the uMzimkhulu Rivers for themselves to form 
the Natal Republic (Thompson, 1990). The new Republic would not retain 
its independence from Britain for long, however, as the Boers of Natal found 
themselves unable to impose full control in the area they occupied. Many 
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agro-pastoralist communities remained, and each day more arrived as those 
displaced from the area by the Zulu returned after hearing of their defeat 
(Thompson, 1990). In one of the first attempts to limit African numbers on 
designated ‘white’ land, in 1841 the government of the Natal Republic 
decreed that no more than five African families could live on one ‘white’ 
farm, and that all ‘surplus’ Africans should be removed to the south 
(Thompson, 1990). Setting a pattern for the future, this white government 
gave preference to white settlers in the allocation of land, and ordered the 
removal of those Africans ‘surplus’ to white needs.  
 
In this instance, the British feared that displacing so many people would 
further disrupt the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony (where the ‘surplus’ 
people were being sent), and more broadly sought to secure the coastline of 
southern Africa for British shipping routes to India. In response, the British 
authorities annexed the Natal Republic in 1842 (Marais, 2011; Thompson, 
1990), and after an abortive attempt to control the Boers of the interior6, 
later officially recognised the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in the 
interior as independent Boer republics (Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). The 
British then assumed the task of subjugating and asserting white supremacy 
over the independent African tribes within and on the borders of the 
colonies of the Cape and Natal. In Natal, the Voortrekkers were replaced by 
British settlers (Ross, 1999), who like their Boer predecessors were vastly 
outnumbered by Africans. To make the Boer policy of only five African 
                                                 
6
 Which has been called the First Freedom War (Le May, 1995).   
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families per ‘white’ farm feasible, the Natal colonial government decided 
that rather than displacing the ‘surplus’ Africans to the south, they would be 
placed in designated ‘reserves’, leaving the rest of the colony open for white 
settlement. Showing the priority placed on white supremacy, the majority 
African population was allocated just 16 per cent of the total land in Natal7 
(Thompson, 1990). This pattern was repeated in 1866 in the Cape colony, 
when some of the Xhosa tribes were confined to the Ciskei ‘reserve’ on small 
landholdings. Once again the land allocated to the Africans was 
disproportionately small in relation to their numbers (Thompson, 1990). 
These patterns of land allocation, later enshrined in the Cape Colony’s Glen 
Grey Act of 1894 (Miller & Pope, 2000a), set the pattern for the division of 
land between whites and Africans in what would become South Africa.  
 
On the eastern boundary of the Cape colony itself, the British confronted 
one of the largest and most cohesive groups of agro-pastoralists, the Xhosa. 
This tribal grouping had successfully resisted settler incursions from as early 
as 1779, despite repeated military defeats, epidemics and famines (Le May, 
1995; Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). The Xhosa were only finally defeated in 
1881, when their lands were incorporated into the Cape Colony as the 
Transkei (Thompson, 1990). The British also considered the Zulu on the 
northern border of Natal to be a significant threat, and engineered a war 
with the kingdom in 1879. Despite a disastrous defeat at Isandlwana, the 
British forces prevailed to later burn the Zulu capital at Ulundi and 
                                                 
7
 2 million acres out of 12.5 million acres (Thompson, 1990).  
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incorporate Zululand into Natal (Ross, 1999). Noting the subjugation of the 
two most powerful tribes in the region, the remaining independent African 
groups faced difficult choices. Thus while the Venda and the Pedi 
unsuccessfully resisted the Boers, the Tswana, Basotho and Swazi requested 
that the British take control of their affairs, resulting in the creation of what 
are today the independent countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
(Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). The final result of these conflicts was to put 
the British and Afrikaner in a dominant position over the African peoples 
(Miller & Pope, 2000a) — white supremacy was assured by the subjugation 
of all the Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralist groups in the region.   
 
Despite the hugely unequal apportionment of land between blacks and 
whites, between 1840 and 1890 there was a positive response by Africans to 
the new market opportunities (Bundy, 1979). On the small amounts of land 
allocated to them (Miller & Pope, 2000a), adapted forms of traditional 
agricultural methods still gave hundreds of thousands of Africans a viable 
alternative to wage labour for white colonists. The adoption of new crops, 
implements and methods increased productivity so that Africans could 
respond to the imposition of taxes and the desirability of trade goods by 
producing and selling an agricultural surplus (Bundy, 1979). Refugees from 
the uMfecane in particular settled in the eastern areas of the Cape colony. 
After working on white farms or for missionaries, they produced from their 
own lands, given to them in reward for fighting for the British (Bundy, 1979). 
By the 1860s many had become prosperous peasants, producing maize and 
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wool for local markets (Bundy, 1979; Thompson, 1990). Differentiated 
classes soon appeared in the African population — a minority formed an 
upper strata which collaborated with the colonial authorities or engaged in 
enterprise, while a majority with access to inadequate amounts of land 
depended on the sale of labour to whites (Bundy, 1979).  
 
The upper strata, some with access to capital and larger landholdings, 
comprised a class of small commercial farmers who responded to the new 
market opportunities more effectively than did the white farmers (Bundy, 
1979). The white farmers, who complained to the white authorities of being 
unable to obtain an adequate supply of cheap labour (Thompson, 1990), 
largely relied on African tenants and sharecroppers to provide an income 
from their land. The colonial authorities determined that allowing the 
development of this class of independent Africans was in their own interest. 
Colonial administrators saw increased production by Africans as a means of 
making the colonies pay their own way, and white traders benefitted from a 
class of prosperous African producers with sophisticated wants and needs 
(Bundy, 1979).  
 
In the Cape Colony at least, a majority of the African people thus retained a 
measure of economic independence (Bundy, 1979), with the tacit 
acceptance of the authorities. However developments in the Kimberley and 
Transvaal areas completely overturned this apparent equilibrium. In 1867, 
massive deposits of diamonds were found near the confluence of the 
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Orange and the Vaal rivers (Thompson, 1990). Soon after in 1880, vast 
amounts of gold were found in the hills of the southern Transvaal. Due to 
inherent difficulties in extracting the minerals, a single company soon 
controlled the extraction of diamonds, and no more than eight 
conglomerates controlled all the gold mining (Ross, 1999). In both the 
diamond and the gold-mining industries, the racial structure of 
preindustrial colonial southern Africa was applied. The labour force was 
soon split: white workers occupied skilled or supervisory roles, with 
opportunities for advancement, high wages and relatively good living 
conditions; in contrast, black workers were restricted to poorly-paid 
temporary labour positions, and subjected to harsh living conditions in all-
male compounds (Thompson, 1990). “Thus developed two characteristic 
features of South African society, namely the racial bifurcation of the 
industrial labour force and the housing of … black migrant workers in 
compounds” (Ross, 1999, p. 56). The idea of white supremacy was 
transferred in this way to the mining sector.  
 
The development of the diamond and gold mining sectors completely 
transformed the political and economic structure of southern Africa. By any 
index — population, immigration, trade, banking, construction or transport 
— the economy of the area expanded rapidly (Bundy, 1979). While most of 
the capital invested into the mines originated from Europe and North 
America, the mineral discoveries also stimulated major developments inside 
southern Africa — small industries sprang up around serving the mines, and 
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African and white farmers supplied grain and meat to the new markets 
(Thompson, 1990). In addition, the rise of the mining industry created an 
urgent need for labour. Mine-owners knew that sufficient labour at the rates 
they offered would not be forthcoming while Africans enjoyed access to 
land and the ability to produce an agricultural surplus (Bundy, 1979). Along 
with white farmers, mine-owners began urging the governments of the 
region to do everything possible to encourage Africans to become wage 
earners, including the application of extra-economic pressures (Bundy, 
1979). Effective lobbying was difficult however while the region was split 
into two Boer Republics and five separate British colonies (see Figure 2-4). 
Many of the new mining capitalists in the Witwatersrand found that they 
had no influence over the Transvaal government (Ross, 1999), and 
concluded that it was an obstruction to further economic development 
(Thompson, 1990). 
 
The vast quantities of gold being produced from its mines transformed the 
strategic importance of the area to the British, who had previously been 
only interested in protecting their sea routes to India. The area was 
suddenly the greatest known source of gold in the world, and was for the 
first time a significant contributor of a vital commodity to the global 
economy (Marais, 2011; Thompson, 1990). The British had a major interest in 
ensuring that conditions for gold production were optimal and that the gold 
went to London rather than Berlin (Ross, 1999), prompting the British 
colonial administration to take direct responsibility for preventing the 
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Transvaal from slipping out of the imperial network (Thompson, 1990). The 
British thus increased pressure on the Transvaal republic until the South 
African War (also known as the Anglo-Boer War or the Second War of 
Freedom) commenced on the 11 October 1899 (Le May, 1995; Ross, 1999).  
 
The war fell into three phases: from October to December 1899, the 
initiative lay with the Boers who invaded Natal and the Cape Colony. While 
British prestige was tarnished, none of these victories was decisive. In the 
second phase of the war, from January to September 1900, two Boer armies 
were forced into surrender, and the Orange Free State and the Transvaal 
were soon annexed as British colonies. Rather than surrender, during the 
third phase of the war the remaining Boer commandos adopted guerrilla 
tactics against the British (Le May, 1995). The British responded with the 
same methods the Afrikaners had used to overcome African resistance, 
burning Afrikaner farms across the Highveld to deny access to food. In 
addition, non-combatant Afrikaners were confined to concentration camps, 
where thousands died of infectious diseases (Ross, 1999). The Afrikaner 
guerrillas finally gave up the struggle after 20 months, and a peace 
agreement was signed in Vereeniging on 31 May 1902 (Le May, 1995).  
 
Segregation 1910–1948  
The war between the British and the Afrikaners, and most especially the 
actions of the British during the final phase of the war, caused deep 
bitterness and permanently damaged the relationship between the two 
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dominant white groups (Le May, 1995). Both groups united, however, in 
their dedication to the idea of white supremacy (Thompson, 1990). The 
Union of South Africa was inaugurated on the 31 May 1910, made up of the 
Cape Colony, Natal, The Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Thompson, 
1990). The world’s newest British dominion contained 4 million Africans, 
500, 000 mixed-race ‘coloureds’, 150, 000 Indians and 1.28 million whites 
(Thompson, 1990). Of these groups, only white men had the vote in the 
Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Natal. In the Cape, economic 
qualifications for the vote meant that most white men, 13% of coloureds, 
and 2% of blacks had the vote. In the Union, however, only white men 
could become Members of Parliament, and provision was made for a 
number of senators to represent the opinions of black Africans. While this 
caused protests from the upper strata of black South Africans in the Cape, 
the British government was only concerned with reconciling the Afrikaners 
within the Union to being part of the British Empire (Ross, 1999). Thus in 
the new Union of South Africa during the era of segregation (from Union to 
the election of the first apartheid government in 1948) the idea of white 
political supremacy remained as powerful as ever.  
 
The ideal of white supremacy was also clearly established in the 
arrangements around the distribution of land in the new Union. White-
owned farms not affected by the South African War were farmed more 
intensively using scientific methods, and white farmers began to discover 
they could earn more from the land themselves than through African 
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tenants (Bundy, 1979). White farmers joined mine-owners in efforts to 
convince the new Union government of the necessity of breaking down the 
independence of the Africans, inducing them to part more willingly with 
their labour at no increased cost to their employers (Bundy, 1979). The 
coinciding needs and perceived solutions provided the basic terms of 
settlement between the largely Afrikaans farmers and the British mine-
owners of South Africa (Rodney, 1972), or between ‘Maize’ and ‘Gold’ 
(Marais, 2011).  
 
The political consummation of this partnership was effectively celebrated in 
the first three years of Union government (Bundy, 1979), with the passing of 
the 1913 Natives Land Act. Following the pattern set by the Natal colonial 
authorities in the 1840s, this Act and the later 1936 Native Trust and Land 
Act eventually allocated just 13 per cent of South Africa’s land surface to the 
black majority of the population. During the Union period, these areas were 
called the ‘native reserves’. Later they were renamed the ‘homelands’ by 
apartheid apologists, or ‘bantustans’ by those opposed to the system. In 
post-apartheid South Africa, they are euphemistically referred to as the 
‘communal areas’. The 87 per cent of South Africa’s land that fell outside of 
these areas was reserved for the white minority only (James, 2007; Marais, 
2011; Van der Walt & Helmbold, 1995). Africans in the agricultural areas 
outside the reserves were transformed from renters and sharecroppers into 
wage labourers (Thompson, 1990), vulnerable to expulsion at the whim of 
the white landowner (Chigara, 2004). 
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The 1913 Land Act culminated in a raft of legislative pressure on black South 
Africans which made access to land more difficult, which raised taxes, rents 
and other fees, and which controlled the various forms of tenancy allowed 
on ‘white’ farms (Bundy, 1979; Chigara, 2004; Marais, 2011; Ross, 1999). The 
Act cemented the dominant policy settings concerning land in South Africa 
from that point on, forcing black South Africans to seek work on white-
owned farms and in white-owned industry at whatever wages were offered 
(Chigara, 2004; Lahiff, 2009; Marais, 2011; Miller & Pope, 2000a). The 1913 
Land Act effectively assured the unequal distribution of land, based only on 
the distinction of race (Chigara, 2004). The Act had two main aims: first to 
eliminate the competition African landownership and sharecropping 
offered to white farmers; and second to facilitate the recruitment of labour 
for the mines (Miller & Pope, 2000a).  
 
In the urban economic sector, the ideal of white supremacy was enshrined 
in the minerals-energy complex. Incorporating a core set of industries 
associated with large-scale mineral extraction, energy provision and 
associated downstream sectors, this complex sat at the core of the South 
African economy by virtue of its weight in economic activity (Marais, 2011; 
Rodney, 1972). This sector was built on the foundations of cheap black 
labour supervised by whites who had come to a compromise agreement 
with their employers and the state after a socialist-inspired revolt in 1922 
(Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). United under the slogan of ‘Workers of the 
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World Fight and Unite for a White South Africa’, the leaders of the ‘Rand 
Revolt’ seized parts of the Johannesburg area, and aimed for the overthrow 
of the state. After crushing the revolt with overwhelming military force, the 
government reached an agreement with white mine-workers, under which 
the categories of race and class coincided closely. With few exceptions, 
black workers were subordinate to white workers, irrespective of their 
productivity (Beck, 2000; Thompson, 1990).  
 
Cheap black labour was thus obtained through the migrant labour system 
based in the reserves. The majority of black South Africans working in the 
‘white’ economy retained households in the native ‘reserves’, and migrated 
to the mines. This obviated the need for employers to pay individual 
workers the wages necessary to support a family (Bundy, 1979). Capital 
accumulation in the economy of the Union was thus “… based on the 
exploitation of a low-wage, highly controlled, expendable African work-
force that was to be reproduced in a system of ‘native reserves’ at minimal 
cost to capital” (Marais, 2011, p. 9). Barricaded by the 1913 Land Act into the 
reserves, the Africans of the Union of South Africa were denied access to 
health, education, welfare and recreational networks. In addition, the state 
did not need to house or police a large urban black population, or be 
threatened by the unrestricted growth of an organised urban proletariat 
(Bundy, 1979). Later, the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act regulated the flow 
of Africans into the cities, based on the idea that South Africa’s towns were 
for the whites, and that blacks were only there to minister to the needs of 
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the white man (Marais, 2011; Ross, 1999). From a Marxist perspective, Bundy 
(1979) argues that social relations in the native ‘reserve’ areas were frozen 
into an ‘incomplete form of proletarianisation’ to the great advantage of 
white employers. The reserves were described by government officials as “… 
the sponge that absorbs, and returns when required, the reserve army of 
African labour” (Bundy, 1979, p. 242). Bundy therefore argues that “… the 
structural underdevelopment of the peasantry was the other side of the coin 
of capitalist development in South Africa” (1979, p. 243). Essentially, the 
reserves subsidised capitalist growth in South Africa (Marais, 2011) by 
providing white capitalists with cheap black labour when required. The 
communal areas ensured white economic supremacy in the Union of South 
Africa.   
 
From this Marxist perspective, the underdevelopment of black farming was 
a necessary component of the process of white capitalist development in 
South Africa. Within the reserves individual tenure was prohibited, and 
Miller and Pope (2000a) suggest that trust tenure and community 
ownership of land was instituted for Africans to prevent the emergence of 
black leadership in the South African farming sector. The Native 
Administration Act 38 of 1927 vested ultimate powers for these areas in the 
Governor-General, who was accorded the title of ‘Supreme Chief’, and given 
complete authority to create tribes and move them or individual blacks as 
he (it was always a ‘he’) saw fit (Miller & Pope, 2000a). Within the reserves, 
the quantity of land was entirely inadequate to support the number of 
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Africans driven to these areas (Rodney, 1972), which were also denied the 
physical infrastructure necessary to transport the excess produce of black 
farmers. Thus between 1929 and 1939, the production of maize and sorghum 
in the Transkei reserve declined by 25 per cent, while that of white farmers 
in the province rose by over 40 per cent (Bundy, 1979). Soon most in the 
reserves could only survive by sending the men out to work on the mines or 
farms for months at a time. The women who remained in these areas 
assumed the full burden of maintaining the domestic economy and raising 
the children. Thus, despite a massive drop over time in the real value of 
wages paid to African mine workers, after 1900 more and more Africans had 
to accept wage labour (Thompson, 1990).   
 
Ignoring the structural drivers which ensured the failure of farming in the 
reserve areas, the government and white farmers upheld stereotypes of 
Africans as inherently unable to farm, derived from the idea of white 
supremacy (Miller & Pope, 2000a). It was widely believed that the poor 
performance of African farmers in South Africa was due to their ‘irrational’ 
tribal practices and customs, and because of their lack of inherent ambition. 
These assertions ignored the government interest in maintaining tribal 
customs such as the chieftain system, legal mechanisms like the 1913 Land 
Act restricting black access to land, and the lack of government investment 
in African agriculture (Lipton, 1985). Thus the 1936 Native Trust and Land 
Act gave the government powers to intervene directly in agricultural 
production in the reserves, to instil what were seen as correct agricultural 
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procedures (Marais, 2011; Ross, 1999). Surveys of land use, official and 
independent, pointed in the direction of a failure by blacks to make 
maximum use of the potential of holdings. This was not seen as an 
indictment of the white government’s manipulation of black South Africans. 
Rather, an aggressive policy of direction and control of land use in the 
reserve areas under the label of ‘betterment planning’ was instigated. This 
involved the creation of ‘villages’, destroying the dispersed rural settlement 
patterns common in many of the agro-pastoralist societies of pre-colonial 
southern Africa. It also led to a bureaucratic system of control over every 
aspect of black land use in the reserves, including a programme of livestock 
culling to deal with livestock overstocking, which caused considerable 
resentment (Miller & Pope, 2000a).    
 
Apartheid 1948–1990  
The victory of the Afrikaner-nationalist National Party (NP) in the 1948 
elections in South Africa ushered in the apartheid era (Marais, 2011; Ross, 
1999; Thompson, 1990). Since 1652, the policy direction in the region had 
maintained and strengthened white supremacy. To this the NP now added 
the idea of Afrikaner nationalism. The NP was elected to power under the 
slogan of ‘apartheid’ — which literally translates as ‘separateness’ (own 
translation). In strict theory, NP ideologues emphasised the importance of 
ethnicity, seeing the various nations of South Africa as divinely created 
entities. Along with the two white ‘nations’ (English and Afrikaans-
speakers), black South Africans were divided into 10 different ethnic tribes 
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(Ross, 1999). The official aim of apartheid was to give each of these ‘nations’ 
the space necessary for them to develop to their fullest potential, in a 
process which apartheid apologists likened to the contemporary 
decolonisation of the rest of Africa (Thompson, 1990). In reality, apartheid 
policies intensified and secured white political supremacy from internal and 
external threats and moved Afrikaners into social and economic parity with 
the English-speaking community, which had dominated the modern 
economy since the development of the mines in Kimberley and the 
Witwatersrand (Oden & Ohlson, 1994). 
 
The NP maintained at its core the idea of Afrikaner nationalism, which 
translated into furthering the ambitions of aspirant bourgeois Afrikaners 
and Afrikaner capital. In practice this was achieved without affecting 
established white English-speaking South African economic interests 
through a concerted affirmative action programme (Marais, 2011). Every 
state institution soon appointed Afrikaners to senior and junior positions in 
the civil service, army, police and state corporations. By 1976, Afrikaner 
entrepreneurs had gained a firm foothold in mining, manufacturing, 
commerce and finance — all previously exclusive preserves of white 
English-speakers. In time the average Afrikaner income rose to 71 per cent 
of that of white English-speakers (Thompson, 1990).  
 
Alongside these efforts to improve the socio-economic position of white 
Afrikaners, numerous controls were put in place to further ensure white 
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supremacy in the political and economic arenas. The Population 
Registration Act of 1950 created legal racial categories, which were frozen 
through further Acts banning sexual contact and marriage between the 
races (Ross, 1999). In addition, the NP removed the limited forms of 
political participation still remaining for coloureds and blacks in the Cape 
province (Thompson, 1990). In the economic sphere, controls on black 
participation were similarly tightened. Urban labour policy ensured that no 
Africans would be allowed to work in the towns until all those already there 
had been absorbed by the white labour market. Further legislation required 
all Africans to carry a ‘reference book’, noting their employment history and 
residence rights in the cities. To be granted residence rights in the cities, 
Africans had to be born in the town, or have worked continuously for the 
same employer for 10 years, or for different employers for 15 years. The 
education of black South Africans was also controlled, based on the idea 
that African education should be limited to those skills valuable to the 
maintenance of the white-run economy. The emphasis was thus on basic 
skills learnt in the first four years of school (Ross, 1999).  
 
Land policies continued to focus on increasing the advantages enjoyed by 
white farmers, particularly Afrikaans-speaking white commercial farmers 
(Marais, 2011; Thompson, 1990). The prevailing ideas of white supremacy, 
combined with the new ideas of the need for ‘separated development’ 
prompted the apartheid government to focus on preventing ‘die beswarting 
van die platteland’ (Hall, 2011), or ‘the blackening of the rural areas’ (own 
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translation) which had been deemed ‘white’. After the passage of the 1913 
Land Act, some farms remained under black ownership in ‘white’ rural areas. 
Members of the black upper strata had purchased some individually or as 
groups, while others had been ‘mission farms’ — land that had been owned 
by missionary societies, and subdivided amongst black tenants. The 
apartheid government named these areas ‘black spots’, and concentrated on 
relocating the owners of these pieces of land (by force when necessary) to 
the bantustan areas (Bundy, 1979; Ross, 1999). In a continuation of the 
principles established by the VOC, the private ownership and right of 
disposal of land applied only to white South Africans — these rights were 
not respected when claimed by black South Africans. In many cases, farms 
owned by black title-holders were seized by the state. The black owners 
were loaded into government trucks and unceremoniously dumped in 
designated villages in the overcrowded homelands. Along with these title 
holders, labour tenants and farm workers deemed ‘surplus’ to the needs of 
white employers were also transferred to the bantustans. It is estimated that 
a total of some 3.5 million ‘surplus’ black people, almost 10 per cent of the 
total population, were forcibly relocated from ‘white’ South Africa to the 
‘homelands’ between 1960 and 1980 in this process (James, 2007; Miller & 
Pope, 2000a; Ross, 1999). In addition, to prevent such areas from arising 
again, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (Act 70 of 1970) was enacted, 
preventing the subdivision of existing large-scale farms into smaller 
production units (Lahiff, 2009; Miller & Pope, 2000a).    
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The overcrowding and environmental degradation of the Bantustan areas 
thus continued unabated. In response, in pursuit of ‘grand apartheid’ 
principles, apartheid ideologues planned a system that made Africans the 
loyal subjects of tribal chiefs in the bantustans, rather than citizens in South 
Africa able to engage with civil society. Thus the Black Authorities Act (Act 
68 of 1951), the Representation between the Republic of South Africa and 
Self-governing Territories Act (Act 46 of 1959) and the National States 
Constitution Act (Act 21 of 1971) laid the foundation for the creation of 
forms of self-government in the ten bantustans, and the later granting of 
‘independence’ to four of these territories between 1976 and 1981. As can be 
seen in Figure 2-5 (page 48), these ‘homelands’ were enormously 
fragmented in general — KwaZulu alone was composed of 11 separate pieces 
of territory. These laws and policies combined to deprive some 8 million 
black South Africans of their South African citizenship — they were given 
political rights only in their respective (impoverished, overcrowded and 
dependent) ‘homelands’ (Chigara, 2004; James, 2007; Ross, 1999; Thompson, 
1990; Van der Walt & Helmbold, 1995). In the imaginations of the planners 
of apartheid, these were the territories of independent states. 
Administrations were created, and elections held. Eventually, four of the 
bantustans acquired a form of independence — Transkei, Ciskei, 
Bophuthatswana and Venda. None was recognised by any country apart 
from apartheid South Africa, and all were heavily dependent on apartheid 
authorities for their budget and internal security (Ross, 1999).   
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Figure 2-5: The 'homelands' of South Africa   (Source: M. Oulton) 
 
 
The ‘visionaries’ of apartheid realised that ‘grand apartheid’ required 
putatively viable economies in the bantustans. As part of this, continued 
efforts were made to stimulate agriculture in the ‘homelands.’ The 
Tomlinson Report of 1955 advocated allowing a class of African landowning 
entrepreneurs in these areas, and removing the trust-based landownership 
system. This was rejected by the government. Despite all the rhetoric of 
decolonisation, the ‘homelands’ continued to serve as pools of cheap reserve 
labour for white industry. White thinking continued to be dominated by 
questions of black social and economic viability within a context in which 
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overall white control was axiomatic. “Questions of black rights — let alone 
entitlement — simply did not feature” (Miller & Pope, 2000a, p. 30).  
 
In contrast to the dire situation in the ‘homelands’, to provide security 
against the region’s variable climate, the white farmers of South Africa 
enjoyed intensive support from the government. Along with the provision 
of cheap disposable labour from the homelands, the productivity of the 
white farmers was intensified by favourable legislation and government 
subsidies. The state surplus from gold and diamond mining was diverted to 
white commercial farmers, in the form of extension advice, veterinary 
facilities, subsidies for fencing, dams and housing, transport subsidies for 
agricultural produce, special credit facilities and bountiful tax relief (Bundy, 
1979; Marais, 2011; Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990).  All these subsidies were 
racially discriminatory and denied to black farmers, giving a huge 
competitive advantage to white commercial farmers over and above the 
legislation curtailing the amount of land open for production to black South 
Africans (Bundy, 1979).     
 
The subsidies focused on the creation of a ‘modern’ white agricultural sector. 
The vision of ‘modernity’ assumed by policymakers in this case were the 
individually-owned large-scale mechanised farms seen in the mid-west of 
the United States of America or East Anglia in Britain (Cousins & Scoones, 
2010; Hebinck, Fay, & Kondlo, 2011). Thus white farmers were assisted to 
mechanise their production methods. As the mechanisation of white 
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agriculture became more general, many Africans became redundant to the 
labour needs of farmers (Thompson, 1990). To ease the process of creating a 
‘modern’ form of agriculture in South Africa, a series of laws gave white 
landowners almost complete impunity in evicting those black South 
Africans living on their land (Chigara, 2004). Many hundreds of thousands 
of Africans were forced to leave the farms where they had worked, and 
move to the overcrowded bantustans (Ross, 1999).  
 
Apartheid policies thus resulted in an oppressive and deeply divided 
economy and society. By the end of the 1970s, South Africa had the highest 
Gini coefficient among 57 surveyed states. Unsurprisingly, income was 
closely related to racial categorisation. In 1983, the disposable income per 
capita of Indians was 37 per cent of that of whites. Coloureds enjoyed a 
disposable income 26 per cent of that of whites, while Africans in the towns 
had 22 per cent of the disposable income of whites and rural Africans six per 
cent (Ross, 1999). In a triumph for the ideal of white supremacy, South 
Africa had become an affluent welfare state for whites. White workers were 
guaranteed access to jobs, enjoyed rising wages, and were cushioned by a 
wide-ranging social-security system, along with easy access to credit and 
loans. Vast resources were invested in their education, health, cultural, 
recreational and sports infrastructure. In African communities, access to 
skilled jobs was severely restricted, and until the early 1970s the education 
system was designed explicitly to equip them only with the rudiments 
required to enter into the lowest ranks of the labour market. The 
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development of an African middle class had been thwarted (Marais, 2011) to 
ensure white economic success. ‘Coloured’ and Indian communities faced 
similar (if slightly less stringent) restrictions. These laws and policies all 
combined to freeze into place privileged access to material and political 
privilege for white South Africans, and to exclude all other people living in 
the country.  
 
Excluded economically and politically, black South Africans had no effective 
channels to challenge the ideal of white supremacy driving South African 
policies. The South African Native National Congress (later renamed the 
ANC) had been founded in 1912 to protect the few rights of the small black 
middle class which arose during the colonial period (Thompson, 1990). 
During the Union era the ANC concentrated on working (largely 
ineffectually) within the few legal avenues available to black South Africans 
to address the needs and concerns of the fledgling black middle class. After 
the election of the NP in 1948, the ANC made efforts to widen its support 
base, and initiated a period of legal non-violent mass resistance to apartheid 
(Marais, 2011). As part of this campaign, 3, 000 people attended the 
Congress of the People in Kliptown near Johannesburg in April 1955. The 
Freedom Charter was adopted, which was to serve as the basis of the ANC 
programme from then on (Ross, 1999). A rejection of the existing political, 
economic and social structure in South Africa, the Charter called for the 
nationalisation of banks, mines and industry, universal suffrage, and the 
abolition of apartheid in all its forms (Le May, 1995). In addition, the 
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Freedom Charter mandated the end of restrictions to land ownership on a 
racial basis, and for a redivision of the land “… amongst those who work it 
to banish famine and land hunger …” (Congress of the People, 1955), along 
with government support for those who use the land. For the first time, 
South Africans were presented with the outline of a democratic alternative 
to apartheid, where liberal democratic rights could be combined with a 
welfarist socio-economic order and be extended to the entire population of 
the country. In the decades to follow, the Freedom Charter became “… the 
touchstone of ANC policy and assumed sacrosanct status as the product of 
the ‘will of the people’” (Marais, 2011, p. 22).  
 
By 1960 it was clear that non-violent mass resistance to the ideals of white 
supremacy and Afrikaner nationalism would not be successful, and so the 
ANC began a period of armed struggle (Marais, 2011). After the Sharpeville 
Massacre on 21 March 19608, and the banning of the ANC and the Pan 
Africanist Congress on 6 April of that year, both organisations formed 
underground military wings and carried out a number of acts of sabotage. 
Both were quickly infiltrated by the government and crippled. Among 
others, Nelson Mandela was captured and sentenced to prison for life in 
1964 (Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). The armed struggle against white 
supremacy and Afrikaner nationalism by the ANC was soon neutered by the 
apartheid authorities.  
 
                                                 
8
 In the Sharpeville Massacre, 67 demonstrators against apartheid pass laws were killed by police 
fire (Thompson, 1990).  
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Despite the efforts of the ANC, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the ideals 
of white supremacy and Afrikaner nationalism seemed safely enshrined for 
the foreseeable future. While the apartheid economy prospered, growing at 
an average of six per cent per annum, Marais (2011) argues that the design of 
the apartheid economy contained the seeds of its own destruction. Marais’ 
analysis is based on ‘modernist’ narratives that as a middle-income country, 
to progress further along the trajectory of development South Africa would 
have needed to create a labour-intensive manufacturing and industrial 
sector (Rostow, 1990). Marais argues that the potential for this to happen 
existed, as by the mid-1960s, the manufacturing sector contributed twice as 
much to the GDP of the South African economy as mining and agriculture. 
In order to continue growing the sector needed more semi-skilled, skilled 
and technical labour. However, based on the ideal of white supremacy, 
apartheid policies focused only on the creation of cheap unskilled migrant 
black labour. The numbers of skilled white workers produced were 
inadequate for the expansion of the manufacturing sector. Apartheid 
restrictions on labour thus meant that the manufacturing sector in South 
Africa could never become export-oriented, and could only serve the 
existing white middle class. This meant that due to restrictions imposed by 
the implementation of the ideal of white supremacy in the economic sector, 
despite its industrialising pretences, apartheid-era South Africa was never 
anything more than an unusually well-developed exporter of mineral 
products. It was effectively stalled on the trajectory of development, and 
could not progress further towards ‘modernity’ (Marais, 2011).  
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This meant that the fortunes of the South African economy (and the 
economic prosperity of white South Africans) came to hinge on two external 
factors — the international price of gold, and access to foreign exchange. 
Thus as long as the gold price remained high and foreign capital could be 
attracted, the structural vulnerabilities caused by white-supremacist 
policies could be supported (Marais, 2011).  
 
These vulnerabilities were soon exposed by a crisis in 1976, when the 
apartheid government announced that black South Africans would 
henceforth receive their schooling in Afrikaans (rather than in English or 
their home languages as before). On 16 June 1976 a group of about 15, 000 
protesting youths was fired on. This sparked off protests and riots around 
the country, which came to be called the Soweto uprisings or the Soweto 
protests. These protests were put down with great force, with estimates that 
up to 700 people were killed in the police response. Most famously, Steve 
Biko, who had been at the heart of the protests, was captured and died in 
custody (Ross, 1999). These events gave a graphic indication of the inherent 
fragility of the apartheid system, and the atrocities the apartheid 
government was willing to commit in order to maintain it. This caused 
foreign capital inflows into the country to dry up overnight (Marais, 2011), 
and stimulated off-shore campaigns and boycotts against apartheid South 
Africa. The international pressure had slowly built up on South Africa since 
the campaign led by newly-independent African countries to force South 
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Africa to leave the Commonwealth in 1961 (Abegunrin & Akomolafe, 2006). 
South Africa could no longer count on a reliable inflow of foreign capital to 
cover the structural vulnerabilities caused by white supremacist and 
Afrikaner nationalist ideals. Inflation was soon running at 10 per cent, and 
GDP increases were scarcely keeping up with the population, making many 
whites poorer (Thompson, 1990). In 1982, the other external factor propping 
up the white supremacist economy also proved temporary — the gold price 
fell steeply, leading to a balance-of-payments crisis. Marais (2011) argues 
that by the early 1980s, it was clear to many in South Africa that apartheid 
economic policy was no longer creating economic growth. If the South 
African economy was to survive and develop further, profound 
restructuring was necessary.   
 
The end of the apartheid equilibrium 
As has been the case in most areas of the world colonised by Europeans, 
white settlers in southern Africa brought with them the idea of white 
supremacy. In land policy, this meant the implementation of the idea of 
private property rights, but only for white settlers. Thus, as the Dutch and 
the British extended control over what would become South Africa in 1910, 
in the pattern first set in the colony of Natal, the majority of the land was 
allocated to white settlers, and the African populations were relegated to 
the remnants. The creation of the Union of South Africa enabled the 
enactment of the 1913 Land Act, which implemented this system uniformly 
over the entire country. The 13 per cent of the land left for black South 
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Africans became a reservoir of cheap labour for white industry, agriculture 
and mining, freeing the government of the burden of policing and providing 
services to an urban black population. This system was intensified under 
apartheid, with more black South Africans being dispossessed of the land 
they owned in ‘white’ rural areas, and ‘surplus’ labour being forced into the 
bantustans. In contrast, white farmers were extended every type of aid 
necessary to become large-scale mechanised ‘modern’ farmers, as seen in 
the US and the UK.  
 
While providing a comfortable and safe life for white South Africans, this 
political and economic system based on white supremacy began to run into 
its self-imposed limits in the 1970s. From a purely economic perspective 
then, it became clear that further growth and development in the economy 
would become increasingly difficult due to the nature of the labour supply 
provided by apartheid policy and the limited domestic market available for 
manufactured goods. The continued prosperity of South Africa’s whites 
came to depend on the international price of gold and international 
willingness to invest in the country — two factors over which South 
Africans had no control. In the meantime, apartheid policies continued to 
churn out cheap unskilled black labourers - by 1980 20.9 per cent of black 
job seekers (Bell, 1984) could not find employment in the formal economy. 
As the scale of the economic changes necessary in the apartheid economy to 
overcome this dependence on external factors became clear, the ideas of 
white supremacy and Afrikaner solidarity which had guided policy in the 
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country for so long began to be called into question by white South Africans 
themselves. Among Afrikaners, divisions around the viability of Afrikaner 
nationalism as a guiding principle soon cohered around class. Prosperous 
Afrikaner professionals, business-people  and absentee landowners 
proposed carefully crafted changes to appease foreign and domestic critics, 
while at the same time strengthening white supremacy by creating further 
divisions among Africans. In contrast, Afrikaner urban workers, marginal 
farmers and bureaucrats whose livelihoods relied on apartheid’s defences 
against black competition feared the consequences of extending effective 
political rights to blacks (Thompson, 1990) and so flocked to the 
Conservative Party, which from its formation in 1982 (Giliomee, 1993) called 
for an intensified implementation of apartheid policies, and the neo-Nazi 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement – own 
translation) (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000).   
 
To help achieve some domestic legitimacy and to enable the economy to 
continue growing, from 1979 steps were taken to dilute strict white-
supremacist policies. Black trade unions were recognised, statutes barring 
black South Africans from certain jobs were dropped, and apprenticeships 
were opened to Africans (Ross, 1999). In addition, influx controls for 
Africans into the cities were removed in 1986, allowing free movement into 
and out of the cities. The state channelled more resources into black 
education and improved black urban infrastructure in a bid to remove some 
of the material sources of discontent (Marais, 2011). In the domestic political 
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sector, limited steps were taken to mitigate measures taken earlier to secure 
white supremacy. Non-white South Africans were given a limited voice in 
the political system — in 1984 a new Constitution gave coloureds and 
Indians a formal say in the ruling of the country through a tricameral 
parliament. Africans were excluded as it was reasoned that they already had 
full political rights in the bantustans (Ross, 1999; Thompson, 1990). 
Apartheid symbols and practices not essential to the maintenance of white 
supremacy, such as regulations creating separate public facilities for blacks 
and whites and laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage, were likewise 
removed (Marais, 2011; Thompson, 1990).   
 
These limited measures were not sufficient to dampen black resistance to 
apartheid. Protests against the government converged on the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) (Marais, 2011), which consisted of several hundred 
affiliated organisations, and saw itself as representing the banned ANC 
(Ross, 1999). The UDF endorsed the Freedom Charter, and included 
prominent former ANC members as participants (Thompson, 1990). In 
November 1984, UDF protests erupted into open revolt, quickly spreading 
through the main cities (Ross, 1999). By early 1988 the government had 
successfully crushed this revolt through the deployment of lethal force 
(Ross, 1999), but apartheid’s economic problems remained. At the macro-
economic scale the country’s balance-of-payments problems had worsened 
(Marais, 2011). Despite the limited concessions by Botha’s government, the 
South African economy was still fundamentally unsound — it was clear that 
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the apartheid state was an expensive extravagance retarding the further 
development of the country, and that sanctions and a spate of divestments 
from the country were having a negative effect. International sanctions and 
boycotts against apartheid South Africa had mixed results. While 
international sporting boycotts of the apartheid state were effective in 
alerting the white South African public to foreign opposition to white 
supremacist policies, exports from South Africa increased after 1987. 
However, international sanctions impeded foreign investment flows — one 
of the two crucial pillars propping up the apartheid economy — and 
prevented the apartheid government from accessing international capital to 
offset balance of payments difficulties. As a cumulative effect of these 
domestic and international factors, by 1987 South Africa had one of the 
lowest growth rates in the world (Marais, 2011; Thompson, 1990).  
 
All these factors combined to bring about a breakdown in white acceptance 
of the idea of white supremacy. One of the first signs of this was the 
formation of the Democratic Party in 1989, out of the remnants of the small 
white parties that had formed the opposition in the apartheid Parliament. 
The Democratic Party had little electoral success, as it only drew support 
from the minority of English-speaking whites. However, the party openly 
espoused libertarian and non-racial principles in Parliament (De Klerk, 
1994; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). Growing numbers of white farmers (both 
Afrikaans- and English-speaking) came to appreciate the costs of creating 
mass unemployment among black South Africans as those living near the 
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bantustans suffered the effects of growing political unrest and crime 
(Lipton, 1985). Besides this, the rising levels of violence in the country led 
many influential and powerful white South Africans within Afrikanerdom to 
abandon support for the idea of white supremacy (De Klerk, 1994). Many 
came to see it as necessary to allow black South Africans to “… acquire at 
least a substantial share of political power in South Africa in the foreseeable 
future” (Thompson, 1990, p. 241) in order to prevent the country from 
sliding into anarchy and bloodshed (Van der Walt & Helmbold, 1995). To 
facilitate this, white business leaders, intellectuals, and clergy made 
clandestine visits to the ANC in its places of exile in the rest of Africa, to 
begin dialogue on potential future political settlements in South Africa. 
These people made the trip “… because they sensed that white minority rule 
was unsustainable, and that if this were so, a negotiated settlement would 
be the best way forward” (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000, p. 12). For the first time 
since the arrival of Dutch colonists at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, white 
South Africans were not united in their support for the idea of white 
supremacy. The ideals of white supremacy and Afrikaner nationalism, 
which had since 1652 directed the mass dispossession of black South 
Africans of their land, and the distribution of massive aid to white farmers 
had finished their course, and were now seen as detrimental to the future of 
the country. If things were allowed to continue as they were, it was highly 
likely that the apartheid state and its opposition would become entangled 
in a death embrace that would destroy South Africa as a nation-state and a 
viable zone for doing profitable business, dragging down with it white 
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privilege. “A point had been reached where all sides could, indeed had to, 
raise their heads above the parapets, scan the terrain and weigh their 
options” (Marais, 2011, p. 58).  
 
Having provided a sense of the progress of policies around land in South 
Africa from the permanent arrival of Europeans in the region to the fall of 
apartheid 1990, this study can now turn to an analysis of the policies 
adopted to reverse the negative effects of these policies. The first step in 
such an analysis is the development of a theoretical framework, to which I 
turn in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three  
Theoretical Approach: Constructivist Institutionalism 
Framework 
The legacy of colonialism, segregation and apartheid policies in South 
Africa created deep racial and economic divisions (Ntzebeza, 2004), which 
were reflected most visibly in the racial distribution of farmland. For many 
black South Africans, the loss of their land through colonialism and 
apartheid policies is a deeply emotive issue, to the extent that Ntsebeza 
(2004, p. 205) warns: “No political stability, democracy or peace are 
imaginable as long as the bulk of the land is in the hands of whites”. To 
address the unique extent of the inequalities in access to land in South 
Africa, one would be justified in assuming that a far-reaching programme of 
land redistribution would be necessary. However, the land reform policies 
adopted by the post-apartheid government so far have resulted in the 
preservation of the landownership status quo inherited from the apartheid 
system — little land has been transferred since 1994, doing almost nothing 
to change the socio-economic conditions of the rural landless poor 
(Greenberg, 2010; Hall, 2010c).  
The patterns of land ownership and the organisation of agriculture in post-
apartheid South Africa closely resemble the systems existing under the 
apartheid regime. This suggests a degree of ‘path dependency’, or long-term 
institutionalisation of practice in the agricultural sector, which has persisted 
into the post-apartheid era. This thesis is driven by the question of why land 
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redistribution policies have done so little to change the agricultural system 
created by apartheid, segregationist and colonial policies, given the 
overwhelming mandate for change given to the post-apartheid government 
by voters in 1994.  
If every policy contains within it an explicit or implicit diagnosis of the 
‘problem’ being addressed (Bacchi, 1999), it is apparent that redistributing 
farmland to black farmers is not an important task to post-apartheid policy-
makers in South Africa. A robust literature has developed within South 
Africa detailing and criticising this lack of action on the part of the South 
African government (Barry, 2011; Cliffe, 2000; Cousins, 1997, 2007, 2012; 
Cousins & Lahiff, 2004; Du Toit, 1994; Fraser, 2007; Hall, 2003, 2010c; 
Hebinck et al., 2011; Jacobs, 2012; Kepe, 2009; Lahiff, 2007; Miller & Pope, 
2000b; Mngxitama, 2006; Ntsebeza, 2007; Walker, 2005b, 2009; Zimmerman, 
2000). However, there has been little to no examination of the worldviews, 
discourses or institutional contexts that underpin the implicit diagnosis of 
the problem of land reform presented in the key institutions and actors 
involved in the policy in South Africa, other than scattered discussions of 
discourses in the land reform policy arena of South Africa (Cousins & 
Scoones, 2010; Du Toit, 2013; MacDonald, 2003; Weideman, 2004). This 
chapter therefore develops a theoretical framework that will enable an 
analysis of the deep assumptions and institutionalised practices underlying 
post-apartheid land reform policy in South Africa.   
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Institutions and policy  
This study approaches land reform through a policy lens, as the process of 
land reform is ultimately developed and implemented as government policy 
in South Africa. The policy studies literature has a rich body of potentially 
applicable ideas to guide the research. The ‘new institutionalism’ approach 
analyses how policy processes function and how outcomes are produced 
within a larger institutional framework. This type of policy analysis assesses 
the ‘political architecture’, and posits a role for political institutions in 
policy-making and fundamental policy change (Considine, 2005). From an 
institutional perspective, then, there is more to a policy decision than meets 
the eye. Although a policy decision may be made by officials, it also reflects 
the factors guiding these officials, such as “… cultural preferences (values), 
symbols and procedures, formal and informal rules (norms, decisions-rules), 
the mandate of decision-makers or agencies, the distribution of power and 
responsibilities, and the role the State is allowed or expected to play” (Buhrs 
& Bartlett, 1993, p. 8). ‘New institutionalism’ therefore offers an approach 
allowing an examination of the wider factors which could potentially 
explain why so little has been done to change the land ownership patterns 
established during the apartheid era.   
According to Ostrom (2005), institutions can be broadly defined as “… the 
prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions …” (p. 3). Institutions give templates for the actions 
of individuals, and in their actions, individuals in turn affect these templates 
(Lawrence et al., 2009). From this basic starting point, ‘new institutionalism’ 
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has developed into three main traditions, each offering unique insights into 
institutions and the effects they exert on policy. Along with the historical 
institutionalism tradition, these include rational choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Immergut (1998) argues 
that for all their differences, these three traditions within ‘new 
institutionalism’ address a common set of problems from a unified 
perspective — all are concerned with ascertaining what actors actually want, 
when the preferences they express in politics are so radically affected by the 
institutional contexts within which they voice these preferences. However 
the way each tradition addresses this question is different.  
Within ‘new institutionalism’, the rational choice institutionalism tradition 
begins with a universal assumption of rationality (Thelen, 1999) — actors 
are seen as having a fixed set of preferences, and as behaving entirely 
instrumentally and strategically to maximise the attainment of these 
preferences. Their strategies will be deeply affected by expectations about 
how other institutional participants are likely to behave. This tradition sees 
institutions as structuring these interactions, leading actors to particular 
calculations and potentially better social outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996). It 
emphasises the coordinating functions of institutions, generating or 
maintaining equilibria (Thelen, 1999). This tradition, therefore, defines an 
institution as a situation where no persons would unilaterally choose to 
alter their current behaviour given the available alternatives and given their 
expectations about how others might respond if they began to behave 
differently (Campbell, 2004).  
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The sociological institutionalism tradition arose primarily in the subfield of 
organisational theory, and argues that many of the institutional forms and 
procedures used by modern organisations are not merely the most efficient 
form for the task at hand. Rather, many of these forms and procedures 
should be seen as culturally-specific practices. Their use is a result of the 
transmission of cultural practices more generally (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
Institutions are therefore not just the rules themselves, but regularised 
patterns of behaviour that emerge from underlying structures, or sets of 
‘rules in use’. “Rather than existing as a fixed framework, ‘rules’ are 
constantly made and remade through people’s practices” (Leach, Mearns, & 
Scoones, 1999, p. 237). While institutions are conceptualised as constraining 
structures, they simultaneously enable the construction of meanings that 
are internal to thinking and speaking agents. Using their ‘background 
ideational abilities’, organisational actors create and maintain institutions 
while simultaneously using their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ to 
communicate critically about those institutions, and to change or maintain 
them (Schmidt, 2010).  
Both the rational choice institutionalism and the sociological 
institutionalism traditions bring unique insights to ‘new institutionalism’. 
However, both share a common characteristic limiting their 
appropriateness for this study. The rational choice institutionalism tradition 
views institutions as voluntary agreements among relatively equal and 
independent actors, understating the degree to which asymmetries of power 
give some actors more influence than others over the process of 
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institutional creation (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Similarly, much of the 
sociological institutionalism analysis of institutions ignores the extent to 
which processes of institutional creation and reform entail a clash of power 
among competing actors (Schmidt, 2010). Such asymmetrical influences 
tend to create unfair institutional arrangements, favouring some 
organisational participants over others. For much of the recorded history of 
South Africa, a white minority government controlled the country, and 
created multiple institutions which deliberately excluded black majority 
participation. Apartheid institutions systematically ordered South African 
society along racial lines that disempowered, demeaned and denigrated 
black people (Von Holdt, 2010). This means that any analysis of the 
institutions governing the South African land redistribution policy would 
need to take account of the role of power in their creation and maintenance, 
and the possibility that the institutions created under these conditions 
would not allow fair access to decision-making by all participants. While the 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism traditions 
do not focus on this, the third tradition included in ‘new institutionalism’, 
the historical institutionalism tradition, makes such an analysis possible.  
Focused squarely on the themes of power (Immergut, 1998), the historical 
institutionalism tradition explains policy outcomes principally through the 
arrangement of institutions in particular societies. In addition to 
channelling policy and structuring political conflict, institutions are also 
seen as defining interests and objectives (Scott, 2008; Thelen, 1999). 
Political institutions are not neutral arenas, but complex forums that 
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generate independent interests and advantages (Scott, 2008). “Various 
institutional factors influence the political processes that adjudicate among 
conflicting interests and may hence privilege some interests at the expense 
of others” (Immergut, 1998, p. 18). Institutional factors therefore affect both 
the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy, and the likely 
direction of that pressure (Thelen & Steinmo, 1998). Scholars from this 
tradition are therefore more likely to assume a world in which institutions 
allow some actors to exert more influence on policy than others (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996). Given the history in South Africa of disproportionate access to 
decision-making and power by a small minority, this tradition is therefore 
likely to generate insights into the course taken by the South African land 
redistribution policy.    
‘New institutionalism’ posits an independent role for political institutions, 
emphasising how they define the framework within which politics takes 
place (Bartlett, 1991). While a statement like this makes intuitive sense, the 
exact definition of the term ‘institution’ is not clear. A first step to clarifying 
the term is to distinguish institutions from organisations. Leach et al (1999) 
put forward what they see as the basic distinction between the two. If 
institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ in society, then organisations can be 
thought of as the players in the game. “Organisations, such as schools, 
NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and banks, exist only because 
there is a set of ‘working rules’ or underlying institutions that define and 
give those organisations meaning” (Leach et al., 1999, p. 237). Where 
institutions encapsulate general values (Taylor, 1984), organisations 
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represent specific interests (Leftwich & Sen, 2011), and are instrumental 
mechanisms created to achieve specified goals (Scott, 2008). Institutions 
define what those goals are and how they are to be achieved.  
Polski and Ostrom (1998a) give the example of business organisations. The 
goal of the business organisation is to make a profit. This goal is given to it 
by the institution of the market. The way this goal is pursued is governed by 
the market, along with the institutions of corporate and tax law (amongst 
others). These institutions themselves are developed subject to the 
constraints of constitutional law. Figure 3-1 gives a schematic representation 
of the relationship described here between institutions and the 
organisations working within them. The limits of the market and the rules 
governing the actions of the players within these limits are defined by 
institutions such as constitutional, corporate and tax laws. In this example 
then, by pursuing the goal of profit and in following the rules of the market, 
business organisations will be preserving the values the market was created 
to preserve, one of which perhaps would be the pursuit of economic 
efficiency. In the realm of policy, then, institutions shape social, economic 
and political behaviour (Leftwich & Sen, 2011), by presenting a restricted set 
of policy alternatives to organisational actors (Hira & Hira, 2000).     
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Figure 3-1: Institutions and organisations 
                                                        Goals (set by institutions for organisations)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Institutions (basic framework)           Organisational actors (Players) 
 
Figure 3-1 depicts a level playing field with goal areas of equal size. This is by 
no means necessarily always the case. Aimed as they are at the preservation 
of certain values, some institutions could make it more likely that certain 
policy outcomes will occur. One of the goal areas could be larger than the 
other for example, or there could only be one possible goal. Alternatively, 
only two players could be allowed to participate, rather than the six 
depicted in Figure 3-1. The shape of the playing field depends only on the 
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power of those creating the institutions, and the values they seek to 
preserve.  
From this perspective, whatever the shape of the arena of action created by 
a set of institutions, as overarching frameworks, institutions do not directly 
determine behaviour but present participants with a set of choices — they 
“… provide a context for action that helps us to understand why actors make 
the choices that they do” (Immergut, 1998, p. 31). Political institutions only 
constrain and enable outcomes without being the immediate and direct 
cause of public policy (March & Olsen, 2006). Representing socially 
sanctioned and collectively enforced expectations, institutions only 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate courses of action 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Specific policy outcomes are the result of 
organisational interactions within these general bounds. The overarching 
systems which institutions create for organisations, aimed at the protection 
and furtherance of specific values, therefore do not directly determine 
organisational behaviour. Rather, they set boundaries between what is 
appropriate and what is not — they set the choices that participants will 
make in the course of determining policy.  
Institutions set these boundaries for organisations by prescribing rules, 
norms and strategies for the different organisational actors (Polski & 
Ostrom, 1998a; Scott, 2008). Formal or informal procedures, rules, norms, 
conventions or routines within institutions are a vital part of how 
institutions regulate the organisational environment (Biermann & 
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Siebenhuner, 2009; Buhrs & Bartlett, 1993; Campbell, 2004; Greif & Laitin, 
2004; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Leftwich & Sen, 2011; March & Olsen, 2006; 
Ostrom, 1986). In terms of Figure 3-1, the rules might stipulate that the 
primary aim of all organisations within this particular institution might be 
to make their way into the ‘goal’ area, and prevent the other organisations 
from doing this. The rules might also stipulate specifically how the other 
organisations may or may not be prevented from entering this area. March 
and Olsen (1984) suggest that historical experience accumulates over 
generations of individual experience, and the information about that 
experience becomes encoded in institutional rules. Rules, therefore, 
function as a kind of organised memory through which past insights and 
short-cuts are reused. Without rules, the most basic of decisions about how 
to proceed on every issue would have to be considered afresh (Considine, 
2005). Organisational actors within an institution are expected to obey 
these rules and be their guardians. Rather than asking what the most 
rational act in a particular situation is, participants seek the most 
appropriate rule in a particular situation (March & Olsen, 2006). 
Organisations choose which action to take by matching the characteristics 
of a particular situation with the most appropriate rules. Far from ensuring 
perfect conformity and inhibiting change, the large number of formal and 
informal rules potentially applying to any situation gives actors a choice of 
actions to take. Organisational actors choose which particular rules to apply 
to a particular situation (Bartlett, 1991). However, the choice of rules to 
apply is relatively limited — while the relevant rules encourage some 
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alternatives, others are not allowed. The alternatives allowed by the 
potentially applicable rules will always preserve the overall values that the 
game was created to further and maintain.   
Institutions also encourage certain policy outcomes by constructing and 
elaborating meanings for organisations. Looking at Figure 3-1, the 
institutions define where the game is played, how goals are scored, and the 
identities of the different organisations or players. Institutionalism 
therefore suggests that how we see the world, how we think and how we 
relate to others through our actions are influenced by our institutional 
identifications and memberships (Gran, 2009). Expectations, preferences, 
experience and interpretations of the actions of others are all constructed 
within and in response to institutions (Bartlett, 1991). Organisations within 
an institutional framework tend to become imbued with their identities as 
belonging to the institution, but also with the various identities associated 
with different roles in the institution (March & Olsen, 2006).  
While the historical institutionalism tradition provides a promising point of 
departure for this analysis, it does contain some inherent limitations. 
Specifically, Hay (2006) argues that historical institutionalism is generally 
characterised by an emphasis on institutional genesis at the expense of an 
adequate account of subsequent institutional change. In the historical 
institutionalism analysis, changes that occur in institutions after they have 
been created are generally taken to be the consequence of path-dependent 
effects, or simply the product of exogenous unpredictable shocks such as 
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wars or revolutions. Little or no agency is assigned to those working within 
set institutions. This analysis focuses on land reform policy in South Africa 
between 1994 and the present — a period in which the rules governing the 
game of land redistribution have been changed repeatedly, without the 
prompting of wars or revolutions. A theoretical lens is therefore necessary 
in this study which is able to give a better account of these changes and 
what might have caused them.  
Discourse analysis  
Although historical institutionalism provides a useful framework for 
understanding the interplay between institutions and the actors working 
within them, it does not offer a satisfactory account of endogenous 
institutional change. A potential way to work past this lies in the 
observation that changes in policy paradigms, social constructions or ideas 
regularly precede changes in institutions (Hay, 2006). What is needed, 
therefore, is an account of institutions that focuses on their interplay with 
ideas, social constructions or policy paradigms.  
Discourse-focused approaches are primarily concerned with ideas and social 
constructions, and start from the assumption that our ways of talking do 
not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations. Rather, they 
play an active role in creating and changing them (Phillips & Jorgensen, 
2002). According to Gee (2011, p. ix):  
People use language to communicate, co-operate, help others, and 
build things like marriages, reputations, and institutions. They also 
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use it to lie, advantage themselves, harm people, and destroy things 
like marriages, reputations, and institutions.  
The overall argument of discourse analysis is that social meanings for 
phenomena can never be ultimately fixed. This opens up the way for 
constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity. The role 
of the discourse analyst is thus to plot the course of these struggles to fix 
meaning at all levels of society (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).  
Traditionally, discourse analysis focused on the investigation of language in 
use and talk and text in context (Howarth, 2000). The linguistic traditions 
of discourse analysis see the process as a very narrow enterprise 
concentrating on a single utterance, or at most a conversation between two 
people (Howarth, 2000). Here, the emphasis is solely on the study of the 
units of written and spoken communication, and focused on the content of 
texts and conversations (Hewitt, 2009). The focus is primarily on the rules 
governing connected sets of sentences in speech or writing. Similarly, 
conversation analysts endeavour from observation to ascertain what 
speakers are doing and how they are doing it (Howarth, 2000). Theories of 
discourse have undergone significant transformations from this starting 
point. 
During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of discourse was 
extended to a wider set of social practices and phenomena. In particular, in 
a series of publications Foucault studied the way discourses shape social 
relationships and institutions (Foucault, 1989). In his works on the history 
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of sexuality and of madness (Foucault, 1990, 1995), Foucault sought to 
dismantle the concepts of ‘sexuality’ and of ‘madness’ as taken-for-granted 
fixed essences, and show how they came to be understood in the way they 
are today. To Foucault, the terms ‘madness’ and ‘sexuality’ are simply the 
names that one attributes to particular situations in particular societies at 
particular points in time. They are not fixed and autonomous states which 
humans always have and always will experience. Rather, they ‘become’, or 
‘emerge’ as objects for thought in practices (Bacchi, 2012). As an illustration, 
the large-scale mechanised farms dominating South African agriculture 
today could be constructed as the inevitable outcome of anonymous global 
economic processes, or as artificial creations of the apartheid era.    
Studying how these ‘objects’ emerge in the historical process of 
problematisation puts their presumed natural status in question, and allows 
us to trace the relations that result in their emergence as objects that are 
commonly accepted. The crucial point here is that, in Foucauldian analysis, 
the discourses of sexuality or madness at any one point in time are not 
inevitable — they are the result of ideas and conflicts around their 
implementation.     
Because of these discourses, in any given historical period, we can write, 
speak or think about a given social object or practice like madness or 
sexuality only in certain specific ways and not others. Much like 
institutions, ‘discourses’ constrain and enable writing, speaking and 
thinking within specific historical limits (McHoul & Grace, 1993), 
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demanding from its adherents performances which act as though its ways of 
being, thinking, acting, talking, writing, reading and valuing are ‘right’, 
‘natural’, ‘obvious’, and the way ‘good’ and ‘intelligent’ and ‘normal’ people 
behave (Gee, 2008). A discourse therefore represents the way a particular 
individual, in particular circumstances and at a particular time, relates and 
conceives of certain aspects of the world (Addams, 2000), and the values 
and viewpoints he or she has about the relationships between people and 
the distribution of social goods. The practices of a discourse contain in their 
public interactional structures the ‘mentalities’ of individual participants. 
Immersion in such practices ensures that the individual takes on 
perspectives, adopts a world-view, accepts a set of core values, and masters 
an identity (Gee, 2008).   
According to Foucault and those building on his work, most of our 
individual interactions with discourses are unconscious, unreflective and 
uncritical (Gee, 2008). This is because there are subtle processes where 
some definitions of issues are organised into politics, while other definitions 
are organised out. “The political conflict is hidden in the question of what 
definition is given to the problem, which aspects of social reality are 
included, and which are left undiscussed” (Hajer, 1995, pp. 42-43). 
Discourses are therefore intrinsically political — their formation is an act of 
radical institution, involving the construction of antagonisms, and the 
drawing of political frontiers. They always involve the exercise of power 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000), by making it impossible to raise certain 
questions or argue certain cases, and only authorise certain people to 
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participate in a discourse (Hajer, 1995). The discourse itself defines what 
counts as acceptable criticism. Uttering viewpoints that seriously 
undermine them defines one as being outside of them (Gee, 2008). In this 
light, it “… becomes imperative to examine the specific idea of reality or the 
status quo as something that is upheld by key actors through discourse” 
(Hajer, 1995, p. 55). The main focus of enquiry for Foucault is which of these 
ideas of reality comes to predominate, and how (McHoul & Grace, 1993).  
The basic assumption driving most analyses of discourse is that instead of 
being merely a neutral medium mirroring the world and reality, language 
profoundly shapes our view of it. Discourse analysis is therefore the 
examination of how the definition or the problematisation of a political 
problem relates to the particular narrative in which it is discussed (Dryzek, 
2005).  In most analyses of discourse, emphasis is placed on understanding 
and explaining the emergence and logic of discourses, and the socially 
constructed identities that they confer. The basic idea is to investigate the 
way social practices systematically form the identities of subjects and 
objects (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). The researcher works to get a view 
of the problem from the ‘outside’, to recognise the hidden assumptions and 
practices behind the discourse being studied (Hewitt, 2009). Over time, 
discourse theorists have drawn on a number of techniques and methods in 
linguistic and literary theory to achieve this (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000).  
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Discourse9 is thus concerned with the way people understand and 
comprehend their social worlds, and sets the direction for the ways in which 
people think and act (Simon-Kumar, 2006). ‘Discourse’ refers to the idea 
that human individuals participate in forms of understanding, 
comprehension or consciousness of the relations and activities in which 
they are involved. This consciousness is seen as being transmitted through 
language and other systems of signs, between people and institutions. The 
way people comprehend and make sense of the social world is seen as 
having consequences for the direction and character of their action (Purvis 
& Hunt, 1993).  
Ideas and institutions  
We can now return to institutions and the ideas underpinning them. As 
shown in Figure 3-1, institutions set out where the game will be played, 
towards which goals, and by whom. They are therefore tremendously 
powerful. One potential key to linking discourses and institutions is thus 
power. Indeed, according to Foucault, the key to unravelling the power 
embedded in society is to analyse society’s discourses (Purvis & Hunt, 1993; 
Simon-Kumar, 2006). Thus, for example, the key to understanding power in 
South African society is to analyse which groups see large-scale mechanised 
farms as the result of inevitable economic processes, and which groups 
argue that they are artificial creations of apartheid policy. It is necessary to 
                                                 
9
 In this study, discourses are seen as involving ideologies, which also view existing social 
relations as both natural and inevitable, allowing particular interests come to be disassociated 
from their public location and appear as universal and neutral (Purvis & Hunt, 1993).  
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understand how Foucault envisaged the operation of power in liberal 
democracies. In addition to exerting negative effects such as excluding some 
types of reality, Foucault also saw power in liberal democratic systems as 
producing concepts, ideas or discourses (McHoul & Grace, 1993; Simon-
Kumar, 2006). In a process called ‘governmentality’, the deployment of 
these ideas encourages members of a society to be self-regulating and 
minimises the need for direct government action in society (Bacchi, 1999).  
These ideas have a two-fold function in the process of ‘governmentality.’ 
Firstly, Foucault argued that the power expressed through discourses is not 
repressive, but instead creates and produces new social categories, new 
types of relationships, and new identities (Foucault, 1991; Wagenaar, 2011). 
All human beings are constituted in discourses — their knowledge of the 
world is set by the system of language statements that particular discourses 
offer them (Simon-Kumar, 2006). They adopt certain modes of appearance, 
ways of using language, attitudes and beliefs, allegiances to certain 
lifestyles, and ways of interacting with each other (Gee, 2008). However, 
they are not wholly free to choose or invent their discourse, because they 
move about in larger preset discursive formations that influence their 
actions, beliefs and aspirations. We govern ourselves by establishing truths 
about ourselves that are in accordance with the truth of the dominant 
narratives in our society (Wagenaar, 2011). Therefore individual motivations, 
strategies and actions are all derived from the ideas or discourses found in a 
social setting.  
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Secondly, discourses or ideas are also given a crucial role in the creation and 
maintenance of institutions in the ‘governmentality’ analysis. As part of the 
process of constructing the dominant narratives available to members of a 
society, therefore, those discourses preferred by the state are translated into 
institutional and organisational arrangements that endure for long periods 
(Hajer, 1995), like schools, prisons, welfare agencies, corporations and 
disability programmes. These arrangements sustain, modify and even 
generate what we perceive and experience (Wagenaar, 2011). Foucault gives 
an outline of the process through which the medical discourse was 
translated into an institutional and organisational arrangement by the state. 
He argues that specific political actions taken to do this included: the 
creation of criteria designating who could receive by law the right to 
practice medicine; a new delineation of the medical object through 
statistical observation at the population level; a new law of assistance 
making the hospital into a space for observation and medical intervention; a 
new mode of recording, preserving, accumulating, diffusing and teaching 
medical discourse; and the integration of the medical discourse into a 
system of administrative and political control of the population. These 
political actions did not change the methods of analysis in the medical 
discourse, but the system of their formation — administrative recordings of 
illnesses, deaths, their causes, admissions and discharges from hospital; the 
establishment of medical archives; and relations between medical personnel 
and patients in the hospital (Foucault, 1991). Through these political 
actions, the medical discourse was translated into institutional and 
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organisational arrangements that include medical laws, hospitals, training 
for doctors, and public health programmes.  
There is therefore an intimate connection between discourses (or ideas) and 
institutions. Institutions are created through political practice to protect 
and further the values of specific discourses (Foucault, 1991; Hajer, 1995; 
Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). These same institutions are then 
maintained through the deployment of discourse. Zilber (2009) shows how 
a specific institution in Israel deploys meta-discourses that legitimate 
existing institutional structures, practices and beliefs. The organisations 
working within this particular institution translate aspects of these meta-
discourses into their own discourses. In turn, the individuals within these 
organisations draw on these organisational discourses in the course of 
making sense of the world around them. Through this process of discourse 
translation and adoption, both the organisations and the individuals within 
them maintain the institutional order. “In a cyclic process of storytelling, 
the institutional order is maintained, as stories at each level reflect higher-
level stories, and further strengthen them” (Zilber, 2009, p. 224). This 
example shows that discourse analysis approaches can provide a useful 
theoretical framework for exploring institutions and the values that they 
protect and further (Munir & Phillips, 2005; Phillips et al., 2004).   
Constructivist institutionalism  
Foucauldian analysis thus places ideas or discourses at the centre of the 
analysis of institutions and the actors within them. Building on this, ideas or 
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social constructions play a pivotal role in the constructivist institutionalism 
approach, a recent addition to the ‘new institutionalism.’ In the 
constructivist institutionalism approach, ideas or social constructions 
perform two functions: they form the basis of institutions (the rules of the 
game), and they inform the actions of the organisations and actors (the 
players in the game). Firstly, in the constructivist institutionalism approach, 
as in the Foucauldian analysis described above, institutions are predicated 
on ideas, and ideas inform their design and development. In addition there 
is no real difference here to the historical institutionalism assertion that 
institutions are created to further certain values, ideas, or principles. The 
real point of difference of the constructivist institutionalism from the 
historical institutionalism approach is in the assertion that institutions are 
not fixed. Their functionality or otherwise is an open question, and 
institutions are the subject and focus of political struggle (Hay, 2006).  
The second point of difference in the constructivist institutionalism analysis 
(as opposed to the historical institutionalism approach) is in the conception 
of actors, or the players in the game. Within both the historical 
institutionalism and the Foucauldian approaches, actors automatically take 
on the identities given to them by institutions or discourses. In contrast, in 
the constructivist institutionalism approach, actors are given a limited form 
of agency. As in Fairclough’s (1992) approach, actors are seen as strategic, 
seeking to realise certain complex goals. However according to the 
constructivist institutionalism approach, they do this in constantly-
changing contexts, which they can only incompletely understand, and in 
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which access to strategic resources is unevenly distributed. Ideas or social 
constructions therefore provide actors with a ‘script’, telling them what 
their desires, preferences and motivations are. The interests of agents are 
thus social constructions. Alternatively, ideas serve as cognitive filters 
through which actors interpret environmental signals. In this approach, the 
conduct of actors is therefore not a direct reflection of their individual 
rational material interests, but rather a reflection of their particular 
perception of their interests (Hay, 2006).  
As in Foucauldian analysis, then, ideas motivate individuals and underpin 
institutions. It should be noted that Foucault asserts that individual actors 
have no agency, even in his later works. They only assume the identities 
offered to them by discourses. Any resistance that occurs is only that 
allowed for by the dominant discourse (Gee, 2008). Despite Foucault’s 
assertion, however, institutions and discourse do still undergo changes. In 
an effort to explain this, the constructivist institutionalism approach 
assumes that the ideas underpinning institutions and the ideas motivating 
actors are not always the same. This means that there is a dynamic 
relationship between institutions and the actors working within them. 
Institutions as the embodiment of specific ideas provide a context in which 
actors function. Actors work strategically within these given institutional 
contexts according to the ideas to which they subscribe (which may differ 
completely from the ideas a particular institution may embody). When 
possible and if prompted by the ideas they subscribe to, actors will attempt 
to change the institutions within which they work to better embody the 
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ideas to which they subscribe. During this process a range of intended and 
unintended consequences unfold.  
The task of the analyst using the constructivist institutionalism approach is, 
therefore, to identify, detail and interrogate the ideas underpinning 
institutions, and the ideas prompting the strategic behaviour of actors 
within these institutions (Hay, 2006). This can be pursued using specific 
theoretical approaches such as the punctuated equilibrium approach 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), Bacchi’s (2009) problem representation 
approach, and Schneider and Ingram’s focus on social categorisations in 
policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). According to the constructivist 
institutionalism approach, then, to understand why so little has been done 
in post-apartheid South Africa to change the landownership patterns 
established during apartheid, it is necessary to examine the institutions 
governing land reform policy, the ideas underpinning these institutions, 
and where possible, the ideas governing the conduct of the actors working 
within these institutions.   
Levels of analysis  
Institutions are thus the ‘rules of the game’, and organisations and actors 
are the players in these games. The constructivist institutionalism approach 
focuses attention on the ideas underlying the ‘rules of the game,’ the ideas 
providing actors with motivations, preferences and desires and the 
interactions between the two. However, when looking at a specific policy 
arena, there can be a bewildering variety of rules and players, making it 
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hard to know where to begin an analysis of the social constructions 
underlying them. Polski and Ostrom (1998a) suggest a multi-level system of 
analysis. Here, institutions and the organisations working within them are 
analysed at three different levels: the constitutional, the collective choice, 
and the operating levels. Each level has its own discrete institutions and 
organisations, affecting and affected by the other levels.  
The formal and informal rules at the constitutional level set the general 
boundaries for policy and action in a selected policy arena. They make clear 
who is eligible to participate in policymaking, and about the rules that will 
be used to undertake it (Ostrom, 2011). At this level, collective choice 
procedures are defined, and all the relevant entities involved in collective or 
operational choice processes are legitimised and constituted (McGinnis, 
2011). Rules at this level prescribe, invoke, monitor, apply and enforce 
(Ostrom, 2005). In Figure 3-1, this level would be where decisions are made 
around the basic outlines of where the game is played, and where ‘goals’ are 
scored. It would also set out who can be part of decisions around changing 
these and other aspects of the game.  
Operating within the boundaries set in the constitutional level, the rules set 
in the collective choice, or the policy level, determine what specific actions 
are to be taken in the operating level, and by whom (Polski & Ostrom, 
1998a). They also influence operational activities and outcomes by 
determining how operational rules can be changed, and who can participate 
in these decisions. At this level, activities like policy-making, management, 
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and the adjudication of decisions occur (Imperial, 1999). These rules are 
about prescribing, invoking, monitoring, applying and enforcement, and 
can be changed slightly faster than can rules in the constitutional level 
(Ostrom, 2005).  The focus here is on the types of rules chosen. They can 
differ according to whether they are input- or output-orientated, or whether 
they are production- or conservation-oriented, and whether they are 
regulatory- or market-oriented (Rudd, 2004). In Figure 3-1, these would be 
the rules setting out who the various organisational ‘players’ are, what 
constitutes scoring a ‘goal’, how they are to be scored, and how long a 
‘game’ lasts. The rules at this level would also set out who has the power to 
change the rules at the operating level.  
At the operating level, formal and informal rules govern participants’ day-
to-day decision-making in specific policy arenas, which derive primarily 
from the regulations emanating from the laws produced at the collective 
choice level (Polski & Ostrom, 1998a). At this level, the practical decisions of 
those individuals who have been authorised or allowed to take these 
decisions by collective choice processes are important (McGinnis, 2011). The 
focus here is on the day-to-day impacts of existing rules and norms on the 
incentives of actors (Rudd, 2004). Operational rules include decisions about 
when, where, and how to do something; who should monitor the actions of 
others; how actions should be monitored; what information should be 
exchanged or withheld; and what rewards and sanctions will be assigned to 
combinations of actions and outcomes. The processes of appropriation, 
provision, monitoring, and enforcement occur at this level (Imperial, 1999). 
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Operational situations will involve rules about provision, production, 
distribution, appropriation, assignment and consumption. These rules can 
also be changed quickly when necessary (Ostrom, 2005). In Figure 3-1, this 
would include the formal rules spelling out how other organisational 
‘players’ may be prevented from scoring goals, as well as the informal 
strategies adopted by the players in the pursuit of their goals. This may also 
include the various teams the players may or may not form with each other 
in the pursuit of their goals.  
The rules at these three different levels are not separated from each other, 
but are nested — each level is affected by decisions taken at the other levels 
(Imperial, 1999). The rules pass down from one level to another, but they 
are translated through the specific circumstances at each level (Bushouse, 
2011). The expectation is that those choice situations of broader scope, such 
as constitution-making, will elicit a more inclusive or cooperative mode of 
behaviour than at the lower levels, where immediate practical implications 
for an actor’s self-interest may loom larger (McGinnis, 2011). In addition, it 
is usually more difficult and more costly to bring about changes in the 
constitutional and the collective-choice levels than it is to do so at the 
operational level. In the example of Figure 3-1, it would be much easier for 
organisational players to change their informal strategies or the teams they 
form part of, than it would be for them to gain the agreement of all the 
other players to change the size of the field in which the game is played. 
This increases the stability of mutual expectations among individuals 
interacting at these upper levels (Ostrom, 2005).   
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In addition, different levels of action and rule-making do not necessarily 
mean different sets of actors, or different levels of government. People can 
and do shift levels of action — sometimes frequently (Blomquist & deLeon, 
2011). In field settings, it is often hard to tell where one level begins and 
another ends. Choices of actions within a set of rules as contrasted to 
choices among future rules are frequently made without recognising that 
the level of action has shifted. For example, in Figure 3-1, in the course of a 
‘game’, the organisational players might agree that while previously it was 
acceptable to switch teams at will, from that point on players can only 
switch teams three times in a ‘game’. When coming to that agreement, the 
organisational players shifted from playing within the previously established 
rules to making decisions about the rules themselves. They shifted from the 
operational to the collective-choice level (Ostrom, 2005). Governmental 
arrangements, inherent in the operations of courts, executive agencies, and 
legislative bodies, enable people to sustain efforts to determine, enforce, 
and alter legal relationships. Each particular decision-making structure or 
decision-making arrangement then, involves a complex set of rules 
regarding the variety of participants who may wish to pursue their strategic 
opportunities in order to realise some outcomes that may be made through 
those decision structures (Ostrom, 2005).    
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Table 3-1 
Questions to be asked 
Level of Analysis Unit of Analysis Research question 
International  Discourses 
What were the international discourses about land 
reform in the process of development?  
Constitutional Constitution 
What discourses defining the role of the state in 
land reform became enshrined in the 
Constitution?   
Collective choice 
Policy documents 
(SLAG, LRAD and 
PLAS)  
What were the hidden assumptions underpinning 
the actual land reform policies implemented?   
Operational 
Personal 
interviews  
What discourses inform practice at the operational 
level?   
 
 
Key questions  
The theoretical insights brought together in this chapter draw attention to 
the influence of the institutional context within which land reform policy is 
developed and implemented. In terms of Figure 3-1 (see page 70), this study 
focuses on the boundaries set for the ‘game’ of land reform to be played in, 
and the rules established for the game itself. Constructivist institutionalism 
offers the insight that over time, discourses are sedimented into institutions 
through political action, establishing the overall boundaries within which 
policies may or may not proceed. This means that the boundaries and rules 
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of the game of land reform originate in the ideas and discourses subscribed 
to by the players in that game. At times, various players have successfully 
incorporated aspects of ‘their’ discourses into the game in the form of 
individual rules, accepted strategies or specific boundaries for the game. 
The motivations, strategies and actions of the policy actors involved in the 
creation of land reform policy thus derive from this institutional context 
and from the discourses each actor subscribes to. In other words, the 
interactions of these policy actors — the interactions of the various players 
in the ‘game’ of land reform policy — result in the creation of the 
institutional context of land reform, and to land reform policy itself. To 
increase understanding of the institutional context surrounding land reform 
policy it is necessary to understand the discourses and ideas involved in the 
creation and maintenance of this context. To understand the motivations of 
the various policy actors involved in the creation of land reform policy, it is 
necessary to understand the various discourses they subscribe to.  
To achieve this understanding, this study seeks an answer to a primary 
question: how we can explain, in the post-apartheid context, the 
preservation of the agrarian structure of land ownership inherited from the 
apartheid era? Why have the results of successive iterations of land reform 
policy resembled so strongly the results of apartheid-era land policies? Why 
has so little been achieved by successive post-apartheid policy initiatives to 
address the inequitable land ownership patterns created prior to 1990?  
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To answer this question, this study will ask a set of sub-questions. The first 
question focuses on the international context at the time of the transition to 
a post-apartheid policy context. Land reform policies have been formulated 
and implemented around the post-colonial world, in widely different forms. 
In addition, a variety of policy participants from around the world have 
expressed their versions of the ‘ideal’ land reform policy. Therefore, in 
answering the primary question, this study will begin at the international 
level. Firstly, at the time of the transition from apartheid to democracy, 
what were the predominant discourses within the international context 
about the ideal approach to land reform as a means of promoting 
development? As the various policy participants prepared to negotiate post-
apartheid land reform policy, what was put forward as the ‘ideal’ set of rules 
and boundaries around land reform? In addition, what were the 
implications of these discourses for shaping the policy response to the 
recognised need for land reform within South Africa?  
Within South Africa, the final Constitution of 1996 set out the basic defining 
boundaries within which post-apartheid land reform policy would be 
formulated and implemented. Therefore, the second sub-question asks: 
what ideas and discourses around the role of the state in land reform 
became enshrined in the new constitution? What were the sets of ideas 
subscribed to by the players who negotiated the basic boundaries within 
which land reform policy would be created? What were the implications of 
these discourses for how land reform could proceed? In addition, what did 
these ideas construct as ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ policy solutions?  
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At the collective choice level, national policy-makers worked within these 
primary constitutional boundaries to create policies aimed at transferring 
limited amounts of land to black South Africans. While governed by the 
constitution, these powerful policy participants subscribe to their own 
discourses and ideas of how what form land reform policy should take. 
These ideas and assumptions will be evident in the various policy iterations 
that they have created. The third sub-question, therefore, asks: what were 
the hidden assumptions and practices underpinning the actual land reform 
policies that have been developed, and how have they contributed to the 
‘governing’ of the agrarian system in South Africa?  
The final sub-question in this study focuses on those policy players tasked 
with implementing land reform policies at the operating, or provincial, level. 
The ideas and discourses these players subscribe to will have great influence 
on how they implement the rules developed at the higher levels of the game. 
The fourth question therefore asks: how is all of this experienced by the 
actual participants in the implementation of the land reform process? What 
different ideas and discourses inform practice at the operational level? 
Where are the key conflicts between these discourses? What are the 
implications for change that will benefit the rural landless poor? How do 
policy participants at the operating level view the rules created for them at 
the higher levels, and how does this affect how they implement these rules?  
Finding answers to each of these sub-questions will thus provide an answer 
to the primary question driving this thesis. A number of specific research 
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methods will be needed to answer these questions, which are set out in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter four 
Methodology 
The overarching objective of this study is to come to an understanding of 
why so little land has been redistributed from white to black farmers in 
post-apartheid South Africa, despite the overwhelming political and moral 
mandate for the government to do so. The previous chapter outlined the 
theoretical framework, derived largely from ‘constructivist institutionalism,’ 
that was developed to answer this question, and outlined the questions 
raised about the South African land redistribution policy that this research 
addresses. Taken together, these questions require an exploration of the 
discourses evident in the various institutions in the South African land 
redistribution policy arena, and drawn on by the actors working within 
them. This chapter begins with a discussion of the ontological and 
epistemological basis of this research. It then turns to a discussion of 
discourse analysis, the primary methodological approach used in the 
research, before elaborating on the particular location of the fieldwork and 
research methods deployed to gather and analyse data.  
Ontology   
The theoretical framework derived from ‘constructivist institutionalism’ 
(Chapter 3) raised a number of specific questions about the South African 
land redistribution policy, summarised in Table 3-1 (page 90). Having 
synthesised a theoretical approach, the next task is to choose appropriate 
research methods to answer the key questions. Denzin and Lincoln (2003) 
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suggest a hierarchy of ideas that the researcher can use, starting with an 
ontology, or framework, that specifies an epistemology, or set of questions, 
that is examined in specific ways, using a methodology. The choices made 
at each level of the hierarchy (starting from ontology) affect the choices that 
can be made at the next level.   
Ontology addresses the basic elements of reality (Silverman, 2010), asking 
what we believe about the nature of reality and what is worth knowing 
(Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). It is the starting point of all research. Ontological 
assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality, 
and are often divided between those based on foundationalism and those 
based on anti-foundationalism (Grix, 2004). Philosophical foundationalism 
asserts that reality exists independently of our knowledge of it. The task of 
the researcher is therefore to find firm, unquestionable and indisputable 
truths (existing independently of culture and history) about this external 
reality, from which our beliefs may be logically deduced (Grix, 2004). The 
origins of this approach lie in early efforts by thinkers such as Descartes and 
Locke to challenge the power of the Church and feudalism. Any reasoning 
which entails unobservables like God, the mind or even hypothetical 
physical entities is rejected — if something is neither directly observable 
nor logically deducible from direct observation, then it can never be 
rigorously analysed (Weinberg, 2008).  
This ontological approach has come under critique from scholars such as 
Wittgenstein (Weinberg, 2008), who argued that social meanings are 
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established in practice through grammatical rules. Later scholars added the 
insight that all linguistic propositions acquire meaning only in relation to 
other propositions to which they are meaningfully related. This means that 
rather than being ahistorical or acultural, social meanings are instead 
nested in particular socio-cultural contexts. Science is therefore not 
constructed on a foundation of enduring logical truths or sense data, but on 
common-sense cultural assumptions, all of which are potentially subject to 
revision. Anti-foundationalism therefore asserts that the world does not 
exist independently of our knowledge of it. Rather, the ‘reality’ that we as 
humans experience is socially and discursively constructed. There are no 
central values that can be rationally and universally grounded (Grix, 2004).   
Epistemology  
An ‘epistemology’ examines the nature and status of knowledge (Silverman, 
2010), answering questions about who can be a ‘knower,’ what tests beliefs 
must pass in order to be legitimated as knowledge, and what things can be 
known (Harding, 1987). It is concerned with the origin, nature and limits of 
human knowledge, and the knowledge-gathering process itself (Grix, 2004). 
“The term epistemology simply refers to the study of who can be a 
knowledge producer and how knowledge is produced” (Mann, 2012, p. 18). 
Grix (2004) suggests two contrasting epistemological positions. Following 
on from foundationalism, positivism advocates the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality. Similarly, 
working from anti-foundationalist premises, interpretivism asserts that a 
strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the 
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objects of the natural sciences. In this approach, the social scientist must 
grasp the subjective meaning of social action. The methodology used 
depends on which of these two epistemological positions is chosen.  
Methodology  
‘Methodology’ can be seen as a set of theoretically-informed principles and 
ideas that informs the design of a research study. The methodological 
framework with its underpinning philosophy mainly influences how the 
research works with the participants, and the position they take in the 
study. Researchers can take either a position of distance, or they can 
acknowledge their inclusion in both the field and the final product of the 
study (Birks & Mills, 2011). It essentially refers to the choices made about 
which cases to study, and what methods of data gathering and data analysis 
will be used in planning and executing a research study. The choice of 
methodology, most broadly either quantitative or qualitative research 
methods or a combination of the two, defines how one will go about 
studying any phenomenon. It is important to emphasise that both types of 
methodology are not in themselves true or false — they can only be more or 
less useful to the specific topic being studied (Silverman, 2010).  
Anti-foundationalism, interpretivism and qualitative approaches  
So what are the implications of the choices made at the ontological, 
epistemological and the methodological level? If a foundationalist 
ontological approach is adopted, the researcher must accept the assumption 
that ‘reality’ exists independently of our knowledge of it (Grix, 2004). 
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Leading on from this choice, at the epistemological level, the researcher 
would be drawn to positivist claims that this ‘reality’ is singular and 
objective, existing independently of its knower (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). The 
researcher would assume that there are patterns and regularities, and 
causes and consequences in the human social world, much as there are in 
the natural world. It would therefore be possible to make causal statements 
about the social world, based on methods derived from the natural sciences 
(Grix, 2004), which have enjoyed unquestioned success in predicting the 
physical world (Howarth, 2000). The overall objective would therefore be to 
produce universal laws or theories that can be confirmed or refuted by 
independent testing and the production of relevant empirical 
counterfactuals. In turn, these universal laws and theories would serve as 
the basis for predicting comparable or future events and processes 
(Howarth, 2000).  
The choice of such a positivist approach would lead to the assumption that 
true knowledge arises from the observation of empirical phenomena, and 
that the logic of measurement and quantification is best for depicting 
empirical observations (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In this approach, numeric 
forms of data are seen as the optimum way to access external reality, and so 
are vital in the research process (Field, 2009). The researcher would be 
searching for the mechanisms of cause and effect that affect human 
behaviour, and aggregating subjects based on their possession of specific 
traits or performances in order to examine the relationships between these 
variables (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). The goal would be a series of statistical 
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equations explaining and predicting human behaviour (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005).  
However, Table 3-1 (see page 90) shows that this study is not aimed at such 
a goal. This study aims to explore the ideas and discourses underpinning the 
institutions involved in land reform in South Africa, and motivating the 
actors involved in the process. To address this, this study settles on a 
theoretical framework focused on the meanings assigned to land, 
agriculture and land reform in the land redistribution policy arena. The 
quantitative methods favoured by positivists are less suited to providing a 
depth of understanding of the attitudes or beliefs of people, organisations or 
institutions. Positivist quantitative approaches are well-suited to studying 
the natural laws governing the physical matter making up the climate, land, 
flora and fauna of South Africa. However they are relatively ill-equipped to 
uncover the meanings humans place on this land, and the consequences of 
these meanings in South African society. This study therefore does not 
adopt foundationalist, positivist or quantitative approaches.    
Anti-foundationalism asserts that our human ‘reality’ is socially and 
discursively constructed. This means that there are no central values that 
can be rationally and universally grounded. Flowing on from this, 
interpretivism posits a difference between people and the objects of the 
natural sciences. Social scientists following this approach therefore strive to 
grasp the subjective meaning of social action. In order to achieve this, then, 
qualitative research is broadly about learning what is important to those 
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being studied (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). It seeks to achieve deep 
understanding of human actions, motives and feelings, illuminating how 
humans use cultural symbol systems to create shared meanings for their 
existences and activity (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). The basic subject matter is 
therefore no longer objective data to be quantified, but meaningful relations 
that are to be interpreted (Kvale, 1996). Qualitative methods explore the 
perspective and meaning of experiences, seeking to identify the social 
structures or processes that explain people’s behavioural meaning (Wong, 
2008).   
Social constructionism — creating meanings   
Within the qualitative tradition, there are a wide variety of possible 
approaches. Social constructionism highlights the processes by which social 
reality is put together and assigned meaning. Here, the leading idea has 
always been “… that the world we live in and our place in it are not simply 
and evidently ‘there’ for participants. Rather, participants actively construct 
the world of everyday life and its constituent elements” (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2008, p. 3). While there is a physical world within which people 
live, the meanings they attach to it are constructed. Our knowledge and 
representations of the world are not reflections of the world ‘out there’, but 
are rather products of our ways of categorising the world (Phillips & 
Jorgensen, 2002). Humans do not find or discover knowledge so much as 
construct or make it. We invent concepts, models, and schemes to make 
sense of experience, and we continually test and modify these constructions 
in the light of new experience. Furthermore, we do not construct our 
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interpretations in isolation, but against a backdrop of shared 
understandings, practices, and language (Schwandt, 2003). Such an 
approach, centrally concerned with the meanings humans construct for the 
world around them, lends itself well to a study of the different meanings 
attached to land and land redistribution in South Africa.  
Additionally, the meanings social participants construct for themselves are 
not singular, stable or passively absorbed. Rather, they are dependent on 
human actors using their cultural stocks of knowledge to engage with an 
ambiguous and reactive world, and to suit their situated, evolving purposes. 
Some of these constructions are reciprocated and sustained in group 
interactions, and cumulatively embedded in formal institutions as 
preferences, techniques and policies (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Within these 
constructions, some forms of action become natural and others unthinkable 
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Over time, the historical, contingent and 
malleable qualities of these creations fade as succeeding generations accept 
them as given and provide them with a sense of inevitability (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2011).  
The concept of social construction allows scholars to emphasise the 
contingent nature of social activity. People constantly make choices based 
on how they understand their alternatives. They must account for the 
choices they have made, and those choices and accounts then constrain 
what they will do next. Many of these choices are soon lost from sight, and 
an edifice of taken-for-granted assumptions about the world emerges and 
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evolves. Adopting a constructionist stance makes it easier for analysts to 
penetrate those assumptions and to recognise and study these processes 
(Best, 2008). As Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) note, the unmasking of taken-
for-granted, naturalised knowledge is often an explicitly formulated aim of 
social constructionist research. Social constructionist researchers generally 
seek to demonstrate how certain states of affairs that others have taken to 
be eternal and beyond the reach of social influence are actually the products 
of specific socio-historical or social interactional processes (Weinberg, 
2008).  
The ways in which we understand and represent the world are historically 
and culturally specific and contingent — our worldviews and our identities 
could have been different, and they change over time (Phillips & Jorgensen, 
2002). There is no inevitability to existing conditions, as they are only the 
result of past choices, which could have been different. The social 
constructionist approach therefore fits well with the theoretical approach of 
this study, and promises new insights into the taken-for-granted 
assumptions about land and the use of land in South Africa. This would be 
an integral part of addressing the basic question driving this study, of why 
so little has been done to change the landownership patterns established 
prior to 1994. Apart from these general approaches to the creation of 
meaning, social constructionism requires certain approaches and attitudes 
from the researcher when carrying out research.  
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Strong objectivity — my place in this study   
Positivism promotes a value-free, impartial, dispassionate objectivity to 
guide scientific research. It is suggested that without this objectivity, one 
cannot separate justified belief from mere opinion, or real knowledge from 
mere claims to knowledge (Harding, 1991). From this perspective, relativism 
(inherent in the social constructionist premise of the contingent nature of 
social activity) is often treated as the opposite of objectivity. Harding (1991) 
has problematized this opposition, criticising modern science for presenting 
itself as if its knowledge has no context. As it does not take into account its 
own cultural and historical conditions of possibility, Harding terms this 
‘objectivism’, and argues for a ‘strong objectivity’, where the cultural and 
social location of the researcher is evident upfront. “By accounting in this 
way for where our own knowledge ‘comes from’, we can produce more 
objective and less distorted representations of the world” (Phillips & 
Jorgensen, 2002, p. 202). Applying the social constructionist view of 
knowledge creation to my research, this study accepts the assumption that 
the knower and the known are inseparable and conditioned by each other 
(Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). Knowledge of social reality therefore emerges from 
the fundamental interdependence existing between researchers and those 
they study. In this approach, I as a researcher did not just use research 
instruments. I was the primary instrument (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). I as a 
researcher could not act as a neutral and external spectator in knowledge 
construction, and my research participants could not claim privilege of 
knowledge or interpretation. Instead, I accepted that all representations, 
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both mine and those of my research participants, were partial perceptions 
of constructed social realities (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). Accepting this meant 
that I must apply the standards of ‘strong objectivity’ described by Harding 
to help me produce a less distorted representation of the different meanings 
attributed to land and land reform in South Africa (or one taking note of 
how it was distorted). I need to therefore to take note of how and why my 
perceptions of reality are partial. I need to explore my social position in 
South African society, and what some of the resulting effects on my 
research may be.  
Being a ‘white’ researcher   
The most immediate factor likely to affect my research is my identity in 
South Africa as a white, English-speaking male. Economic, social and 
cultural power is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the white population 
in South Africa at present  (De Kock, 2011), and being white in post-
apartheid South African society (as in much of the rest of the Western 
world) continues to be advantageous (McKaiser, 2011). ‘Critical whiteness 
studies’ (Allen, 1994; Haney Lòpez, 2006; Lipsitz, 1998), a critical research 
approach, from the US, works to expose ‘whiteness’ as something that 
masquerades as the norm, pretending to be the transparent mode of the 
‘normal’ or common-sense social centre rather than ‘others’ who stand out 
or deviate from this conveniently invisible powerful norm (De Kock, 2011). A 
white South African academic, applying this insight to the place of whites in 
South Africa today, comments:  
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We [white South Africans] move easily about in a world made in our 
own image, validating our own values and beliefs and sustaining our 
own comfort, unimpeded by the kinds of structural and systemic 
challenges black people face daily (Vice, 2011).  
Ntombenhle Khathwane, a black South African businesswoman, comments 
that as a result of this unconscious identification of whiteness as the norm, 
the history on which black South Africans base their identity  
… is that of enslavement, oppression and dispossession; it is a history 
of losers. By contrast, white South Africans base their identity on a 
history of being winners (Khathwane, 2011).  
This invisible norm of whiteness placed me in a position of strength relative 
to many of my black respondents, especially those with little formal 
education. This meant that rather than answering my questions in ways 
indicating their own thoughts and feelings, they could have answered my 
questions in ways they felt would please me. When analysing the data I 
gathered from such respondents, I had to take note of this possibility.  
Diesing (1999) describes researchers as identifying with or relating to a 
certain location in society and as viewing society as spread out around that 
location. In South Africa and in much of the rest of the Western world, we 
see this with researchers steeped in Eurocentric norms who identify 
themselves as being Western and/or white. In addition, these self-identified 
Western/white researchers often unconsciously claim as their exclusive 
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cultural heritage norms like rationality, purity, productivity, 
disembodiment, refinement and self-discipline (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  
The rest of the world — Africa, Asia, etc. — is spread out around the West, 
and becomes Diesing’s ‘object,’ which takes on its characteristics according 
to its degree of sameness or difference from the researcher. Accordingly, 
Eurocentric concepts of families, deviance, social movements, psychological 
development, organisational behaviour, stratification, and even spirituality 
are applied by the white researcher to the experiences of people of colour 
(Stanfield & Dennis, 1993). The degree of freedom accorded to the object by 
the researcher also depends on the distance between the two. Objects 
similar to the researcher are accorded more freedom than those that are 
very different (Ross, 1999). In the South African context, if the researcher is 
white, this often means that the black person becomes represented or 
spoken for by others, and cannot participate in world discourse of action on 
his/her own behalf (Ogundipe-Leslie, 2001). Black respondents are also 
portrayed as having little autonomy of response. From the vantage point of 
the colonised/black/other, the term ‘research’ has therefore been 
inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism. Unconsciously 
locating themselves beyond race, whites cannot participate effectively in 
mutually accountable dialogue with other racial groups (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2011). Linda Tuhiwai Smith, situating herself as an indigenous researcher in 
New Zealand states: “It galls us that Western researchers and intellectuals 
can assume to know all that it is possible to know of us, on the basis of their 
brief encounters with some of us” (Smith, 1999, p. 1). It is therefore deeply 
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important that white researchers acknowledge the material basis of their 
power in relation to black people (Bhavnani & Coulson, 2001). As a white 
South African male, I recognise that I am put in a socially dominant role 
compared to those of my respondents who are black, most especially those 
that are not in the middle class, and that this affects my interactions with 
them. Commenting on the place of white South Africans in post-apartheid 
South Africa, Eusebius McKaiser, a coloured (or mixed race) South African 
academic, writes:  
You [white South Africans] have an unqualified political and ethical 
right to engage in the political and public spheres of (y)our country, 
but be mindful of how your whiteness still benefits you and gives you 
unearned privileges. Engage black South Africans with humility, and 
be mindful of not reinforcing whiteness as normative … (McKaiser, 
2011).  
As the research instrument, I am aware that the knowledge I created is 
shaped by my position in South Africa society. I endeavour to bring 
reflexivity to my work and especially to the values and norms that I bring to 
my study.    
Being an ‘outsider’ researcher  
I also need to take note of the fact that my research is affected by my having 
left South Africa in 2004 and having gained New Zealand citizenship since 
then. While my formative years and much of my adult life to this point has 
been lived in South Africa, my time in New Zealand society has also had an 
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effect on my personal perspectives. This means that while I have a good 
understanding of how South African society works, I do not see the world 
exactly as someone in South Africa does today. I am not fully an ‘insider’ 
anymore in South Africa, but not fully an ‘outsider’ either. This is perhaps 
not such an unusual situation. Scholars have noted that pure outsiders, who 
base their views on a study of the situation from afar, are rare. More 
common are involved outsiders — people personally connected to a 
situation by belonging to one of the national, religious or ethnic groups 
involved, or because of an identification with a general political stance 
relevant to the analysis of a specific situation (Hermann, 2001). Researchers 
who are members of the culture or subculture about which they write will 
bring a special quality to their material. Their understanding and 
interpretation is likely to be different from that of an outsider. On the other 
hand, scholars from outside a culture have frequently had a more 
challenging vision than those bound by their own culture. Both angles of 
vision are complementary in arriving at a largely valid interpretation of the 
data gathered (Lerner, 2001). My position as an involved outsider largely 
allows for both these advantages. While I have an in-depth understanding 
and experience of South African society, the eleven years I have spent 
outside the country so far have given me a different perspective on the 
possibilities in the South African land redistribution programme.  
Purpose of this study   
Having thus established the broad effects that my identity as a white 
English-speaking male who now lives outside of South Africa would have on 
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my research, I still need to make clear how I believe the knowledge that I 
am creating is relevant and valid. Social constructionism takes a specific 
approach to knowledge. Rather than seeing it as an attempt to outline an 
external reality as neutrally and as rigorously as possible, this approach sees 
knowledge as ideological, political and permeated with values (Schwandt, 
2003). Knowing and the reality of everyday life are founded in an inter-
subjective world in which individuals cannot exist without interacting and 
communicating with others (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). In addition, knowledge 
is shaped by social processes in which we construct common truths and 
compete about what is true or false (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). 
Conversations and social interactions are the ultimate contexts in which 
knowledge is produced and understood. This makes knowledge historical, 
situational and changing, and so difficult to replicate (Koro-Ljungberg, 
2008). I accept that the knowledge that I am producing is a contingent 
construction of reality, just as all other representations are. How then can I 
guarantee that the understanding of reality that I produced is valid? To put 
the question more generally, does the relativism inherent in the social 
constructionist premise that I adopt make it impossible to distinguish 
between good and bad descriptions of reality (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002)?  
Critical research should explicitly position itself and distance itself from 
alternative representations of reality on the grounds that it strives to do 
something for specific reasons. At the same time, critical research should 
make clear that the particular representation of reality it provides is just one 
among other possible representations, thus inviting further discussion 
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(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Adopting this approach for my research then, 
at the concrete level I aim to contribute to the effort to reflect on a land 
redistribution policy that provides more equitable access to farmland for 
black South Africans. De Kock10 (2011) comments that the overwhelming 
grip on economic power held by whites in South Africa is detrimental to the 
long-term survival of South African society. A more equitable land 
redistribution policy in the country would be part of this process of 
destabilising the overwhelming economic power of whites present in South 
Africa today. At the level of principle, however, I accept that the research I 
produce is contingent and offers partial insights into a complex reality. I put 
it forward, however, in the hope that it adds to the debate around land 
redistribution in South Africa, allowing for the creation of a better land 
redistribution policy.   
Discourse analysis  
This study aims to find the ideas and discourses underpinning and 
motivating the institutions and the actors at the three levels of land 
redistribution policy in South Africa. A primary task in answering this 
question is, therefore, to clarify what meanings are attached to land by 
participants in the South African land redistribution policy arena. As noted 
in chapter three, one of the primary qualitative research methods for 
studying social meanings is discourse analysis. However, specifying 
discourse analysis as a method in any traditional way is very difficult. In 
                                                 
10
 Surnames with prefixes are capitalized according to Afrikaans spelling rules in this study, where 
the prefix is only capitalized at the beginning of a sentence.  
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fact, discourse analysis is often described as a theoretical perspective rather 
than a method, and as a general epistemological perspective on social life 
containing both methodological and conceptual elements (Cramm, Exel, 
Moller, & Finkenflugel, 2010). Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) make the point 
that in discourse analysis, theory and method are intertwined and 
researchers must accept the basic philosophical premises in order to use 
discourse analysis as their method of empirical study. What, then, are these 
basic philosophical premises?  
Much like social constructionism, discourse theory sees language 
constructing the meanings we assign to physical reality (Fairclough, 1992). 
On any particular topic, different people will almost always hold a wide 
variety of views and attitudes. The views and attitudes of specific people, 
taken together in a single bundle, are what are referred to as a ‘discourse’. 
Put another way, discourses represent the way a particular individual, in 
particular circumstances and at a particular time, relates and conceives of 
certain aspects of the world. In addition, between individuals with shared 
experiences and personal attributes, there may be some degree of 
commonality or sharing of discourses (Addams, 2000). A discourse is 
therefore simply an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through 
which meaning is given to social and physical realities. In this light, 
discourses consist of structures embedded in language (Dryzek, 2005), 
which enable those who subscribe to them to interpret bits of information 
and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. Constructing 
meanings and relationships and helping to define common sense and 
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legitimate knowledge, individual discourses rest on assumptions, 
judgments, and contentions that provide the basic terms of analysis, 
debates, agreements, and disagreements. In addition, the way a discourse 
constructs the world is not always easily comprehended by those who 
subscribe to other discourses (Dryzek, 2005). Perhaps Gee (2011) gives the 
most colourful description of what it means to be part of a discourse, saying 
that it means being able to engage in a particular sort of ‘dance’ with words, 
deeds, values, feelings, other people, objects, tools, technologies, places and 
times, so as to be recognised as a distinctive sort of ‘who’ doing a distinctive 
sort of ‘what’. So how do we make sense of these dances, and the identities 
and roles they give their participants? 
Techniques of discourse analysis  
There is no one accepted method on how to carry out discourse analysis. 
While different perspectives offer their own suggestions, all start from the 
assumption that our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, 
identities and social relations. Rather, they play an active role in creating 
and changing them (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). The overall idea of 
discourse analysis is that social meanings for phenomena can never be 
ultimately fixed. This opens up the way for constant social struggles about 
definitions of society and identity. The role of the discourse analyst is thus 
to plot the course of these struggles to fix meaning at all levels of society 
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002).  
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Table 3-1 (page 90) shows the questions arising from the theoretical 
approach developed for this study. To exhume, clarify and analyse the ideas 
and discourses found at these three levels of analysis in South African land 
redistribution policy, this study draws on the forms of discourse analysis 
developed and deployed by Dryzek (1997), Bacchi (2012) and Schneider and 
Ingram (2005; 1993). In his study of discourses around the environment, 
Dryzek offers an overview of a much larger terrain of discourse, deploying 
analytical devices which give him “… some confidence in painting such large 
and complex discursive terrain in broad strokes” (2013, p. 11). This study 
aims to provide a similarly wide-ranging overview of the large terrain of 
discourse on land reform. Like environmental discourses, land reform can 
also be seen as being doubly or perhaps even triply complex. Issues of land 
reform and redistribution involve not only the overall economic 
development of a country, but also sustainable agricultural production and 
human rights issues. As in the constructivist institutionalism approach, 
Dryzek distinguishes between discourses and the exercise of power by 
agents, and creates a checklist of four elements designed to capture the 
essence of the various discourses he studies. Firstly, the analyst should 
clarify the basic entities recognised or constructed in a discourse. Secondly, 
the assumptions about natural relationships between these different entities 
made in the discourse under study need to be mapped out. Thirdly, the 
analyst should examine how the discourse portrays agents and their 
motives. Finally, Dryzek recommends examination of the key metaphors 
and rhetorical devices found in the discourse being studied (Dryzek, 2013).  
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Illustrating the variety of approaches that can be taken under a discourse 
analysis approach, Bacchi develops an approach to policy analysis that 
focuses on the problematisations found in government policy (2012). ‘Policy’ 
is generally associated with a programme, or a course of action. ‘Public 
policy,’ used to describe government programmes, is generally assumed to 
solve social problems. Bacchi (2009, pp. ix-1) argues “… that it is important 
to make the ‘problems’ implicit in public policies explicit, and to scrutinise 
them closely”. Every policy or policy proposal is a prescriptive text here, 
setting out a practice that relies on a particular problematisation. How 
problems are represented in policy carries all sorts of implications for how 
the issue is thought about, how the people involved are treated, and how 
they are encouraged to think about themselves (Bacchi, 2009, 2012). 
Bacchi’s analysis is not concerned with intentionality, but rather seeks to 
identify the deep conceptual premises operating within problem 
representations. The point is to draw attention to the assumptions and 
presuppositions that make it possible to develop these policies (Bacchi, 
2009). To achieve this, Bacchi deploys the ‘What’s the problem represented 
to be?’ (WPR) approach. Bacchi’s method thus fits into the constructivist 
institutionalism approach as a way to develop a deep understanding of the 
discourses policymakers subscribe to through an analysis of the policy 
documents they create.  
Bacchi’s WPR approach starts from the presumption that some problem 
representations create difficulties for members of some social groups — 
more so than for members of other groups. One of the ways Bacchi (2009) 
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suggests that this happens is through the effects of subjectification — “… we 
become subjects of a particular kind partly through the ways in which 
policies set up social relationships and our place (position) within them” (p. 
16). Ingram and Schneider (2005) develop this theme further, arguing that 
public policies are 
… the primary means of legitimating, extending, and even creating 
distinctive populations — some of whom are extolled as deserving 
and entitled and others who are demonized as undeserving and 
ineligible. These groups have been treated very differently in the 
governance process (p. 2).  
The agenda, tools and rationales of policies impart messages to target 
populations, informing them of their status as citizens, what they deserve 
from government, and what is expected of them. Policy messages indicate 
whether the problems of target populations are legitimate objects of 
government attention, what kind of game politics is, and who usually wins 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Schneider and Ingram argue that positive and 
negative social constructions combine with political power to produce four 
different types of target populations: the advantaged enjoy positive social 
constructions as deserving people, and have significant political power 
resources; contenders are not seen as deserving, but have ample political 
power resources equalling those of the advantaged; dependents are socially 
constructed as deserving in a moral sense, but helpless and usually in need 
of discipline, and have few political power resources; finally deviants are 
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constructed as undeserving, dangerous and of no value to society, and have 
few legitimate political power resources (Ingram & Schneider, 2005).  
Schneider and Ingram’s framework of analysis has been deployed in the 
analysis of a wide range of policy issues, from the construction of Mexican 
and Cuban immigrants by US politicians (Magaña & Short, 2005), to prison-
based AIDS policy (Hogan, 1997) to political constructions of old age 
(Hudson & Gonyea, 2012). The application of the approaches developed by 
Dryzek, Bacchi and Schneider and Ingram will enable a deeper 
understanding of the ideas and discourse underlying the institutions and 
actors involved in land redistribution policy in South Africa.    
Research location  
The theoretical approach taken in this study is derived from ‘constructivist 
institutionalism,’ which focuses attention on the ideas and discourses 
maintaining and motivating the institutions and actors involved in land 
redistribution policy. At the constitutional level, this directs attention to the 
South Africa Constitution, and the provisions it makes for land reform and 
land redistribution. In addition, it focuses on the different discourses 
evident among those involved in the creation of this Constitution. At the 
national policy level, the approach developed in this study focuses attention 
on the three major iterations of land redistribution policy developed by the 
national bureaucracy for land redistribution. At the local level the approach 
developed in this study directs attention to the discourses of the various 
organisations involved in land redistribution policy at the provincial level. 
These include organisations representing black large-scale commercial 
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farmers (preferably beneficiaries of land reform); small-scale communal 
farmers; white large-scale commercial farmers; commodity organisations; 
agricultural corporations; NGOs involved in land reform; rank-and-file 
members of the DRDLR and the two provincial departments of Agriculture; 
consultants involved in land reform projects; and members of political 
parties in the two provinces. Given the time and resource constraints of 
doctoral research this study concentrates on two provinces within South 
Africa: the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces (see Figure 4-1, page 
119). 
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Figure 4-1: The provinces of post-apartheid South Africa  (Source: M. Oulton) 
 
 
These two provinces differ in size — while KwaZulu-Natal province takes up 
7.7 per cent of the South African landmass, the Eastern Cape province 
occupies 13.8 per cent (Lehohla, 2010). Together, these two provinces make 
up 21.5 per cent of the total South African landmass. In addition, while the 
Eastern Cape province contains 13.5 per cent of the South African 
population, KwaZulu-Natal province is home to 21.3 per cent (Lehohla, 
2010). This means that the two provinces contain 34.8 per cent of the total 
South African population. However, the relative populations of whites and 
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blacks in the two provinces are very similar to each other, and correspond 
roughly to the overall proportions found in South Africa nationally. In 
KwaZulu-Natal province black South Africans11 make up 95 per cent of the 
population, and whites 5 per cent (Brooks, 2004). In the Eastern Cape 
province, the proportion of black South Africans is similar at 95.3 per cent, 
while the proportion of whites is similar at 4.7 per cent (Lehohla, 2011). 
Overall, black South Africans make up 90.8 per cent of the national 
population, while white South Africans come to 9.2 per cent (Lehohla, 
2010). The two provinces are very similar in the tribal makeup of their 
respective African populations, in that in both provinces the vast majority of 
the African population belongs to a single ethnic grouping. Where 83.4 per 
cent of the Eastern Cape population belong to the various parts of the 
isiXhosa language group, 80.9 per cent of the KwaZulu-Natal population 
speak isiZulu (Anonymous, 2011a). In both provinces political allegiances 
lean strongly to the ruling ANC. In the 2014 national and provincial 
elections, the ANC received 70.09 per cent of the vote in the Eastern Cape 
province, and 64.52 per cent in KwaZulu-Natal (IEC, 2014a, 2014b). The 
voting record in these two provinces is similar to national voting patterns in 
the country, where the ANC gained 62.2 per cent of the vote in 2014 (IEC, 
2014b).  
While both provinces are situated on the wetter eastern seaboard of the 
country, KwaZulu-Natal enjoys a higher rainfall than the Eastern Cape. 
                                                 
11
 In this study, following conventional racial classifications in South Africa, the term ‘black South 
African’ refers to the African, ‘coloured’ (mixed race) and Indian populations of South Africa. 
‘White South African’ refers to all South Africans of European origin.  
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Where the Eastern Cape province enjoys an average rainfall of 527 mm, 
KwaZulu-Natal province averages over 1000 mm annually (Limpopo, 2011; 
SAinfo, 2012). It must be borne in mind though that the low average rainfall 
of the Eastern Cape is due mainly to the semi-desert Karoo areas in its 
western interior. In the eastern coastal areas of the province, the rainfall 
and climate are similar to those prevailing in KwaZulu-Natal. The two 
provinces thus present a microcosm of the broader rainfall patterns 
prevailing in South Africa, as seen in Figure 2-1 (see page 20).  
In terms of agriculture, given its favourable resource base, it is perhaps not 
surprising that KwaZulu-Natal contributes one third of food production and 
37 per cent of the country's agricultural exports (Mather, 1998). The 
comparatively good rainfall of the province make agriculture central to the 
economy of the province — the sugar-cane plantations along the Indian 
Ocean coastal belt are the mainstay of KwaZulu-Natal's agriculture. The 
coastal belt is also a large producer of subtropical fruit, while the farmers in 
the hinterland concentrate on vegetable, dairy and stock-farming. Another 
major source of income is forestry (SouthAfrica.info, 2014b). The drier 
climate in the Eastern Cape mean that in the former ‘white’ rural areas, 
there are irrigated citrus and deciduous fruit orchards, and a large sheep-
farming sector (SouthAfrica.info, 2014a). The two provinces thus present a 
representative sample of most of the types of agriculture practiced in South 
Africa.  
While almost half the size of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal has similar 
123 
 
proportions of former ‘white’ farmland (under private ownership) and 
former bantustan land — land under communal tenure makes up 34.05 per 
cent12 of KwaZulu-Natal province, while the former bantustans of the Ciskei 
and the Transkei make up 27.8 per cent of the Eastern Cape13. These 
patterns do not correspond to the broader patterns of landownership over 
the whole country, where at the end of apartheid roughly 13 per cent of the 
country was under communal tenure, and the rest under private white 
ownership (Adams et al., 1999). However the overall patterns correspond, 
with the majority of the land allocated to large-scale mechanised farms 
individually owned mostly by whites, and a lesser part allocated to 
communal tenure by black Africans. Therefore, taken together, it could be 
argued that these two provinces provide a broadly representative sample of 
the climatic, political, demographic and agrarian conditions prevailing in 
the rest of South Africa. Taken together, the two provinces have almost all 
the bio-climatic regions found in the rest of South Africa. As in the rest of 
South Africa, political allegiances are broadly to the ANC. As in the rest of 
the country, the vast majority of the agricultural areas was reserved for 
individual white ownership. In the light of these factors, and the fact that 
most of my personal contacts in South Africa are in these two provinces, I 
decided concentrate my research activities in the country within these two 
                                                 
12
 Calculation based on the former KwaZulu ‘homeland’ being 32, 130 km
2 
in extent (Frankental & 
Sichone, 2005), and KwaZulu-Natal province being 94, 361 km
2 
in size (Lehohla, 2010). The 
calculation being (32, 130 km
2
/94, 361 km
2
)*100 = 34.05%.  
13
 Calculation based on the Transkei being 44 030 km
2
 in extent (Anonymous, 2010), the Ciskei 
being 2, 970 km
2
 in size (Anonymous, 2011b), and the Eastern Cape province being 168, 966 km
2
 
in size (Lehohla, 2010). The calculation being [(44, 030 km
2
 + 2, 970 km
2
)/168, 966 km
2
] * 100 = 
27.8%.    
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provinces.  
Document collection and analysis   
The different sources of data for historical analysis consulted in this study 
primarily included primary and secondary sources (Danto, 2008). Primary 
sources included original documents which were generally available on the 
internet or from library collections. These comprise original pieces of 
legislation, Parliamentary debates, minutes of meetings, and policy 
documents. Primary documents giving quantitative data were also used 
when appropriate, e.g. statistics on the amount of land transferred from 
white to black farmers, or statistics on blacks removed from ‘white’ land 
during the apartheid era. There were a number of primary documents 
originating from the executive government shedding light on its intentions 
towards the South African land redistribution policy, published between 
1992 and 2012. Examples of these policy documents included the 1997 White 
Paper on South African Land Policy, or the ANC’s Ready to Govern policy 
statement of 1992.  
To gain background information, I also examined sources from the South 
African media. I consulted newspapers and magazines representing white 
perspectives on the land redistribution policy, concentrating on articles 
published between 1994 and 2012. This included newspapers like the Mail & 
Guardian, the Natal Witness and the Sunday Times (for an English-speaking 
perspective). For an Afrikaans perspective, I consulted newspapers like Die 
Beeld and Die Burger. Newspapers like the Sowetan gave a black perspective, 
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and for a big business perspective I looked at newspapers like the Business 
Day and the Financial Mail. Magazines like the Farmers Weekly, Landbou 
Weekblad and Pro-Agri also shed some light on how large-scale commercial 
farmers view the land redistribution policy. 
Secondary sources normally include the writings of other scholars on the 
piece of history in question. In my case this included the works covered in 
the above historical review, and other studies of the participants in the land 
redistribution policy in South Africa. An advantage of using secondary 
sources for data is that the conditions under which the data were generated 
will be more controlled and explicit. The differences in these conditions can 
therefore be at the very least consciously acknowledged, and at best 
corrected for (Chase, 1995).  
A range of documents was collected and consulted, including the South 
African Constitution and policy documents. The policy documents ranged 
in date of publication from 1994 to 2010, and included the documents 
created by the government for the three iterations of land reform policy, 
annual reports and strategic plans by relevant government departments, 
speeches by relevant ministers and Acts of parliament. A total of 26 
documents were used. Analysing the information in these types of 
documents required a specific set of analytical tools, derived from other 
studies of similar historical materials. Beringer (1978) states that historical 
analysts often struggle to describe the method they have used, and argues 
that historical analysis simply involves reading source material and deriving 
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evidence from that material to be used in supporting a point of view or 
thesis. Danto (2008) adds that the purpose of a historical study is generally 
to give an overview of specific problems, programmes or policies within 
predetermined dates; and to trace major ideological themes in history.  
In carrying out this study, I deployed a variety of research methods to 
gather data from the field including analysis of primary and secondary 
documents and interviews with key stakeholders. A large part of the 
research carried out for this study involved historical analysis of documents 
produced by the different institutions and organisations involved in the 
South African land redistribution policy arena today. Therefore, as a part of 
the discourse analysis method adapted for this study, firstly, I read and 
compared secondary sources, like monographs and journal articles. 
Secondly, I clarified the points of view that emerged from the content, 
including contradictions between texts. Thirdly, I located relevant primary 
sources, reviewing them critically, and searching out explanations in the 
texts. Fourthly, I referred back to the secondary sources for outside 
interpretations that support or contradict the primary sources (Danto, 
2008). In addition, I took careful note of the timespan and the chronology 
of events around the phenomenon I was investigating (Chase, 1995).  
Danto (2008) also emphasises that in historical research, social beliefs and 
personal values abound on both sides — those carried by the researcher and 
those contained within the evidence. Invariably, the biases of the 
information, the narrators, and other researchers must be weighed against 
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each other. It is therefore necessary to identify the conditions under which 
the material was generated. These conditions need to be specified and 
selected, so as to provide theoretically relevant data (Chase, 1995). “The 
researcher must patiently filter documents through an understanding of the 
original authors, where they come from, and how their stories changed over 
time” (Danto, 2008, p. 9). As part of this effort, it is important to detect and 
determine bias both in the source of information and in ourselves as 
researchers; to clearly identify unstated assumptions; to find ambiguous or 
equivocal claims or arguments; to recognise logical inconsistencies or 
fallacies in a line of reasoning; and to determine the strength of the 
argument (Danto, 2008).  
Qualitative interviews carried out for this study   
The interviews carried out in this study were focused at the provincial level 
of land reform policy. Just as there are many types of discourse analysis, 
there are many types of interviews — structured, semi-structured, or 
unstructured (Fontana & Frey, 2003). Positivist quantitative researchers will 
often favour strongly structured interviews. The essence of unstructured 
and semi-structured interviews is in their qualitative nature, in the desire to 
understand rather than to explain (Fontana & Frey, 2003). The goal of the 
qualitative interview is to examine how knowing subjects (researchers and 
study participants) experience or have experienced particular aspects of life 
as they are co-constructed through dialogue (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). The 
aim is to understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold 
the meaning of their experiences, and to uncover their lived world prior to 
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scientific explanations (Kvale, 1996). The point of this study is to 
understand the meanings attached to land in the various institutions, 
organisations and individuals involved in the land redistribution policy in 
South Africa. This study uncovers the values and outcomes espoused by the 
various participants, and sheds light on their interactions with the policy 
environment around them. Quantitative methods would not be helpful in 
gaining these understandings. However, qualitative interviews are “… 
particularly well suited to understanding the social actor’s experience, 
knowledge and worldviews” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 173). In addition, they 
fit in well with the anti-foundationalist view of the human world as a 
conversational reality, and the interpretive view of the conversation as a 
basic mode of constituting knowledge. Semi-structured qualitative 
interviews are therefore used to gain these understandings and insights.  
In the semi-structured interview, I prepared a number of questions 
beforehand to put to the interviewees. In the interviews however, these 
questions were not presented in any specific, predetermined order. This 
allowed for a certain degree of flexibility, and the pursuit of unexpected 
lines of enquiry or unforeseen contingencies during the interview (Grix, 
2004; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). My goal in using this research method was to 
generate depth of understanding, rather than breadth. Research design and 
questioning therefore remained flexible to accommodate new information, 
adapt to the actual experiences that people had had, and to adjust to 
unexpected situations. As the researcher, I created future questions based 
on what had been already heard. Many of the questions asked emerged only 
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during the course of the research, and were then pursued to find detail or 
evidence that underlay the answers (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). My qualitative 
interviews were thus an interchange of views between two people 
conversing about a theme of mutual interest, or conversations with a 
structure and purpose (Kvale, 1996). However, there was an imbalance of 
power in these conversations — as the interviewer in many instances I had 
greater control over the respondents than the respondents had over me.  
 
To guide my conduct in this situation, I obtained approval for conducting 
the interviews from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences’ Human 
Research Ethics Committee.  The interviews were conducted under the 
guidelines of the University of Waikato’s human research ethics guidelines. 
These guidelines directed that I work respectfully with the participants and 
fairly represent them in the final thesis. In addition, during the interviews 
respondents often took measures to equalise the balance of power in the 
situation. In these instances, I often yielded back some of my control as the 
interviewer, to encourage a full articulation of the respondent’s beliefs, 
interests and experiences (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  
 
Most qualitative interviews are the site of tension between two demands. 
The interviewer needs to get the right kind of data that will help address the 
project’s research questions, while at the same time listening attentively and 
allowing the conversation to lead to new discoveries (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). 
My qualitative interviews were thus based on reflexivity, equal 
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opportunities for communication, and negotiation. It was important to 
negotiate and discuss with the interviewee how questions could be asked 
during the interview, how decisions were made about the acceptable topics, 
when it was time to end the dialogue, how data could be shared, and what 
would happen to the recorded data (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). Informed 
consent was obtained for all interviews.  The consent forms outlined the 
rights of the participants, and made clear that the research had ethical 
clearance from the University of Waikato.  These forms were signed by the 
interviewees and me at the beginning of the interviews. In addition, the 
participants were guaranteed anonymity in the research.  I also explicitly 
requested the permission of each interviewee to record the interviews on a 
digital voice recorder. Where this permission was not granted, notes were 
taken during the interview and transcribed more fully afterwards. 
Permission was also sought from interviewees that the data from the 
interviews could be used in the research.  The interviews typically took 
between 1 and 2 hours; they were subsequently fully transcribed.  The 
transcripts and the original recordings are held by me in a personal archive.  
Appendix I collates all the documents used during the interview process.  
These measures were taken to establish a fair degree of equality in each 
interview, and allow each participant to truly say what they want without 
challenge. While I established a broad agenda for the interview, participants 
could still exercise agency by reframing a question, answering a question 
with a question, by setting limits on what they are willing to say, or even by 
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quitting the interview (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). None of the respondents in 
this study chose to quit an interview.  
 
Each interview conversation was unique, as I matched my questions to what 
each interviewee knew and was willing to share (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). As 
the interviewer, I listened to what the subject was trying to say, always on 
the lookout for subtle, fleeting meanings as they emerged. At times I also 
sometimes stepped back or aside, to dwell on a topic, to explore the 
ramifications of a remark, or to mentally revise the ideas guiding the 
interview before taking the next step forward (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). 
Contextual and emotional shifts occurring during the interviews required 
continuous reflexivity and self-disclosure, but also openness and a 
willingness to negotiate (Koro-Ljungberg, 2008). Aimed as they were at 
building understanding of the social actor’s experience, knowledge and 
worldviews, the qualitative interviews conducted for this study were deeply 
interactional events during which I and the interviewee constructed 
knowledge together. The ‘data’ that was produced was socially constructed. 
The role of the interview itself was to allow a continuous and dynamic 
unfolding of participant perspectives during its course (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2011). In order to develop this reflexive capacity and make the best use of my 
resources and time, a focused plan of who would be interviewed at the 
provincial level was developed. 
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Interviewees for this study  
To get as full a picture as possible of the values espoused by the various land 
redistribution policy participants in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal 
provinces, it was necessary to talk to members of the most powerful 
organisations involved in the land redistribution policy process in these 
provinces. Within the various organisations, I spoke to between three and 
five members at different hierarchical levels with varying responsibilities in 
both provinces, to get as wide a range of views as possible. When new 
interviewees repeated stories I had heard before, I judged that a sufficiently 
wide range of views had been obtained. In total 17 people were interviewed 
in the Eastern Cape, 17 in KwaZulu-Natal province and one in New Zealand, 
for about an hour each. Given the ostensible aim of land redistribution – to 
change the balance of land ownership between whites and blacks, and men 
and women, it is necessary to demarcate the racial, gender and ethnic 
markers of those interviewed for this study. Of these interviews, seven were 
with women involved in the NGO sector, the two land reform 
bureaucracies, as consultants and as large-scale commercial farmers. 
Overall among all the respondents, 19 were black — of these 14 were African 
(three women and 11 men), two were coloured (mixed race)(both male) and 
three were Indian (one woman and two men). The 16 remaining 
respondents were white (three women and 13 men). While an effort was 
made to interview the full range of those involved in land redistribution 
policy at the provincial level, this distribution of interviewees is the result of 
the contacts I was able to mobilise in the field. While most of the interviews 
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were recorded on a digital device and later transcribed, two respondents 
preferred that I only took notes during the interview. Some respondents 
requested anonymity, and so are not referred to by name in this study. 
Other respondents were happy to be identified. In addition I attended and 
took notes at the 2012 Annual Congress of Kwanalu, the organisation 
representing the large-scale farmers of KwaZulu-Natal.   
The analysis also makes use of additional materials provided to me by some 
respondents. For example Mr Pringle, President of Agri-EC (representing 
the white large-scale commercial farmers of the Eastern Cape), provided me 
with a book he and his colleagues had put together discussing land reform 
in South Africa (Agri Eastern Cape, 2010). In addition, to flesh out some 
details that were only hinted at in other interviews, I accessed further 
publicly available materials from their respective organisations. The 
interview with the respondent from the Agricultural Development Agency 
(ADA), for example, had not been scheduled very far in advance, and so was 
constantly interrupted. Therefore to gain clarity on some ideas that this 
respondent only briefly alluded to, I analysed published materials from his 
organisation to gain a better idea of the Agricultural Development Agency 
approach towards land reform. These additional materials can be found in 
the bibliography of this chapter.  
In order to gain insight into the various discourses around land 
redistribution at this level, it was crucial to speak to the actual beneficiaries 
of the land redistribution process, or established black large-scale 
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commercial farmers. Mr Xolile Ngqameni from the African Farmers’ 
Association of South Africa (AFASA), and Mr Mandla Buthelezi from the 
National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU) granted me interviews to discuss 
their views of the land reform process in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-
Natal respectively. In addition, I secured interviews with two beneficiaries 
from small family-based groups that gained land through the Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in the 
Eastern Cape. While one of these interviewees requested anonymity, Mr 
P.V. Njoli was happy to be identified in my study. Two individual black 
large-scale commercial farmers in KwaZulu-Natal were good enough to 
speak to me, while requesting anonymity. Finally, I was able to talk with 
two communal farmers in the Transkei communal farming region about 
how they viewed the process of land redistribution, both of whom preferred 
to remain anonymous.  
The land-based NGOs have played an integral part in the land reform 
process from the very beginning, and so it was vital that I gained a sense of 
their perspectives on the process. I was able to secure interviews with 
representatives of the Border Rural Committee (BRC), the Eastern Cape 
Agricultural Research Project (ECARP) and Umncunube in the Eastern 
Cape. In addition, I was able to interview an ex-employee of Volunteer 
Service Abroad14 in Hamilton, New Zealand, who had participated in a 
specific land reform project near East London in the early 2000s. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, I was able to interview Duncan Stewart and Lisa Del Grande 
                                                 
14
 A New Zealand-based NGO working in local-scale international development projects.  
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from Lima in Pietermaritzburg, and Stephen Hulbert from the Association 
for Rural Advancement (AFRA). All these organisations have long 
participated in land and land reform issues in South Africa.  
 
To gain a sense of the narratives and discourses around land reform among 
the white large-scale commercial farmers, I concentrated on interviewing 
representatives of the organisations representing these farmers in the two 
provinces. In the Eastern Cape, I spoke with Mr Ernest Pringle, President of 
Agri-EC. This is the largest organisation representing the white commercial 
farmers of the Eastern Cape, and is an affiliate of the national-level Agri-SA. 
I also carried out an interview with Mrs Louise Rossouw, who represented 
the Transvaalse Landbou Unie (also known as the Transvaal Agricultural 
Union or TAU). In KwaZulu-Natal, I was able to interview a representative 
of the TAU for that province, who requested anonymity. While I was unable 
to secure an individual interview with a representative of Kwanalu, the 
organisations representing the large-scale commercial farmers of KwaZulu-
Natal, I was given permission to attend their Annual Congress for 2012, held 
in Pietermaritzburg on the 13th August 2012. At this Congress the subject of 
land reform was repeatedly discussed, and allowed me insight into how 
members of this organisation approach the topic.  
 
The large-scale commercial sector is also represented by commodity 
organisations which focus on promoting and furthering the interests of 
their producers. In KwaZulu-Natal, the South African Sugar Association 
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(SASA) co-ordinates the activities of the growers and the millers of sugar-
cane. This organisation has a department devoted to land reform issues, 
headed by Mr Anwhar Madhanpall at the time of the interviews, who talked 
to me about SASA’s approach to the issue. In the Eastern Cape, a group of 
large-scale dairy farmers have contributed funding to create Amadlelo, an 
organisation focused on selecting and training young black graduates in the 
commercial production of milk on a large scale. It also facilitates the 
creation of and manages large-scale milking businesses on communal land 
(Amadlelo Agri, n.d.).  Mr Jeff Every, the leader of this organisation, was 
kind enough to grant me an interview. KwaZulu-Natal is the base of 
operations for MONDI and SAPPI, two corporations focused on the 
production, processing and export of timber and timber products. Both 
corporations own large amounts of land in the province, and are powerful 
figures in the national agricultural sector. Representatives from both 
corporations were able to grant me interviews to convey their views on the 
land reform process.  
 
Besides the various farmers involved in land reform, it was important to 
understand provincial bureaucrats think about the process. I carried out 
interviews with five rank-and-file bureaucrats in the DRDLR in the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. While three of the interviewees requested 
anonymity, Mr Sigqibo Mfuywa and Mr Vivian Loest were happy to be 
identified in my thesis. It was equally important that I spoke to members of 
the provincial departments of Agriculture in the two provinces. In the 
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Eastern Cape, my interviewee respondent in the Department of Rural 
Development and Agrarian Reform (DRDAR) requested anonymity. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mr Daya Chetty and Mr Roland Gevers from the 
Department of Agriculture, Environmental Affairs and Rural Development 
(DAEA&RD) provided supplementary materials that would aid in my 
research. In addition, a further interview respondent from this Department 
requested anonymity. Respondents in KwaZulu-Natal repeatedly referred to 
the important role played by the Agribusiness Development Agency, a 
government body created to bridge the gap in the services provided by the 
DRDLR and the DAEA&RD in the province. The interview respondent from 
this government organisation with whom I secured an interview requested 
anonymity. Researchers into land reform in South Africa have referred to 
the important role played by consultants who are hired by the government 
in the process of land redistribution (Hebinck et al., 2011). I was able to 
carry out interviews with three such consultants with extensive experience 
in this process. In the Eastern Cape, Mr Charlie Josephs and Mr Lane 
Webber were interviewed, while in KwaZulu-Natal, Mrs Susan Pletts 
provided insight into her views of land reform in that province. 
 
Finally, on the basis that it was vitally important to get some idea of how 
members of the major political parties in each province think about land 
reform, interviews were carried out with representatives of the two largest 
political parties in the two provinces. While South Africa currently has a 
range of political parties in its Parliament, in 2012 when I was carrying out 
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the interviews, the ANC dominated popular support in both the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Therefore, I concentrated my efforts on gaining 
an interview with a member of this party in either province. Personal 
contacts are the most efficacious way to secure interviews with members of 
the ANC. My network of contacts in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal 
only enabled me to secure an interview with a member of that party in the 
Eastern Cape. Similarly, at a national level the Democratic Alliance was the 
second-largest party in the South African Parliament at the time of the 
interviews (EISA, 2009), and so I concentrated my efforts on gaining an 
interview from a representative of this party, and was able to spend an hour 
with Mr Athol Trollip, at the time the shadow minister for rural 
development and land reform. I was unable to secure interviews with 
members of other parties in either province.   
Interview analysis  
In total, I interviewed 36 people. Table 4-1 below shows the categories, 
location and number of people interviewed. Once the interviews were 
completed, each interview was transcribed. The transcript of each interview 
was read through a number of times. Through the readings, I searched for 
participant answers on a number of themes.  Specifically, I examined 
interview responses indicating opinions on what constitutes ‘development’ 
in South Africa, what the best form of agriculture is, what the place of land 
reform is in the process of development, and what the best form of land 
reform is. In addition, I sought participant opinions on what is to be done 
with the ‘communal areas’ of South Africa, and the place of women in land 
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reform. Within each of these themes, a number of categories of responses 
were constructed. Responses on the theme of ‘development’, for example, 
fell into two main categories — those advocating the integration of black 
South Africans into the economy created during colonial and apartheid 
times, and those advocating the alleviation of the plight of the rural poor.  
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Table 4-1:  
Categories of interview respondents in this study 
 Eastern Cape KwaZulu-Natal 
Beneficiaries 
(Individual large-scale 
commercial farmers) 
AFASA — Mr. X. 
Ngqameni 
NAFU — Dr M. Buthelezi 
Anonymous 
Anonymous 
Beneficiaries 
(Group-farmers) 
Mr. P.V. Njoli 
Anonymous 
 
Potential beneficiaries 
(Communal Farmers) 
Anonymous 
Anonymous 
 
NGOs 
BRC 
ECARP 
Umncunube 
VSA 
Lima — Mr D. Stewart; 
Ms. L. Del Grande 
AFRA — Mr S. Hulbert 
Existing white farmers 
Agri-EC — Mr E. Pringle 
TLU — Ms L. Rossouw 
TLU 
Kwanalu Annual Congress 
2012 
Commodity 
organisations 
Amadlelo — Mr J. Every 
SASA — Mr A. Madhanpall 
MONDI 
SAPPI 
Bureaucracy 
(DRDRL) 
Mr S. Mfuywa 
Mr V. Loest 
Anonymous 
Anonymous 
Anonymous 
Bureaucracy 
(Provincial Departments of 
Agriculture) 
Anonymous 
Mr D. Chetty 
Anonymous 
ADA 
Consultants 
Mr C. Josephs 
Mr L. Webber 
Mrs S. Pletts 
Political parties 
ANC - Anonymous 
DA — Mr A. Trollip 
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Data analysis  
To aid my analysis of all the data raised with the research methods 
described above, I used the NVivo software package. NVivo is a qualitative 
data analysis software package that provides facilities for data management, 
for coding and retrieving text, and for theory testing (Crowley, Harre, & 
Tagg, 2002). Articles discussing the use of computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software in their studies are few and isolated (Kikooma, 2010), 
but such software is mainly appreciated by qualitative scholars for providing 
facilities for data processing that are faster, more precise, and requiring less 
floor space (Bourdon, 2002)15. Concerns have been raised that as qualitative 
data analysis software is based on grounded theory approaches, it cannot be 
used for other studies not based on grounded theory, such as this one. It is 
not necessary, however, to follow grounded theory guidelines when using 
this software (Welsh, 2002)16. Crowley (2002) asserts that in the same way 
that a word-processing package does not dictate whether you write a novel 
or a sermon, NVivo software does not determine nor constitute a method. 
In fact, studies have found that data analysis software is used mainly as an 
organising tool (Welsh, 2002). “Therefore, the use of computers in 
qualitative analysis merely made organisation, reduction and storage of data 
more efficient and manageable” (Wong, 2008, p. 15). Ultimately however, 
the researcher still has to synthesise the data, and interpret the meanings 
extracted from it (Wong, 2008). The main feature of NVivo used in this 
study was the ‘node’ feature, which enabled the manual gathering of 
                                                 
15
 No page numbers were given in the original text.  
16
 No page numbers were given in the original text.  
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material into themes. For example, I took all the quotes from my 
respondents about subsistence farming, and put them together in one node 
on NVivo. A total of six main nodes were created during this study, 
subdivided into 56 subnodes. This made it easier to discern the approaches 
of the various participants in the South African land redistribution policy 
process, and so discern the meanings attached to land and land 
redistribution in South Africa. 
Conclusion  
This study offers an analysis of why so little has been done in post-apartheid 
South Africa to change the landownership patterns established prior to 
1994. An antifoundationalist, interpretivist and qualitative approach has 
been adopted for this study, focused on the social constructionism 
approach. The research produced here will have been affected by my social 
position in South Africa society as a white English-speaking male, which 
puts me in a socially dominant role compared to the black respondents in 
my study. At all three levels of analysis, this study uses various methods of 
discourse analysis developed by Dryzek, Bacchi and Schneider and Ingram 
to analyse the ideas and discourses underpinning the institutions of land 
redistribution policy, and motivating the actors working within them. This 
study focuses on the Constitution of South Africa, various policy documents 
and range of semi-structured interviews were carried out with actors and 
organisations involved in land redistribution policy in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal provinces. Finally, to ensure the systematic processing and 
analysis of all the data I generated, I used NVivo qualitative analysis 
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software. What follows is an analysis of international discourses around 
land reform, which provides an overall context for land redistribution in 
South Africa.  
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Chapter Five 
The International Context of Land Reform: Discursive 
Drivers of Debate 
No policy is created in a vacuum — a multitude of both domestic and 
external factors affect the formulation and implementation of any public 
policy (Lindblom, 1959). This is as true of land reform policies as of any 
other. Governments considering the creation and implementation of such 
policies must to create one suited to the unique circumstances each country 
faces. Visions of the ideal land reform policy, therefore, are nested within 
broader narratives about what ‘development’ looks like, the best course for 
it to take, and who should benefit. Governments contemplating land reform 
policies must make policy within a broader context, which constructs the 
‘possible’ and the ‘impossible’ in land reform policy proposals. South African 
policymakers were not immune to this broader context when the broad 
boundaries of land reform policy were negotiated during the transition to 
democracy. They were not immune to this broader context during the 
creation of the first, second and third iterations of land reform policy, either. 
This broader ideational context has so far not been clearly defined in the 
literature on land reform and development in South Africa, despite its 
potential to significantly influence the nature of state policy. Therefore, in 
order to answer the question of why so little has been done to change the 
agrarian order created in colonial, segregationist and apartheid South Africa, 
as a first step it is necessary to map out this broader ideational context.  
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The impact of internationally derived discourses of land reform is clear in 
South Africa. Between 1990 and 1994, during the negotiations to set the 
political framework of the post-apartheid regime, various actors were also 
contributing to the development of a land redistribution policy for the new 
democratic government. One of the most active participants in this process 
was the World Bank (Bradstock, 2005). Simultaneously giving policy advice 
and soliciting a new client, it oversaw a major programme of policy research 
(Hall, 2010c) that culminated in the publication of Options for Land Reform 
and Rural Restructuring in South Africa (World Bank, 1993). The aims, 
methods and original timeline of the State Lands and Acquisition Grant 
(SLAG) policy developed by the South African government were almost 
directly derived from the options put forward in this publication (Williams, 
1996), demonstrating the decisive influence  of the World Bank in shaping 
the early stages of land redistribution policy in South Africa.  
The domestic pressures on the South African land redistribution policy, 
such as the chronic poverty of much of the rural population and the need to 
redress the country’s history of unjust dispossession, have been 
comprehensively analysed (Aliber, 2003; Binswanger & Deininger, 1993; 
Budlender & Latsky, 1990; Carter & May, 1999; Cousins, 2007; Hall, 1998, 
2004b; Lahiff, 2005; MacDonald, 2003; Ntzebeza, 2004). In contrast, the 
broader ideational context through which the problem of racially-based 
inequity in land ownership has been conceptualized has received little or no 
attention (one exception being Cousins and Scoones (2010)). No other 
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scholars of land reform in South Africa pay attention to these broader 
assumptions, making clear the need for an analysis of the major discourses 
of land reform, at least in the South African context.    
This chapter clarifies the specific form of land reform policy arising from 
the various narratives of development. Through a discourse analysis of the 
scholarly literature on land reform and distribution, it explores the 
underlying assumptions, norms, and policy recommendations implicit in 
various land reform discourses. The analysis identifies five discourses of 
land reform — a Large Farms discourse, a Small Farms discourse, a Socialist 
discourse, a Dependency discourse and a Critical discourse. Each is 
underpinned by a distinct set of norms, each implies a distinctive set of 
agents involved in land reform, each has a unique narrative around land 
reform, and each leads to distinctive policy proposals for land reform. The 
analysis that follows clarifies these aspects of the five broad discourses 
identified, allowing greater understanding of the international influences on 
specific land reform policies in the South African context.  It is important to 
note that these discourses are not mutually exclusive, nor are they 
exhaustive. The discussion begins with setting the key aspects of the neo-
liberal context.  
South African scholarship on wider trends in land reform  
A wide array of scholars agree that at the macro-economic level, neoliberal 
approaches have dominated the post-apartheid government approach to 
development in South Africa (Bond, 2000; Marais, 2011; Peet, 2002). In the 
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sphere of land reform, a strong neoliberal emphasis has been noted 
(Moseley & McCusker, 2008). The history and the background assumptions 
driving the prescriptions given by agricultural ‘experts’ involved in land 
reform in the Eastern Cape of South Africa, which lead them to assume that 
large-scale capital-intensive commercial farms are the best form of 
agriculture have been analysed (Hebinck et al., 2011). Similarly, deference to 
the ‘Large Scale Commercial Farm’ model has been shown to account for 
the generally unworkable project designs of SLAG-based redistribution 
projects in Limpopo province (Aliber & Cousins, 2013). The imperative for 
economic development in the form of individually-owned commercial farms 
has been identified as the dominant discourse in the KwaZulu-Natal Land 
Reform Pilot Project, which “… finds powerful resonance in the global 
dominance of neo-liberal ideology …” (MacDonald, 2003, p. 157). These 
studies illustrate that there is a consensus in the scholarship on land reform 
in South Africa that this particular policy arena has been dominated by a 
neoliberal notion of the place of agriculture and land reform in the process 
of development.  
Stepping back, however, there is very little examination of what this 
neoliberal notion of agriculture and land reform actually consists of. 
Similarly, there is scarcely any exploration of other approaches, frameworks 
or discourses which might exist around land reform and its place in 
development, and what influence these alternative discourses might have 
exerted on land reform policy in South Africa. The sole exception is Cousins 
and Scoones (2010), who outline the “… competing analytical frameworks 
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commonly used in assessments of land and agrarian reform” (p. 36) in the 
international literature. They too describe the neo-classical economics 
framework, which corresponds largely to the neo-liberal approach outlined 
above. Along with this approach, however, Cousins and Scoones suggest the 
presence of five other discourses of land reform in South Africa, including 
the new institutional economics framework, livelihoods approaches, a 
welfarist variant of the livelihoods approach, Marxism and radical political 
economy.  
Briefly, where the ‘neo-classical economics’ discourse focuses on the 
transfer of farms to efficient farmers (often seeing larger farms as 
economically efficient) through the market, ‘new institutional economics’ 
gives rise to efforts to create efficient small farmers through government 
and market action. ‘Developmentalist livelihoods’ approaches see land 
redistribution as part of government efforts to provide the rural poor with 
multiple and diverse livelihoods, while ‘welfarist livelihoods’ approaches see 
land redistribution as part of efforts to provide the rural poor with food 
security. ‘Radical political economy’ sees land reform as a process of 
securing the land and resources held by peasant farmers against a global 
corporate food regime. Finally, what the authors name the ‘Marxist’ 
discourse, focuses on the transition to capitalism in agriculture, and 
ultimately seeks to create the most efficient form of agriculture possible, in 
order to facilitate national economic growth (2010). Their study is not 
presented as a comprehensive review, but rather concentrates on the 
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definition of what a ‘viable’ size is for land transfer arising from each of 
these frameworks of analysis in the context of land reform.  
Cousins and Scoones’ study is an important contribution to clarifying the 
broader assumptions held by policy participants in the South African land 
reform programme around ‘viability’. However, there is room for a more 
detailed examination of the normative perspectives on development, the 
narratives around land reform, assumptions around the agents involved in 
land reform, and the policy proposals regarding land reform found in each 
of these discourses.  In addition, Cousins and Scoones do not mention all 
the discourses or analytical frameworks for development and land reform 
that potentially have had an effect on land reform in South Africa. This 
chapter, therefore, undertakes a deeper analysis of the various approaches 
to land reform and the implicit vision of what constitutes ‘development’; 
where land reform is seen to fit into the process of development within each 
approach; who the agents are in land reform; and a more precise 
clarification of the policy recommendations towards land reform arising 
from each of these approaches. The discourses outlined in this chapter align 
broadly with those suggested by Cousins and Scoones. An extra discourse, 
the Dependency discourse, is added to those suggested by Cousins and 
Scoones, and the Critical discourse described here combines the two 
livelihoods and the radical political economy approaches suggested by 
Cousins and Scoones.   
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Discourse analysis approach  
While based loosely on the analytical framework presented by Cousins and 
Scoones, this chapter approaches each ‘framework of analysis’ as a 
discourse. To make sense of the multiple overlapping perspectives in the 
land reform policy arena, I developed a checklist of four elements derived 
from Dryzek’s (2013) method. Firstly, the normative perspective of each 
discourse on development and land reform was identified.  This meant 
uncovering the processes invoked in discussions of development, the 
entities that are involved in these processes, and the place of land reform in 
development. Secondly, who the discourse portrays as the primary agents in 
land reform was examined, along with their assumed motives (Dryzek, 
2005). Thirdly, the implicit narratives around development and land reform 
within each discourse were identified with specific attention to the 
depiction of problematic land ownership arrangements. How policy 
problems are defined is important, as problem definition shapes the nature 
of the policy solutions offered (Stone, 2012). Finally, the policy proposals for 
land reform implicit in each discourse were investigated. Table 5-1 shows 
the steps undertaken to carry out a discourse analysis, described here in 
tabular form. 
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Table 5-1  
Steps to undertake discourse analysis (Source: Adapted from Dryzek's 2013)  
Step One. Normative perspectives on development 
- Entities 
- Processes 
- Place of land reform in this process 
Step Two. Agents involved in land reform and their motives 
Step Three. Key narratives of the discourse 
Step Four. 
Policy proposals for land reform — what should land 
reform look like?  
 
Out of this analysis five discrete approaches or discourses around land 
reform were developed: the Large Farms, the Small Farms, the Socialist, the 
Dependency, and the Critical discourses. Table 5-2 (page 179) provides a 
summary of each discourse, detailing the specific policy recommendations 
for land reform deriving from each approach. I discuss each of these below.  
Large Farms discourse   
Due to its support for large-scale mechanized farming systems, the first 
discourse described here is named the ‘Large Farms’ discourse. 
Corresponding closely with Cousins and Scoones’ ‘neo-classical economics’ 
discourse (2010, p. 39), it is accepted today in many national contexts as the 
‘common sense’ approach. This discourse has its origins in modernization 
theory, which arose after the Second World War (Kuznets, 1955; Mergel, 
2012; Rostow, 1960). This approach was expressed in a slightly different form 
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with the rise of neoliberalism, or the ‘Washington Consensus’ during the 
1980s (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Marangos, 2009). Policy recommendations for 
land reform arising from this discourse were until very recently common 
from institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank (Marangos, 2009).  
The Large Farms discourse sees the process of development as a continuum 
spanning ‘traditional societies’ at one end, and ‘modern societies’ at the 
other. According to this discourse, traditional society is characterized by a 
largely poor population engaged in small-scale subsistence farming 
(Rostow, 1990). Food production is organized through kinship units (Keelan 
& Moon, 1998), and agricultural production is limited, as the technology 
used is based on “… pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-
Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world” (Rostow, 1990, p. 4). This 
means that a high proportion of the resources in this type of society must be 
devoted to agriculture, and most political power lies with those who own 
the land (Rostow, 1990). These societies are called ‘developing’, ‘Third 
World’, or ‘subsistence economies’.  
‘Modern’ society, in contrast, is marked by a largely urban population 
(Larrain, 1989), and most of the workforce is in the industrial and service 
sectors. In these societies, real income per capita has risen to the point 
where a large number of people earn more than they need for basic food, 
shelter and clothing. The leading sectors in these economies produce 
consumer goods and services, and constant growth in the economy is taken 
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as normal (Rostow, 1990). The agricultural sectors of these societies form 
only a small part of the national economy, and are highly mechanized 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2007). These societies are called ‘developed’, ‘First World’ or 
‘industrial economies’. In the Large Farms discourse, ‘development’ is the 
movement of societies along a ‘trajectory of development’ from the 
traditional to the modern society (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
The market is considered to be the primary mechanism for moving 
countries along this trajectory, and is seen as an arena where buyers and 
sellers can interact. Through the market, agricultural land, capital and 
technology are transferred to those able to use them the most efficiently 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2007). According to Timmer (2006, p. 5),  there is a “… 
structural transformation where agriculture, through higher productivity, 
provides food, labour and even savings to the process of urbanization and 
industrialization”. Agricultural production is believed to rise mainly 
through farm mechanization, which leads to economies of scale becoming 
increasingly important. Continued efficiency in the use of resources then 
makes the consolidation of farms necessary, leading to an increase in 
average farm size (Griffin, Khan, & Ickowitz, 2002). Over time, the 
agricultural sector becomes less important relative to the industrial and 
service sectors, which grow rapidly partly because of the stimulus provided 
by the ‘modernizing’ agricultural sector (Timmer, 2006). This structural 
transformation enables progress along the trajectory from ‘tradition’ to 
‘modernity’. It is therefore important that agricultural markets work as 
perfectly as possible, with no distortions.    
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Market distortions here are portrayed as skewing the distribution of 
resources, allowing less efficient farmers to retain ownership of the land. 
Relying on distorted markets to distribute resources like land, capital and 
technology drastically slows the movement of a society along the trajectory 
towards ‘modernity’ (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). The scope of government must 
therefore be very limited. Its major functions must only be “… to preserve 
law and order, to enforce private contracts, [and] to foster competitive 
markets” (Friedman, 2009, p. 2).   
With this normative perspective on development, the Large Farms 
discourse is ambivalent about the place of land reform programmes 
involving market regulation and explicit government-led initiatives to 
redistribute land. If large mechanized farms are the inevitable result of 
development (Timmer, 2006), why should a developing country already 
with an agricultural sector dominated by large mechanized farms (for 
whatever reasons) subdivide and redistribute them? In addition, in this 
discourse, the agricultural sector constitutes a secondary development 
factor (Bandeira & Maria Sumpsi, 2009). A shift away from agriculture is an 
invariable accompaniment to economic and industrial growth (Kuznets, 
1955; Rigg, 2006). Governments in developing countries should therefore 
not expend precious resources creating small farms that will only 
reconsolidate into larger ones again over time.  
This discourse assumes the existence of two main agents or actors: the 
government, and economically rational citizens who act only to maximize 
155 
 
their own material self-interest (Stone, 2012). Thus landowners increase 
production to increase their own material well-being. Those who are 
successful prosper and expand the amount of land they own. Less successful 
landowners sell or hire their land out to the more successful. In this way, 
large pieces of land end up in the hands of those most able to produce from 
them. This is seen as being best for overall economic progress.  
The government is assumed to be motivated to move along the trajectory of 
development as rapidly as possible. Therefore, it takes every measure 
possible to create the open undistorted markets necessary to channel assets 
to the most efficient users (Jacobs, 2010), and otherwise keeps its activities 
and powers minimal (Friedman, 2009). This is assumed to allow rapid 
economic growth, and as a consequence improve the lives of all.  
The narrative here is that agriculture in developing countries is hampered 
primarily by a lack of secure property rights. If these can be created, then 
the owners of these properties will be able to access credit, progress 
economically and pull their societies along into modernity. Where there are 
property rights, in some cases agriculture and development is held back by 
small, unproductive, backward farmers, who refuse to use new technologies 
to produce more. The driving assumption here is that large mechanized 
farms are the most technologically advanced and productive form of 
agriculture — they constitute ‘real’ agriculture. Anything else endangers the 
national food supply. Developing countries should therefore do all they can 
to achieve this form of agriculture.  
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Policy proposals for land reform  
The Large Farms discourse is not normally in favour of land reform 
programmes that involve explicit attempts at redistribution. The inevitable 
result of the development process is believed to be large mechanized farms, 
owned by a few successful large-scale farmers, as seen in the ‘modern’ 
world. Rural poverty is eliminated, according to this discourse, through 
migration from rural to urban areas, and rising wages for the remaining 
rural workers (Timmer, 2006). In this light, if a country already has an 
agricultural sector dominated by large farms, the value of subdividing and 
redistributing them is not clear. It is in the general interest to proceed on 
the presumption that “… the past success of some people in picking winners 
makes it probable that they will also do so in the future, and that it is 
therefore worthwhile to induce them to continue their attempts” (Hayek, 
1984, p. 73).   
However, in cases where overwhelming social or political pressures 
mandate land reform, this discourse advocates market-led land reform 
policies. In these ‘willing buyer willing seller’ policies (Zimmerman, 2000), 
large landowners are paid the full market value for land that they are 
willing to sell voluntarily. Beneficiaries usually bear the full costs of the 
land transfer (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). Repaying these debts can be extremely 
difficult, as land market values are often higher than productive values. 
Government subsidies on the interest rates paid by beneficiaries are 
sometimes recommended to remedy this (Bandeira & Maria Sumpsi, 2009).  
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A market-led land reform programme depends on individual, permanent, 
inalienable, and freely trade-able forms of land ownership. In countries 
where they do not exist, proponents of this discourse propose they be 
created. Specific transformations in property rights must take place in the 
developing world, resulting in the ‘enclosure’ of land, which is seen as an 
important condition of the development of capitalism (Akram-Lodhi, 2007), 
as they are assumed to increase the investment incentives of land users. 
Where there is no precise system of individual land rights, this discourse 
gives rise to recommendations for policy interventions to provide these 
rights, arguing that this will increase the incentives of land users to invest in 
their land. This means that ‘traditional’ communal land ownership 
structures must inevitably be replaced with individual land ownership 
systems (Deininger, 2003). Over time, it is assumed that the most efficient 
of these new individual landowners will come to own more and more land, 
freeing the less efficient landowners to apply their talents elsewhere. This 
underlying assumption that the concentration of land in a few hands is 
inevitable and good is explicitly challenged in the next discourse to be 
discussed, the Small Farms discourse.    
Small Farms discourse   
During the 1960s, development approaches were dominated by this 
approach, which recommended government-led redistributions of small 
parcels of farmland in order to spur economic growth and development (El-
Ghonemy, 2010). There was strong institutional support for this approach 
from international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank. 
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In the 1980s, however, it was abandoned in favour of Large Farms 
approaches, although some scholars continue to advocate for the creation of 
small-scale agricultural sectors in developing countries (Griffin et al., 2002; 
Lipton, 2009). This discourse corresponds with the ‘new institutional 
economics’ discourse suggested by Cousins and Scoones (2010).  
This discourse recognizes much the same basic entities found in the Large 
Farms discourse, namely, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies, and the 
market. The ‘Small Farms’ discourse also sees societies moving along a 
trajectory of development through the transfer of assets like land, capital 
and technology from inefficient to efficient users. The efficient users 
develop their assets to their full potential, increasing agricultural 
production, and as a consequence the entire national economy (Lipton, 
2009). Distortions to these markets will obviously have a negative effect on 
the progression of a society along the trajectory of development (El-
Ghonemy, 2010). So far, this is the same as the narrative in the Large Farms 
discourse. However, these two discourses differ drastically as to who is 
deemed the most efficient users of agricultural assets, and what changes 
need to be made to the market for agricultural land to ensure that these 
users can get access to land.     
Those drawing on this discourse argue that in developed countries capital is 
cheap while labour is expensive, making it logical to employ fewer people 
and use more machinery. As it takes a certain minimum amount of land to 
make full use, for example, of a combine harvester, smaller farms are 
159 
 
gradually consolidated into larger units. In the developed world, then, there 
are economies of scale — farm productivity increases with farm size 
(Bandeira & Maria Sumpsi, 2009; Banerjee, 1999; Koo, 1968; Lipton, 2009).  
In contrast, the Small Farms discourse gives rise to assertions that there are 
no economies of scale in the developing world at the individual farm level. 
Rather than capital being cheap and labour expensive, in the developing 
world capital is in fact expensive while labour is cheap (Lipton, 2009). This 
means that in the developing world capital-intensive mechanized farms are 
inefficient - the most efficient farms in the developing world are labour-
intensive. Furthermore, scholars in the Small Farms discourse argue that 
supervising agricultural labour is extremely expensive and not especially 
effective. This means that small farms using mostly family labour are the 
most economically efficient mode of agricultural production in the 
developing world (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, & van den Brink, 
2009; Lipton, 2009). At the farm level, there are no economies of scale in 
the developing world — rather, there is an inverse relationship between 
farm size and production efficiency (Banerjee, 1999). The productivity of 
farms is seen as increasing as their size decreases (El-Ghonemy, 2010; Koo, 
1968). “Aggregating from farm level, smaller farm size and higher land 
equality are linked to higher annual farmland productivity, and probably 
also to faster growth of non-farm and total GDP” (Lipton, 2009, p. 69). 
Large farms are seen as inherently inefficient, and so must be broken up 
into smaller units and redistributed to rural farming families. Land reform 
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programmes are therefore a vital part of the movement of a society along 
the trajectory of development.   
In this discourse, the primary agents in land reform are the rural poor, large 
farmers and the government. The rural poor are seen as wanting to make 
productive investments and start new enterprises in order to better their 
lot. When they are able to get access to land, they are strongly motivated to 
produce as much as possible from it. They live on their farms, manage the 
farms themselves, use labour-intensive farming techniques, and have strong 
incentives to invest all their savings back into their land (Binswanger-
Mkhize et al., 2009; Lipton, 1993a). They leave a lower proportion of their 
land fallow or uncultivated, and have intensive cropping rotations which 
use the most valuable crops possible in their environments (Griffin et al., 
2002). Motivated as they are to increase the production on their land as 
much as possible, they make the best possible use of the land. 
Because of the inverse relationship in the developing world, the large farms 
that do exist have normally been created by government intervention. Being 
artificial creations, these large farmers do not need to use these assets in the 
most efficient way possible, and some value their farmland for reasons other 
than agricultural production like insurance, inflation hedging, and tax 
shelters (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2009). The Small Farms discourse 
describes two types of large farm in the developing world. Those that are 
non-mechanized face major problems in mobilizing and organizing labour 
to work their land. To overcome this, the large landowners create systems of 
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political and social control over the available labour in rural areas, ensuring 
that they have no choice but to work at low rates of pay for the large 
landowners. This creates an unskilled workforce and exacerbates rural 
poverty (Griffin et al., 2002). In contrast, those large farms in the developing 
world which are highly mechanized use minimal labour, meaning that few 
people can work on these farms, and most have to migrate to rural or urban 
slums. In countries where there are chronically high rates of 
unemployment, this form of agriculture has a very high social cost 
(Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2009). Large farms are, therefore, seen as 
slowing the movement of developing countries along the trajectory of 
development.  
Policy proposals for land reform  
The land reform policy proposals of this discourse revolve around aiding 
and encouraging the development of a small-scale farming sector. As a first 
step, proponents of the Small Farms discourse recommend that all 
measures favouring urban areas over rural areas must be disbanded, and 
rural infrastructure must be upgraded and maintained. At the same time, all 
legislative and financial support for large farms must be removed (Griffin et 
al., 2002). Developing states are advised to break up large farms into smaller 
units, similar to the process implemented in Taiwan in the years 
immediately after the Second World War. In this programme, the farms of 
large landowners were expropriated at lower-than-market values, and 
beneficiaries paid prices for their land linked to its productive value (Koo, 
1968). Once these small farms have been created, the state must provide a 
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wide span of support mechanisms for land reform beneficiaries, like 
extension, agricultural credit and processing and marketing facilities 
(Bandeira & Maria Sumpsi, 2009; Deininger, 2003). “One cannot, as has 
often happened, simply give land to the peasants and then abandon them, 
and expect that all will be well” (Griffin et al., 2002, p. 9). While the Small 
Farms discourse strongly supports small-scale peasant agriculture, as will 
emerge in the next section, the Socialist discourse displays some 
ambivalence about their economic worth.   
Socialist discourse   
The Socialist discourse, encompassing communism and its variants, first 
arose from the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and corresponds with the 
‘Marxist’ approach suggested by Cousins and Scoones. The creation of 
institutions embodying the ideas of this discourse began with the ascent to 
power of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 (Davis & Scase, 1985), and land 
reforms adhering to the specifications of the Socialist discourse began in 
Soviet Russia in the 1920s (Schlesinger & Blustain, 1964). During the Cold 
War these land reforms were instituted in many of the countries of Eastern 
Europe (Davis & Scase, 1985) and those parts of the developing world under 
communist rule (Lipton, 2009; Pipes, 2003; Tauger, 2010). After the end of 
the Cold War in the 1990s, most countries formerly under communist 
governments moved away from the recommendations arising from this 
discourse (Tauger, 2010). Some began even earlier. While retaining much of 
the rhetoric of the Socialist discourse, countries like China, Algeria and 
Vietnam largely abandoned the recommendations arising from this 
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discourse in the 1980s in favour of land reform programmes similar to those 
recommended by the Small Farms discourse (Pipes, 2003; Tauger, 2010; 
Wädekin, 1990).  
Much as in the Large Farms and Small Farms discourses, the Socialist 
discourse sees the process of development as a linear progression from a 
‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ society. However, contrary to the assertions 
arising from the Large Farms and Small Farms discourses, it does not see 
the market as the mechanism for moving along this trajectory. In addition, 
another type of society is envisaged, after the ‘modern’ state has been 
reached. Firstly, scholars within the communist discourse suggest five basic 
stages in the development of human society. Much as in the Large Farms 
discourse, it is assumed that every country without exception must pass 
through each of these stages in turn. From the tribal society (Schlesinger & 
Blustain, 1964), societies progress to the slave-owning and then the feudal 
stages. At each stage different social classes own the dominant modes of 
production, or ways of producing goods (Schlesinger & Blustain, 1964). The 
second-last stage of human development is capitalism (Marx & Engels, 
1848), which corresponds to the ‘modern’ state described in the Large Farms 
discourse. Here the capitalists own the means of production, and the 
workers sell their labour in order to survive (Mandel, 1983). The workers 
combine raw materials and tools to produce something with greater value 
than what existed before. This additional value goes to the capitalists who 
employ the workers (Mandel, 1983). Capitalist employers pay workers only a 
fraction of the value they create — just enough to keep them alive. The rest 
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of the surplus value is kept by the capitalists (Pipes, 2003). Capitalism is 
thus seen here as exploitative and unjust, and not as the ultimate 
destination of every society on earth.  
Like the Large Farms discourse, the Communist discourse gives rise to 
arguments that through the mechanism of the market, the long-term 
tendency in capitalism is for industrial wealth to become concentrated into 
fewer and fewer hands (Pipes, 2003). Unlike the Large Farms discourse, this 
is seen as a negative development. As the capitalist system goes through 
repeated cycles of boom and bust, the living conditions of workers 
deteriorate until their situation becomes unbearable (Mandel, 1983). Finally, 
the workers unite to overthrow the ‘modern’ capitalist state and take 
control of the means of production (Schlesinger & Blustain, 1964). This 
ushers in the fifth and final phase of social and economic development after 
‘modernity’ — socialism.  
In the Large Farms and Small Farms discourses, the market is an important 
part of a society’s movement along the trajectory of development. Various 
adjustments to the market are suggested in order to facilitate this 
movement. In contrast, the communist discourse sees the market as serving 
only to increase the wealth of a few capitalists. Therefore, in the socialist 
stage it must be replaced with something more rational. Market relations 
must disappear, along with the classes dependent on private ownership of 
property (Conquest, 1988; El-Ghonemy, 2010). The production of 
commodities through the market is replaced by conscious organization on a 
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planned basis (Davies, 1980a). Rather than the individual capitalist search 
for profit, investment is driven by a centralized planning process (Davis & 
Scase, 1985). As part of this process, private property in land is replaced with 
common ownership on a higher level (Bergmann, 1998).  
Marx argued that this type of socialist revolution is not likely in 
undeveloped countries. Rather, it is part of the natural evolution of societies 
that have already reached the ‘modern’ stage (Davies, 1980a). However, 
Lenin asserted that it was possible to bypass the capitalist stage, and 
proceed directly from feudalism to socialism (Pipes, 2003). The key to 
progress in these situations is rapid industrialization led by the state 
(Conquest, 1988). To do this, it is necessary to nationalize all of the 
country’s human and material resources, and subject the economy to a 
central plan (Pipes, 2003). The focus of this central plan must be on 
developing heavy industries (energy extraction, steel and chemical 
production) rather than the manufacture of consumer goods. The first 
priority in these situations is to generate funding for investment and capital 
accumulation (Davis & Scase, 1985).  
The primary agents in this discourse are social classes. The state is the 
representative of the urban and rural workers, while the peasants are the 
remnants of the old capitalist class (Conquest, 1988). The primary 
motivation of the state is to accelerate the process of industrialization in 
order to move their countries to the socialist stage. A socialist society must 
rest on an industrial base (Pipes, 2003), and the funds for this development 
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of industry must be obtained from the agricultural sector. In order to 
maximize the amount that could be gained from agriculture to finance 
industrialization, the efficiency and productivity of agriculture must be 
increased (Conquest, 1988). Agriculture must be modernized on the basis of 
large-scale co-operative farms working to a central plan developed by the 
state (Conquest, 1988).  
The peasant class is ultimately seen as being enemies of the working class 
(Pipes, 2003) — it is depicted as deeply conservative, and trying in vain to 
roll back the wheel of history in order to preserve its own historical place in 
society (Marx & Engels, 1848). The replacement of the small-scale farming 
methods of the peasants is seen as essential if the socialist state is to be 
successfully established (Davies, 1980b). This is somewhat complicated by 
the fact that communist governments sometimes must facilitate the 
emergence and growth of the peasant sector when initially taking power, to 
gain their support and to break the power of the old capitalist and feudal 
elites. Thus in countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Cuba, when communist regimes took power, the existing large land estates 
were broken up and redistributed in smaller sections to peasant farmers 
(Davis & Scase, 1985; Tauger, 2010). Despite this, it is not envisaged that 
small-scale agriculture can survive long in the socialist state, let alone 
flourish (Conquest, 1988). Ultimately the peasants must be induced by the 
state to abandon their small-scale production methods and join large-scale 
co-operative industrialized farming operations.  
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The main problem envisaged in this discourse is that of facilitating the 
industrial development of society, in order to create a socialist state. In 
order to achieve this, the agricultural sector must be made as efficient and 
productive as possible. Like the Large Farms discourse, the communist 
discourse sees large-scale capital-intensive farms as being the most efficient 
and productive form of farming. However, it recommends that the 
ownership of these farms be vested in the state (Pipes, 2003). This means 
that the peasants must be persuaded to leave their inefficient small plots 
and join the large-scale collectives created by the state. These farms can 
then produce food and raw materials for industry according to centralized 
plans. In this way, the capitalist phase of development can be leap-frogged 
and the socialist state can be created. This will help usher in a form of 
society where it can be truly said: “From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs” (Schlesinger & Blustain, 1964, p. 51).  
Policy proposals for land reform  
The key policy proposal for land reform in this discourse is, therefore, a 
transition from small-scale peasant farming to ‘industrialized’ production 
on large-scale collective farms (Davis & Scase, 1985). In a ‘top-down’ process 
directed by a strong state (Fforde, 1990), rural farming collectives are to 
become enterprises controlled and organized along factory lines (Davies, 
1980b). Collective farms are envisaged as being large agricultural units in 
which basic farming methods are modernized and mechanized (Fitzpatrick, 
1994). These collectives should also be supplied with the machinery and 
training required to run large-scale farms. It is expected that mechanization 
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will bring about a rapid technical revolution in agriculture (Davies, 1980b). 
These collectives can either be state farms, where the residents are wage-
workers, or collective and cooperative farms, where the group shares 
incomes and costs and makes the day-to-day decisions on the farm (Lipton, 
2009).  
There is no single set process for facilitating the change from small-scale to 
large-scale collectivized agricultural production. While the entire process 
aims at creating a collectivized large-scale agricultural sector, it is accepted 
that each country will implement “… policies of land reform, agricultural 
reorganization and industrial development in the light of its own particular 
circumstances” (Davis & Scase, 1985, p. 110). Like Engels, many scholars in 
this discourse have argued that it would be possible to persuade the 
peasants of the advantages of cooperative large-scale farming over time 
(Bergmann, 1998). In other cases, however, the urgency of the need to 
industrialize (such as that faced by the USSR in 1928) may mean that the 
peasantry must be forced onto larger collective farms (Davis & Scase, 1985). 
The Communist discourse focuses on using land reform to create the 
conditions for industrialization within national economies.  
The next discourse to be analysed takes a step back and situates land reform 
policy as part of the struggle of ‘traditional’ countries to move along the 
trajectory of development, despite efforts from ‘modern’ countries to block 
their progress.  
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Dependency discourse   
The Dependency discourse emerged after the Second World War in 
reaction to some of the development approaches contributing to the Large 
Farms discourse, and was strongly associated with the United Nation’s 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
The ideas of this discourse were highly influential for much of the twentieth 
century in Latin America. However, the debt crisis in the Latin American 
region of 1982 was taken by many to show that these ideas had not delivered 
the results promised (Vernengo, 2006), leading to this discourse losing 
much of its influence. Cousins and Scoones do not mention it in the South 
African context. However, as demonstrated later (see chapter nine), at the 
provincial level an adapted form of this discourse is drawn on by an 
important group of those involved in the creation and implementation of 
land reform policy in South Africa.  
The Dependency discourse approaches development from the point of view 
of the developing world. It begins by accepting the two basic entities put 
forward in the Large Farms discourse — ‘traditional’ society and ‘modern’ 
society. The Dependency discourse similarly accepts that all countries are 
on a fixed trajectory from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘modern’. Some have 
already arrived at ‘modern’ status, and some have not. Here, the ‘modern’ 
nations are those that make up the developed world, while the developing 
world consists of societies at various points along the trajectory from a 
‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ status (Keelan & Moon, 1998).  
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The Large Farms and the Small Farms discourses see this movement along 
the trajectory as being driven by the ‘market’. The Dependency discourse 
accepts this, but sees the operation of the market in different societies as 
being distorted by the international capitalist system (Cardoso & Faletto, 
1979). By being incorporated into the world-capitalist system, different 
countries are set along the trajectory of development. However, the 
Dependency discourse sees the capitalist system as having inherent 
characteristics which have an enormous impact on the operations of 
markets in different societies, and so on the speed with which the different 
countries will travel along the trajectory (Frank, 1970). 
The Large Farms discourse asserts that the only reason a particular country 
has not attained ‘modern’ status is that it still bears relics of its ‘traditional’ 
past. The only valid reasons for underdevelopment are thus internal to the 
country itself. In contrast, the Dependency discourse argues that this 
cannot be true. Rather, “… the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole 
…” (Frank, 1970, p. 5) bears the brunt of the blame for under-development. 
Under-development in particular countries is generated by the same 
historical process which also generated economic development in the 
‘modern’ countries (Frank, 1970). The difference between ‘modern’ and 
‘traditional’ societies is due to the position of a particular society in the 
international economic structure of production and distribution. As a rule, 
‘modern’ societies will produce industrial goods, while ‘traditional’ societies 
will produce raw materials. “This requires a definite structure of relations of 
domination to assure an international trade based on merchandise 
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produced at unequal levels of technology and cost of labour force” (Cardoso 
& Faletto, 1979, p. 17). International and domestic markets are distorted, 
forcing developing countries into producing only raw materials for 
developed countries, at prices dictated by the developed countries. A 
‘modern’ status is therefore the monopoly of the developed countries only, 
and these countries achieve this status at the expense of the undeveloped 
countries, through the expansion of the world capitalist system (Raman, 
2007). The causes of under-development are therefore not to be found in 
national systems, but must be sought in the pattern of economic relations 
between developed and developing societies (Black, 1991).  
The Dependency discourse envisions two main agents operating at the 
international level. The developed ‘metropolis’ countries, situated mostly in 
Europe and North America, have economic colonies, or ‘satellites’, in other 
parts of the world. The metropolis countries have already attained the state 
of ‘modern’ development. They are already industrialized. These countries 
thus have more power than the other nations, and an almost exclusive 
possession of the sectors crucial to production and capital accumulation 
(Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). The Dependency discourse argues that these 
countries keep the benefits of technical progress to themselves, and deny 
them to the satellite nations, thus impeding their development (Larrain, 
1989). Capital is generated in these metropoles, and invested in the satellite 
countries in ways that benefit the metropole alone, or the satellite only 
minimally (Keelan & Moon, 1998).  
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However, satellite countries are dependent on the metropoles for this 
capital — their capital-goods production sectors are not strong enough 
financially, technologically or organizationally to ensure the continuous 
development of their own national economies (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). 
Being dependent on the metropoles for capital, the economic, social and 
political structures of these countries are driven to orient themselves to 
meet the external demands placed on them by developed countries. This 
usually results in underdeveloped countries exporting only primary 
commodities, and importing almost all their manufactured items. Their 
industrialization is almost totally dependent on external forces (Keelan & 
Moon, 1998). Further economic development in these satellite countries is 
profoundly inimical to the dominant interests of the metropoles, who need 
the cheap raw materials provided by the satellites, in order to keep 
accumulating capital (Keelan & Moon, 1998). The Dependency discourse 
thus gives rise to assertions that the metropolitan powers co-opt the elites 
of the satellite states — in return for the support of the metropolis powers, 
the satellite elites funnel economic surpluses and capital out of their own 
countries, and into the metropolis states (Frank, 1970). ‘National 
underdevelopment’, or the failure of a country to move along the trajectory 
of development, is thus a situation of objective economic subordination to 
outside nations and enterprises (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979).  
The overall narrative of this discourse is that developing countries are in 
unequal economic relationships of dependence with the developed nations. 
The developing world cannot expect to achieve ‘modern’ status by 
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continuing in such economic relationships, and must break these unequal 
relationships to pursue regional or inwardly-directed paths of development.   
Policy proposals for land reform  
Most of the recommendations derived from this discourse are concerned 
with macro-economic and social factors. Overall, rather than developing 
industries aimed at the export of goods to the metropoles, or ‘towards the 
outside’, satellites should adopt a model of development ‘towards the 
inside’. This means that the government of a ‘satellite’ country should take 
action to protect local industries. Protectionist tariffs should be instituted to 
stimulate ‘import-substituting industrialization’. The entire economy of a 
satellite country needs such protection for as long as its productivity 
remains lower than that of the metropoles (Larrain, 1989). For this to 
happen, instead of serving as a proxy for the metropolitan powers in a 
particular country, the governments of satellite states must take the 
initiative of organizing, promoting and supervising all the industrializing 
efforts of their countries to guarantee the continuity of the process, 
especially in energy, transport and other essential industries (Larrain, 1989).  
This particular discourse does not directly address the issue of land reform. 
However, the agricultural sectors of the satellites tend to reflect the original 
reason for making them colonies — the production of primary commodities 
for export, not the promotion of an integrated national economy offering 
viable internal markets for more than basic goods (Saul & Leys, 2006). In 
extreme cases, this discourse calls for the outright expropriation of privately 
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owned assets to help eradicate absolute poverty, provide expanded 
employment opportunities, lessen income inequalities, and raise the living 
standards of the masses (Todaro & Smith, 2009). Therefore, where a small 
elite owns most of the land in a satellite country, and this elite is seen to be 
working only in the interests of the metropoles and not the satellite in 
question, it is highly likely that this discourse would recommend large-scale 
expropriation of this land for redistribution to the poor and the landless, 
and the creation of some form of small-scale agricultural sector (Saul & 
Leys, 2006; Todaro & Smith, 2009). It is anticipated that these beneficiaries 
would then focus on the production of agricultural commodities needed in 
the domestic economies of the countries they are situated in (Pieterse, 2001; 
Todaro & Smith, 2009). All the discourses described to this point accept the 
trajectory of societies from a ‘traditional’ to some form of a ‘modern’ state. 
The following discourse to be analyzed challenges this idea.  
Critical discourse   
Cousins and Scoones (2010) suggest the presence of two versions of a 
‘livelihoods’ discourse, along with a ‘radical political economy’ discourse in 
South Africa. The Critical discourse described here combines these three 
approaches, along with others such as the post-development approach. All 
these approaches and discourses derive mainly from the long tradition of 
critical analyses of dominant conceptions of ‘development’ (Gibson-
Graham, 2007), especially those contributing to the Large Farms discourse. 
A wide variety of criticisms have been levelled at this dominant approach, 
from a variety of starting points. All, however, focus on a critique of 
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hegemonic ideas of ‘development’, and so are treated together in this study. 
The ideas of the Critical discourse have received varying degrees of 
acceptance in the institutions dominating the development arena. The 
publication of the Brundtland Commission Report (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987) showed acceptance of some of the 
ideas within this larger discourse17, and stimulated renewed discussion of 
alternatives to ‘mainstream’ development initiatives (Friedman, 1992). The 
publication of the Human Development Index by the United Nations 
Development Programme (Qizilbash, 2006) also showed some 
institutionalization of the ideas of Sen and Ul Haq (1995). Over time, it 
became widely accepted in development institutions that development 
efforts are more successful if the community participates and 
nongovernmental organizations are given key roles in development 
cooperation (Pieterse, 2001). In addition, international bodies like the 
World Bank created offices focused on the environment and women 
(Friedman, 1992), implying some acceptance of the ideas included in this 
discourse.  
This discourse begins with a harsh critique of the forms of development 
that have been implemented around the world since the Second World 
War. ‘Development’, or the idea of a society moving from a ‘traditional’ to a 
‘modern’ state on a set trajectory, is seen here as a particular discourse that 
closes off alternative ways of thinking (Kiely, 1999). It falsely constructs 
                                                 
17
 It must be noted, however, that the Brundtland Commission Report was critiqued for not being 
radical enough in its recommendations (Dryzek, 2013).  
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those societies that are not ‘modern’ as ignorant, in the thrall of backward 
and oppressive traditions, stuck in the past, local, inferior and non-
productive, and needing the help of the scientific, advanced, superior, 
global and productive ‘modern’ countries (Gibson-Graham, 2007).  
A strand within this discourse goes so far as to completely reject the need 
for any form of ‘development’ to occur. Scholars within the post-
development strand of the Critical discourse assert that for various reasons, 
the ultimate aim of the ‘development’ discourse — attaining a middle-class 
lifestyle for the majority of the world population — is impossible (Pieterse, 
2000). ‘Development’ as it is implemented around the world is external to 
many of the societies it changes so profoundly, and based purely on the 
model of the industrialized world. It has little relevance to the actual needs 
of societies in the ‘Third World’, and only suits the needs of the First World 
(Escobar, 1995; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997). Interventionist and 
managerialist, and steeped in social engineering and the ambition to shape 
economies and societies, ‘mainstream development’ tells ‘Third World’ 
people what to do in the name of modernization, nation building, progress, 
mobilization, sustainable development, human rights, poverty alleviation 
and even empowerment and participation (Pieterse, 2000). The gaps 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ resulting from the implementation 
of the dictates of ‘development’ are then dismissed by it as the inevitable 
price of a better life for all (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997).  According to this 
strand within the Critical discourse, the hegemonic discourse of 
‘development’ therefore needs to be changed. This requires a movement 
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away from the development sciences in particular, and a partial strategic 
move away from conventional top-down Western modes of knowing and 
experience.  Something like this is said to be already happening in the 
informal economies of the Third World (Escobar, 1995).   
Despite the strong critique from this strand, the basic idea of a transition 
from one type of a society to another is accepted by many within the 
broader Critical discourse. The precise nature of this transition is not made 
clear, other than an assertion that the final destination is not necessarily the 
‘modern’ status seen in the developed world (Pieterse, 2001). Development, 
therefore, should consist of four main components: firstly, the basic needs 
of the poor must be met. This includes food security, education, health 
services, clean water supplies, health services and adequate shelter (Cathie, 
2006; Stewart, 2006). Secondly, the capabilities of individuals need to be 
increased — they need the tools to make the best use of these basic 
necessities, and of potential future opportunities (Pieterse, 2001). Thirdly, 
the economic opportunities available to the poor need to be expanded 
(Anand & Sen, 2000). Finally, poor women should be a primary focus of 
development and land reform initiatives, and development should not be 
confined to economistic notions, but broader ideas inclusive of culture and 
agency (Agarwal, 1994; Bhavnani, Foran, Kurian, & Munshi, 2009; Bhavnani, 
Foran, & Kurian, 2003; Kurian & Munshi, 2003).   
It is also extremely important that the implementation of these four 
components is not done in a ‘top-down’ manner. The goals and values of 
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development must be generated from within the society concerned 
(Agarwal, 1994; Pieterse, 2001). The state should empower households, 
communities and their representative organizations,  through involving 
them socially and politically in the development process (Friedman, 1992; 
Pieterse, 2010). Successful development here is ‘bottom-up’, and ideally all 
problems that are best handled locally would be decided on by local units of 
government and the organizations representing households and 
communities (Fay, 2009; Friedman, 1992). Communities and households 
must be consulted on what changes they want in their ways of life. If they 
want a land reform programme, then it must be implemented in the shape 
and form that they specify.  
The main agents of this discourse are the poor and the state. The 
subsistence-based communities of ‘traditional’ societies are portrayed as 
being in a fragile balance that is easily destroyed by the processes of 
development (Pieterse, 2000; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997). While they are 
seen as wanting to improve their quality of life, they do not have a 
‘capability to function’ (Todaro & Smith, 2009), and are deprived of basic 
necessities. They are trapped in their inability to make full use of the little 
that they have. They need the intervention and aid of the other major agent 
in this discourse, the state.  
The state here should be motivated to aid and encourage the human 
development of excluded households and communities, to ensure that 
society changes in the best way possible. To do this, it must take action to 
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provide the poor with their basic necessities, increase the economic 
opportunities available to them, and develop their capabilities to use these 
opportunities (Mehrotra, 2000; Sen, 1999). However, ‘top-down’ 
interventions by the state are portrayed here as an inevitable failure or 
disaster for the majority of the targeted populations (Rahnema & Bawtree, 
1997), as they are almost always excluded from their old means of 
sustenance, and given little or nothing to replace them with (Kiely, 1999). 
Therefore the state should work in partnership with poor rural 
communities, extensively consulting them at all stages of this process 
(Friedman, 1992).    
The basic narrative here is that development that concentrates only on 
growth in the overall economy tends to marginalize and impoverish the 
majority of the poor in developing countries — they become the castaways 
of development (Latouche, 1993). The solution is that economic 
development needs to be adjusted so that it improves the lives of the poor. 
Governments need to devolve as much power as possible to households, 
communities and NGOs, allowing them to decide what they want from the 
development process, and empowering them to achieve this. Through 
consultation, governments of developing countries must take steps to meet 
the basic needs of the poor, open up the economic opportunities available 
to them, and increase their capabilities to use these opportunities to the 
fullest extent. Women especially need to be given the chance to access 
economic resources, and improve their own lives.    
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Policy proposals for land reform  
This discourse makes a general case for the nexus between equity and 
growth, arguing that the greater the degree of equality in a society, the 
faster the likely rate of growth. Therefore, measures to increase the 
opportunities available to the poor (like creating many small farms out of a 
few large ones) can contribute to improving people’s lives (Pieterse, 2010). 
In addition, in many agrarian economies arable land is the most valued 
form of property, with great economic, political and symbolic significance. 
It is a productive, wealth-creating and livelihood-sustaining asset, and is 
often the basis of political power and social status (Agarwal, 1995). 
Successful land reform programmes in this discourse therefore form part of 
a suite of measures aimed at spreading economic opportunities to the 
worst-off in society (Anand & Sen, 2000). Sen (1999) points to the examples 
set in East Asia and in the Indian state of Kerala, where efforts to distribute 
land equally have reduced the poverty levels of the poor. There is also a 
strong argument made for giving poor rural women independent rights to 
land, rather than relying on old assumptions of unitary male-headed 
households and giving title only to men (Agarwal, 1994). Alongside the 
expansion of basic education and health care for the beneficiaries as seen in 
Kerala (Sen, 1999), policy proposals here also mandate a heavy focus on 
educating land reform beneficiaries on how to make the best use of their 
land.  
 
 Table 5-2:  
Summary of international discourses 
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DISCOURSES NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON 
DEVELOPMENT 
AGENTS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS NARRATIVES POLICY PROPOSALS FOR LAND REFORM 
LARGE FARMS 
‘Traditional’ to ‘modern’ via market; 
Land reform unnecessary 
Large Farmers — Economic rationalists; 
State — create free market 
Small farmers as backward; 
Large farms: 
- Most efficient  and advanced; 
- Must be facilitated 
‘Willing buyer willing seller’; 
Undistorted market; 
Create property rights for land market if necessary 
SMALL FARMS 
‘Traditional’  to ‘modern’ via market; 
Land reform vital 
Small farmers — use their land fully; 
Large farmers — keep non-market advantages; 
State — move along development trajectory 
Small farms are most efficient in developing world; 
Large farms: 
- Retard  economic progress; 
- Must be broken up, redistributed 
Remove urban bias; 
Remove large farm bias; 
State must: 
- Buy large farms at productive value; 
- Redistribute smaller units at productive value; 
- Provide post-settlement support 
SOCIALIST 
‘Traditional’ to ‘modern’ to ‘socialist’; 
Market unnecessary after ‘modern’; 
Land reform necessary for industrialization 
State — stimulate industrialization; 
Large farmers — use science to increase 
productivity 
Peasants — protect redundant historic position 
Socialist state requires industrial base; 
Agriculture must be as efficient as possible 
State must persuade peasants to join larger more 
efficient units 
State must: 
- Create rural farm collectives; 
- Enable their mechanization 
DEPENDENCY 
‘Traditional’ to ‘modern’ via market; 
‘Modern’ prevent movement of ‘traditional’ to 
create dependency; 
Land reform necessary to break this 
‘Modern’ metropoles  — monopolise capital; 
‘Traditional’ satellites — dependent on 
metropoles; 
Satellite governments — co-opted by metropoles 
Satellite countries cannot achieve ‘modernity’ while 
dependent on metropolitan powers; 
Satellite countries must break dependence via economic 
autarchy 
Large-scale farms focused on export to metropoles must 
be broken up and redistributed; 
New small farms must produce for local markets 
CRITICAL  
‘Development’ a harmful hegemonic discourse; 
Change must focus on: 
- Meeting basic needs, 
- Developing capabilities, 
- Expanding economic opportunities, 
and 
- Rural poor women; 
Must be ‘bottom-up’ 
‘Traditional’ societies — want improved quality 
of life; 
State — aid human development of the excluded 
‘Development’ marginalizes the majority; 
Development must be bottom-up; 
 
Redistribute land to spread economic opportunity; 
Give women independent rights to land; 
Educate beneficiaries to make best use of their land 
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Conclusion   
Governments contemplating a land reform programme will find strong 
opinions on how such a policy should be designed and implemented. The 
preceding review, based on a comprehensive review of the development and 
land reform literature, leads to the conclusion that these opinions will 
derive from the discourses outlined above. Each discourse constructs 
generalised assumptions and storylines around what development is, how it 
should occur, and the place of land reform policies in this process. These 
discourses are significant to the extent that they advance the interests of 
those deemed to be ‘insiders’, and suppress those of ‘outsiders’. By setting 
out the problem of land reform in a certain way, each discourse outlined 
above positions the actors involved in specific ways. The optimum 
distribution of power, and what justice, equity and ‘good development’ look 
like all differ fundamentally depending on the ‘discourse lens’ used to look 
at the problem of land reform. The policy recommendations arising from 
each of the five discourses, therefore, have significant consequences for the 
societies where they are implemented. In order to understand why so little 
has been achieved in land reform in South Africa, it is necessary to 
understand this broader discursive context. The policymakers creating the 
constitutional policy settings for land reform, and subsequently creating 
land reform policy, will have been influenced by what is constructed as 
‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ internationally.  
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In societies where the policy recommendations arising from the Large 
Farms discourse are implemented, those who own large farms are 
advantaged, while the rural poor are not. Economic development is 
constructed as best achieved through the open market, and ‘good 
development’ means creating a large-scale mechanized farming sector, 
where landownership is concentrated in a few hands. In contrast, where the 
recommendations arising from the Small Farms discourse are implemented, 
existing large-scale farmers are disadvantaged, while government resources 
are aimed at the creation and maintenance of a small-scale commercial 
farming sector. Here, economic development is seen as the product of 
government intervention in the market to distribute the ownership of land 
more widely among the population. Where the recommendations derived 
from the Socialist discourse are implemented, power is concentrated in the 
state. The state alone is seen as capable of ensuring economic progress, by 
taking the place of the market. Through this lens, the agricultural sector 
exists only to provide a base from which a strong industrial sector can be 
created, to the overall benefit of all society. Those preventing the creation of 
large-scale, mechanized and collectively-owned units must not be allowed 
to impede the advance of ‘progress.’ The recommendations arising from the 
Dependency approach situate large land-owning elites who produce raw 
materials for export as the ‘outsiders’. In order to create economic 
opportunity and progress, their power is to be stripped away, to allow the 
creation of small-scale farms which produce materials for domestic 
consumption. Finally, the policy recommendations of the Critical discourse 
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concentrate power at the local level. The rural poor in ‘Third World’ 
situations are depicted as the ‘insiders’. They are to be advantaged with the 
resources and decision-making power to decide their own fates. The state 
and all ‘development experts’ are required to step aside, in order to allow 
economic progress to be created by those who know best what is needed at 
the local level.  
This chapter has, therefore, provided an answer to the first sub-question 
asked in this study. During the period of the creation of the basic 
boundaries around land reform, six main discourses defined what was 
‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ in land reform, arising from the experiences and 
results of land reform policy games played in other contexts. These were the 
main options considered by the policy players who created the boundaries 
and rules around the game of land reform policy. The following chapters 
show the resonances of certain of these discourses at the constitutional, 
national policy and operational levels.  
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Chapter Six 
Land Ownership, Discursive Struggles and the New 
Constitution 
This study addresses the question of why so little has been achieved by 
successive policy initiatives to address the inequitable land ownership 
patterns created prior to 1990. A crucial aspect of answering this question 
must be an examination of the basic boundaries laid down for land reform 
at the highest policy levels. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the ideas, 
values and discourses that inform the institutions and key actors in the 
South African land reform policy arena at the constitutional level of 
analysis. It is informed by the assumption that ideas and discourses 
underpin institutions, that actors are motivated by particular discourses, 
and that actors endeavour to ensure that institutions reflect the ideas 
within their discourses (Hay, 2006). When the discourses and ideas of a 
smaller group of actors are generally accepted, a ‘policy monopoly’ is 
formed, allowing that group to shape relevant institutions (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009). Groups holding policy monopolies will structure institutions 
according to the interests mandated by their discourses. Other groups 
motivated by other discourses will seek to break the policy monopoly and 
have their own ideas inform institutions.  
A change in the generally-accepted ideas and discourses almost invariably 
heralds a change in the institutions governing a policy area (Hay, 2006). 
These periods of change, called ‘crises’ in the punctuated equilibrium 
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approach (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), are a time of contestation between 
the old ideas underpinning a policy monopoly and new ideas with potential 
to establish a new policy equilibrium. Skilful or lucky actors may be able to 
recognise these periods of change and take advantage to promote their 
preferred courses of action.  
While the punctuated equilibrium pattern is evident in a wide range of 
policy arenas in the US (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), it is used in this 
chapter to frame the analysis of changes occurring in land policy at the 
constitutional level in South Africa between 1990 and 1996. Prior to 1990, 
the dominant policy equilibrium in South Africa provided access to political 
and economic resources only to white South Africans. In land policy, this 
translated into providing private ownership of land to white South Africans 
only. Black South Africans were confined to 13 per cent of South Africa’s 
land area, and denied private ownership of the land they occupied, forcing 
them to serve as cheap unskilled labour for white employers. In the 
meantime, white farmers were given extensive government assistance in 
running their businesses.  
By the 1980s it was clear that changes to the dominant policy equilibrium 
were inevitable. White acceptance of the previous policy based on white 
supremacy and Afrikaner nationalism had become fractured, and in 1990 
when the new NP leader F.W. de Klerk assumed power, he seized the 
opportunity presented by the fall of international Communism to begin 
negotiations with the ANC around the creation of a new policy direction for 
 187 
 
South Africa. The ANC and the NP agreed on a two-stage process of 
negotiation. First, an Interim Constitution would be negotiated, which 
would lay the basis for the creation of the final Constitution by an elected 
Constitutional Assembly later. Negotiations around the creation of the 
Interim Constitution, called the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codesa) began at the end of 1991, and involved a wide range of participants.  
Du Plessis (1994), commenting on the negotiations around the drafting of 
the Bill of Rights in the Interim Constitution, describes two basic 
approaches to human rights among the various parties in the negotiations 
— the ‘libertarians’ and the ‘liberationists’. While both approaches shared a 
basic commitment to liberal-democratic values, du Plessis argues that the 
libertarians drew heavily from classical (enlightenment) liberalism, and 
argued for a bill of rights premised on individual liberty as a core value, 
rather than equality. Including both white liberals (who had expressed their 
opposition to apartheid in the past in human rights terms) and former 
members of the apartheid government (who now saw the entrenchment of 
their basic rights as the best way to serve their vested power), the 
libertarians argued for minimal state authority in post-apartheid South 
Africa, and attempted energetically to preserve as much as possible of their 
existing economic and political power relationships by controlling the 
negotiation process around the Bill of Rights (Du Plessis, 1994; Szeftel, 1994; 
Yanou, 2009). Put another way, those who had ignored the property rights 
of black South Africans during the ‘black spot’ removals of apartheid came 
to see the entrenchment of property rights within the Bill of Rights as the 
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key to maintaining their status in post-apartheid South Africa (Spitz & 
Chaskalson, 2000). As will become clear, many of the themes in this 
discourse show strong similarities with themes found in the large farms 
discourse described in chapter five.  
In contrast, the liberationists argued for a more interventionist state to 
ensure the equal distribution of means and opportunity in South Africa, and 
an Interim Constitution containing only minimal rights. The main advocate 
of this approach was the ANC, along with other black liberation 
organisations and the land-based NGOs. Drawing from themes found in the 
dependency and the critical discourses described in chapter five, these 
parties argued against the inclusion of a property clause in the Interim Bill 
of Rights, as such a clause would entrench existing racial disparities arising 
from colonial and apartheid land policies. Rather, the Bill of Rights should 
entrench the ability of the government to intervene in the property market, 
to create a different economic equilibrium to that established during the 
colonial, Union and apartheid eras (Du Plessis, 1994; Spitz & Chaskalson, 
2000; Szeftel, 1994; Yanou, 2009).  
The property clause negotiated in the Interim Constitution was a 
compromise between the liberationist and the libertarian discourses, 
mandating government efforts to transfer land to black South Africans, but 
with the payment of market-based compensation to white land owners. 
South Africa’s period of crisis ended in 1996 with the signing into law of the 
final Constitution, which allowed for land restitution, and a market-based 
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land redistribution programme. The material gains of white South Africans 
under the previous policy equilibrium were thus guaranteed under the new 
regime, while simultaneously incorporating some liberationist ideas into the 
final Constitution. The new post-apartheid equilibrium in South Africa thus 
carried strong elements from pre-crisis policy settings.     
Punctuated equilibrium  
In line with the overall social constructionist stance taken in this study, the 
theoretical approach adopted for this chapter focuses on the ideas 
underpinning institutions, and the discourses from which actors draw their 
motivations. From this perspective, political actors are seen as having a 
primary interest in establishing a monopoly on understandings on policies 
and on the institutional arrangements that reinforce that understanding. 
Political actors, therefore, have a primary interest in ensuring that the 
discourses they subscribe to inform key political institutions and gain 
general public acquiescence. ‘Policy monopolies’, as stated earlier, describe 
situations where a group of actors has successfully ensured that ideas from 
the discourse they subscribe to underpin the institutions most important to 
them, and where there is a general public acceptance of this (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009; Hay, 2006; Schmidt, 2010).  
Policy monopolies are thus intimately tied to generally accepted ideas, 
which create and sustain institutions. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) 
suggest that the idea underpinning a policy monopoly and its attendant 
institutions can generally be connected to a core political value which can 
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be communicated directly and simply. If a group can convince others that 
its activities serve such lofty goals, then a policy monopoly can be created. 
The ‘punctuated equilibrium’ approach, in common with constructivist 
institutionalism, argues that “… it is the ideas that actors hold about the 
context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which 
informs the way in which actors behave” (Hay & Rosamund, 2002, p. 148). If 
those actors holding a policy monopoly can convince the broader public to 
accept the ideas underpinning the policy monopoly, they are able to 
proceed unchecked. Thus, during the periods when generally accepted ideas 
coincide with the existing policy monopoly governing a given policy, the 
prevailing conceptions of a policy issue dominate both press coverage and 
official behaviour. During these times, those benefitting from the policy 
monopoly will create institutional structures designed to protect them from 
later encroachments (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).  
The institutions created during these times tend to favour some interests 
strongly over others, and define relevant policy issues in a way that supports 
the existing distribution of political advantage. In particular, issues may be 
defined to include only a single dimension of conflict (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009). Institutions help ensure that policy problems are defined in one 
particular manner and not in another by freezing a set of political 
participants and a particular dimension of a policy issue into the policy 
process, and excluding others (John, 2012). As long as there are high levels 
of public apathy, supportive beliefs among members of the political elite,  
and favourable reports in the media, a particular policy can remain in place 
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for extended periods of time, changing only slowly (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009; John, 2012).  
However, as is made clear in the constructivist institutionalism approach, 
institutions are neither omnipotent nor eternal — they can create partial 
equilibria, but only for defined periods of time. This is because they are the 
subject and focus of political struggle (Hay, 2006; John, 2012). While the 
holders of a policy monopoly will fight to ensure the ideas they subscribe to 
continue to underpin the institutions most important to them, other actors 
subscribing to other discourses will struggle to bring about a change in this 
situation, so that the ideas they subscribe to come to underpin important 
institutions. Thus both constructivist institutionalism and the ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ framework see shifts in the commonly accepted ideas 
underpinning institutions as heralding significant subsequent institutional 
change. The destruction of a policy monopoly and its attendant institutions 
is almost always associated with a redefinition of the prevailing policy 
image, or a change in the generally accepted ideas around a policy or a 
political system (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Blyth, 2003; Hay, 2006). 
Dramatic and rapid change in these institutions and their resulting policies 
is possible, especially if the way relevant issues are defined are changed to 
bring in new participants (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).  
New ideas bring about new interpretations of events, and new potential 
participants. This means that through new ideas, new participants will be 
attracted into a policy area — political leaders, government agencies and 
 192 
 
private institutions may become interested in a policy area in which they 
had previously shown no interest whatsoever (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). 
If the pressures generated by those subscribing to the new ideas about the 
policy in question are strong enough, “… they may lead not only to a change 
in policy, but also to institutional changes designed to reinforce and 
stabilise the policy around some new point of equilibrium” (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009, p. 83). Waves of popular enthusiasm around a given issue, 
stimulated by new ideas, provide the circumstances for new policy-makers 
to change existing institutions, or create new ones to support their new 
policies.  
Within the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ framework, these periods of 
contestation are called ‘crises’. During such a crisis, there is “… intense 
ideational contestation in which agents struggle to provide compelling and 
convincing diagnoses of the pathologies afflicting the old … policy paradigm 
and the reforms appropriate to the resolution of the crisis” (Hay, 2006, p. 
67). The old idea sustaining a given policy monopoly competes with other 
ideas which could potentially replace it, and bring in new policy 
participants (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). During these periods of crisis the 
conflicting ideas can be mapped out using discourse analysis (Schmidt, 
2010).  
If the pressures for redefinition and change are sufficient, “… they may lead 
not only to a change in policy, but also to institutional changes designed to 
reinforce and stabilise the policy around some new point of equilibrium” 
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(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 83). There can be great friction in the 
reactions of political systems to forces pushing for change, stemming from 
the unwillingness of major power-holders to change the ideas they hold, or 
from the resistance of the institutions created to sustain these ideas. 
However when this friction is overcome, a political system can leap ahead to 
a new point of policy equilibrium (Baumgartner, Green-Pederson, & Jones, 
2006).  
Individual actors and their differing constructions of their own interests can 
be crucial here — those actors who see themselves as benefitting from the 
existing policy equilibrium will strive to protect it. Others who believe they 
would benefit if their own policy solution were adopted seek to overturn the 
existing policy equilibrium (John, 2012). However, the dynamics during 
these periods of rapid change are particularly difficult to control. The most 
skilful political actors in a policy system may be able to recognise these 
trends early enough to take advantage of them (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009). Thus during these periods of rapid change, the previous constraints 
on change (embodied in the existing institutions) no longer apply. Almost 
any type of new policy is possible, depending on the political skills of the 
various policy entrepreneurs involved in a policy subsystem. The type of 
new policy which emerges is contingent on the ideational contestation 
unleashed in the moment of crisis (Hay, 2006).  
Baumgartner and Jones thus describe a pattern of “… long periods of 
stability in public policy understandings and behaviour punctuated by short 
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periods when dramatic changes take place” (2009, p. 57). After these 
dramatic changes, the policy settles into another period of stability 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). After long periods of little change in a given 
policy area, waves of popular enthusiasm around a given issue create the 
possibility of new ideas being accepted, allowing new policymakers to create 
new institutions to support new policy approaches.  These new institutions 
structure participation and policymaking, often ensuring privileged access 
to the policy process for those who helped create them. After public interest 
and enthusiasm in the new ideas fade, the institutions remain, pushing their 
preferred policies forward independent of popular control. During this time, 
there may be stability or incrementalism in policy settings. Some years later, 
however, the issue may reach the public agenda again, triggering off a new 
period of ideational contestation. This could result in the dismantling of 
those very institutions owing their existence to the first period of 
enthusiastic popular acceptance, and the creation of a new set of 
institutions around a new point of equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009). Baumgartner and Jones therefore argue that in a wide range of policy 
areas, long periods of stability in public policy understandings and 
behaviour are punctuated by short periods when dramatic changes take 
place (2009). 
The primary focus of Baumgartner and Jones is on specific policy 
subsystems within the US. Despite their domestic focus (on policy areas 
such as nuclear energy, tobacco or pesticides), the authors do allow for the 
possibility that “… a political system as a whole, not only particular issue 
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areas, may go through periods of stability and rapid change” (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009, p. 243). There is some evidence for a punctuated equilibrium 
pattern of politics at the national level in the US, a political system built “… 
on a conservative constitutional base designed to limit radical action …” 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 236). The political system as a whole still 
alternates between long quiet periods of little to no change, and shorter 
periods  of more rapid and dramatic changes. In the US, disruptions to 
established ways of making public policy may come at all levels of scale — 
in fact some may affect the entire political system (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009), leading to a cascade of changes in all the policy subsystems within 
that political system (Baumgartner et al., 2006).  
It was initially assumed that this pattern was a result of the complex and 
pluralistic political system of the US, with its extensive separation of 
powers, bicameralism and federal dynamics (Baumgartner et al., 2006). 
However, scholars in Europe and elsewhere have found the approach 
applicable to other political systems, including unified parliamentary 
political systems (Baumgartner et al., 2006). This suggests that the 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ approach has potential to inform the analysis of 
changes occurring at the constitutional level in South Africa between 1990 
and 1996, the period where the country’s policy settings based on colonial, 
segregationist and apartheid ideas, policies and institutions, underwent 
dramatic change. Specifically in terms of land policy, from the 
establishment of the first European colony in what was to become South 
Africa in 1652 (Thompson, 1990) to the freeing of Nelson Mandela in 1990 
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(Ross, 1999), the governments of South Africa could be seen as having 
maintained a particular policy focus, or a particular policy equilibrium, 
based on a specific set of ideas. The period 1990–1996 in this approach was a 
period of crisis, when the ideas underpinning the old policy equilibrium 
around land entered a period of contestation. Because the period of crisis 
for apartheid took the form of a negotiated transfer of power, it becomes 
particularly important to understand the viewpoints around land policy 
suggested by the various participants in the negotiations, and those advising 
them. The final Constitution of South Africa, signed into existence in 1996, 
could be seen as providing the broad policy settings for post-apartheid 
South Africa, and framing what would and would not be possible in terms 
of land reform. The first task in this chapter, therefore, is to outline the 
policy equilibrium around land between 1652 and 1990 in South Africa.   
Land policy prior to 1990  
The general outline of South Africa’s history from the first European 
settlement in 1652 to the beginning of negotiations in 1990 (in chapter two), 
and land policies during this period, described a political system that aimed 
to strengthen the control exerted by the white population over the country’s 
economy and politics. To paraphrase Baumgartner and Jones (2009), the 
institutions set in place in these periods strongly favoured the interests of 
the white population in the country over all others, and defined all policy 
issues in ways that gave white South Africans political and material 
advantage. This policy equilibrium was able to continue for such a long 
period of time because of strong support among both British and Dutch 
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settlers for the idea of white racial supremacy. The technological advantages 
they held over the indigenous populations allowed them to continue in this 
belief, like contemporary Europeans in North America and elsewhere 
(Thompson, 1990).  
Over time, to buttress the idea of white supremacy, black South Africans 
were stripped of all citizenship rights in ‘white’ South Africa, and made into 
subjects of tribal chiefs in the ‘independent’ bantustans. A series of further 
laws ensured the economic and social dominance of white South Africans at 
the expense of the black majority. These laws and policies all combined to 
freeze into place privileged access to material and political wealth for white 
South Africans, and to exclude all other people living in the country. High 
levels of support among whites and their leaders meant that this policy 
equilibrium remained in place for an extended period of time, from the 
earliest periods of colonial settlement in the country in 1652 to the freeing of 
Nelson Mandela in 1990. White access to power and material resources had 
a strong determining effect on the policy settings around land and land 
access in South Africa during this period.   
As discussed in chapter two, from the earliest days of what would come to 
be South Africa, the principle of the private ownership of land with full 
rights of disposal was set — but only for people of European origin (Miller & 
Pope, 2000a; Thompson, 1990). The South African state facilitated the 
accumulation of capital by white farmers (Gcabashe & Mabin, 1990), and 
removed black farmers who had purchased land in areas subsequently 
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declared ‘white’ (James, 2007; Miller & Pope, 2000a; Ross, 1999). To prevent 
such areas from arising again, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (Act 
70 of 1970) was enacted, preventing the subdivision of existing large-scale 
farms into smaller production units (Lahiff, 2009; Miller & Pope, 2000a).   
By the 1980s, there were clear signs to many white South Africans that the 
existing policy could not continue — there were clear pressures for 
redefinition or a change of ideas in the system. However, Baumgartner, 
Green-Pedersen and Jones (2006) note that there can be great friction in the 
reactions of political systems to forces pushing for change, stemming from 
the unwillingness of major power-holders to recognise the need for change. 
This is evident in the response of the government of President P.W. Botha 
to early signs of crisis in the apartheid system, whose administration 
attempted to adapt to make cosmetic changes while clinging to the 
established policy settings based on the ideas of Afrikaner nationalism, 
white superiority and separate development (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000; 
Thompson, 1990). However, growing “… internal opposition, international 
pressure and sanctions, and deepening economic crisis together signalled 
that the policy of reform and repression could not be indefinitely sustained” 
(Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000, p. 11).  
In terms of the punctuated equilibrium framework, the ideas underpinning 
the existing equilibrium in South Africa were entering a period of crisis, or 
of contestation. one of the most telling points that a period of crisis was 
imminent was a breakdown in white acceptance of the idea of white 
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supremacy, as seen in the formation of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1989 
(De Klerk, 1994; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). Besides this, the rising levels of 
violence in the country led many influential and powerful white South 
Africans within Afrikanerdom to abandon support for the idea of white 
supremacy (De Klerk, 1994) — many came to see it as necessary to allow 
black South Africans to “… acquire at least a substantial share of political 
power in South Africa in the foreseeable future” (Thompson, 1990, p. 241) in 
order to prevent the country from sliding into anarchy and bloodshed (Van 
der Walt & Helmbold, 1995).  In addition, Afrikaner consensus on the 
necessity of Afrikaner nationalism began to break down along class lines. 
Many middle and upper-class Afrikaners had reached the point of mulling 
the possibilities of political change in South Africa. In contrast, many in the 
Afrikaner working class still depended on favourable apartheid policies for 
their economic security, and so turned to the newly-formed Conservative 
Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). 
Finally, many white South Africans came to accept the idea that the South 
African economy suffered from structural problems created by apartheid 
policies. They now believed that to secure growth in the economy, and to 
secure the continued prosperity of white South Africans, the idea of 
separate development would need to be abandoned (De Klerk, 1994). In 
terms of the punctuated equilibrium framework, the ideas underpinning the 
dominant policy equilibrium in South Africa began to lose (white) public 
acceptance, meaning that a period of ‘crisis’ was imminent.  
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In 1989, President P.W. Botha suffered a stroke, and was succeeded by F.W. 
de Klerk (Thompson, 1990). “Upon his inauguration as state president, de 
Klerk seized the opportunity to shift from Botha’s programme of reluctant 
window-dressing to a policy of real reform” (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000, p. 
13).  Like most observers of the South African situation, de Klerk seems to 
have accepted that the existing political equilibrium could not last. He also 
indicated that the fall of international Communism created the possibility 
of further changes in South Africa (Slabbert, 2006). This is perhaps an 
example of changes to an established international equilibrium (between 
international Communism and capitalism) leading to subsequent 
equilibrium changes at the national level. “The course of world history had 
taken a new direction. The government grasped the opportunity to 
normalise South African politics” (De Klerk, 1994, p. 5).  
Specific to the South African situation, the fact that there was no longer a 
communist menace to fight against meant that the apartheid government 
could not count on the (covert or overt) support of the US. In addition, the 
ANC could no longer credibly be accused of being a cover for a communist 
plot to take over South Africa (Ross, 1999; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). Prior 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, while much of the developed world had 
implacably opposed the apartheid system and its apologists, due to the 
support given to the ANC by the USSR, the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments had shown no overt support for the ANC. However, after 1990, 
popular and state support for the ANC struggle to combat racism and 
oppression suddenly grew in the developed world, and was embraced 
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especially by the US (Slabbert, 2006). It was clear that with a liberal 
democratic paradigm becoming the policy equilibrium at the world scale, at 
least in theory, many of the policies previously espoused by the ANC, such 
as nationalisation of the mines and industries in South Africa, were highly 
unlikely to gain external support (Slabbert, 2006). White prosperity, which 
the apartheid system had been constructed to facilitate, appeared to be 
under threat from the stagnation and decline of the South African economy 
and the pressure of international sanctions and isolation. The long-standing 
white adherence to the idea of white supremacy lost majority support in 
that community. This was shown in a whites-only referendum held in 1992, 
on whether negotiations around a new constitution with the ANC should 
continue. The positive response from white voters showed large-scale white 
acceptance of the idea that power should be shared with blacks in South 
Africa (Oden & Ohlson, 1994; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). Many of the 
original ideas underpinning the pre-1990 policy equilibrium no longer 
seemed to apply to the changed circumstances.  
President de Klerk therefore felt that changes to the constitution in South 
Africa had a good chance of being negotiated successfully, and so 
announced the lifting of the ban on the liberation movements within South 
Africa, and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 (Spitz & 
Chaskalson, 2000). These actions “… provided a moment of uncertainty — 
perhaps five or six years’ duration — when, it seemed to most observers, 
nearly any kind of political-economic future was possible” (Bond, 2000, p. 
15). South Africa entered a period of what Baumgartner and Jones would 
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term a period of crisis. Almost any type of new policy was now possible, 
depending on the outcome of the negotiations around the political 
institutions of post-apartheid South Africa. Among the many policies faced 
with the potential for massive changes was the existing apartheid policy 
equilibrium around land.  
Dynamics of the period of crisis  
Some understanding of the structure and context of the period of crisis is 
necessary, in order to understand some of its outcomes. The NP and the 
ANC agreed on a two-stage process of negotiation. During the first part of 
the process, an Interim Constitution would be negotiated (Goldstone, 1997). 
This was presented expressly as a provisional instrument, which would set 
out the procedure for its own replacement by the final Constitution. In 
addition, it would exercise a degree of control over the process of creating 
the final Constitution through the creation of Constitutional Principles, 
with which the final Constitution would have to comply. The legitimacy of 
the Interim Constitution derived from the political pact reached between 
the parties in 1993. The legitimacy of the final Constitution would come 
from the vote of an elected Constitutional Assembly (Spitz & Chaskalson, 
2000).  
It is also important to understand that the negotiations around the Interim 
Constitution and the 1994 elections unfolded against a backdrop of intense 
violence and bitter conflict (Szeftel, 1994). Apartheid policy units and death 
squads, state-sponsored vigilante gangs and warring Inkatha Freedom Party 
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(IFP) and ANC activities transformed many black communities into war 
zones. Prior to the beginning of the period of crisis, only 5, 400 people had 
died in political violence between 1985 and 1989. During the period of crisis, 
however, between the release of Mandela in 1990 and the democratic 
elections of April 1994, the number rose steeply to 14, 800 (Gloppen, 1997; 
Marais, 2011). All the negotiators involved believed that compromises were 
urgently necessary in order to prevent the violence spreading and becoming 
a cataclysm that would engulf the country. For those involved in the 
negotiations, the choice seemed largely to be between a change in the 
political equilibrium in the country or continued violence, possibly leading 
to civil war (Szeftel, 1994).  
Formal political negotiations on the terms of transition began at the end of 
1991, with multiparty talks at Codesa (Gloppen, 1997). The NP represented 
both itself and the existing South African government. Included were 
representatives from the ‘homeland’ governments of KwaZulu, Transkei, 
Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, along with representatives of the ‘traditional 
leaders’ within the bantustans. The anti-apartheid liberation movements 
present included the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), the 
Black Consciousness-based Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the Zulu-
nationalist IFP. The Democratic Party mainly represented English-speaking 
white South Africans and a non-racial viewpoint, while the Conservative 
Party, the Afrikaner Volksfront and the Afrikaner Volksunie represented 
Afrikaans and far-right political concerns. The Labour Party, the National 
People’s Party and the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses represented 
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coloured and Indian interests in the negotiations, but had no strong role in 
the proceedings (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000).  
Records of the debates at Codesa were not available for analysis18, but it is 
possible to gain a deeper understanding of the discourses that informed the 
positions of these actors through examination of the debates of the lower 
house (the National Assembly) between 1994 and 1996 around agricultural 
and land reform issues. These debates which took place after the ratification 
of the Interim Constitution and the election of the Constitutional Assembly 
and at the passage of the final Constitution show continued reference to 
themes, ideas and values drawn from the libertarian and liberationist 
discourses. The debates that are drawn on in this chapter did not contribute 
directly to the creation of the sections in the Interim or the final 
Constitutions dealing with land reform. But the debaters in the National 
Assembly drew from the same liberationist and libertarian discourses that 
informed those who negotiated the property clauses of the Interim and final 
Constitutions. These National Assembly debates, therefore, allow a deeper 
analysis of the libertarian and liberationist discourses, and their 
implications for land reform in post-apartheid South Africa.   
The Libertarian position    
The following sections of this chapter analyse the libertarian and 
liberationist discourses. The assumed process of ‘development’ is described, 
                                                 
18
 In compliance with South African law, records of the Codesa debates were made publically 
available by National Archives in January 2012, 20 years after the records were created (SAHA, 
2011). However, the relevant records made available online appear fragmentary, and the 
location and resource constraints inherent in doctoral research meant that I was not able to 
return to National Archives in South Africa to access the physical records available for analysis.  
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along with the resulting views of land expressed. The assumed actors in 
land reform and agriculture are studied, along with the policy proposals 
given for land reform and improving the socio-economic situation of the 
rural landless. The libertarian discourse, which exhibits significant overlap 
with the Large Farms discourse discussed in chapter five, is informed by the 
assumption that ‘development’ is a process of movement from a ‘traditional’ 
to a ‘modern’ state through the mechanism of the market. In constructing 
development in these terms, it emphasises the value of land as an economic 
resource, and argues that land reform could only be about increasing the 
productivity of the land (Grobbelaar, 1996; Mentz, 1994).  
Land primarily an economic resource  
This discourse emphasises the crucial importance of maintaining existing 
levels of food production (Van Zyl, 1994). Here, land reform needs to “… 
contribute greatly towards feeding our people at affordable prices, towards 
supplying work and serving as a stabiliser of our country’s economy” (Van 
Zyl, 1996, p. 42). This is because “… land is a limited natural and economic 
resource which has to be used in a beneficial and sustainable manner” 
(Hanekom, 1995a, pp. 831-832).  
While it is acknowledged in this discourse that land holds emotional 
significance to some, it is constructed as being primarily of commercial 
significance to the country as a whole. This means that approaches to land 
redistribution need to “… soften the divide between emotional claims and 
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commercial claims to land” (Schoeman, 1994, p. 2535). Therefore, to the 
libertarians, the objective of land reform should be: 
… a flourishing, rural landscape, consisting of a mix of large, medium 
and small farms, promoting both equity and efficiency. We must 
make more people richer and not make rich people poorer, in order 
to succeed in what we are trying to do. If, one day, we only have rich 
people in South Africa, then we will have achieved all our goals (S. J. 
Schoeman, 1996, p. 2953).  
This meant that the task of the government in land reform was to allow 
black agricultural entrepreneurs to access agricultural land (Hanekom, 
1995b). 
The fundamental importance of individual property rights  
Libertarians argued strongly in favour of the inclusion of a property clause 
in the post-apartheid constitution on the basis of human rights, economics 
and the process of reconciliation. Firstly, perhaps mimicking the language 
of human rights used  by anti-apartheid campaigners, libertarians expressed 
a strong commitment to “… the protection and advancement of the right to 
private ownership and the right to own land as fundamental rights of 
individuals” (Badenhorst, 1996, p. 2998).  
It must be noted that those who have subscribed to a ‘libertarian’ position 
in other contexts, such as Nozick (Younkins, 2002) have argued that 
property acquired through confiscation (like much of the land held by 
whites in South Africa) is not held legitimately. In contrast, those 
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articulating the libertarian discourse in this particular context modified it to 
suit their construction of their individual interests. Therefore, the 
construction of land ownership put forward here was ahistorical, expedient 
and selective, ignoring the large-scale dispossession which occurred during 
most of the country’s colonial and apartheid past.    
Secondly, libertarians argued that the inclusion of a property clause in the 
constitution was necessary to guarantee the continued prosperity of the 
entire country. Members of the NP argued that it is  
… a fundamental principle of the free-market society in which we live 
that land should and can be offered as collateral for loans from 
financial institutions. This can only be done if such land is 
transferable … One cannot force financial institutions to risk their 
capital without being sure that they will have a claim on the 
collateral that is being offered (E. A. Schoeman, 1996, pp. 2979-
2980).  
Libertarians argued that without private property rights, South Africa would 
lose the confidence of international investors (Meyer, 1995), and be “…  just 
another African state where people have all the land at their disposal, but 
are dying of hunger …” (Van Zyl, 1996, p. 42).  
In addition, the libertarian discourse gave rise to arguments that if the 
existing title deeds of white farmers were disregarded, those black South 
Africans who obtained land in the future would not be safe either. 
Disregarding the property rights of white South Africans would be  
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… creating a culture whereby those that are going to be the next 
owners of the land, will go through the experience of having their 
ownership of that land questioned, because there will still be 
millions more who do not have land (Grobbelaar, 1994, p. 2552).  
Therefore, libertarians warned against “… the destabilisation of land-
ownership purely for the sake of political expediency” (Fourie, 1995, p. 846), 
and argued for the inclusion of a property clause in the final Constitution 
(S. J. Schoeman, 1996). 
Inevitable economic processes creating large farms  
As part of the process of using the resource of land as efficiently as possible, 
libertarians again repeated themes found in the Large Farms discourse, 
arguing that as a natural economic process, farms become larger and owned 
by fewer people, and that any land reform programme seeking to stop this 
process would be futile. Thus, brushing aside the slew of legislation 
preventing black South Africans from participating as independent farmers 
during apartheid, the libertarian discourse gave rise to arguments that for 
decades in South Africa, both black and white South Africans had been 
prevented from farming by this inevitable and anonymous economic 
process:   
Do hon members know how many people in this country have for 
generations, for decades, yearned to go back to the land, but the hard 
facts prevent them from doing so? … They are not only the deprived 
Tswana, Venda and Xhosa communities, but also Afrikaner boys and 
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girls, including my own brothers and children. They cannot come to 
the farm because they cannot make a living there. The result is 
urbanisation, a world-wide phenomenon which we cannot halt with 
any plan in the world (Van Zyl, 1994).  
According to the libertarian discourse, then, it is inevitable that the vast 
majority of the population cannot farm or own land.  
Within the libertarian discourse, as a result of this inevitable economic 
process, small-scale farms are inherently unproductive, and can only mean 
communal land ownership and subsistence farming. Ignoring the decades of 
economic and policy burdens placed on the black rural landless poor of 
South Africa, libertarians pointed to the small-scale farms of the communal 
areas, which they argued “… bear the ravages of overexploitation, wrong 
farming practices and a total disregard of sound soil conservation practices” 
(Schoeman, 1994, p. 2536). Therefore, the government was advised to 
carefully reconsider any land redistribution policy focused on the creation 
of small farms (Schoeman, 1994), which would result in South Africa having 
to import most of its food (Grobbelaar, 1995). Libertarians thus emphasised 
the potential for extensive land reforms to negatively impact on overall 
production input and agricultural exports (Hall, 2010c). 
In contrast, within the libertarian discourse the existing large farms in 
South Africa are vitally important, as they produced six per cent of the gross 
national profit, and 99.5 per cent of the value produced on agricultural land 
(Weideman, 2004). The white large-scale commercial farmers of South 
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Africa are depicted as the most efficient users of the land in the country, 
and are recognised as such in the rest of Africa and around the world — the 
“… achievements of South African agriculture compel respect throughout 
the world … South Africa is considered the agricultural leader on the 
continent. What is more, the rest of Africa is seeking our expertise to help 
them” (Van Niekerk, 1995, pp. 2053-2054). 
Legitimacy of white-owned land   
The libertarian discourse also contains elements not found in the Large 
Farms discourse. It is suggested, for example, that land reform is 
unnecessary as white South Africans had obtained all their land by 
legitimate methods. Libertarians argued that around the world, there exist 
several legitimate methods of acquiring land including: “…  the occupation 
of land which is or was mainly empty; secondly, by conquering; thirdly, by 
treaty; and fourthly, on a buyer-seller basis on the open market” 
(Schoeman, 1995, p. 868). According to the libertarian discourse, all the 
farms owned by white South Africans were obtained by one of these four 
methods, making land reform unnecessary. This shows the influence of a 
persistent colonial discourse, resonating today in arguments legitimising 
the amount of land owned by whites.   
Economic rationalists  
Again echoing themes in the Large Farms discourse, within the libertarian 
discourse those involved in agriculture and land reform are depicted as 
economic rationalists. Therefore, liberationists repeatedly argue that issues 
around land and land reform could not be approached primarily on the 
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basis of emotion (Jordaan, 1994), and depicted a tension between “… 
emotional claims and commercial claims to land” (Schoeman, 1994, p. 2535). 
Those depicted as approaching land reform emotionally were black South 
Africans who appealed to the history of dispossession and injustice in the 
country. In contrast, libertarians depicted white South African farmers as 
rational and successful farmers. White farmers were described as rightly 
proud of their success as commercial agricultural producers (Van Zyl, 1994).  
Recommendations for the rural landless    
In addition, the libertarian discourse gave rise to agreement with the 
conclusions of the Tomlinson Report, which had been rejected so many 
years before (Miller & Pope, 2000a). Libertarians suggested that land reform 
should aim at the creation of black commercial farmers in the former 
bantustan areas, which would sustain the relative allocation of land from 
the apartheid era:  
… Let us establish a new generation of Black farmers who have 
ownership of their land, in the former homelands and also in the 
traditional tribal areas and let us provide these farmers with a tailor-
made financial scheme, linked to an extensive extension service, 
which will ensure that a new Black farming community in South 
Africa is established which will compare with those of successful 
agricultural industries of the world … (Odendaal, 1994, p. 2550).  
This draws from the Large Farms policy proposal that where property rights 
are not available for sale in the market, they should be created. Thus, after 
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enforcing communal tenure in the former bantustans since 1913, libertarians 
argued that in the former bantustans, people “… should be freed from the 
traditional land tenure system, and allowed property rights with an 
accompanying sense of self-respect” (Schoeman, 1994, p. 2537). The 
communal land tenure system was described as unproductive (Hall, 2010a; 
Weideman, 2004), destructive of the natural environment (Van Zyl, 1995), 
and having the effect of impoverishing those trapped in such systems 
(Odendaal, 1995). Providing individual title to those living in the former 
bantustans would allow them to access borrowed capital using their land as 
collateral, and so progress along the trajectory of development (E. A. 
Schoeman, 1996).  
Limited redistribution in former ‘white’ areas   
Alongside this, the libertarian discourse gave rise to proposals that limited 
amounts of land be made available to black South Africans in the former 
‘white’ rural areas. How this was to be done was made clear in the NP’s 
Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act (No. 126 of 1993), which 
proposed a land reform strategy allowing the establishment of a small 
number of black small-scale or ‘beginner’ farmers. They were to be smaller 
versions of the ‘standard’ model of white commercial agriculture, and would 
buy their land through a ‘willing buyer willing seller’ policy, with 
government grants supplementing the market prices paid for the land. 
Beneficiaries would also be strictly controlled in terms of the use they could 
make of their land (Winkler, 1994), and provided with access to the finance 
and advice they needed to succeed as commercial farmers by both the 
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government and their white neighbours (Beyers, 1996; S. J. Schoeman, 1996; 
Van Zyl, 1994). A “… market and demand-driven process, with a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, is the best possible solution to our problem” 
(Meyer, 1995, p. 887). This would allow the confirmation and extension of 
freehold land tenure in South Africa, which the libertarian discourse 
constructs as essential (Fourie, 1994; S. J. Schoeman, 1996; Van Zyl, 1995).  
Lower expectations around land reform  
The libertarians in the National Assembly were aware that such a scheme 
would not benefit the vast majority of the rural landless poor. Not everyone 
would be helped by market-assisted land reform, as “… land is scarce in 
South Africa. We must tell each other honestly in this Committee that not 
everybody will be able to own land. Nowhere in the world does everybody 
own land” (Grobbelaar, 1996, p. 2969). In addition, to ensure the success of 
new black large-scale commercial farmers, potential beneficiaries would 
have to be subjected to strict selection criteria (Badenhorst, 1996). 
Therefore libertarians argued that it was necessary to prevent the creation 
of undue “… expectations among too many people, because we will not be 
able to assist everyone who wants land” (Van Zyl, 1994, p. 2562).  
Maintenance of the apartheid status quo   
The libertarians, therefore, argued strongly in favour of maintaining the 
agrarian structure created by apartheid policies, and allowing the gradual 
introduction of a few black South Africans as large-scale commercial 
farmers alongside the existing white farmers. Drawing on narratives of 
development echoing those found in the Large Farms discourse, the 
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libertarians construct land as a purely economic resource, and individual 
property rights as a crucial element in guaranteeing the productivity of the 
land. Libertarians argued that large farms are an inevitable consequence of 
blind economic forces, and so should not be broken up into smaller units of 
production. Existing white farmers are constructed as having obtained their 
land legitimately, and making the best possible economic use of their land. 
Drawing on the Large Farms emphasis on individual property rights, 
libertarians recommended that the socio-economic situation of the rural 
landless in the former ‘bantustans’ be improved through granting them 
property rights to the land they occupied, and offering limited 
opportunities to purchase land to a few in the former ‘white’ farming areas.  
The Liberationist position  
Prevention of the development of black South Africans  
Competing with the libertarian discourse in the National Assembly and the 
negotiations around the Interim and final Constitutions was the 
liberationist discourse, which draws from aspects of the Dependency 
discourse described in chapter five. In this discourse, the primary defining 
feature of South Africa’s history and development was the retardation of the 
natural progress and socio-economic development of the black people of 
South Africa by white South Africans, in a similar way that the metropole 
countries are constructed as impeding the development of satellite 
countries in the Dependency discourse. To the liberationists, there is thus 
an intimate link between political power, dispossession and development 
(Holomisa, 1994).  
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Land reform integral to black socio-economic development  
The liberationist discourse gives rise to arguments that the stunting of the 
development of black South Africans was primarily achieved by the theft of 
black South Africans’ land (Goosen, 1995; Holomisa, 1995; Makwetu, 1996; 
Seperepere, 1995). Land here is constructed as a basic right, and central to 
the process of development (Routledge, 1996). The dispossession of black 
South Africans of their land was therefore central to the process of stifling 
their progress along the trajectory of development (Goosen, 1995; Ngubane, 
1994).  
The majority of people in this country have, for more than three 
centuries, been dispossessed of their national heritage, the land. In 
order to perpetuate that dispossession, they were dehumanised, 
harassed, oppressed and exploited. The problem was compounded by 
the most vicious system of forced removals. Like all apartheid 
measures, the objective of forced removals was to impoverish our 
people, to subject them to humiliation and to make them … slaves in 
their own country (Seperepere, 1994, p. 2538). 
Liberationists therefore argue that land reform (or restoring black South 
Africans the land taken from them during colonialism, segregation and 
apartheid) is a central mechanism to allow black South Africans to progress 
socio-economically. Black South Africans “… can never regard themselves 
free as long as the land is not returned to them, the rightful owners. Indeed, 
freedom without land is a pipedream” (Seperepere, 1994, p. 2538), and “… 
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political freedom without economic empowerment is meaningless” 
(Holomisa, 1994, pp. 2516-2517). This means that “… not until we address 
this issue properly can there be any peace in our country” (Makwetu, 1994, 
p. 2528). To achieve peace and development in South Africa then, an 
aggressive purposeful land reform policy is necessary to restore the land 
stolen from black South Africans (Netshimbupfe, 1994).  
Land reform integral to black citizenship  
Within the liberationist discourse, for the black people of South Africa the 
loss of their land was intimately connected with the loss of their citizenship 
and freedom (Holomisa, 1994). As black South Africans “… lost their 
citizenship, they also lost their land in the process” (De Lille, 1995, p. 72). 
This means that “… our people can never regard themselves free as long as 
the land is not returned to them …” (Seperepere, 1994, p. 2538). In many 
ways then, “… land is life itself. Without land a nation is incomplete” 
(Modisenyane, 1995, p. 692). The liberationist discourse gives rise to 
arguments that the return of the land to black South Africans is necessary as 
a concrete sign that black South Africans are now full citizens in the 
country.  
Black victims, white perpetrators  
Three agents in land reform are constructed in this discourse: black South 
African commoners, white South Africans, and traditional African leaders. 
Within the liberationist discourse, black South African commoners and 
traditional African leaders are victims, in much the same position as the 
satellites of the Dependency discourse. Both groups have historically been 
 217 
 
excluded from the government, the economy and the land of South Africa 
(Holomisa, 1994; Makwetu, 1996; Ngubane, 1996; Phohlela, 1996; 
Seperepere, 1994). While black farmers (traditional leaders and commoners) 
were highly productive in the past, colonial, segregation and apartheid 
policies have combined to force both groups of black South Africans into 
the position of impoverished servants of white masters who are not allowed 
to make decisions for themselves (Holomisa, 1994; Mokoena, 1994; 
Ngubane, 1994, 1995; Ngwenya, 1996). Suffering from poverty and 
malnutrition, it is not that black South African commoners and traditional 
leaders want land, it is that they desperately need land for housing and the 
production of food (Holomisa, 1995; Makwetu, 1994; Seperepere, 1994).  
In contrast, white South Africans are constructed in similar ways as the 
metropoles of the Dependency discourse — they have gained their land and 
wealth unjustly through the use of military force during the colonial, 
segregation and apartheid eras (Holomisa, 1994, 1996b; Makwetu, 1996; 
Ndlovu, 1995; Netshimbupfe, 1994, 1995). White South Africans are 
portrayed as having derived great pleasure from the suffering of all black 
South Africans (Seperepere, 1994), and continuing to practice gross human 
rights malpractices in post-apartheid South Africa (Phohlela, 1995). The 
white farmers are thus the illegal occupiers of an unfair portion of South 
Africa’s farmland, many of whom do not even live on their farms (Holomisa, 
1994; Makwetu, 1994, 1996).  
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Traditional African chiefs as guardians of the land  
There are also aspects of the liberationist discourse which do not 
correspond with the Dependency discourse. A strong subset within the 
liberationist discourse (many hereditary African chiefs themselves) focused 
on traditional African leaders as important agents in the land reform 
process. Ignoring the complicated history of collaboration and 
manipulation between the chiefs and white authorities, these speakers 
described African chiefs as custodians of the land who acted on behalf of 
the communities they ruled (Netshimbupfe, 1994), holding it in trust for 
them. These chiefs could not do as they pleased with this land, but had to 
act in consultation with their elders, or invite the wrath of their subjects 
(Holomisa, 1994). These chiefs were depicted as heroic resisters to the 
incursions of white settlers, many of whom were dispossessed or died in 
defence of their land and communities (Holomisa, 1995; Mokoena, 1994; 
Ndlovu, 1995). It was admitted that some chiefs are seen as obstacles to the 
development of the land they control (Holomisa, 1994), that some deny 
land access to women in their communities, and that some sell community 
land for their own personal gain. However, it was argued that many chiefs 
perform a vital welfare function in South African society, as they  
… operate functional and relatively efficient systems of communal 
land administration which protect the rights of all members, 
particularly the rights of the poor, who would be vulnerable to losing 
their land to market forces if the land were to be individualised 
(Mathebe, 1996).  
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Traditional African leaders are thus constructed in this strand of the 
liberationist discourse as both the guardians of African culture and the 
poorest of the rural landless in South Africa.  
Those within the liberationist discourse constructing traditional chiefs as an 
important part of the land reform process also argue that land should be 
returned to the chiefs rather than individuals or non-tribal groups 
(Makhanya, 1994; Mentz, 1994). Given pre-colonial forms of land access and 
ownership, the liberationist discourse gives rise to suggestions that the 
chiefs are in fact the rightful owners of the land:  
When we talk about land, we talk about the land that was annexed 
by the British, who annexed it from amakhosi [Zulu traditional 
leaders]. If the land is then given back, one should go back to the 
amakhosi to find out who annexed their land, when , and the land 
can then be given back to them [Hansard translation from 
isiZulu](Ndlovu, 1996, p. 2976).  
In addition, the chiefs should be the focus of land reform as they are the 
guardians of traditional African culture (Ngubane, 1995). The traditional 
authorities and the laws and customs under which they live “… give 
meaning and a sense of belonging to millions of South Africans” (Hlengwa, 
1996, p. 2992).  
White land gained illegally  
The liberationist discourse gives rise to arguments that most of the land 
owned by white South Africans was gained dishonestly and by violent 
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means. Members of the ANC argued that historically, “… there is no trace of 
who purchased land from a specific [African] chief” (Netshimbupfe, 1995, p. 
862). Rather whites had  
… over the heads of the indigenous owners of the land, and in 
collaboration with the colonial land apartheid governments, 
arrogated to themselves ownership of the land. Their title to the land 
was duly registered in accordance with their imposed system of 
landownership, to the extent that the Whites are now, in terms of 
the law, in possession of documentary proof of ownership in the 
form of title deeds, whilst the Black residents can only point to the 
graves of their forebears as proof of their right of ownership of the 
land (Holomisa, 1996b, p. 18). 
During the colonial era, land was awarded to white soldiers who had killed a 
certain number of indigenous Africans in battle (Dyani, 1995). When the 
Natives Land Bill was signed into law and implemented in 1913, for the 
majority of black South Africans “… this was the era when both the poles, 
the Arctic and the Antarctic, fell on South Africa, when winter fell upon the 
Black people of South Africa” (Phohlela, 1996, p. 3005). Later, during the 
apartheid era “…there was no willing buyer and no willing seller, but 
straightforward confiscation [of black people’s land]. Whatever 
compensation was paid was laughable and also amounted to confiscation” 
(De Lille, 1995, p. 71). Therefore, any market-based land reform programme 
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would only legalise the robbery of colonial, segregation and apartheid 
policies, and condone the land grabbing of the whites (Makwetu, 1994). 
Property rights entrench apartheid inequality   
In this light, within the liberationist discourse it was argued that there was 
no need for a property rights clause in the final Constitution (Hanekom, 
1995c; Khasu, 1996a; Makwetu, 1996), which would only entrench the 
existing racial disparities arising from colonial and apartheid land policies 
(Du Plessis, 1994; Sizani, 1996; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000; Szeftel, 1994; 
Yanou, 2009). In addition, arguments arising from the libertarian discourse 
about the necessity of property rights to ensure investment were also 
directly challenged: “This argument about investment flying out of the 
country because of the property clause is arrogant, racist and erroneous. At 
best it is balderdash” (Khasu, 1996a, p. 376).  
Government expropriation   
In addition, the liberationist discourse gives rise to arguments against a 
market-based land reform programme (Sizani, 1996), that access to land is a 
basic human right (Goosen, 1995), and pointing to the small amounts of 
land transferred under a similar policy in Zimbabwe prior to President 
Mugabe’s fast-track land reform of 2000. Doubt is expressed about market-
based policies which would “… create a situation in which only those who 
have financial means, and the banks, will be able to make use of the land” 
(Holomisa, 1995, pp. 841-842). A market-led land redistribution programme 
would tie the hands of the post-apartheid government (Makwetu, 1994), 
making it unable to help the rural landless poor, and creating a situation in 
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which only a fortunate few would be able to purchase land (Holomisa, 
1994). Liberationists went so far as to argue that the “… principle of willing 
buyer, willing seller is the language of the wealthy and the lofty” (Khasu, 
1996b, p. 52), and would only serve to “… unduly enrich those who are 
endowed with large tracts of land, regardless of how they acquired them” 
(Holomisa, 1996a, p. 2960). Such a land reform programme would make the 
post-apartheid government pay for the sins of apartheid (Holomisa, 1994). 
Rather than a market-based land reform programme, the liberationist 
discourse prompts arguments in favour of a land claims process where the 
victims of apartheid and segregation removals would regain their land 
without paying for it, or financial compensation for the land they lost 
(Mokoena, 1994; Netshimbupfe, 1994; Ngwenya, 1994). In addition, in place 
of a market-based land reform programme, the government should 
expropriate land for redistribution to black South Africans (Du Plessis, 1994; 
Holomisa, 1995, 1996a; Netshimbupfe, 1994; Sizani, 1996; Spitz & 
Chaskalson, 2000; Szeftel, 1994; Yanou, 2009).  
Redistribution to groups rather than individuals   
Once the government had gained possession of land for redistribution, 
many liberationists argued that it should be redistributed to large groups of 
black South Africans rather than individuals. “It is no good to help 1 000 
people to become land owners. One has to use the communal system to be 
able to give land to the other people as well” (Mentz, 1994, p. 2535). This is 
because communal farming systems had helped black farmers outcompete 
 223 
 
white farmers in the early stages of colonialism by giving free access to land 
and cheap family labour  (Ngubane, 1994). The redistribution of land to 
groups could give black farmers these advantages once again, in addition to 
providing training to future black commercial farmers (Mentz, 1994).  
Government finance for beneficiaries   
Liberationists further argued that one of the primary problems restricting 
black South Africans in the communal areas was an inability to access 
capital. Therefore, it was suggested that an agreement be found between 
finance institutions and those controlling land access in communal areas 
enabling residents of these areas to borrow money to develop their land 
(Holomisa, 1994; Netshimbupfe, 1995). However this agreement should 
preclude the possibility of financial institutions seizing land in payment for 
unpaid debts, as those living in the communal areas “… are the poorest of 
our citizens, who have no other source of making a living except their land, 
and if they were to be exposed to the risk of losing that land, they would 
have nowhere else to go” (Holomisa, 1996a, p. 2959).  
The liberationist discourse also gives rise to advocacy in favour of the 
provision of intensive assistance to the beneficiaries of land reform 
(Chuenyane, 1995, p. 891).   
… we have to establish programmes to assist them in re-establishing 
themselves as viable, functioning enterprises, if we are to avoid the 
danger of creating more impoverished resettlement camps 
(Ngwenya, 1994, p. 2531).  
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Given the amount of assistance provided to white farmers, it would be 
unacceptable for the post-apartheid  government to neglect the needs of the 
beneficiaries of land reform (Seperepere, 1994). 
Focus on rural landless women   
A strong strand within the liberationist discourse argues that land reform 
should concentrate on giving land title to rural landless women (Holomisa, 
1994). This is because there “… can be no doubt that the people who bear 
the heaviest burden of poverty in the rural areas, are women” (Ngwenya, 
1994, p. 2532). In an indication of some debate within the liberationist 
discourse, African chiefs in the communal areas are also urged to give more 
opportunities to women to access and own land (Ngwenya, 1994). In these 
areas, women  
… are permitted to work the land, but not to own it. Some are not 
even permitted to participate in community meetings if they do not 
have their husband’s permission. Surely this practice goes against the 
provisions of the Constitution? … The removal of these laws is 
necessary for land reform (Routledge, 1996, p. 3003).  
This strand of the liberationist discourse, therefore, urges a strong focus on 
the needs of rural landless women.  
No sale of land to foreigners   
Finally, the liberationist discourse gives rise to the argument that no more 
land should be sold to non-South Africans while black South Africans are 
still landless. “I am saying that no land should be sold to foreigners while 
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our people do not as yet have any land. I want to repeat that no land must 
be sold to foreigners” (Ndlovu, 1996, pp. 2976-2977). Rather, the South 
African government should have first option of purchasing all land put on 
the market (Holomisa, 1996a).  
Land reform to break black dependency   
In contrast to the libertarians, then, the liberationists argued for changes to 
the agrarian structure created by apartheid policies in favour of black South 
Africans. Constructing black South Africans as having been forced into an 
inferior dependent relationship with white South Africans, liberationists 
argued that the primary way this was accomplished was through the 
illegitimate dispossession of their land. Land reform is therefore depicted as 
essential to restoring the economic independence of black South Africans. A 
distinct section of this discourse calls for the return of agricultural land to 
traditional African chiefs, who are constructed as the original guardians of 
the land. Another section argues that rural landless women should be the 
primary focus of land reform efforts. All those subscribing to the 
liberationist discourse challenge the libertarian emphasis on individual 
property rights, and recommend government expropriation of white-owned 
farms, for redistribution to groups of black South Africans. These groups 
need intensive financial and technical assistance from the government, to 
help them progress socio-economically.  
Land reform within the new constitution  
In the development of both the Interim and the final Constitutions, 
agreement on the land and property clauses was only reached in the very 
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final stages of the negotiations (Hamilton, 2006). The property clause 
created in the Interim Constitution has been called a “… clumsily drafted 
compromise …” (Walker, 2005a, p. 815) where existing property rights were 
protected, while provision was made for the state to expropriate property 
from private land owners under certain circumstances, and against the 
payment of proper compensation based on the history of the acquisition of 
the land, the market value of the land, the value of the owner’s investment 
in the land, and the interests of all those affected (Cousins, 1997; Du Plessis, 
1994; Hall, 2010a; Marais, 2011; Miller & Pope, 2000a; Spitz & Chaskalson, 
2000; Walker, 2005a). Land restitution was limited to those cases of 
dispossession which occurred after 1913 (Cousins, 1997), and would be 
implemented by a Commission to process claims and a Court of Law to 
make the final adjudication (Walker, 2005a). The tension between the 
liberationist concerns of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC and the 
libertarian concerns of the NP and the Democratic Party was resolved in 
such a way that neither set of concerns was given clear priority. The two 
approaches were put on a level footing, leaving the courts to weigh the two 
against each other. Because the Interim Bill of Rights exerted such a great 
influence over the final Constitution agreed to in 1996, the struggle and 
compromises made in 1993 over property rights and land restitution 
procedures in the Interim Constitution inadvertently set the future 
direction of land redistribution policy in South Africa (Spitz & Chaskalson, 
2000). The final post-apartheid Constitution was signed into law by 
President Nelson Mandela on the 10th December 1996 (Gloppen, 1997). 
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South Africa’s six-year period of crisis which had disturbed the pre-1990 
equilibrium was over, and a new period of post-apartheid policy equilibrium 
was established.  
It has been commented that in post-apartheid South Africa, the ‘democratic 
movement’ found itself assimilated into the state, rather than taking over 
and transforming it (Hebinck et al., 2011). This is reflected in the 
compromise arrived at on land — through the influence of liberationist 
ideas, the new post-apartheid land policy equilibrium allowed for the 
possibility of the restitution of land to those dispossessed between 1913 and 
1990. However, under the competing influence of libertarian ideas, the new 
post-apartheid equilibrium still retained an emphasis on the rights of 
existing white large-scale farmers as being more important than those of 
black South Africans seeking greater access to land. Thus Section 25 (1) 
states that: “No-one may be deprived of property … and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 7). The 
1996 Constitution therefore entrenches the extant arrangements of land 
ownership in South Africa (Hall, 2010a, p. 41; Hamilton, 2006).  
This study is motivated by the question of how the agrarian structure 
created prior to 1990 could be preserved in the post-apartheid era, despite 
the overwhelming mandate given to the government for change. In 
answering this, this chapter examines how the libertarian and liberationist 
discourses define land reform, and which aspects of each discourse became 
enshrined in the new constitution — which determined the basic 
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boundaries within which the game of land reform policy would be played by 
actors at the national policy and operational levels. The ideas from each 
discourse enshrined in the constitution had a number of implications: 
Firstly and most importantly, the libertarian ideas enshrined in the 1996 
Constitution entrenched the advantages gained by white farmers under the 
old equilibrium. While the new policy equilibrium around land was based 
on a different set of ideas to those subscribed to during apartheid, the 
effects of the old policy equilibrium around land were preserved in the post-
apartheid policy equilibrium around land. Despite questions around how 
this could be morally justified (Ntsebeza, 2004), the libertarian emphasis on 
individual property rights enshrined in the constitution meant that the 
outcomes of the post-apartheid game of land reform could not differ 
substantially from the pattern of land ownership during the colonial, 
segregation and apartheid eras. Therefore, while white South Africans no 
longer have privileged access to land in post-apartheid South Africa, the 
land they gained in the past, when they did have privileged access to it, is 
guaranteed to them in the Constitutional Bill of Rights.   
The libertarian compromise with liberationist ideas meant that some access 
to land for black South Africans is made possible by subsequent clauses 
giving the government limited powers to expropriate land for land reform 
(Cousins, 1997). “Property may be expropriated … for a public purpose or in 
the public interest …” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 7). The public 
interest is defined as “… the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural 
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resources …” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 7). However, as the land 
rights of white South Africans are guaranteed, regardless of their privileged 
access to it in the past, the expropriation of the land is “… subject to 
compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment 
of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 7). In a minor 
victory for the liberationist ideational approach, the amount of the 
compensation paid must reflect “… an equitable balance between the public 
interest and the interests of those affected …” (Republic of South Africa, 
1996, p. 7). Along with the market price of the land, ‘just and equitable 
compensation’ is therefore defined as including the current use of the 
property, the history of its acquisition, the extent of direct state investment 
and subsidy in the property, and the purpose of the expropriation (Republic 
of South Africa, 1996).   
Reflecting the liberationist ideas of sections of the ANC, Section 25 goes on 
to provide the outlines of a broad-based land reform programme in South 
Africa. The government is mandated to “… take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which 
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis” (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, p. 7), making some form of land redistribution 
programme necessary. In addition, the government was mandated to 
improve the tenure of those “… whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices …” (Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, p. 7), setting the stage for tenure reforms as part of a broader 
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land reform programme. Finally, the victims of ‘forced removals’ dating 
after the proclamation of the 1913 Land Act were guaranteed restitution of 
the land they lost, or equitable redress for it (Republic of South Africa, 
1996), mandating a land restitution programme as well.  
All three of these mandated programmes, however, were to proceed under 
the pre-eminent libertarian principle set out at the beginning of Section 25 
which guaranteed existing property rights. One of the reasons, therefore, 
why so little has been achieved by post-apartheid land reform policies, is 
that at the constitutional level, while the new policy equilibrium “… 
contains potentially far-reaching constitutional imperatives for a more 
extensive land reform than that indicated in 1993” (Walker, 2005a, p. 816), 
the government is limited by the constitutional requirement that the 
property rights given to white South Africans before 1990 under a policy 
equilibrium based on the idea of white supremacy are respected. The 
following chapter examines the iterated efforts of the post-apartheid 
government to create land reform policy within these basic policy 
boundaries.  
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Chapter Seven 
Post-Apartheid Land Redistribution Policy: Assumptions 
and Silences 
On the 4th of September 1998, Fidel Castro, leader of Cuba and a personal 
hero to then-President Mandela and most of his government, gave a speech 
to a rapturous reception at a special sitting of the National Assembly, South 
Africa’s lower house of Parliament, in Cape Town, South Africa. After 
congratulating all present for the peaceful transition from apartheid, he 
turned to the subject of improving the economic plight of South Africa’s 
black people. Perhaps surprisingly, Castro suggested that there was  
… absolutely nothing to be gained by disrupting the production 
system or squandering the vast material wealth, technical capacities, 
and productive efficiency created by the noble hands of workers 
under a cruel and unjust — virtually slave — system (Figueroa, 1998).  
He went on to remark that preserving the positive aspects of such a system, 
while simultaneously ensuring its benefits were distributed more fairly was 
perhaps one of the most difficult tasks attempted by any society. Castro 
here penetrated to the heart of the dilemma facing those designing and 
implementing land redistribution, in 1998 and today. What would be the 
best way to preserve the benefits of the existing agricultural sector in South 
Africa, while simultaneously addressing the injustices committed while 
creating it, and distributing its benefits more widely in society?      
 232 
 
Listening to Castro was the Minister of Land Affairs of the day, who had 
been given the task in 1994 by President Mandela of providing an answer to 
this dilemma, within the boundaries set by the Interim Constitution of 1993 
and the final Constitution in 1996. His answer was the State Lands and 
Agricultural Grant (SLAG), which was replaced with the Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) policy, and later the 
Pro-Active Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS). All three of these policies can 
be seen as sequential and iterated efforts to address the dilemma articulated 
by Castro, and create a viable land reform programme within the negotiated 
constraints of the Interim and the final Constitutions. All three policies can 
thus be seen as attempts to ‘square the circle’ of addressing the need for 
justice (past and present) for black South Africans while simultaneously 
fulfilling the terms established in the Interim and the final Constitution that 
upheld property rights.  
This chapter forms part of the overall effort in this study to answer the 
question of why post-apartheid land reform policies have achieved so little 
in terms of redistributing land. The focus of this chapter is on the hidden 
assumptions and practices underpinning the actual land reform policies 
that have been developed in the post-apartheid context through an analysis 
of the series of documents produced by the government for each of these 
three policies. An interrogation of the assumptions and presuppositions 
which lay behind each of these policy iterations is undertaken using the 
‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ approach developed by Bacchi 
(2009). A series of questions are asked of these three policies, aimed at 
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uncovering the problem representation, the assumptions, the history and 
the silences embedded in each. The aim is to make the implicit and hidden 
politics within each plan visible and provide a clear picture of what each 
policy aimed or aims to achieve, and for whom.  
Theoretical approach  
Before embarking on this analysis, it is necessary to outline the theoretical 
lens used here. As is outlined in chapter three, Foucault provided the 
insight that we are governed by ‘problematisations’. While it is generally 
assumed in everyday life that these problematisations are natural, they are 
in fact not fixed. Rather, they ‘become’, or ‘emerge’ as objects for thought in 
practices (Bacchi, 2012).Tracing the relations that produce these 
problematisations enables us to learn how we govern ourselves, and how 
truth is produced. Disrupting their ‘taken-for-granted’ status as truth, and 
revealing the fixed problematisations through which we are ruled as 
‘fragile’, opens up relations of ruling for critical scrutiny.  
The problematisations through which we are ruled arise out of many varied 
social practices, including the rules that are imposed on society, and the 
reasons given for them. Foucault studied the governmental rules and 
practices around the ‘mad’ to reveal how ‘madness’ was conceptualised or 
problematized. Problematisation as a method therefore involves studying 
problematized ‘objects’, to consider their mutability. This detachment 
creates the possibility of understanding to a greater extent the system of 
limits and exclusions we practice without realising it (Bacchi, 2012).  
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One way problematisations are presented by governments is through 
policies. Any policy proposal put forward will reflect deep-seated cultural 
assumptions. This implies that the ‘problems’ policies are meant to address 
are not exogenous, but rather endogenous — they are created within the 
policy-making process. Rather than reacting to problems, governments are 
in fact active in the creation and production of policy problems — policies 
give shape to problems, they do not actually address them (Bacchi, 2009).  
Critical insight can therefore be obtained by making the ‘problems’ that are 
implicit in public policies explicit, and scrutinising them closely. It is 
possible to scrutinise problematisations by identifying the implied problem 
from the proposed plan of action, or public policies and policy proposals. 
Every policy or policy proposal is a prescriptive text here, setting out a 
practice that relies on a particular problematisation. This is possible 
because what we propose to do about something indicates what we think 
needs to change. How the ‘problem’ is represented matters — the way the 
problem is represented carries all sorts of implications for how the issue is 
thought about, how the people involved are treated, and how they are 
encouraged to think about themselves (Bacchi, 2009, 2012). During the 
process of problematisation, complexity is necessarily reduced — only part 
of a story is being told. “As a result it is critically important to interrogate 
the problem representations that lodge within public policies in order to see 
what they include and what they leave out” (Bacchi, 2009, pp. xii-xiv). 
Rather than accepting the designation of some issue as a ‘problem’, the 
kinds of ‘problems’ that are presumed to exist and how they are thought 
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about must be interrogated. In this way, we gain important insights into the 
thinking that informs governing practices. It is necessary to think deeply 
about the assumptions and presuppositions lying behind and shaping 
selected policies, and to consider the implications flowing from these 
presuppositions and how particular forms of rule have come to be.  
Bacchi’s (2012) ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ (WPR) approach 
argues that it is possible to take any policy proposal, and to ‘work 
backwards’, to deduce how it produces a ‘problem’. To do this, six questions 
are asked of a given policy: how a problem is represented in a specific 
policy; the presuppositions or assumptions underlying this representation 
of the ‘problem’; the history of this problem representation; what is left 
unproblematic in this problem representation; the effects produced by this 
representation of the ‘problem’; and how this representation of the 
‘problem’ has been produced, disseminated and defended (Bacchi, 2009). 
These questions are “… designed to tease out conceptual premises, to draw 
attention to the ‘history’ (genealogy) of specific problematisations, and to 
consider their effects, including subjectification effects, for how people live 
their lives” (Bacchi, 2012, p. 5). The point of this exercise is not to stake out a 
position for or against a specific policy stance, nor to identify the ‘real’ 
problem. Rather, the intention is to explore the systems of limits and 
exclusions we practice without realising it. The goal is to stand back from 
taken-for-granted objects and concepts, and to determine how they have 
come to be through studying the politics that have gone into their making.  
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This approach to policy analysis is less concerned with intentionality than 
with identifying the deep conceptual premises operating within problem 
representations. The point is to draw attention to the assumptions and 
presuppositions that make it possible to develop these policies. The aim is 
to dig deeper than usual, with the goal of understanding policies better than 
the policy makers themselves (Bacchi, 2009).  
This chapter uses an adapted form of Bacchi’s set of questions, in order to 
examine the taken-for-granted concepts driving the SLAG, LRAD and PLAS 
policies. Specifically, this study interrogates the problem representations, 
the presuppositions, the history of these three policies, and the silences they 
contain. Chapter eight will examine the effects produced on land reform 
beneficiaries. The questions are not answered and set out in the order given 
here, but the answers are used as and when necessary to bring to the light 
and present clearly the hidden assumptions and the underlying focus of 
each of these three policies.  
Having outlined the questions driving this chapter, I now introduce the 
texts they were applied to. As discussed in chapter six, the negotiated deal 
reached between the ANC and the NP in the negotiations in 1993 (Spitz & 
Chaskalson, 2000) around the property clause in the Constitution set the 
outer boundaries within which land reform in South Africa would occur. In 
the metaphor used in an earlier chapter, these negotiations set out the lines 
of the playing field within which the game would be played. The basic 
parameter within which all efforts at land reform would have to work was 
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that South Africa’s white farmers had every right to own the property and 
the capital which they had accumulated during the colonial, segregation 
and apartheid eras. In any post-apartheid land reform programme, the 
Constitution mandated that white farmers would have to be compensated 
for any land they gave for redistribution. While the Constitution specified a 
range of factors which would determine the compensation white farmers 
would receive, a large part of the determination of the prices paid for land 
was determined by the market.  
This chapter follows the attempts of the ANC government to enact a land 
reform programme within the boundaries of this negotiated playing field. It 
examines the three policies created by the ANC government in pursuit of 
land reform, under the compulsion of having to pay market-determined 
prices for all land transferred from white to black ownership. SLAG was 
implemented from 1994 to 1999, during the period that Derek Hanekom as 
Minister of Land Affairs presided over the DLA. LRAD was enacted from 
2000 in the same Department under Minister Thoko Didiza, during the 
Presidency of Thabo Mbeki (Hall, 2004a). In 2009, the name of the DLA was 
changed to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
(DRDLR), and Gugile Nkwinti was appointed Minister of this Department 
by President Jacob Zuma (Jacobs, 2012). Under Minister Nkwinti, the PLAS 
policy was developed and was implemented in place of LRAD. From this 
point on, when discussing SLAG and LRAD the DLA will be referred to as 
the responsible department. When discussing PLAS the DRDLR will be 
referred to rather than the DLA.  
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When discussing SLAG, this study will draw from the White Paper on South 
African land policy (DLA, 1997), as it provides a full account of relevant 
information to allow the analysis of the assumptions and presuppositions 
that made it possible for this policy to be developed. When discussing 
LRAD, the Land redistribution for agricultural development: A sub-
programme of the land redistribution programme (MALA, n.d.) policy 
document was analysed. Finally in relation to PLAS, four documents were 
studied: the Framework for the proactive land acquisition strategy (PLAS) 
(DRDLR, 2011a); the Policy for the recapitalisation and development 
programme of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
(DRDLR, 2013); the Green Paper on land reform, 2011 (DRDLR, 2011b), and a 
speech given by Minister Nkwinti in Parliament in 2012 (Nkwinti, 2012). The 
Green Paper on land reform (DRDLR, 2011b) provides insights into the 
overarching aims and motivations of PLAS, and so was included as a source. 
Minister Nkwinti’s speech provides insights into the deeper motivations 
behind the PLAS policy. Having outlined the approach to the analysis of 
these documents, and the sources drawn on, the chapter turns to the 
scrutiny of SLAG, perhaps the most hopeful of the three policies, and aimed 
at benefitting the widest range of the rural landless poor.   
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Table 7-1  
Focus and method of SLAG, LRAD and PLAS 
 
Beneficiaries Method 
SLAG Poorest households Market 
LRAD 
Individual entrepreneurs with 
access to capital 
Market 
PLAS Aspiring black commercial farmers Government 
 
State Lands and Acquisition Grant  
Mass poverty relief through the market  
Table 7-1 provides a summary of the focus and method of the three land 
reform policy iterations at the national policy level. In essence, the SLAG 
policy provided a small grant to households earning less than a set income 
threshold, to assist them to purchase land on the market. Beneficiary 
households were encouraged to join together in larger groups, pool their 
grants and buy pieces of land together (Hall, 2010c). SLAG was the first land 
redistribution policy produced by the first post-apartheid government. As 
such, it was the product of the great hope and energy of the new ANC 
government. This policy also held great symbolic power for many black 
South Africans, as it promised a way to regain the land taken under the 
colonial and apartheid governments. Thus, drawing on themes explored 
previously in the liberationist and the Dependency discourses, the SLAG 
policy is unequivocal about the disadvantaged status of black South 
Africans. Throughout the document, the majority black population of South 
Africa is described as historically disadvantaged and poor, ignored by the 
formal financial sector, and confined by colonial and apartheid legislation 
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to “… overcrowded black labour-reserve areas …” (DLA, 1997, pp. 9, 24, 73). 
This meant that under apartheid, black South Africans were unable to own 
land, and so in post-apartheid South Africa they suffer under insecure forms 
of land tenure, and have no access to productive resources. In contrast, the 
minority white population is described as being served by a modern and 
sophisticated financial system, and as being the freehold owners of large-
scale commercial farms . By implication they are also historically 
advantaged, wealthy, enjoying secure forms of land tenure and full access to 
productive resources. Land redistribution is, therefore, part of the overall 
process of changing this inequality, so that black South Africans can 
improve their economic position.   
The question is how the SLAG policy aimed to achieve this. As specific 
problem representations are not inevitable or permanently fixed, competing 
problem representations exist over time and space (Bacchi, 2009). There 
was no inevitability, therefore, about what particular policy instruments 
SLAG would deploy. However, the overall approach to the task of land 
redistribution taken under SLAG was governed by the constraints laid on 
the land reform process in the Interim Constitution of 1993, and the final 
Constitution of 1996, where provisions to safeguard existing property rights 
meant white land owners were to be given market-related compensation for 
their land if it was transferred under the land reform programme (Republic 
of South Africa, 1996). This representation of the problem draws on the 
concept — embedded deeply in existing Western societies and economies 
— that land is a form of property, which can be owned outright by one 
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person, and exchanged on the market like any other commodity. The 
process of how property rights came to be the dominant form of 
landownership in South Africa, and how this principle came to be 
embedded in the Constitution has been described in some detail in previous 
chapters. The important point here is that it was not inevitable that the land 
reform programme would be market-based. A strong argument was made at 
a key decision-point by the liberationists that it should not be bound by the 
market. However, as the result of negotiations between the two most 
powerful parties, a property clause was included in the Constitution. This 
meant that all transfers of land under land reform would have to be 
compensated at their market value, that land redistribution would occur 
through market transactions under the provisions of the property clause in 
the constitution. Under SLAG, the government gave a subsidy to 
beneficiaries, assisting the purchase of land on the market. Despite 
centuries of discriminatory policies barring black South Africans from 
access to land, then, the 1997 White Paper deployed the ahistorical policy 
tool of the market, with no reference to the social, political or economic 
context of the problem of landlessness in South Africa.   
The constraints on land reform in the Constitution meant that in SLAG, the 
“… challenge is to find a way of redistributing land to the needy, and at the 
same time maintaining public confidence in the market” (DLA, 1997, p. 17). 
In this statement lies the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the 
SLAG policy. Black South Africans were constructed in this policy as 
needing to be given access to land as a matter of justice, but at the same 
 242 
 
time the existing agrarian system (called ‘the market’ in the White Paper) 
had to be preserved. In fact, this binary was to be remedied through the 
market for farmland. The market could not be bypassed in the matter of 
restorative justice (DLA, 1997). However, if black South Africans were to 
take matters into their own hands and take the land they want outside of 
the market and the law, or if the government were to bypass the market in 
transferring land in the name of justice, this would break public confidence 
in the existing agrarian system, and so constitute a threat to long-term 
stability, development and sustainable growth (DLA, 1997), and create 
social and economic dislocation (DLA, 1997).  
The analysis so far has uncovered and examined the key binary within the 
SLAG policy — the opposition between the demands of justice and the 
demands of the existing agrarian system. This is similar to the analysis by 
the World Bank, which gave recommendations on land reform prior to 1994. 
According to Hall (2010c), World Bank analysts saw land reform as 
revolving around a tension between “… the desire to address welfare 
objectives through the redistribution of land and the need to promote the 
productive use of agricultural land” (p. 182). The binary at the heart of land 
reform according to this analysis was between equity and efficiency. To the 
World Bank, a market-led land reform could give black South Africans 
greater access to land through the market (increasing their welfare), while 
simultaneously creating a more efficient (small-scale) agricultural sector.  
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The binary presented in the White Paper by the DLA, however, is different. 
Rather than being a choice between social equity and economic efficiency, 
the justice/existing agrarian system binary frames land redistribution as a 
choice between either creating greater economic equality through non-
market means, or creating economic equality through the market, and 
thereby allowing the market to dictate the pace of land redistribution. In 
the equity/efficiency binary constructed by the World Bank, social equity is 
seen as optional. In the binary presented in SLAG, social equity is not seen 
as optional. It is the end result of both options. The only real debate is on 
how it is to be achieved. Using non-market means to redistribute land here 
is portrayed as highly risky and undesirable. Leaving the redistribution of 
land to the market is seen as being much safer, and the guarantor of long-
term prosperity for the entire country.  
In contrast, in the World Bank analysis, social equity was seen as existing in 
opposition to market efficiency (Hall, 2010b). Under SLAG then, the market 
is presented as a method to achieve the social equity that South Africa so 
desperately needs. In fact, the market is presented as the only responsible 
way for the government to do this. Land redistribution under SLAG cannot, 
therefore, be much more than the “… removal of impediments to the 
efficient operation of the land market” (DLA, 1997, p. 36). While both the 
World Bank and the DLA come to the same conclusion here, the point is 
that they arrived at the market as the best way to effect land reform by 
different routes. The DLA, however, at least acknowledged the possibility of 
non-market means to transfer land.   
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‘Development’ according to SLAG  
This emphasis on the market led to a specific conception of development 
constructed in the White Paper  (DLA, 1997). Development here is economic 
development, characterised by an increase in entrepreneurial activity. The 
main indication of how the process of ‘development’ is constructed in SLAG 
is in the assertion that:  
Property rights are critical for gaining access to capital for 
investment in entrepreneurial activity — either through selling the 
asset or through getting finance on the strength of it. In developed 
economies, 70% of the credit which new businesses raise is secured 
by using formal titles as collateral for mortgages (DLA, 1997, p. 13). 
The assumptions around development here are obviously derived from the 
boundaries laid around land reform in the Interim and the final 
Constitutions, but on a broader level it links to wider narratives around 
economic development such as the Large Farms and libertarian discourses, 
which specify property rights as a key mechanism for transferring resources 
like agricultural land, capital and technology through the market to those 
able to use them most efficiently (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). As these resources 
are used as efficiently as possible, ‘developing’ societies move from a 
‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ state (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Kuznets, 1955; 
Marangos, 2009; Mergel, 2012; Rostow, 1990).  
The focus on property rights means that the value of land as constructed in 
SLAG is primarily economic: 
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Our land is a precious resource. We build our homes on it; it feeds us; 
it sustains animal and plant life and stores our water. It contains our 
mineral wealth and is an essential resource for investment in our 
country’s economy (DLA, 1997, p. 7). 
The primary value of land here is as a source of capital that can stimulate 
the rest of the economy. This means that ‘land redistribution’ is primarily an 
economic process. The White Paper (1997) asserts that the “… primary 
reason for the government’s land reform measures is to redress the 
injustices of apartheid and to alleviate the impoverishment and suffering 
that it caused” (p. 11). In the short term, this may involve providing black 
South Africans “… with basic needs and more secure livelihoods” (p. 11), and 
land for residential purposes. This may include providing land to “… women 
who need to grow food to feed the family …” (p. 27), and it may involve 
allowing individuals and communities to “… have a choice as to the form of 
tenure they prefer” (p. 104).  This is because the purpose of redistributing 
land is “… to improve their livelihoods and quality of life” (p. 36). However, 
to the DLA, the most important manner of improving the livelihoods and 
quality of life of black South Africans was to give them property rights, and 
so integrate them into the existing formal economy. This meant that the 
primary task of SLAG was “… to extend property ownership and/or access to 
productive resources to the historically disadvantaged and poor …” (p. 67).  
To ease inequality between whites and blacks in South Africa then, SLAG 
proposed giving black South Africans access to land through the market. 
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Thus, all the different groups of people who were identified as the targets of 
the SLAG grant — the landless, the farm workers, the labour tenants, those 
with insecure tenure, and the land restitution claimants (DLA, 1997) — 
were constructed as suffering from a lack of access to capital to buy land on 
the open market. “The reality is that the poor and the landless are not in a 
position to acquire land at market prices without assistance from the state” 
(p. 17). As the Minister of Land Affairs at the time explained in Parliament 
in 1994: “We have a situation in our country in which there are many willing 
sellers of land and anxious buyers of land, but because of the inability to get 
finance for land purchase, nothing is happening” (Hanekom, 1994, p. 2514). 
All that was needed then was an injection of capital to poor households, to 
bring about the “… removal of impediments to the efficient operation of the 
land market” (DLA, 1997, p. 36).   
The SLAG grant therefore was meant to help “… poor and disadvantaged 
people to buy land …” (DLA, 1997, p. 35) through the market. This in turn 
was supposed to give them access to capital for investment in 
entrepreneurial activity. There were no restrictions on what beneficiaries 
could do with their land under SLAG in the White Paper. If they chose to 
undertake economic activity on the land they had bought, a wide range of 
possible types of agricultural production were envisaged, ranging from 
growing food or raising livestock for subsistence purposes to “… a minority 
who are able to produce a surplus and wish to produce more …” (p. 27). This 
policy document constructs such beneficiaries as engaging in small-scale 
agricultural production of crops on irrigated or rain-fed plots, small 
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livestock production in feedlots or extensive grazing systems, or the 
cultivation of timber or fruit trees. Alternatively, the beneficiaries could 
enter into production contracts with other agri-business, or even use their 
grants to buy shares in existing large-scale commercial farms. All these 
activities were seen as in some way accessing or generating capital from 
land, which over time would enable them to move further from a 
‘traditional’ economic state, and closer to a ‘modern’ state, like white South 
Africans were able to under colonial, segregation and apartheid policies.  
Silence: How the land came to be owned by white South Africans  
SLAG provided a small grant to help beneficiaries purchase land on the 
open market. The compromise made on property rights by the ANC during 
its negotiations with the NP meant that there was a deep silence in SLAG 
around how that land came to be owned by white South Africans. The land 
which black SLAG beneficiaries were to purchase from white farmers was 
on the market because it was wrested violently by extra-market means by 
white South Africans from black South Africans during the colonial, Union 
and apartheid eras. The fact that these extra-market means included the use 
of physical violence and force is likewise left unaddressed. There is some 
acknowledgement in SLAG of land dispossession and the bitterness it has 
caused among black South Africans, evident in statements that resentment 
“… over land dispossession runs deep in our society. It threatens to boil 
over…” (DLA, 1997, p. 11). Despite this, it was repeatedly emphasised 
throughout the 1997 White Paper that land redistribution must take place 
through the market.  
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In a moment of supreme unintended irony, the SLAG policy condemns 
black landless South Africans who themselves use extra-market means to 
gain access to land, on the basis that the “… the invasion and illegal 
occupation of land is a threat to stability and development” (DLA, 1997, p. 
27). This implies that when white South Africans used exactly the same 
extra-market means to access land before 1994, this somehow contributed 
to creating ‘stability and development’. However after 1994, the use of such 
extra-market means by black South Africans to access land detracted from 
‘stability and development’. The SLAG policy does not acknowledge or 
address this contradiction.    
Intended beneficiaries  
Having established how land redistribution worked under SLAG, what 
follows is an examination of the intended beneficiaries. Land reform under 
SLAG was problematized as a matter of providing black South Africans with 
the capital to access land on the open market. It has been estimated by Hall 
(2004a) that apartheid policies left about 16 million black South Africans 
living in the communal areas during the 1990s, without access to enough 
land to support themselves. At the same time, some 3 million black South 
Africans lived and worked on commercial farms owned by whites. This 
suggests a total of at least 19 million people were potential targets of the 
SLAG grant. In order to ascertain who among these 19 million people were 
actually targeted by the SLAG grant, it is necessary to examine how they 
were categorised within this policy.   
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The specific focus of SLAG was to provide “… the disadvantaged and the 
poor with access to land for residential and productive purposes” (DLA, 
1997, p. 9). To do this successfully, the first task was “… the identification of 
particularly marginalised groups in need of land …” (p. 12). A number of 
these particularly marginalised groups are mentioned throughout the 
document. These include evicted and existing labour tenants, landless farm 
workers, new entrants to agriculture, women, and people resident in the 
communal areas. Women especially were singled out as priority targets of 
the policy (p. 12) , as they were “… discriminated against under many types 
of tenure arrangements” (p. 33). The White Paper did not position all groups 
as needing land for the same reasons. For some, land was needed only to 
grow food for subsistence. Others were positioned as needing access to land 
to graze their livestock, as well as a minority who are able to produce a 
surplus and wish to produce more. So there is a “… range of clients seeking 
to obtain land: from the poorest … to emergent black entrepreneurs …” (p. 
37). Having recognised different groups as the target of the policy, and 
having recognised a range of different needs, the White Paper argues that 
these differing needs will all be catered to adequately by “… a single, yet 
flexible, redistribution mechanism …” (p. 37) — a financial grant of R15 000 
extended to single households or families (DLA, 1997) to enable them to 
buy land.  
A focus on households  
All the groups targeted by this policy — women, labour tenants, farm 
workers, aspiring black entrepreneurs — were classified into the same basic 
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homogenous unit of the household. Targeting households as the focus of 
the grant would therefore be the best way to serve the interests of these 
groups. “Land reform aims to contribute to economic development … by 
giving households the opportunity to engage in productive land use …” 
(DLA, 1997, p. 7). In addition, the poorest households in these groups would 
be in the greatest need, and so the grant was only made available to 
households with an average income of less than R1, 500 per month (p. 68). 
Individuals who were not part of a family were not specifically barred from 
accessing the grant, but they would need special permission to be given the 
grant. Households were constructed, then, as the basic unit of society in 
this policy document, and not individuals. The SLAG grant was therefore 
aimed at the vast majority of the households among the estimated 19 
million rural landless poor living in South Africa at the time.  
Genealogy of the focus on households   
Given the boundaries laid around land reform by the Constitutions of 1993 
and 1996, and the focus of SLAG on the transfer of property ownership 
through the market, it is perhaps surprising that the grant is aimed at the 
poorest households in the rural areas, and expects them to group together 
to buy land. Given the market focus of SLAG, it might have been expected 
that the grant would be distributed on an individual basis rather than to 
households and groups. This discrepancy is perhaps explained by the 
influence of many NGOs (all of which had focused on land dispossessions 
during the apartheid era) on the creation of the SLAG policy.  
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The last two decades of the apartheid regime saw a proliferation of land-
based NGOs in South Africa, these being mostly funded by foreign donors. 
Largely created and staffed by middle-class English-speaking whites, during 
the apartheid era these organisations tried to legally defend communities 
threatened with ‘black spot’ resettlement from state action. The expertise of 
human rights lawyers working in the legal NGO, the Legal Resources 
Centre, was in great demand from other land NGOs seeking to challenge 
the legality of the apartheid state’s forcible removal of black people from 
‘white’ areas (James, 2007; Walker, 2005a). As noted in chapter six, these 
NGOs had been active participants in the negotiations around the 
Constitution of post-apartheid South Africa, drawing on the liberationist 
discourse along with the ANC and the PAC (Wixley, 1994). Thus, the NGOs 
consistently resisted the inclusion of a property clause in the Interim and 
the final Constitution on the basis that obliging the payment of market-
value compensation for redistributed land was a major threat to meaningful 
land reform (Hall, 2010c; Walker, 2005a). At the negotiations around the 
Interim Constitution, the NGOs had continually emphasised the need to 
bring the debates back to the question of justice and the restoration of land 
rights (Hall, 2010a; James, 2007). When it became clear that working within 
the negotiating process would not bring the results they desired, the NGOs 
organised a march of 500 people in July 1993 to the site of the negotiations, 
threatening land invasions if their demands were not met (Hall, 2010c). 
Their efforts, however, were largely in vain.  
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Despite this defeat, the land-based NGOs were given another opportunity 
to influence the land reform process. After the elections of 1994, the newly-
created DLA was charged with implementing the land reform programme, 
and needed new staff. Given their experience around land and land issues, 
their solid academic qualifications, and, in some cases, their overseas 
experience, the members of the land-based NGOs were an obvious source 
for recruitment for the new DLA. Once employed in the DLA, they were 
able to implement some of the ideas in the liberationist discourse to which 
they subscribed. To them this meant turning the focus of policy within the 
Department as strongly as possible onto securing livelihoods for the poor 
(Hall, 2010a; James, 2007). The fact that the land-based NGOs not directly 
involved in creating policy within the DLA strongly supported the focus on 
‘households’ in the White Paper (Hall, 2010c) suggests that they were 
successful in doing this, and that the concentration on households within 
the White Paper of 1997 (rather than on individuals) came from the 
influence of the former members of the land-based NGOs employed within 
the DLA. While they were not successful in keeping the property clause out 
of the Constitution, they could now at least bend the market-based land 
reform programme mandated by the Constitution in the direction of those 
they considered to be most in need of land, the poorest households among 
the rural landless.  
Justifications for the grant amount  
The White Paper (DLA, 1997) concedes that a single grant of R15 000 would 
not be enough for single households to buy land and begin growing 
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agricultural commodities for home consumption or the market. It explained 
that the grant was set at this level because, as a result of inadequate levels of 
funding from the central government, the DLA had to decide “… whether to 
provide a high level of subsidy to a small number of people, or whether to 
provide a modest subsidy to a higher number of beneficiaries” (p. 18). The 
Department made the decision in favour of a modest grant, “… so that as 
many eligible people benefit as possible” (p. 17). Households accessing this 
grant were expected to join together in larger groups, pooling their grants 
collectively “… to negotiate, buy and jointly hold land under a formal title 
deed” (p. 36). This is made possible by the Communal Property Associations 
Act, 28 of 1996, which enabled groups to “… collectively acquire, hold and 
manage property in terms of a written constitution” (p. 59). The groups 
identified as the main targets of the land reform policy — women, labour 
tenants, farm workers and aspiring black entrepreneurs — were broken 
down into basic household units. These units were then expected to 
recombine into groups (which may or may not have resembled the original 
groups identified), which pooled their grants to acquire and own land. In an 
echo of liberationist policy recommendations, these groups were expected 
to manage the land collectively, and make their own decisions as a group 
about how the land would be managed. “The intention is that groups should 
develop rules which are appropriate to their values and circumstances” (p. 
59). In this way, SLAG would provide access to land ownership to the largest 
possible number of people, and so allow them to improve their economic 
standing.  
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Group beneficiaries rather than individuals  
A number of reasons revolving around social welfare, politics and economic 
productivity are given for expecting that beneficiaries buy land as groups 
rather than as individuals or as families. It was asserted that “… many 
African people hold land through communal systems, because of the social 
and economic functions these fulfil …” (DLA, 1997, p. 59). Drawing on 
aspects of the liberationist discourse, the White Paper argues that this is 
because communal systems “… provide free or very cheap access to land to 
the poor” (p. 31). This provides an important survival safety net for the poor. 
In addition, the land cannot be sold to raise cash in emergencies or 
foreclosed for debt — this means that the people living on communal land 
cannot be dispossessed. The White Paper also argues that there is a ‘false 
dichotomy’ drawn between the merits and productivity of individual 
ownership of land over communal ownership. Many communal land 
ownership systems incorporate a high degree of individual land rights, and 
similarly, much privately owned land is not owned by individuals, but by 
large companies. In terms of politics, individual land ownership is also 
depicted as potentially dangerous because the previous apartheid 
government introduced legislation which “… envisaged that in the long run, 
all land in South Africa would be held under individual ownership” (p. 59). 
Given the politics of post-apartheid South Africa, anything proposed by the 
previous government was automatically seen in a poor light. Finally, in 
terms of economics, it is argued that “… there is no conclusive empirical 
evidence from Africa that individualisation of ownership is a variable in 
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increasing agricultural productivity. On the contrary other factors such as 
access to market, credit and quality and quantity of land are more 
important” (p. 31).  
The practical effects of SLAG were soon publicized in the prominent failures 
of many large group projects such as at Elandskloof. This particular project 
failed due to unmet beneficiary resourcing expectations, along with intense 
conflict arising between the beneficiaries themselves over membership 
eligibility and access to resources and power (Barry, 2011). It became clear 
that the provision of property rights alone to large collections of households 
was not sufficient by itself to improve the lives of the rural landless poor.  
This led to a search within the DLA for another more suitable policy, and 
finally resulted in the introduction of LRAD in 2001. As will become clear, 
this new policy was not nearly as optimistic, wide-ranging or innocent of 
practical experience as SLAG had been.   
Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development  
Rewarding the lucky few  
SLAG had focused on providing access to land ownership to the poorest 
households among the rural landless in South Africa, and was in place from 
1994 to 1999. According to Hall (2010c), reviews of the SLAG policy were 
underway as early as 1998, when internal discussion documents and policy 
papers outlined alternative approaches. This policy review was intensified 
when Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa 
in 1999, and Derek Hanekom was replaced as Minister of Land Affairs by 
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Thoko Didiza. This was widely understood to be a signal from President 
Mbeki of his intent to implement an overall Africanist economic agenda in 
the agricultural sector. On her part, Minister Didiza brought a new focus to 
the Department with a greater emphasis on market forces and a much 
narrower beneficiary focus than had been seen previously under SLAG 
(Hall, 2010a; James, 2007). LRAD presented a new sliding scale of grants to 
beneficiaries, again to aid them in the purchase of land on the market (Hall, 
2010c).  
The new LRAD policy began from the same point as SLAG. Black South 
Africans were depicted as suffering from the legacy of racial discrimination 
in the ownership of farmland — they were the previously-disadvantaged 
groups of post-apartheid South Africa.  While this was never stated in the 
document, white South Africans were implicitly placed in exactly the 
opposite position — they were the previously advantaged (MALA, n.d.). 
While in the past the white half of this binary was privileged, the LRAD 
grant was aimed at lessening the disadvantage of the black side. In terms of 
agriculture, LRAD aimed to do this by facilitating “… the transfer of 30% of 
all agricultural land [from white to black South Africans] over a period of 15 
years” (p. 1).  
Like SLAG, LRAD took the form of a grant aimed at enabling black South 
Africans to access the market for land. The problem representation was thus 
the same under LRAD as under SLAG — a lack of market access. The next 
step for the designers of LRAD was to decide who among the rural landless 
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poor the grant would benefit, and by how much. Under SLAG, Minister 
Hanekom had chosen to provide a small grant to as many of the rural 
landless poor as possible. When faced with this same choice, Minister 
Didiza made the choice to provide larger grants to a smaller number of 
people. This led to two important differences between SLAG and LRAD. 
Firstly, the LRAD grant was greatly increased relative to the SLAG grant. In 
addition, LRAD grants began at a minimum of R20, 000. Even this 
minimum grant exceeded the SLAG grant of R15 000 per household. Based 
on the amount of capital applicants could access, the LRAD grant increased 
to a maximum of R100, 000. The increased amount of the grant, and the fact 
that multiple individuals from a single family could each receive an LRAD 
grant lessened the pressure on beneficiaries to buy land in large groups.  
This leads on to the second major difference between SLAG and LRAD. 
Where SLAG had provided a minimal benefit to poorest households, LRAD 
concentrated on providing larger grants to individual African 
entrepreneurs. Like SLAG, the LRAD grant represented the problem of 
landlessness in South Africa as a lack of capital. Unlike SLAG though, this 
lack of capital was represented as affecting individual black South African 
entrepreneurs, and not poor black households. It was assumed that while 
individual black entrepreneurs had some access to capital (through loans, 
savings and other forms of equity), they did not have the full amount of 
capital required to access land on the open market, or to make full use of 
the land. Therefore, all that was necessary was that the DLA gave these 
individuals extra capital to augment what they could access from other 
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sources, allowing them to compete on the open market for land that came 
up for sale on the market. To draw out the entrepreneurs among the rural 
landless poor, an ‘own contribution’ of at least R5000 was required, which 
would be matched by a government contribution of R20 000. These two 
amounts combined would enable individual beneficiaries to purchase 
around 40 hectares of land19. Larger ‘own contributions’ were rewarded with 
larger government grants, to a maximum of R100 000 (MALA, n.d.)20, giving 
access to a potential 830 hectares of land on the open market21. In this way, 
the more successful African individual entrepreneurs were selected for and 
given access to substantially more land, and so substantially more potential 
income, under LRAD.  
Integration with and preservation of the status quo  
With a new focus on selecting and rewarding individual African 
entrepreneurs, the new LRAD policy aimed to preserve the existing large-
scale commercial agricultural sector. As in SLAG, there is a deep silence 
around the dispossessions and injustices suffered by black South Africans 
during the creation of this sector. The main thrust of LRAD was to 
deracialise the ownership of land within the existing context of large-scale 
commercial farms (Hall, 2010c). In practical terms, this meant that LRAD 
                                                 
19
 Assuming an average price of R600 per hectare in 2000 (Obi, 2006). The calculation being (R5 
000 + R20 000)/R600.00 = 41.7 hectares.  
20
The document used for this analysis of LRAD, Land redistribution for agricultural development: 
A sub-programme of the land redistribution programme (MALA, n.d.) is not dated. However, in 
the document it does mention an earlier draft from April 2000  , and funds that would be 
introduced in the 2002/2003 financial year . From this, it can be assumed that the document was 
released between April 2000 and 2002.  
21
 Again, assuming an average price of R600 per hectare in 2000, and an own contribution from 
the beneficiary of R400 000. The calculation being (R400 000 + R100 000)/R600.00 = 833.33 
hectares.  
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would focus on integrating the individual African beneficiaries selected 
under LRAD, into the existing white large-scale commercial farming sector. 
No reason was provided for wanting to preserve the sector in its existing 
form, and LRAD thus came to be identified with new processes of class 
formation, and an emerging discourse of black economic empowerment 
(Hall, 2010a). This economic empowerment, however, would only be for a 
very select group.     
The SLAG policy had aimed to provide access to land to as many of the 19 
million rural landless poor as possible. By the time LRAD was implemented 
in 2001, given that only one per cent of previously ‘white’ farmland had been 
transferred by 1999 (Hall, 2010c), the number of people living in these 
conditions almost certainly would not have decreased substantially. This 
implies that around 19 million people continued to be the theoretical 
beneficiaries of LRAD when it was created. This figure helps to put 
important aspects of the LRAD policy into perspective. LRAD aimed at 
creating a new class of black commercial farmers. Given there were around 
45 000 large-scale (white-owned) commercial farms in South Africa in the 
1990s (DAFF, 2012), LRAD promised that in time a substantial proportion of 
these farms would be owned and operated profitably by black South 
Africans. At its most successful then, LRAD only aimed at benefitting some 
45 000 individual African entrepreneurs. At 0.23 per cent of the estimated 19 
million rural landless poor at the time22, this is a tiny minority of potential 
beneficiaries.  If 45 000 black commercial farmers were successfully 
                                                 
22
 (45 000/19 000 000)*100 
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absorbed into the existing large-scale agricultural sector in South Africa, the 
LRAD policy was largely silent on how the remaining 99.77 per cent of rural 
landless black South Africans were to benefit.  
Privileged access to policy formulation  
A result of this change of focus by Minister Didiza were changes in the 
groups given access to the policymaking process around land redistribution. 
Policy-making forums now included consultants (often former civil 
servants) and agricultural economists from selected universities. In 
addition, a Presidential Working Group on Agriculture was created, 
bringing together the unions representing white and black commercial 
farmers. Minister Didiza announced a moratorium on new SLAG projects, 
and a review of existing land redistribution policy. The new policy 
participants, along with a joint task team of officials from the DLA and the 
National Department of Agriculture were tasked with creating a new land 
redistribution policy in February 2000. Two public events were held to 
consult stakeholders in land redistribution on the creation of this new 
policy in April and December 2000, and in which were included land-based 
NGOs, the Land Bank, and private financial institutions. Hall (2010a) argues 
that this reflected the emergence of a new policy alliance between a small 
but growing class of black commercial farmers, and the old agricultural 
establishment which had focused on the creation of large-scale white 
farmers prior to 1994. This new policy alliance is clear in a list provided in 
the LRAD document of the key stakeholders who were consulted during the 
course of drawing it up. Included were the Department of Agriculture, the 
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DLA, provincial Departments of Agriculture, and other ‘key stakeholders’. 
According to Hall (2010c), these other key stakeholders included selected 
NGOs, the Land Bank, private financial institutions, agricultural economists 
from selected universities, private consultants, and representatives of the 
white and black commercial farming unions. 
The new focus on creating a class of large-scale black commercial farmers in 
the DLA led to many of the white left-wing activists, who had contributed 
much to the creation of the SLAG policy, returning to the NGO sector. 
Many of these activists criticised Didiza and her superiors in the new 
government of President Mbeki for sharing a disdain for the rural landless 
with their apartheid predecessors, thereby turning land reform away from 
securing livelihoods for the poor (James, 2007). In turn, the DLA questioned 
the legitimacy of the land-based NGOs as spokespeople for the rural 
landless. 
In an indication of the extent to which the rural landless poor were 
excluded from the consultation process for the new policy, their only 
contribution to the creation of LRAD was to organise a protest outside the 
venue of one of these consultation meetings in December 2000 (Hall, 2010c; 
Wegerif, 2004). The rural landless poor were, thus, largely excluded from 
the creation of the LRAD policy, reflecting a deep silence. There was a small 
provision made for beneficiaries who might want to use the grant to buy 
land for subsistence purposes, or for production within the communal 
areas, but this was seen as symbolic and rhetorical (MALA, n.d.). However, 
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a number of other facets of LRAD combined to exclude the vast majority of 
the rural landless poor from access to the new grant.  
Mechanisms of exclusion  
The most important aspect of the policy which led to the exclusion of the 
rural landless poor was the requirement of an ‘own contribution’ to access 
LRAD grants. The minimum ‘own contribution’ was for R5000, which could 
be in the form of cash, labour or assets like machinery, equipment, or 
livestock (MALA, n.d.). The LRAD policy was silent about those applicants 
who were unable to muster the minimum own contribution of R5000. Given 
the levels of poverty in the rural areas of South Africa, where as a result of 
the effects of past apartheid policies some rural landless households spend 
up to 90% of their incomes on food (Del Grande, 2008), many potential 
beneficiaries do not have access to such funds (either borrowings or 
savings), nor do they own equipment worth this amount, and are unable to 
commit themselves full-time to contributing this amount of labour. The 
requirement of this ‘own contribution’ was, therefore, an important barrier 
in the way of the vast majority of the rural landless poor. The LRAD policy 
does not address the situations of rural landless black South Africans living 
in such conditions.   
Settlement versus agriculture  
The focus on the creation of black commercial farmers and the concomitant 
exclusion of the majority of the rural landless poor is also clear in the 
distinction made between land used for agriculture and land used for 
settlement. “LRAD is designed to provide grants to black South African 
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citizens to access land specifically for agricultural purposes … Purely 
residential projects would not be supported under LRAD …” (MALA, n.d., p. 
1). A settlement/agricultural binary was constructed here, between land for 
agricultural use and land purely for settlement. LRAD would only provide 
land for residential purposes if “… beneficiaries seek to establish household 
gardens at their new residences, and … funds for top-structure are sourced 
form [sic] elsewhere, e.g. Department of Housing” (p. 1). However, LRAD is 
designed to provide grants to black South Africans “… specifically for 
agricultural purposes, or to make better use of land already accessed (e.g. in 
communal areas)” (p. 4). The document repeatedly emphasises that land 
purchased by LRAD beneficiaries “… must be intended for an agricultural 
use of their choosing, such as improved food production to improve 
household consumption, grazing, production for markets, and other 
agricultural activities” (p. 5). Successful beneficiaries must be “… committed 
to use the grant to purchase or lease land for agricultural activities” (p. 8). 
Beneficiaries must “… show an intention to farm or enter Agri-business …” 
(p. 11), implying that any use of redistributed land for residential purposes 
would be a waste, and cannot be allowed. There is, therefore, a clear 
expectation that land transferred under LRAD would only be used for 
commercial agricultural production. 
Subsistence versus commercial agriculture  
The exclusion of the majority of the rural landless poor was further evident 
in the requirement that applicants submit a farm plan with their 
applications, which would indicate “… the intended agricultural use of the 
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land and estimating a rough projected cash flow” (p. 9). This is also 
apparent in the language used to describe the inputs beneficiaries will need, 
including “… infrastructure investment, capital assets and short-term 
agricultural inputs” (p. 4), and “… productive capital, and operational 
inputs” (p. 4). Even if beneficiaries had extensive farming experience, it was 
still envisaged that they would need advisory services to help them operate 
efficiently as agri-business people . Finally, the approval of LRAD grants was 
based on the ‘viability’ of the farm plans submitted, which was defined as “… 
total project costs and projected profitability” (p. 4). The focus on 
producing evidence of business planning and financial expertise excluded 
the majority of the rural landless poor. The stipulation that LRAD would 
only be available to those who “… want to farm on full time basis (except for 
food safety-net beneficiaries) … [and] who are willing to live on or near the 
land and operate or work on it …” (MALA, n.d., p. 8) is further evidence that 
the focus was on the creation of a class of black commercial farmers. This 
document is also informed by the assumption that successful farmers 
expand the size of their operations over time. Therefore, it suggested that 
smaller farmers who were successful would naturally work their way from 
smaller units of land to larger ones by repeatedly using the LRAD grant 
(MALA, n.d.). The final point of success would be where a beneficiary would 
be able to purchase a larger piece of land “… through a combination of 
normal bank loans approved under standard banking procedures, and own 
assets and cash” (pp. 4-5).   
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Post-settlement support for the select few  
The minority of beneficiaries who were to gain access land through LRAD 
were not assured of economic success as commercial farmers. LRAD (like 
SLAG) did not address the need to support the development of 
contemporary agriculture knowledge and skills, something that white 
farmers had benefitted from through generous agricultural extension 
policies during the apartheid era. The document only notes that the transfer 
of land under LRAD would “… create an increased demand for advisory 
services on the part of beneficiaries” (MALA, n.d., p. 12). It goes on to note 
that to meet this need, the agricultural extension service would have to be 
reformed, and that the Department of Agriculture would need to create a 
special programme to assist LRAD beneficiaries. As the Department of 
Agriculture operated independently of the DLA at the time, this document 
is silent about how extension support would be achieved. It does suggest 
that beneficiaries could consult extension services in the private sector, 
paying for these services through cost-sharing mechanisms that “… defray 
part of the expense of purchased agricultural advisory services …” (p. 12). 
The document is once again silent about beneficiaries who would be unable 
to afford the services of private extension providers, or did not have the 
skills and experience to negotiate cost-sharing agreements with private 
providers of extension advice. The focus and methods of LRAD largely 
echoed the Africanist and neoliberal focus of the Mbeki administration. 
When President Mbeki lost his position of leadership in the ANC in 2007 
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(BBC, 2014), and later the Presidency of South Africa, a change in focus in 
land reform became extremely likely.  
Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy  
Under the third iteration of land redistribution policy, PLAS, the 
government undertook the task of acquiring land on the open market. 
Under this policy, the government retains ownership of land purchased for 
redistribution, and rents it out to selected beneficiaries, while 
simultaneously providing them with intensive financial and extension 
support (DRDLR, 2011a, 2013). The origins of PLAS lie in the ANC National 
Conference at Polokwane in December 2007, which is described as a 
watershed moment in the history of the ANC and of South Africa as a whole 
(Jara & Hall, 2009). At this Conference President Mbeki was removed from 
the leadership of the ANC and replaced with Jacob Zuma, paving the way 
for Zuma to be elected President of South Africa later in 2009 (BBC, 2014). 
By this time, LRAD had been in operation for eight years. The removal of 
Mbeki opened the way for changes to be made to South Africa’s overarching 
economic policies, and as a part of this, a reassessment of land reform in 
post-apartheid South Africa. This new focus became clear in the new 
resolution on agrarian change, land reform and rural development issued 
from the Polokwane Conference by the ANC. This resolution began from 
the recognition that “… the foundational challenge is not the redistribution 
of land, but the structure of the rural economy” (Jara & Hall, 2009, p. 221), 
and mandated a much larger role for the state in supporting land 
redistribution.  
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After his election, President Zuma selected Gugile Nkwinti as the new 
Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform tasked with implementing 
this new approach to land reform. In addition, what had been the DLA 
under Ministers Hanekom and Didiza was renamed the DRDLR (Nkwinti, 
2012). The development of policy around this new approach resulted in the 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), PLAS and the 
Recapitalisation and Development Programme (RADP).   
Development and underdevelopment  
The new approach to land reform presented by the DRDLR was in many 
respects clearly distinct from SLAG and LRAD. Firstly, unlike in the 
previous two iterations of land redistribution policy, a clear definition of 
‘development’ is given, as “… shared growth and prosperity, full 
employment, relative income equality and cultural progress …” (DRDLR, 
2011b, p. 3). In contrast, its opposite, ‘underdevelopment,’ is defined as “… 
poverty, unemployment, relative income inequality and cultural 
backwardness” (p. 3). Within South Africa, black South Africans are 
portrayed as ‘underdeveloped’, while white South Africans are ‘developed’. 
This difference between the two groups is not seen as a coincidence, or the 
result of impersonal market forces. Rather, drawing on themes found in the 
liberationist and Dependency discourses, it is asserted that white South 
Africans reached this state of development through a process of “… 
accumulation by dispossession” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 4) — white South 
Africans accumulated enough to enter a ‘developed’ state through 
dispossessing black South Africans of what they had. The story of South 
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Africa is therefore of the “… systematic denudation and impoverishment of 
African people …” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 3).  Again, in a strong echo of the 
liberationist discourse, it is asserted that one of the most important 
possessions taken from black South Africans was their land — black South 
Africans suffered a “… pervasive process of land alienation that dispossessed 
the majority of South Africans of their land over the past few centuries” 
(DRDLR, 2013, p. 6). The SLAG and LRAD silence around the injustices and 
dispossessions suffered by black South Africans is thus broken in PLAS.   
The loss of land and culture  
In an amplification of ideas found in the liberationist discourse at the 
Constitutional level, in PLAS documents the alienation of black South 
Africans from their land is portrayed as doubly disastrous, as land is 
constructed here as having both a cultural and an economic function. 
Firstly, a strong connection is made between land and the maintenance of 
African culture in South Africa. African culture is linked to the concept of 
‘ubuntu’, which is defined in English as ‘human solidarity’ (DRDLR, 2011b). 
Once the African people of South Africa lost access to land, they lost the 
ability to give expression to ubuntu, as they no longer were able to provide 
for their fellow human beings. This led to the loss of social cohesion among 
their communities (DRDLR, 2011b). In addition to enabling them to ensure 
social cohesion, having access to land gave black South Africans economic 
independence. While they were able to produce their own food and some 
surplus for the markets, black South Africans did not have to work for white 
employers. In addition, they had the opportunity to grow and develop 
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further economically. This is precisely why “… colonialists targeted land to 
subdue conquered populations, in order to turn them into vassals and 
slaves” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 1). In the course of this process of dispossession, 
an entire class of black commercial farmers was destroyed (DRDLR, 2013). It 
was primarily the dispossession of land suffered by black South Africans 
that put them in a state of ‘underdevelopment’. This was because without 
land, they  
… could no longer produce enough food to feed themselves as 
families; nor could they keep livestock. They had to survive on 
meagre or slave wages, which could hardly meet their own family 
needs, let along being generous and readily share with neighbours. 
Colonialism and Apartheid brutalised African people, turning them 
hostage to perennial hunger and want, and related diseases and 
social strifes and disorders (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 2).   
In contrast, white South Africans were able to prosper, owning most of the 
country’s commercial agricultural land, and dominating the agricultural 
industry completely (DRDLR, 2011a, 2013).  
Unjust, but worth maintaining  
Despite breaking the silence on South Africa’s history of dispossession of 
the Africans, PLAS like LRAD sees it as important that the existing large-
scale commercial agricultural sector is maintained in its existing form. 
Unlike the LRAD policy, a reason is given for this — the DRDLR sees it as 
vitally important that current levels of food production in South Africa are 
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maintained. The public interest lies in ensuring “… access to food at both 
household and national level to bring about household food security and 
national food self-sufficiency” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 6). There is an inherent 
assumption within PLAS that although the existing large-scale commercial 
farms of South Africa are the result of tremendous historical injustice, they 
are still important because in their present form being run as commercial 
businesses, they guarantee the food security of South Africa. As a 
government employee expressed it during an interview carried out for this 
study, “… the commercial farming sector is subject to the discipline of the 
profit and loss account” (CS4, 2012). This means that when the state 
acquires a farm under PLAS, it is “… acquiring an operating complex, 
capital-intensive operation … [I]t is not possible to disturb the production 
process as there is too much risk at stake regarding the assets that are being 
acquired …” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 22). This means that it is necessary to ensure 
that “… all land reform farms are 100% productive” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 15). The 
public interest in maintaining food production is more important than the 
interests of beneficiaries in accessing land. According to those crafting the 
PLAS policy, the best way to ensure that the public interest is maintained is 
to preserve the existing formal agricultural economy. Therefore, repeating 
the central contradiction that was contained in the SLAG policy, to ensure 
that national and household food sufficiency is maintained, it is thus 
deemed necessary to ensure the rapid “… transfer of agricultural land to 
blacks without distorting the land market or business confidence …” (p. 9).  
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Separate assistance for the rural landless poor  
The PLAS commitment to preserving the existing large-scale commercial 
agricultural sector creates the same problems for the majority of the rural 
landless poor as were outlined in the discussion of LRAD. If success under 
PLAS means the creation of a new class of black large-scale commercial 
farmers, what is to happen to the remaining rural landless poor? While 
LRAD made vague gestures in the direction of the landless poor, the 
DRDLR has created a separate policy approach for those in this group who 
live in the communal areas. Under the Comprehensive Rural Development 
Programme (CRDP), the DRDLR asserts that three steps are needed to 
create economic opportunities for these people within the communal areas, 
and so preserve the existing agricultural economy in South Africa. Firstly, 
the government needs to provide the basic infrastructural needs of the rural 
landless population (water, sanitation, electricity and housing) in the 
communal areas where they live. Secondly, the government needs to 
provide these rural communities the chance to develop the skills necessary 
to operate successful businesses in the existing formal economy. Finally, it 
needs to help people living in these areas to develop “… small, medium and 
large agro-industries sustained by rural markets and credit facilities” 
(DRDLR, 2013, pp. 8-9). By undertaking these actions to aid the integration 
of the rural landless poor into the existing formal economy, the government 
will help the rural poor reach a state of ‘development’, which would include 
“… self-reliance of rural communities, local economic development, 
increased agricultural production, sustainable use of natural resources, 
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inclusive rural participation in developed value chains and improved rural 
livelihoods …” (p. 9).  
The majority of the rural landless poor are thus to remain in the communal 
areas where they were placed during the apartheid and colonial eras, 
engaged in agricultural manufacturing jobs. These will be created through 
“… increased investment in agro-processing, trade development and access 
to markets and financial services …” (p. 10). Creating such manufacturing 
opportunities in the communal areas will also help in “… the significant 
reduction of the rural-urban population and resources flow” (p. 12).   
Recreating the rural black bourgeoisie  
Outside of the communal areas, in another echo of the liberationist 
discourse, the aim of PLAS is “… rekindling the class of black commercial 
farmers destroyed by the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 11). 
The aim of PLAS is:  
… to provide black emerging farmers with the social and economic 
infrastructure and basic resources required to run successful 
agricultural business[es]. It is the intention of the policy that black 
emerging farmers are deliberately ushered into the agricultural 
value-chain as quickly as is possible … (DRDLR, 2013, p. 10).  
‘Black Emerging Farmers’ are defined as those black South African citizens 
who were excluded from South Africa’s formal agricultural economy in the 
past, and “… who have recently begun to engage in farming on a larger scale 
to sell crops and livestock on the market with the support and assistance of 
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the State” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 4). Therefore, it is expected that PLAS will help 
successful beneficiaries increase the size of their agricultural businesses 
over time (DRDLR, 2011a), to become large-scale commercial farmers like 
the existing white commercial farmers. Like LRAD then, PLAS is only aimed 
at benefitting a minority of the rural landless poor within South Africa.   
The PLAS emphasis on integrating black commercial farmers into the 
existing agricultural structure is also evident in the categorisation of PLAS 
beneficiaries into four distinct groups. The common trait in all four groups 
is that people are “… already engaged in agriculture at all scales …” (DRDLR, 
2011a, p. 6). They are categorised according to what type of agriculture they 
want to engage in, and at what scale of production. The first category is for 
those who seek land and tenure security for productive purposes at a 
subsistence level and/or for residential purposes. The second is dedicated to 
those already farming commercially at a small scale, while the third is for 
those farming at the medium scale. The final category is for black business 
people who wish to expand into agriculture (DRDLR, 2011a). While the 
categories are engaged in agriculture, the first is the only one composed of 
people wanting to produce food solely for subsistence purposes, while the 
other three focus on commercial agricultural production. This shows a 
greater emphasis on those wanting to (or already) farming commercially.   
Seeking black entrepreneurs  
However, the eagerness to attract black businessmen into farming on the 
assumption that they will be successful large-scale farmers does contradict 
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other aspects of PLAS. The PLAS programme is differentiated from SLAG 
and LRAD as it “… moves away from an adhoc, first come-first served 
programme, where those that were able to mobilise capital became the 
target of land reform regardless of their capabilities” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 13). 
The beneficiaries of the fourth category will, therefore, be selected 
according to their agricultural capabilities, as well as the capital they have 
accumulated in urban-based businesses. These documents are silent on how 
it will be ensured that the beneficiaries of this category have the requisite 
capabilities to farm successfully.  
The three policy documents examined here additionally discuss undesirable 
types of beneficiaries of the RADP, including “… people who run their own 
businesses in towns and cities, but employ managers to run their farms …” 
(DRDLR, 2013, p. 11). These documents are silent on how such a stipulation 
affects the selection of PLAS beneficiaries under category four. These 
documents are also silent on how many beneficiaries under this category 
would find such a course of action financially advantageous, and how 
benefitting such a tiny proportion of South Africa’s black population (and a 
relatively advantaged one at that) would help relieve the plight of the rural 
landless poor.  
The state and the market  
While the CRDP is to create opportunities for the majority of the rural 
landless poor in the communal areas, PLAS is aimed at aiding those black 
South Africans wanting to or already farming commercially. Under SLAG 
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and LRAD, drawing from themes in the Large Farms and the libertarian 
discourses, the implicit assumption was that the poverty of black South 
Africans was the result of distorted markets, and that to help them become 
prosperous, it was only necessary to provide them with property rights. This 
would enable them to participate in the existing formal agricultural 
economy, and so automatically improve their economic positions (DLA, 
1997; MALA, n.d.). In contrast, drawing on narratives found in the 
Dependency and the liberationist discourses, some suspicion of the market 
is expressed in the PLAS approach, which describes the willing buyer willing 
seller model as weak, because of distortions in the land market (DRDLR, 
2011b). This means that institutional arrangements are necessary, “… to 
monitor markets against corruption and speculation …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 9). 
In addition, market-led approaches to land reform are criticised as, under 
LRAD, only those able to mobilise capital were targeted in land 
redistribution, regardless of their farming capabilities.   
In contrast to the faith placed in the market under SLAG and LRAD, 
drawing on ideas from the Dependency and the liberationist discourses the 
designers of PLAS argue that the “… two opposing socio-economic pillars, 
development and under-development, are a direct function of certain 
political choices and decisions, as well as certain administrative traditions 
and institutions, processes and procedures” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 3). The states 
of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ are thus seen in PLAS as the 
product of government actions, rather than purely market processes. 
According to PLAS, white South Africans reached their state of 
 276 
 
‘development’ through political choices and direct government action. This 
view puts government at the centre of the development process, and that 
allowing market-led approaches to dominate land redistribution, as did 
SLAG and LRAD, would only perpetuate underdevelopment. In a dramatic 
departure from the assumptions driving SLAG and LRAD, then, the PLAS 
documents borrow from policy prescriptions in the Dependency and the 
liberationists discourses, expressing the belief that rather than leaving the 
process of development to the market alone, the post-apartheid 
government must take action, to ensure that South Africa will gain “… the 
desired social cohesion and development … [rather than] … perpetuate the 
current colonial-apartheid’s social and economic fragmentation and under-
development” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 3). 
The government of South Africa must, thus, take action to bring black 
South Africans out of a state of ‘underdevelopment’ and into a state of 
‘development’. In a strong echo of the liberationist discourse, according to 
the creators of the PLAS policy, the greatest blow struck against black South 
Africans was to dispossess them of their land. This means that restoring 
access to land is “… a fundamental element in the resolution of the race, 
gender and class contradictions in South Africa” (p. 1). Therefore the 
DRDLR argues that South Africa needs to undergo an ‘agrarian 
transformation’, which is defined as “… a rapid and fundamental change in 
the relations (systems and patterns of ownership and control) of land, 
livestock, cropping and community” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 1). As has been 
shown, the CRDP is aimed at creating opportunities for the rural landless 
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within the communal areas. This implies that ‘agrarian transformation’ as 
envisaged in PLAS does not mean changing the existing dual agricultural 
system in South Africa (of large-scale commercial farms and crowded 
communal areas). Rather, it means integrating black large-scale commercial 
farmers into the existing commercial farming sector, while simultaneously 
empowering the inhabitants of the bantustans to take part in the formal 
economy as entrepreneurs and manufacturers of processed agricultural 
goods.   
Post-settlement assistance  
Up to this point, PLAS shows strong similarities with LRAD in its aim to aid 
in the creation of a new black commercial farming class. However, PLAS 
differs strongly from LRAD in the way that this is to be achieved. The SLAG 
and LRAD policies were based on ideas found in the Large Farms and the 
libertarian discourses, assuming that once provided with property rights in 
land the rural landless poor would be able to participate effectively in the 
existing formal economy. These policies were therefore focused almost 
completely on transferring these property rights to black South Africans. 
The DRDLR notes, however, that gaining property rights did not improve 
the lives of most beneficiaries of SLAG and LRAD, and that many of the 
farms redistributed under these programmes “… were not successful and, 
thus, in distress or lying fallow … [or] on the verge of being auctioned or 
had been sold … resulting in a reversal of the original objectives of land 
reform” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 11). The designers of the PLAS policy draw two 
conclusions from this: firstly, that black South Africans do not necessarily 
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need access to property ownership in order to prosper, but only access to 
land itself. Secondly, it is argued that SLAG and LRAD beneficiaries failed to 
produce on their land because of “… a lack of adequate and appropriate 
post-settlement support” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 11). Once again in an echo of 
liberationist themes,  according to PLAS, the rural landless poor of South 
Africa need to be given access to land (and not necessarily ownership of it), 
and access to the skills and the capital necessary to gain benefit from it.  
Where SLAG and LRAD represented the problem as a lack of access to land 
ownership, PLAS represents the problem as only a lack of access to land 
itself. According to the designers of PLAS, it does not matter who owns the 
land, what matters is that black South Africans are given access to it, and 
the resources required to profit from it. Given this reasoning, then, to 
provide black South Africans with access to land, under PLAS the 
government will proactively identify and purchase farmland, and then lease 
this land out to beneficiaries (DRDLR, 2011a).   
Mentorships  
While leasing these government-owned farms, PLAS beneficiaries are given 
the chance to develop the skills needed to farm commercially on land leased 
from the government through mentorship arrangements with farmers 
(generally white) from the established commercial farming sector, along 
with other forms of accelerated training (DRDLR, 2013). In addition, PLAS 
beneficiaries are given access to the capital they need to farm commercially 
through the RADP, where successful applicants are given government 
 279 
 
funding for their farming operations over a period of five years (DRDLR, 
2013). Alternatively, PLAS beneficiaries can access both skills training and 
capital through co-management arrangements with private equity partners, 
contract farming arrangements with food retailers, or share-equity 
arrangements on established commercial farms (DRDLR, 2013).  
While some of the silences contained in SLAG and LRAD are addressed in 
this policy, it contains a number of other areas of silence within itself. As 
discussed above, one of these was the desire to attract independent black 
urban-based entrepreneurs into commercial agriculture, while 
simultaneously criticising LRAD for having done this. Another area of 
silence lies around the issue of mentorship under PLAS. Firstly, the 
designers of PLAS are very clear about the terrible effects of apartheid and 
colonial policies on black South Africans. They are also clear that these 
same policies benefitted white South Africans directly, including white 
farmers. However, an important part of PLAS is the provision of “… capacity 
building prior to transfer through incubators, mentorships and other 
accelerated forms of training …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 9) to PLAS beneficiaries. 
This training is provided to beneficiaries by “… commercial agriculture and 
the private farming sector …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 16). The established white 
commercial farmers, who were the direct beneficiaries of black 
dispossession for so long, are now expected under PLAS to partner with 
PLAS beneficiaries, and give them the skills necessary to be successful 
commercial farmers. These documents are silent on how a working 
relationship is to be created between individual beneficiaries and mentors. 
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Indeed, the comments given by white farmers and black beneficiaries in the 
course of interviews carried out for this study indicate that this is not likely 
to be easily done. White farmers acting as mentors suggested that 
beneficiaries do not understand “… the amount of time and effort it actually 
takes from them to actually make them successful farmers” (Every, 2012). In 
return, beneficiaries either did not feel they needed white mentors (Naidoo, 
2012), or expressed deep suspicions about the true motives of white 
mentors. One stated that white mentors could not be trusted, as “… the 
mentors have their own agenda … to take back the land, directly or 
indirectly” (Buthelezi, 2012). Another agreed, suggesting that some mentors 
purposely gave their beneficiaries bad advice, so that they could “… come 
back and buy those farms when they have been run down” (B2, 2012). The 
policy documents around PLAS and the RADP are silent as to how such 
difficulties could be overcome.  
Access to landownership  
In addition, there is a profound silence around beneficiaries who might 
want to gain ownership of the land they rent from the government. In an 
interview carried out in the course of this study, a member of the DRDLR 
suggested that after gaining capital and skills while leasing land from the 
government under PLAS, successful beneficiaries could move into the open 
market for agricultural land, and purchase freehold private land for 
themselves if that is what they want (CS2, 2012). However, the land reform 
beneficiaries interviewed in the course of this study repeatedly expressed 
anger that they would not be given ownership of the land they leased under 
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PLAS, arguing that land ownership “… should not eternally be in the books 
of government, because empowerment will never be complete without 
ownership of land …” (Ngqameni, 2012). Many PLAS beneficiaries became 
deeply discouraged when informed that they would not eventually gain 
ownership of the land that they were leasing from the government (B2, 
2012). Others argued that they had no incentive to invest in the land they 
worked if they were only granted access to it for a few years at a time, at the 
discretion of bureaucrats (B1, 2012). Based on these comments, it is 
reasonable to assume that gaining ownership of the land being leased from 
the government is very important to many of PLAS beneficiaries. However, 
there is a complete silence from the DRDLR on beneficiaries who would 
want to gain ownership of the land they lease under PLAS. Rather, the 
Department lays emphasis on instances “… when it is not in the public 
interest to restore or redistribute land, or where legislation prohibits such 
full restoration or redistribution” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 13). No examples are 
given, however, of such examples.  
In addition, a member of the DRDLR interviewed for this study argued that 
at times, SLAG and LRAD transferred land ownership to people who did not 
want to use the land for commercial production, but only for residential 
purposes. While the DRDLR saw this as wasteful, it could not intervene as 
the beneficiaries owned the land. By retaining ownership of land purchased 
for redistribution, the government could ensure that the land was used as 
productively as possible, and that beneficiaries gained access to the skills 
and knowledge they needed to succeed as commercial farmers (CS2, 2012). 
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Such a view expresses faith in the power of a centralised state to make the 
right decisions, discounting the desire for individual autonomy and control.  
Conclusion  
This study focuses on the poor record of achievement in land reform policy 
in post-apartheid South Africa. At the national policy level, this chapter 
analyses the hidden assumptions and practices of the policies that have 
been developed within the boundaries set at the constitutional level. A 
sense of these hidden policy drivers is evident in the speech given by Fidel 
Castro to the National Assembly in 1998, in which he advocated preserving 
what were seen to the positive aspects of the agrarian structure, while 
simultaneously compensating those who suffered unjust dispossession 
during its creation and distributing its benefits more widely. Each policy 
iteration can be seen as an attempt to achieve these three objectives.   
SLAG sought to fulfil these objectives by redistributing property rights to 
the rural landless through the market. A small grant was provided to poor 
households, which were expected to pool their grants and buy land in large 
groups. SLAG thus aimed to help as many of the rural landless as possible to 
access land, through the market. The long-term prosperity that was 
constructed as the benefit of the land market would thus be retained and 
preserved, and those who lost access to land under apartheid would gain 
some redress. The price of this was a total silence around the injustices 
committed during the creation of this market.   
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LRAD, likewise, sought to redistribute property rights through the market, 
by providing grants to black South Africans. The focus of the grant, 
however, was changed such that larger grants were given to a much smaller 
number of individual African entrepreneurs, who were expected to become 
a class of black large-scale commercial farmers, like their white 
counterparts. The benefits of the existing agrarian structure would thus be 
preserved, its benefits would be distributed more widely, and beneficiaries 
would gain recompense for the dispossessions suffered during apartheid. 
Once again, this came at the price of silence around the creation of that 
market, along with total silence around the majority of the rural landless 
excluded from these grants.   
PLAS retains the focus of the previous two policy iterations on preserving 
the agrarian structure created during apartheid, and maintains the LRAD 
focus on creating a new black rural bourgeoisie. The way this is done, 
however, changes dramatically. While the injustices committed during the 
creation of this market are now acknowledged, it is still constructed as 
worth preserving, and so the government now purchases land and leases it 
out to beneficiaries. The land market and its assumed benefits are thus 
retained, and the benefits of the large-scale agricultural sector are 
distributed more widely to those selected to be PLAS beneficiaries. PLAS 
also breaks the silence around those rural landless who cannot become 
large-scale commercial farmers, and directs resources towards the 
alleviation of their dependent state.  
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Through the three iterations of SLAG, PLAS and LRAD, post-apartheid land 
redistribution policy shows a narrowing of focus, a lowering of expectations, 
and an increasing reliance on the government rather than the market. It is 
also perhaps a story of a gradual loss of optimism, faith and goodwill 
towards the market. It is a movement from aiming to improve the lives of as 
many of the rural landless poor as possible, to aiming to restore the small 
class of black commercial farmers described by Bundy (1979) who were 
destroyed by colonial and apartheid policies. It is a progression from an 
assumption that white farmers would sell their lands for fair prices on the 
market, to creating institutions to minimise corruption in the land market. 
It is a change from the assumption that all the rural landless poor needed to 
prosper were property rights, to the government retaining these rights for 
itself. Where the Department of Agriculture was initially trusted to give 
beneficiaries post-settlement support, the DRDLR now does this. Private 
capital was relied on at first to lend money to beneficiaries. Now 
government structures have been created for this purpose. There was an 
initial assumption that large groups of beneficiaries would be able to work 
successfully together. Today, preference is given to individual beneficiaries. 
At first it was assumed that a small-scale commercial sector would arise 
naturally from land redistribution. Presently, it is asserted that the large-
scale commercial farming sector is necessary to maintain South Africa’s 
food security. Where initially the post-apartheid government worked 
closely with NGOs speaking for the rural landless poor, today it works with 
NGOs representing the large-scale commercial farming sector.  
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The task given to Ministers Hanekom, Didiza and Nkwinti is extremely 
difficult, as observed by Castro in 1998. This chapter has aimed to bring out 
the assumptions, silences and problem representations of SLAG, LRAD and 
PLAS, and describe this gradual movement in focus and method. Having 
done so aids in the greater process of providing a better answer to the 
dilemma of how to create a more fair land redistribution policy that 
preserves the benefits of the existing large-scale commercial farming sector, 
while simultaneously satisfying the need for past and present justice among 
the rural landless poor of South Africa. The next chapter examines in 
greater detail the implicit constructions of land reform beneficiaries in 
SLAG, LRAD and PLAS.  
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Chapter Eight 
Deviancy and Dependency in Land Redistribution  
This study asks why the results of land reform efforts in the post-apartheid 
era resemble so strongly the pattern of land ownership in the colonial, 
segregation and apartheid eras. This chapter is focused on the hidden 
assumptions of land reform policymakers about their target populations — 
the rural landless and land reform beneficiaries. If the study of politics and 
public policy is at least partly the study of ‘who gets what, when and how’ 
(Lasswell, 1936), then it must take account of the social constructions 
policymakers draw on when deciding what to give to whom, when and how. 
As part of the WPR approach drawn on in the previous chapter, Bacchi 
suggests that the opinions policymakers hold about a problem, or how they 
represent that problem, have very specific consequences for the different 
social groups involved (Bacchi, 2009). Similarly, Ingram and Schneider 
(2005, p. 17) direct attention to how social groups are constructed by 
policies as either deserving or undeserving, and argue that the types of 
policies allocated to different groups can be predicted if attention is paid to 
the social constructions of these groups. This chapter explores the social 
constructions of land redistribution beneficiaries implicit in policy 
documents for the SLAG, LRAD and PLAS programmes. The method of 
analysis offered by Schneider and Ingram (1993) is adapted to analyse the 
types of policies provided to land redistribution beneficiaries in South 
Africa, after which it is applied to the three land redistribution policy 
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iterations that span the period from 1997 until now. This is followed by a 
discussion of the implications of this study. Part of the reason why so little 
has been done to change the land ownership patterns created during the 
apartheid era is because policymakers construct the rural landless poor and 
land reform beneficiaries as undeserving of tangible policy benefits, and 
unable to solve their own problems. I turn firstly to the framework of 
analysis developed by Schneider and Ingram.  
Advantaged, Deviant, Contenders and Dependents  
The implicit views that South African policymakers hold of the rural 
landless poor, as manifested within the SLAG, LRAD and PLAS policies, are 
important to land reform beneficiaries. These views determine if 
policymakers see them as deserving tangible policy benefits, or only 
symbolic policy benefits. Tangible policies are defined by Edelman (1964) as 
those policies which provide specific benefits to constituents such as 
profitable contracts, greater latitude in the economic activities of a business, 
better schools, or in the case of land reform, access to affordable 
agricultural land. They have a direct positive effect on the material fortunes 
of beneficiaries. In contrast, symbolic policies appease public concern about 
an issue without substantively addressing the underlying problems. Such 
policies fail to provide any substantial difference, benefit or reward. No 
long-term tangible changes that directly solve a policy problem are created 
(Marion & Oliver, 2010).  
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Edelman (1971) asserts that very large tangible policy benefits are provided 
to those the government constructs as serving the national interest. In 
contrast, those the government perceives not to be serving the national 
interest receive restricted benefits, or only symbolic policies. Ingram and 
Schneider (2005) build on this insight, analysing how policymakers 
categorise those for whom they make policy. Four basic constructions of 
social groupings are proposed: while the advantaged are constructed as 
serving the national interest, to various degrees contenders, dependents and 
deviants are not. The type of policy allocated to each of these different 
groups is quite predictable, if analysts pay attention to whether groups 
enjoy positive characterisations or negative connotations (Newton, 2005).   
The interests and needs of advantaged groups are constructed as 
coinciding closely with the interests and needs of their society and economy. 
What is good for these groups is seen as being good for the country overall. 
Therefore, political parties compete with each other to provide generous 
tangible benefits (Edelman, 1971) and benign symbolic regulations for these 
groups. The tangible policy benefits provided to these groups will normally 
include substantial financial entitlements and non-income-tested subsidies, 
along with training and technical assistance. Responsible agencies will seek 
out all eligible persons, and encourage them to use the available policy 
opportunities. Tangible sanctions and force will not be used as burdens for 
these groups, but rather symbolic policy tools such as self-regulation, 
positive inducements and, at worst, standards and charges that do not 
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stigmatise, but only discourage certain actions (Ingram & Schneider, 2005; 
Schneider & Ingram, 1993, 1997).   
 
Figure 8-1: Policymaker constructions of target populations  
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sanctions, force and even death. At worst they will be incarcerated or 
executed. At best, they will be left free but denied information, discouraged 
from organising, and subjected to the authority of others (including 
experts), rather than helped to form their own self-regulatory organisations 
(Ingram & Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Any policy benefits 
provided to these groups will likewise be symbolic, and like the punitive 
policies, will do nothing to change the underlying problems affecting the 
lives of those in these groups (Marion & Oliver, 2010).  
Between these two extremes lie the groups constructed as the dependents 
and the contenders. Contenders need to be given tangible benefits because 
of their political power, but this must be done secretly, so that the public 
(who sees them as undeserving) do not know how much largesse they 
receive. To achieve this, statutes and policies towards these groups will be 
complex and vague (Ingram & Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
During times of low public attention, policies applied to these groups will 
tend to be tangible and beneficial. When public attention on these groups 
increases, policies towards these groups will shift to symbolic policy 
burdens.   
Finally, the constructions of dependent groups simultaneously emphasise 
their deservedness and their helplessness. While policymakers would never 
want to be seen as acting against the interests of these groups, their 
fragmentation, lack of organisation, low rates of political participation and 
lack of material resources all combine to make them politically weak. This 
 291 
 
makes it difficult to direct tangible benefits towards them. Symbolic policies 
permit elected leaders to show great concern for these groups, but relieve 
them of the need to actually allocate resources to them (Ingram & 
Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Ingram, 1993, 1997). Dependent groups will 
get subsidies, however, the relative small size of  these subsidies (Edelman, 
1971), along with strict eligibility requirements that involve labelling and 
stigmatising render them symbolic. Outreach programmes from responsible 
agencies will not be common. Rather, clients will be expected to present 
themselves to the agency to make their case for receiving benefits. 
Dependents will not be encouraged to devise their own solutions, but will 
have to rely on agencies to help them. Government only responds to them 
when members of these groups subject themselves to government, and 
relinquish power over their own choices. These groups are seen as lacking 
the capacity, skills, character, discipline, and will to manage their own 
destiny (Schneider & Ingram, 1997), and so the use of authority will be more 
common here. Policy burdens imposed on these groups are justified either 
as being necessary to achieve higher purposes, or as a way to protect the 
individual from harm. Burdens are justified for these groups as either for 
their own good, or for the greater good (Ingram & Schneider, 2005; 
Schneider & Ingram, 1993, 1997).  
Policy is one of the principal tools with which government provides cues 
about issues, situations and population groups (Edelman, 1971). Thus, this 
framework of analysis provides a hierarchical schema of how policymakers 
construct different groups, with advantaged groups receiving the most 
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tangible benefits and the other groups receiving mostly symbolic policies. 
The application of this framework of analysis to the SLAG, LRAD and PLAS 
policies would therefore uncover the implicit views held of land reform 
beneficiaries and the rural landless poor by policymakers in the DLA, the 
DRDLR and the South African government.  
If the application of this framework of analysis indicates that these groups 
are constructed by the South African government as advantaged or as 
contenders, this would demonstrate that it sees their wants and needs as 
important, to some extent commensurate with the national interest, and so 
worthy of substantial tangible policy benefits. However if analysis shows 
that the government constructs them as deviants or dependents, this would 
demonstrate that the government does not see them as legitimate targets of 
concern, and so will only direct symbolic policies towards them. It would 
demonstrate that ultimately the government does not see the problems of 
the rural landless poor as legitimate public problems (Schneider & Ingram, 
1997).   
In addition, the application of this framework will contribute towards a 
greater understanding within the scholarship on land redistribution in 
South Africa of how policy-makers socially construct beneficiaries, and the 
(potential) material consequences of such constructions. While studies note 
poor outcomes for beneficiaries of land redistribution, and their lack of 
power in the programme (Barry, 2011; Bradstock, 2005; Hamilton, 2006; 
James, Ngonini, & Nkadimeng, 2005; Lahiff, Borras, & Kay, 2007; Lebert & 
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Rohde, 2007; May, Stevens, & Stols, 2002; McCusker, 2004; McLeod, 
McDonald, & van Oudtshoorn, 2008; Twyman, Sporton, & Thomas, 2004; 
Zimmerman, 2000), few address why this situation might have been allowed 
to arise. None ask what this might say about how policymakers construct 
these beneficiaries. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature.  
The previous chapter applied a modified version of Bacchi’s WPR approach 
to the three major iterations of land redistribution policy created and 
implemented by the South African government between 1994 and the 
present day. To do this, it drew on a number of key policy documents. This 
analysis will draw on the same documents, as effectively this chapter is a 
continuation and an amplification of the analysis begun in the previous 
chapter. These documents are utilised because they are key explanations 
issued by the relevant Departments for each policy. Having laid out the 
theory and the sources used in this chapter, I turn now to the analysis of the 
three iterations of land redistribution policy.  
Land reform and the national interest  
The primary task in determining how policymakers construct the rural 
landless poor and land reform beneficiaries in SLAG, LRAD and PLAS is to 
ascertain whether or not the interests of these groups are identified as 
congruent with the national interest in these policies. This section focuses 
on an analysis of the rationale for these policies for land reform. SLAG 
provided a small grant to the poorest rural landless households, 
encouraging them to pool their grants in larger groups and buy commercial 
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farms on the market. If the rural landless poor and SLAG beneficiaries were 
seen as an advantaged group, their interests would have been directly 
associated with the immediate national economic interest — for example, 
as being necessary to boost economic growth, reduce economic inequality, 
or safeguard national food security. However, this was not the case. The 
White Paper states that the challenge of land reform is “… to find a way of 
redistributing land to the needy, and at the same time maintaining public 
confidence in the land market” (DLA, 1997, p. 17). In this quote, the needs of 
the rural landless are constructed as being balanced by the need to preserve 
the land market, created during the apartheid era through mass 
dispossession and injustice.  
Subsequently, the needs of the rural landless are constructed as being 
subordinate to those of the market. This is clear in assertions that land 
reform is necessary mainly to preserve the formal economy over the long 
term.  “Without a significant change in the racial distribution of land 
ownership, there can be no long-term political stability and therefore no 
economic prosperity” (DLA, 1997, p. 11). Effectively, the needs of the rural 
landless are not seen as coinciding with the national interest, which is 
constructed as being embodied in the existing formal economy. Their 
concerns are only addressed in the process of offsetting potential challenges 
to those participating in the formal economy. Those participating in the 
formal economy, such as white large-scale farmers, are constructed as 
having interests coinciding closely with that of the nation. The failure to 
 295 
 
identify the interests of SLAG beneficiaries directly with immediate national 
needs suggests this population group was not constructed as advantaged.   
The implication was that it was not actually in the interests of the public to 
solve the problems of the rural landless poor. Instead, the rural landless 
poor would only receive attention through the generosity of the 
government (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Perhaps the clearest indication of 
this is in the White Paper in the revelation that the “… money provided for 
land reform makes up less than half of 1% of the national budget … Land 
reform has been allocated about one twentieth of the proposed spending on 
rural infrastructure” (1997, p. 34). The small proportion of the budget 
allocated to the land reform programme demonstrated that the government 
did not see it as a critical national priority (Edelman, 1971). The government 
did not see it as necessary to direct large amounts of public resources to this 
group. Instead, it allocated enough money  for symbolic policy benefits, 
leaving the DLA with “… the dilemma of whether to provide a high level of 
subsidy to a small number of people, or whether to provide a modest 
subsidy to a higher number of beneficiaries” (1997, p. 17). Clearly, SLAG 
policymakers did not construct the rural landless poor and land reform 
beneficiaries as advantaged.  
Analysis of the LRAD policy shows that those designing this policy, likewise, 
did not construct beneficiaries as advantaged. Despite providing greater 
resources to a smaller class of aspirant black commercial farmers, the 
rationales given for land reform and the LRAD grant still do not identify the 
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interests of these new beneficiaries as being congruent with the national 
interest, as they would if they were constructed as an advantaged group. 
LRAD was primarily justified as being necessary to achieve social objectives:  
… increase access to agricultural land by black people … contribute to 
relieving the congestion in overcrowded former homeland areas … 
improve nutrition and incomes of the rural poor … overcome the 
legacy of past racial and gender discrimination in ownership of 
farmland … [and] … empower beneficiaries to improve their 
economic and social wellbeing (MALA, n.d., p. 3).  
None of these reasons for land reform are presented as being vital for the 
immediate national good, which is usually linked to economic achievements. 
Similarly, the stipulation that one third of all LRAD projects be reserved for 
women is justified as being necessary to give them “… security against 
poverty and providing them independent economic status …” (MALA, n.d., 
p. 4) as well as helping the South African government meet its international 
commitments to improve the socio-economic position of women. Potential 
economic benefits were only incidentally used as justifications for land 
redistribution, when it was suggested that redistributing land to black 
farmers could possibly “… stimulate growth from agriculture” (p. 3), and “… 
enable those presently … in communal areas to make better productive use 
of their land” (p. 3).  
The justifications provided for PLAS show a similar reluctance to conflate 
the interests of the rural landless and land reform beneficiaries with the 
 297 
 
national interest. Land reform in PLAS is primarily rationalised as being 
necessary to achieve historical justice, rather than to contribute to vital and 
immediate national needs such as economic growth or creating national 
food security. Thus, the land question is presented as “… a fundamental 
element in the resolution of the race, gender and class contradictions in 
South Africa” (DRDLR, 2011b, p. 1). It is necessary for the “… repossession of 
land lost through force or deceit; and, restoring the centrality of indigenous 
culture” (p. 1). The distribution of land from white to black South Africans is 
necessary because “… social cohesion … is a direct function of land access 
and ownership …” (p. 2). Land reform is an essential part of the process of 
toning down “… the anger, bitterness and pain of those who have been 
subjected to this brutal treatment …” (p. 3). Transforming land relations in 
South Africa is also necessary to “… instil national identity, shared 
citizenship and autonomy-fostering service delivery …” (p. 4).  
Such justifications of land reform all construct historical justice as the main 
reason driving land reform in South Africa. Only once is it suggested that 
there might be an economic reason for undertaking land reform. Land “… is 
a central mechanism in addressing the livelihood strategies, and economic 
and social development of individuals and communities in rural areas …” 
(DRDLR, 2011a, p. 4), making it necessary to broaden access to land and to 
secure the land rights that people currently hold. Significantly, even this 
economic justification for land reform is only given for individuals and 
communities in rural areas, and not for the South African economy as a 
whole.  
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Taken together, it is clear that the policymakers behind SLAG, LRAD and 
PLAS did not construct land reform beneficiaries and the rural landless poor 
as advantaged. In all three policy iterations, it is clear that policymakers 
believed that land reform could not and cannot be allowed to occur to the 
extent that it threatens the existing national economy of the country. The 
needs of the landless rural poor, and land reform beneficiaries, are always 
subordinate to the perceived needs of the national economy. If these groups 
are not constructed as advantaged, according to Schneider and Ingram’s 
approach they will be constructed as either deviant, contenders or 
dependents. Further analysis of these three policies shows more clearly 
which of these three constructions apply.  
Subsidies and eligibility criteria  
One of the clearest indications of whether these groups are constructed as 
deviant, contenders or dependents lies in the policy tools employed in SLAG, 
LRAD and PLAS. Policy tools directed to groups constructed as deviants are 
coercive, and involve sanctions, force and even death. In contrast, those 
groups constructed by policymakers as contenders receive tangible benefits 
that are transferred in secret through complex and vague policies. Groups 
constructed as dependent will receive symbolic benefits (Ingram & 
Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Ingram, 1993, 1997). Most often, small 
subsidies subject to strict eligibility requirements and involving labelling 
and stigmatising are used by policymakers to show the requisite symbolic 
support for such groups (Edelman, 1971).  
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The policy tools utilised in SLAG show clearly that the targeted groups in 
this policy were not constructed as contenders or as deviant, but as 
dependent. The SLAG grant was a basic subsidy of R15, 000 (or NZ$6, 
299.22)23 provided to the landless, subject to financial and family-based 
eligibility requirements. To qualify for the grant, applicants had to be part 
of a household earning less than R1, 500.00 or (NZ$ 629.92)24 per month 
(DLA, 1997). Applicants, thus, would be income tested, and labelled (and 
potentially stigmatised) as extremely poor (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
Single people, not belonging to a household, would not normally qualify for 
the grant, no matter what their monthly income. Qualifying applicants had 
to be married or in an established relationship, and with proven financial 
dependents. In addition, those applicants who had already received the 
National Housing Subsidy (provided to first-time home owners, and set at 
the same level) were not eligible to receive the SLAG grant. Furthermore, 
applicants were required to submit a full business plan for the land they 
were considering buying in order to be considered for the grant. Fulfilling 
these eligibility requirements in no way guaranteed that an applicant would 
be awarded the grant — it only meant that the application would be 
considered (DLA, 1997). These eligibility criteria, and the absence of any 
guarantee that the grant would be awarded, demonstrate that the 
beneficiaries were constructed as dependents by the DLA. 
                                                 
23
 Calculation based on an exchange rate of ZAR 1.00 to NZD 0.4199480988 on 01/12/1995 (xe, 
2014a). Conversion values were taken for 1995 to give an idea of the buying power of 
beneficiaries at the time. The Rand to NZ Dollar conversion rate has changed since then.   
24
 Calculation based on an exchange rate of ZAR 1.00 to NZD 0.4199480988 on 01/12/1995 (xe, 
2014a).  
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Similarly, the policy tools deployed in LRAD clearly show that beneficiaries 
were constructed not as contenders or deviants, but as dependents. LRAD 
applicants were subjected to strict eligibility requirements, and the 
stigmatisation and labelling which these requirements involved. In order to 
qualify for the LRAD grant, applicants had to provide an ‘own contribution,’ 
and the amount of the grant given to each beneficiary under LRAD was 
based on size of that contribution (MALA, n.d.). The minimum contribution 
required was R5, 000 (or NZ$1, 576.73)25, which received the minimum grant 
of R20, 000 (or NZ$6, 306.92)26 . Those making contributions higher than R5, 
000 received higher LRAD grants, up to a maximum of R100, 000 (or NZ$31, 
534.58)27 for an own contribution of R400, 000 (or NZ$126, 138.33)28 .  
Beneficiaries able to contribute more of their own capital were therefore 
favoured by this policy. This is shown in the language used to describe them 
in this document. Such beneficiaries were described as having “… the skills 
and resources to manage larger farms” (p. 4), and as being able to fund 
themselves through “… normal bank loans … [and] standard banking 
procedures …” (pp. 4-5). They were thus considered ‘normal’, and able to 
quickly fit into the ‘standard’ formal economy of South Africa created prior 
to 1994. They are also described as having “… greater farming experience 
and expertise than those accessing land for subsistence …” (p. 9) purposes. 
                                                 
25
 Calculation based on an exchange rate of ZAR 1.00 to NZD 0.3153458360 on 01/12/2000 (xe, 
2014b).   
26
 Calculation based on an exchange rate of ZAR 1.00 to NZD 0.3153458360 on 01/12/2000 (xe, 
2014b).   
27
 Calculation based on an exchange rate of ZAR 1.00 to NZD 0.3153458360 on 01/12/2000 (xe, 
2014b).   
28
 Calculation based on an exchange rate of ZAR 1.00 to NZD 0.3153458360 on 01/12/2000 (xe, 
2014b).   
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This implies that, in contrast, those beneficiaries who could not contribute 
as much (and perhaps were in greater need of a government subsidy in 
order to access land) were therefore ‘not the norm’, ‘non-standard’, with less 
experience and less expertise, which made them less deserving of a LRAD 
subsidy. The eligibility requirement of an ‘own contribution’, along with the 
labelling and stigmatisation of those who could not produce it, suggests the 
rural landless poor, especially the vast majority who had not been able to 
accumulate large amounts of capital, were constructed as dependents by 
LRAD policymakers.   
It is also apparent that the policymakers of LRAD constructed even those 
who were able to produce an ‘own contribution’ as dependent. The 
possibility is allowed for in the LRAD programme that successful 
beneficiaries would be able to access the LRAD grant repeatedly. However, 
restrictions are placed on those beneficiaries wanting to do so. The overall 
benefit a single beneficiary could access through successive LRAD grants 
was “… limited to an accumulated amount of R100, 000” (MALA, n.d., p. 
9)(or NZ$31, 534.58). Two further burdens were placed on such applicants. 
Firstly, when applying for second or third grants, the own contribution 
required from these beneficiaries would “… be gauged not in relation to the 
new grant being applied for, but rather in relation to the total amount of 
grants that have been accessed thus far plus the new grant” (p. 9). In other 
words, the own contribution required from such applicants would be 
greater than that required for those applying for the first time. Secondly, 
assets acquired by prior LRAD grants “… cannot be counted as an own 
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contribution when applying for an additional grant” (p. 9). These 
restrictions thus combined to lower the amount of funding LRAD 
beneficiaries could access, and discouraged beneficiaries from repeatedly 
accessing LRAD grants in order to access larger pieces of land. This 
restricted subsidy, along with the lack of rationale given, points to the 
dependent status of LRAD beneficiaries in the eyes of contemporary 
policymakers.   
This aspect of the LRAD seems contradictory — as has been shown, the 
target group of this policy is an already-privileged group with access to 
resources, whom LRAD can assist to become part of the rural black 
bourgeoisie. On the other hand, specific barriers are put in place to stop 
these beneficiaries leveraging their assets to access additional grants. 
Beneficiaries are assisted with access to benefits, but are only allowed to 
access them once. It is difficult to explain these conflicting provisions 
without access to the debates contributing to the creation of LRAD. Given 
the focus of LRAD on creating black commercial farmers through the 
market, though, it is likely that these restrictions on accessing the grants 
more than once may have been imposed to prevent the development of 
black commercial farmers dependent on government grants for survival — 
they would be forced to survive on their own as independent agri-business 
people after accessing their initial grant, and therefore be independent. The 
important point here, however, is that even the beneficiaries, who were 
favoured over the rural landless who were unable to provide an ‘own 
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contribution’, were constructed as dependent, and needing the guidance of 
the government.   
The focus on strict eligibility requirements along with labelling and 
stigmatising, indicating dependent construction by policymakers, is 
likewise apparent in PLAS. Applicants to PLAS must “… have recently begun 
to engage in farming on a larger scale to sell crops and livestock on the 
market with the support and assistance of the State” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 4). In 
addition to this, favour will be shown to applicants who show evidence of 
“… experience, capabilities and access to capital …” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 13). 
The type of land allocated to applicants will also depend on whether “… they 
are aiming at addressing only household food security needs or whether 
their intention is to link into a broader market or production chain …” 
(DRDLR, 2011a, p. 6). It can be argued then that through the application of 
eligibility criteria, PLAS beneficiaries are seen as dependents by the 
government. 
A certain amount of stigmatisation is also evident in the language used to 
set out eligibility for those applying for capital to undertake commercial 
production under the Recapitalisation and Development Programme 
(RADP), which provides PLAS beneficiaries with government funding for 
their farming operations (DRDLR, 2013). While the resources directed to 
PLAS beneficiaries through the RADP are more generous than had been 
provided under SLAG and PLAS, the eligibility criteria, stigmatisation and 
labelling imposed on beneficiaries during the allocation of these resources 
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resonates strongly with a dependent construction. This funding is reserved 
for land reform beneficiaries situated on “… under-producing agricultural 
enterprises …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 5), those who “… bought land, but could not 
generate resources to develop it …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 15), or “… distressed 
land reform properties …” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 17). In order to qualify for RADP 
funding then, applicants have to have failed very obviously as commercial 
farmers. Applying such eligibility criteria thus transfers some stigma on 
RADP and PLAS beneficiaries. On the basis of the eligibility criteria 
imposed on PLAS applicants, and the stigma attached to some of these 
criteria, PLAS beneficiaries are also constructed as dependents by the South 
African government.  
Passive state support  
Where policies for contenders will reach out to their target populations in 
secret, and entire government departments are focused on apprehending 
and punishing those constructed as deviants, policies aimed at dependent 
groups will be characterised by requirements that potential clients present 
themselves to the responsible agency to make their case for receiving 
benefits (Ingram & Schneider, 2005; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). In this 
respect, SLAG, LRAD and PLAS all give strong indications that those 
designing them constructed the target populations as dependent. In SLAG 
the dependent status of the rural landless poor is confirmed in the 
stipulation that the “… grant can be obtained on application to the 
Department of Land Affairs” (DLA, 1997, p. 69). The DLA did not contact 
prospective beneficiaries to inform them of the grant. Rather, they were 
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expected to approach the Department themselves. The extent of the 
unwillingness of the Department to communicate with potential 
beneficiaries became clear during the interviews carried out for this study, 
when small-scale communal farmers living in a former Bantustan (and so 
surely potential beneficiaries of SLAG, LRAD and PLAS) requested 
information from me — someone who was not even a current resident of 
the country — on where and how they could apply for government help to 
access land (RL1, 2012).  
Similarly, the dependent construction of LRAD beneficiaries and applicants 
was indicated in the way potential beneficiaries were required to present 
their own applications for the grant (MALA, n.d.) — government agencies 
did not reach out to potential beneficiaries, or automatically extend it to 
them as would have been the case if they were an advantaged group. Under 
LRAD, applicants were in fact required to submit detailed applications for 
the grant to two different bureaucracies for approval — firstly to local 
officials of the relevant provincial Department of Agriculture, and then to a 
provincial grant committee composed mainly of representatives of the DLA.  
The current iteration of land reform policy, PLAS, similarly requires 
potential beneficiaries to present themselves to the DRDLR (DRDLR, 2011a). 
During this application process, the dependent construction of potential 
PLAS beneficiaries is clear in that applicants must take steps to convince the 
DRDLR of their worth as beneficiaries. PLAS applicants must show “… 
commitment, ability and passion for hands-on-farming” (DRDLR, 2013, p. 
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15). In addition, they must present evidence “… of their interest and skills in 
agriculture and other enterprises …” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 14) and preferably 
already be engaged in agricultural activities. Potential PLAS beneficiaries 
are interviewed by a DRDLR committee, “… and their success will depend 
on their scores” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 20) awarded by the committee. In 
addition, the application process for PLAS is not advertised generally by the 
DRDLR. This became clear during the course of my interview with an 
employee of the DRDLR, who stated that: “… we don’t go and search for 
them. We wait for them to come to us. We don’t go and look for them” (CS1, 
2012).  
Assumption of incapacity  
One of the strongest indications that a target population is constructed as 
dependent is when these groups are not permitted to devise their own 
solutions, but are required to rely on government agencies (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993, p. 339). Thus, the use of authority — including statements 
granting permission, or prohibiting or requiring action — is common in 
relation to dependents, as they are not constructed as self-reliant. Such a 
construction is clear in SLAG, where the DLA argues that the rural landless 
“… often experience problems gaining access to information about land 
development opportunities and processes. In addition, unorganised 
communities are not able to express a realistic demand for land” (1997, p. 
23). This reflects the reasonable assumption that the DLA “… has a 
responsibility to ensure that state resources are wisely used and that prices 
negotiated are just and equitable” (p. 40). Therefore the Department argues 
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that it has the obligation “… to explain clearly to grant applicants the rules 
with regard to valuation …” (p. 40). This includes such rules as: that 
purchasers do not have an inalienable right to any particular piece of land; 
that willing-seller willing-buyer is only effective if potential buyers are not 
fixated on purchasing a single particular farm at any cost; and that 
purchasers “… should be encouraged to negotiate the price down in order to 
obtain the best value for ‘their money’ …” (p. 40). There is a clear 
assumption here that the beneficiaries would not be able to understand the 
processes of buying land at the lowest possible price, that they were likely to 
be irrationally focused on purchasing one particular farm at any price, and 
that they therefore needed the guidance of the Department. The DLA did 
not see land reform beneficiaries as being capable of creating their own 
solutions.   
In a further indication that SLAG beneficiaries were seen as dependents, 
unable to devise their own solutions, the White Paper also required them to 
contract the services of a professional planner to draw up a business plan 
for the land to be purchased, as part of their application for the SLAG grant 
(DLA, 1997). It was assumed that the applicants would not be able to devise 
the best way to make use of the redistributed land — whatever they wanted 
to do with it would be wasteful. Therefore, these planners would “… assist 
poor communities to plan for the acquisition, use and development of land 
and for the mobilisation of resources required to do this” (p. 70). Their 
contribution would include “… legal and financial-planning assistance, land 
use planning, infrastructure planning, land valuation, and assistance with 
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land purchase negotiations, including the formation of a legal entity” (pp. 
70-71). Planners would be paid for by a further grant made available to 
successful applicants for a SLAG grant. The extensive nature of the duties 
assigned to the planner again points to assumptions that SLAG beneficiaries 
were incapable of negotiating to buy land, or organising economically 
productive activities on that land once it had been transferred.   
Similarly in the LRAD programme, applicants for the grant were required to 
make a detailed case for their approval, in a format decided on and 
arbitrated by government officials from two different Departments. Power 
was taken out of the hands of the applicants, and put in the hands of 
anonymous government officials. No scope was allowed for negotiation 
between the government and applicants, or for them to work in a 
collaborative manner. The dependent construction of LRAD applicants was 
clear in the requirement that they subject themselves to government and 
relinquish power over their own choices.   
The lack of agency ascribed to beneficiaries is even greater in the PLAS 
programme. In policy documents related to PLAS, the failure of previous 
land reform programmes is blamed on a lack of ability on the part of the 
beneficiaries. Thus, “… the opportunities we make available through land 
reform have to correspond more closely to the skills possessed by the 
lessee … training and mentoring are valuable interventions to build lessees’ 
capabilities, but too much is often expected of them” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 14). 
As the Minister of Rural Development and Land Affairs argued in a 
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Parliamentary speech, “… they say God helps people who help themselves. 
But the underlying truth is that some people have to be taught how to help 
themselves …” (Nkwinti, 2012, pp. 7-8). To avoid expecting too much of 
beneficiaries then, and to teach them how to help themselves, under PLAS, 
the state decides what land to buy for land reform. Only in “… exceptional 
cases …” (DRDLR, 2011a, p. 18), where “… capable potential farmers …” (p. 18) 
have identified land themselves will the Department consider buying land it 
has not chosen itself, and only on the proviso that buying this land furthers 
the Department’s strategic plans, there are funds available, and the ‘capable 
potential farmers’ “… fall within the ideal lessee profile …” (p. 18). Once the 
land is purchased, the government still retains ownership of it, “… for use by 
the lessees of the programme” (p. 4), “… at a level at which they can manage 
such resources” (p. 14). In addition, when leasing land from the government, 
PLAS beneficiaries are continually monitored and audited. It is clear that 
the DRDLR thus constructs PLAS beneficiaries as lacking self-reliance. This 
means that they cannot be expected to devise their own solutions to the 
problems facing them. Rather the government must step in to rectify the 
situation.  
Conclusion  
Prompted by the question of why so little has been achieved by successive 
post-apartheid policy initiatives around land reform, this chapter focuses on 
how post-apartheid policymakers construct the rural landless poor and land 
reform beneficiaries. These constructions are crucial to the success or 
failure of land reform, as they determine whether these policies will provide 
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tangible or symbolic benefits. The theoretical framework that underpinned 
the analysis offered in this chapter puts forward a hierarchy of constructions, 
with groups constructed as advantaged receiving tangible policy benefits, 
and those groups constructed as contenders, dependents or deviants 
receiving more symbolic benefits from policies. The application of this 
schema to the SLAG, LRAD and PLAS policies shows clearly that in all three 
policies, the rural landless poor and land reform beneficiaries were and are 
constructed as dependents.  
In all three land reform policy iterations, the interests of the rural landless 
and of land reform beneficiaries are not conflated with the national interest. 
Rather, the interests of these target populations are seen as being 
subordinate to the interests of society at large. The interests of society at 
large are seen as being better served by the existing agrarian structure, 
created during the colonial, segregation and apartheid eras. This means that 
the rural landless and land reform beneficiaries are not constructed as 
advantaged.  
Further analysis shows that the rural landless and land reform beneficiaries 
are not constructed as deviant or contenders, but as dependents. Both SLAG 
and LRAD provide limited (largely symbolic) subsidies designed to assist 
beneficiaries to purchase land on the market, indicating dependent 
constructions. In addition, in all three policy iterations, the relevant 
government departments do not reach out to potential beneficiaries, as they 
would if they were constructed as advantaged, contenders or deviants. 
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Rather, applicants have to present themselves, and as mentioned, subject 
themselves to strict eligibility criteria involving stigmatisation and labelling. 
The provision of symbolic subsidies under SLAG and LRAD was directed at 
those of the rural landless who complied with strict eligibility requirements. 
Similarly, while the resources directed to PLAS beneficiaries are more 
tangible and substantial, the strict eligibility criteria imposed on applicants, 
involving some labelling and stigmatisation, indicate that these 
beneficiaries are also constructed as dependent.  
The clearest indication that the rural landless and land reform beneficiaries 
are constructed as dependents is in the lack of agency attributed to these 
target populations. SLAG assumed that beneficiaries were not competent 
enough to buy land on the market. LRAD required applicants to submit 
themselves to two separate government agencies. Under PLAS, the 
perceived failures of SLAG and LRAD are ascribed to the lack of ability of 
the rural landless and beneficiaries themselves. Beneficiaries here are 
required to submit to the almost complete control of government 
bureaucrats, and are never entrusted with private ownership of the land 
they own.  
What is striking in this analysis is that in all three iterations of land reform 
policy, the rural landless and land reform beneficiaries are always 
constructed as dependent. While each policy contains strong rhetoric 
around the creation of independent, successful black commercial farmers, 
even the successful black entrepreneurs targeted by LRAD and PLAS are 
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constructed as unable to create their own solutions, and constantly needing 
the direction of government bureaucrats. The assumptions about black 
beneficiaries driving these constructions resonate strongly with colonial, 
segregation and apartheid constructions of black South Africans as lacking 
in intelligence and initiative, and needing constant guidance from others. 
The harsh punishments promised to those among the landless inclined to 
take the initiative to solve their own problems and invade vacant land (DLA, 
1997) likewise show strong similarities to the deviant constructions 
apartheid policymakers ascribed to black South Africans who resisted their 
policies. This implies that apartheid paradigms, methods and social 
constructions have successfully made the transition to the post-apartheid 
era, especially in the assumptions of bureaucrats and policymakers about 
black participation in agriculture.  
The question driving this thesis asks how so little could have been done in 
post-apartheid South Africa to change the patterns of land ownership 
created during the colonial and apartheid eras. The analysis in this chapter 
provides another part of the answer to this question: such a small quantity 
of land has been transferred so far under land redistribution because 
policymakers in South Africa construct the rural landless poor and land 
reform beneficiaries as dependents. They do not see the problems of the 
rural landless poor as being sufficiently important to the national interest, 
and they assume these target populations are incapable of solving their own 
problems.  
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Chapter Nine 
The Politics of Land Reform on the Ground: The Views of 
Farmers, Department Officials and NGO Members  
This study seeks to explain how, in the post-apartheid context, the agrarian 
structure inherited from apartheid has largely been preserved, despite 
successive post-apartheid policy initiatives addressed at changing this. A 
crucial part of this explanation will come from analysis of the ideas and 
discourses subscribed to by those tasked with implementing land reform 
policies at the provincial level. If the content of a policy, along with its 
impact on those affected can be substantially modified, elaborated or even 
negated during its implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2009), it is important to 
understand how those implementing land reform policy view the process.  
MacDonald (2003) argues that discourses contribute to the construction of 
certain values and goals as more worthy than others, identify particular 
institutions as primary actors in a policy issue, and attribute authority to 
certain bodies of knowledge over others. Thus clarifying the discourses 
apparent at the provincial level in the South African land reform arena will 
bring into the open the assumptions of these participants on the proper 
goals of land reform, the best institutions to pursue these goals, and the 
appropriate knowledge they should use to do this. Exhuming and examining 
these deep assumptions is therefore a crucial step in providing an answer to 
the question of why so little has been done to change the patterns of land 
ownership set during the apartheid era in South Africa.  
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The ideas and beliefs found at the provincial level in this study were 
uncovered through a series of semi-structured interviews carried out in the 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces of South Africa. These 
interviews were with respondents from a range of groups involved including 
land redistribution beneficiaries, communal farmers, NGOs, black and 
white large-scale commercial farmers, and commodity organisations from 
the formal agricultural economy. In addition, interviews were carried out 
with representatives of the DRDLR, the provincial departments of 
agriculture in the two provinces, the Agricultural Development Agency in 
KwaZulu-Natal and consultants in both provinces. Representatives of the 
ANC and the DA in the Eastern Cape were also interviewed. The interview 
transcripts were closely read to draw out respondents’ assumptions about 
the process of ‘development’, the place of land reform in this process, and 
policy proposals for land reform. These answers were then mapped out on a 
four-way matrix based on the views about the ideal form of farm ownership, 
and how this could be achieved through redistribution.   
This facilitated the clarification of three discourses among the respondents 
interviewed, which have been named ‘Assisted Integration’, ‘Competitive 
Integration’ and ‘Rural Support’. The largest number of respondents 
interviewed could be placed in the ‘Assisted Integration’ discourse, 
advocating that the government lead the process of land reform, through 
the creation of black large-scale commercial farmers. Respondents who 
expressed these beliefs were largely bureaucrats, beneficiaries and 
consultants involved in land reform. The ‘Competitive Integration’ 
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discourse was drawn on by those respondents already established in the 
formal agricultural economy — the white large-scale commercial farmers, 
the commodity organisations and the agricultural corporations. These 
respondents also see land reform as ideally involving the creation of black 
large-scale commercial farmers, but advocate that this be purely a market-
led process. Finally, the remaining respondents drew from the ‘Rural 
Support’ discourse, arguing that land reform should form part of the process 
of improving the conditions of the rural landless poor.  
This chapter outlines the existing literature on discourses at the local level 
of land reform in South Africa, before analysing the three discourses 
uncovered in this study. A discussion of these discourses follows, along with 
an exploration of some of the implications of the views of land reform 
uncovered in this study.  
Previous studies of land reform discourses at the provincial level    
There are few published studies of discourses around land reform at the 
local or the provincial level in South Africa. A few studies explore the 
deployment of discourses within specific land reform projects (James, 2000, 
2007; James et al., 2005; Lebert & Rohde, 2007; May & Lahiff, 2007). The 
only published in-depth study of discourses around land reform at the local 
level is  based on a discourse analysis of policy discussions and 
documentation around the KwaZulu-Natal Land Reform Pilot Project 
during the period 1995–1996 (MacDonald, 2003), which identifies two 
influential discourses in that province at that time. An ‘economic 
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development’ discourse is identified as dominant, which was drawn from 
mainly by the Department of Agriculture. In common with the libertarian 
discourse identified at the constitutional level, this discourse gave rise to 
support for the creation of small-scale black commercial farmers through 
market-led methods, who would use their land in a similar way to the 
existing white large-scale commercial farmers in the area. This dominant 
discourse was challenged by ‘community leaders’ or ‘local elites’ who drew 
from a discourse of ‘need’ and ‘historical justice’. As in the case of the 
liberationist discourse identified at the constitutional level, this discourse 
asserted that in view of the extreme poverty and need for land in the area, 
economic development criteria could not be applied to the Pilot Project, as 
they would exclude the majority of the rural landless poor in the region 
from accessing land through it (MacDonald, 2003).  
While this study gives an invaluable insight into the dynamics governing 
the implementation of the KwaZulu-Natal Pilot Project in the Estcourt area 
of KwaZulu-Natal province, the narrowness of this study — focused only on 
the discourses found among those involved in the creation of the Pilot 
Project — leaves many questions unanswered. What, for instance, were the 
discourses subscribed to by the NGOs assisting in the implementation of 
the Pilot Project? What were the ideas, beliefs and assumptions of the local 
white farmers in the area who sold their land to the Pilot Project? What 
were the narratives of land reform drawn on by local DLA staff, who must 
also have been involved in the project? Given the relative paucity of studies 
on the discourses present at any level of the land reform policy arena in 
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South Africa, and given the amount of time that has passed since this study, 
there is scope for a re-examination of these discourses. I turn next to a brief 
outline of the methods used in this re-examination.  
Data capture for this study  
Du Toit (2013) makes the point that land reform is not a central, self-
contained project in and of itself — rather, it is a component of a much 
larger process of socio-economic change in South African society as a 
whole. Therefore, once the recorded interviews had been transcribed, I 
examined the narrative given about land reform in each interview in order 
to determine the answers to three basic questions. The first basic question 
focused on what each respondent assumed to be the overall process of 
development in South Africa. Secondly, I interrogated where respondents 
saw land reform and land redistribution fitting into this overall process. 
Finally, I asked what the respondent proposed as the appropriate land 
reform programme for South Africa. These responses allowed me to begin 
constructing the discourses drawn on by respondents during the interviews.  
Given the format of the semi-structured interviews, the discussions in the 
interviews and the answers to these three questions varied widely. At the 
very extremes, one respondent saw land reform as part of a genocidal effort 
by the ANC government to eradicate the white farmers of South Africa 
(Rossouw, 2012), whereas another saw the process as a necessary step to 
establish socialism in South Africa (Njoli, 2012). It was at first difficult to see 
how fewer than 36 individual discourses could be extracted out of the 
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interviews. However, further analysis revealed that despite the widely 
differing narratives given in the interviews, most respondents could be 
placed on a single spectrum based on their opinions of whether land reform 
should be a market-led or a government-led process. Thus, while Rossouw 
saw land reform as part of an overall programme designed to eliminate 
white farmers, she agreed that if a land reform policy was absolutely 
necessary, it would best carried out through the market (2012). Similarly, 
while Njoli saw land reform as part of the progress of humanity towards 
socialism, he felt that it should be carried out by the government rather 
than the market (Njoli, 2012). In addition, all respondents could be placed 
somewhere along a second spectrum according to their opinions on 
whether land reform should transfer farms in their existing form, or as 
smaller units. In this case, both Rossouw (2012) and Njoli (2012) agreed that 
land reform should transfer farms in their existing form. I therefore decided 
to construct a four-way matrix out of these two spectrums, as seen in Figure 
9-1.  
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Figure 9-1: Four-way matrix used to isolate discourses in this study 
Government 
 
   Discourse One                                Discourse Four 
     
             Large farms                                                                             Small farms 
   Discourse Two   Discourse Three 
                                                                        
 
Market 
 
With this matrix, I was able to group together those respondents advocating 
the redistribution of existing large farms through government action into a 
single discourse. Similarly, those advocating market means to achieve this 
are grouped into another discourse, as were those respondents advocating 
the creation of small farms through the market, and those preferring that 
the government lead such a process. Having created these groups, I was 
then able to return to the interview transcripts and the interview notes, and 
analyse the similarities among those respondents grouped into each 
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discourse. No respondents were placed within ‘Discourse Three’. Therefore, 
no discourse was constructed for that quadrant of the four-way matrix, and 
this study describes only three discourses.    
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Discourse One: ‘Assisted Integration’ (AI)   
Development as integration through jobs and education  
Table 9-1 
Summary of Assisted Integration (AI) discourse 
ISSUE  CHARACTERISTICS 
"Development" Integration into formal economy 
Place of land reform 
Politically necessary; 
One of many methods of integration 
Existing large farms 
Created by apartheid 
Most efficient form of agriculture 
Guaranteed food security 
Policy prescriptions 
Government-led land reform 
Transfer existing farms to beneficiaries 
Create black large-scale farmers 
Transfer farms to small groups or 
individuals. 
Post-settlement 
Government financial support 
Mentorships for technical support 
Title for 
beneficiaries 
After probationary lease period 
Communal areas Provide long-term rights to land 
Rural Landless 
Women 
Not mentioned  
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‘Discourse One’ in Figure 9-1 (page 317) groups together those respondents 
advocating that the government lead the process of transferring farms in 
their existing large-scale capital-intensive form. To begin understanding 
this discourse, it is necessary to explore the assumptions around the process 
of development put forward by respondents in this category. In the course 
of the interviews, it became apparent that to those articulating this 
discourse, ‘development’ in the South African context is taken to mean the 
redistribution of economic resources from white ownership to black 
ownership. Due to apartheid and colonial policies, most resources in South 
Africa “… are currently concentrated still in the hands of whites” 
(Ngqameni, 2012). Therefore, the process of ‘development’ is the process of 
creating “… a fair distribution, of the resources that we have … There’s a lot 
of disbundling that needs to happen here” (Ngqameni, 2012). From 1994 to 
1999 the politics of South Africa was aimed at reconciliation between whites 
and blacks. But “… the politics of the country have changed since then. 
Because we now talk about ‘economic freedom in our lifetime’” (Mfuywa, 
2012). Thus while black South Africans enjoy full political rights in the post-
apartheid era, these respondents still see themselves as economically 
subjugated. ‘Development’ must therefore bring about a greater share of 
resources for black South Africans. However, further analysis shows that 
those subscribing to this discourse do not envision this redistribution of 
resources being carried out in a way that damages or radically changes the 
formal economy created during the colonial, segregation and apartheid 
eras.  
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Various ways of facilitating this integration are suggested by proponents of 
this discourse. Some emphasise the importance of providing a stronger and 
more complete education to black South Africans (Josephs, 2012). It is 
assumed here that the most devastating apartheid policy was the denial of 
adequate educational facilities: “… when you look at the policies of 
Verwoerd, the guy who actually invented the apartheid system, he said … he 
will ensure that he gives a black inferior education” (Buthelezi, 2012). This 
means that today, “… the solution to the country’s problems, and to the 
economic problems, is nothing else but one: education” (Buthelezi, 2012). 
Education is not only for young people however. Those who are not in 
school must be engaged in capacity-building programmes and projects 
(Buthelezi, 2012), which would allow them to be integrated into the existing 
formal economy. Others emphasise the importance of employment and 
argue that the quickest and most effective way to integrate black South 
Africans into the formal economy is through creating jobs and reducing 
unemployment (CS6, 2012). Most of the problems in the country are caused 
by unemployment (B2, 2012), that is, they are not integrated into the formal 
economy. It is necessary to “… give almost everybody something to do, some 
job, so that they earn some money” (CS5, 2012). Working permanently and 
earning steady salaries, they will be able to improve their lives and those of 
their families, as part of the formal economy. Various ways of creating these 
jobs are suggested, ranging from government job-creation schemes (B2, 
2012), to facilitating higher rates of economic growth in the formal economy 
to stimulate the creation of new jobs (Mbeki, 2003). These respondents, 
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then, argued for a wider redistribution of economic resources, through the 
integration of black South Africans into the formal economy.  
Land reform a political necessity and part of a wider programme of 
development  
Most respondents located within this discourse agreed that land reform was 
an important political necessity, given the history of dispossession. 
Interview respondents made it clear that “… if you understand the history of 
this country, the struggle was about the whole issue of the land question … 
and if you ignore that, then you are asking for trouble” (CS6, 2012). 
Respondents described a strong popular pressure for a land reform 
programme — “… in the minds of the majority of the people … the issue of 
land is a serious issue …” (B3, 2012). These assertions provide an interesting 
contrast to the lack of priority accorded to this issue at the national policy 
level, as analysed in chapter eight. While recognising a wide popular 
support for land reform, respondents also argue that it must be viewed as a 
part of the larger project of ‘development’. Land reform and land 
redistribution, however, are seen as only one of many ways of integrating 
people into the formal economy. “It’s not going to solve the [problem one] 
hundred per cent … It will partly solve the problem. There are other things 
that should be done” (B2, 2012). Land reform is therefore seen as only being 
a small part of a larger process in this discourse.  
Large-scale commercial farms worth protecting  
In the conception of ‘development’ used in this discourse, the overall 
intention is not to change the existing formal economy of South Africa in 
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any far-reaching way. Rather, the intention is to facilitate the expansion of 
this economy in a way that includes black South Africans as well. This 
implies that the existing formal economy of South Africa is seen as worth 
preserving, extending and protecting, even though it was created through 
the large-scale oppression and dispossession of black South Africans. This 
view of the formal economy extends to how the large-scale commercial 
farming sector is conceptualised.  
 
There is a clear recognition that the existing large-scale commercial farms 
were created through apartheid policies. Interview respondents commented 
that “… the land was taken unfairly. By force” (Njoli, 2012). “Our history is 
very clear in this country, that there has been an imbalance, when it comes 
to ownership of land and land distribution …” (Ngqameni, 2012). In 
addition, after gaining the land in this manner, the existing white large-
scale commercial farmers were given extensive  
… assistance from the previous governments … They were provided 
with support, and development. In terms of resources, they were 
given the land, they were given water … You know, institutions were 
set up, financial institutions, Land Bank, and other institutions that 
… were there to transfer skills, to the farmers of the time … The 
market was even reserved (Buthelezi, 2012).  
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As a result, the large-scale commercial white farmers of South Africa’s 
formal economy today have almost exclusive possession of agricultural land, 
and the expertise and capital required to make use of it (CS6, 2012).  
Alongside this, these large-scale commercial farms are presented as the 
most efficient form of agriculture possible. The large-scale commercial 
agricultural sector has achieved commercial importance, developing “… 
from just subsistence farming …” (ADA, 2013b, p. 3) to being a profit-
generating, market-focused sector. This sector is highly productive, and has 
achieved this through investing in infrastructure, human capital, and the 
latest scientific research in agricultural production. Proponents of this 
discourse assume that there is no better way of using the country’s 
agricultural resources than the example offered by its commercial farms 
(ADA, 2013b; B3, 2012; Buthelezi, 2012; Chetty, 2012; Loest, 2012).   
 
Respondents articulating this discourse agreed that, in addition to being the 
most efficient and productive form of agriculture, the large-scale 
commercial farms guarantee the food security of South Africa (B2, 2012; B3, 
2012; Josephs, 2012; Mfuywa, 2012; NG1, 2012). Therefore, on the basis that 
food security today is more important than the country’s history of 
dispossession (B1, 2012), land reform should not be allowed to disrupt 
agricultural production. As an interview respondent from the DRDLR stated: 
“You know you can address the land question, but you must also balance it 
with food security” (CS6, 2012).  
 327 
 
Land reform to create black large-scale commercial farmers.   
The assumption that large-scale commercial farms are the most efficient 
form of agriculture and guarantee food security has direct implications for 
the type of land reform to be undertaken. Firstly, beneficiaries must be 
given farms as they are — farms should not be subdivided into smaller units 
(ADA, 2013b; AFASA, 2012; B3, 2012; CS6, 2012; Josephs, 2012; Mfuywa, 2012; 
Ngqameni, 2012; Njoli, 2012). Secondly, in order to preserve the efficiency of 
the agricultural sector and food security, land redistribution must 
concentrate on creating black large-scale commercial farmers, and 
integrating them into the existing class of white large-scale commercial 
farmers (ADA, 2013b, p. 10; Anonymous 5, 2012; B3, 2012; Buthelezi, 2012; 
CS1, 2012). An LRAD beneficiary, when describing the purpose of land 
redistribution emphasised the aspiration that black people “… will be 
incorporated into this farming business” (B2, 2012). Similarly, a respondent 
working in the DRDLR stated that the purpose of land reform was to 
support “… those who want to produce in the mainstream, that is 
commercial agriculture” (Mfuywa, 2012).  
 
Respondents in this discourse also argued that land redistribution should 
concentrate on small-scale growers in the communal areas, giving them the 
chance to expand their operations and become large-scale agricultural 
producers outside of the communal areas. The focus should be on 
identifying those small-scale farmers currently renting land in the 
communal areas with potential, and supporting their development. A 
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DRDLR respondent commented: “… you can see that this person can do 
wonders if he were to get a bigger piece of land” (Anonymous 5, 2012). 
Another said, “… we are supposed to prioritise those people, who have been 
small-scale growers, to graduate them to become commercial farmers” (CS1, 
2012).  
In the drive to create large-scale commercial farmers, adherents to this 
discourse allow for the transfer of farms to either individual beneficiaries, or 
small groups of beneficiaries. Group-based beneficiaries interviewed in the 
course of this study emphasised that their success as commercial farmers 
was at least partly due to the fact that their groups were small and based on 
family ties (B3, 2012; Njoli, 2012). This made it easier to make decisions and 
gain agreement when necessary. In addition, it would make possible the use 
of the technical knowledge of the older members of the family group, and 
the financial and management knowledge of their (more highly educated) 
children (Josephs, 2012). A DRDLR official emphasised that groups also 
needed to have ‘constructive dynamics’. Groups with ‘destructive dynamics’ 
would continue to fail no matter what the DRDLR tried to do. In contrast, 
groups with constructive dynamics were much more likely to succeed 
(Loest, 2012).  
Others articulating this discourse express a preference for the transfer of 
land to individual black South African beneficiaries (ADA, 2013b; CS6, 2012; 
Mfuywa, 2012). The conflicts common in large groups were repeatedly 
highlighted by many respondents (B2, 2012; Chetty, 2012; Pletts, 2012). 
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Members of AFASA emphasised that land must be redistributed on the 
basis of “… one man, one farm. One farm, one entity, one company. Then 
you talk viable” (Ngqameni, 2012). Interview respondents from the DRDLR 
agreed that priority “… should at least be given to that person who is already 
established, who has already … proved himself to be able and committed” 
(Anonymous 5, 2012).  
Given the focus of the state on maintaining current food production levels 
and creating black large-scale commercial farmers to many of those 
identifying with this discourse, the long-term aim of land redistribution is 
no more than to ensure that overall black South Africans own as much land 
as do white South Africans. Respondents asserted that in many cases, much 
of the land owned by white farmers lies fallow: “… a white farmer is holding 
a number of farms. And … maybe he’s only using one farm … Not all those 
farms are used” (CS5, 2012). Redistributing these farms to aspirant black 
commercial farmers would both ensure a wider distribution of economic 
resources to black South Africans, and ensure agricultural land is used more 
intensively.  
The central role of government in land redistribution  
Many of the respondents drawing from this discourse presented a strong 
critique of the capacity of the state to deliver land reform policy (ADA, 
2013b; B2, 2012; Chetty, 2012; CS3, 2012; CS6, 2012; Huddleston, 2012; Josephs, 
2012; NG1, 2012; Pletts, 2012; Webber, 2012). Simultaneously, however, they 
were equally adamant that the open market alone could not be relied on to 
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transfer land to black South Africans. Members of AFASA argued strongly 
against market-based land reform in South Africa as it has been 
implemented since 1994: “We are saying as AFASA ‘it has not worked. It has 
failed us. The willing buyer-willing seller has failed us’” (Ngqameni, 2012). 
The “… willing buyer/willing seller approach [has] not been effective for 
transformation purposes” (AFASA, 2012, p. 4). Others agreed that the 
market is not the best way to achieve land redistribution (B3, 2012), 
asserting that so far willing buyer-willing seller had allowed a tiny minority 
of white farmers to maintain a grip on most of South Africa’s farmland 
(Njoli, 2012), and exorbitant prices had been paid for the few farms that 
have been transferred (Mfuywa, 2012). Those articulating this discourse, 
therefore, argued that despite its many failings, the government must step 
into the market to play a prominent role in land reform.  
According to this discourse, then, the most important role of the 
government is to intervene in the land market, obtaining farms for land 
redistribution by expropriation (with adequate compensation) when 
necessary (CS5, 2012; CS6, 2012; Mfuywa, 2012; NG1, 2012; Ngqameni, 2012; 
Njoli, 2012). In addition to acquiring the land for redistribution, the 
government was also expected to support beneficiaries after they have been 
settled to enable them to develop as independent large-scale commercial 
farmers. A respondent elaborated that South Africa needs to learn from the 
mistakes made in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In these countries, many 
were understandably eager to regain their land, but found that once in 
possession of that land, they were unable to farm it commercially. They 
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needed more than enthusiasm, because “…  farming to me is like every 
business that we have in our country … you need to have the knowledge and 
expertise to be able to run your own farm” (B2, 2012). A representative of 
NAFU commented that black South Africans have come to realise that  
… we don’t actually need land per se. We need land and the 
resources to work that land. We need water and the resources to 
work that land. The skills, and the resources to acquire those skills. 
We need the market, and we’ve got to have the resources to meet the 
requirements in terms of quality, in terms of the standard, the 
specifications and all those kind of things. And we need also to look 
at the issues of the infrastructure (Buthelezi, 2012). 
This discourse, therefore, accords a strong role to the state in the provision 
of post-settlement support to beneficiaries.  
 
Respondents drawing from this discourse assert that the existing white 
farmers of South Africa achieved their present position because of the 
intensive support they received from previous governments (AFASA, 2012; 
Buthelezi, 2012). Therefore, to ensure the success of beneficiaries, they also 
need full government support to access the capital, knowledge and markets 
they need to produce commercially (ADA, 2013a; Anonymous 5, 2012; CS1, 
2012; CS5, 2012; CS6, 2012; Huddleston, 2012; Loest, 2012; Mfuywa, 2012; NG1, 
2012; Ngqameni, 2012; Njoli, 2012; Pletts, 2012). Some of the respondents 
went on to stipulate that government support should only last for a set 
period, and should diminish each year, to ensure that beneficiaries do not 
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become dependent, but develop as independent large-scale commercial 
producers (B3, 2012; Chetty, 2012). 
The importance of mentors   
As part of the process of providing beneficiaries with the skills to succeed as 
commercial farmers, many of the respondents expressing this discourse 
agreed that beneficiaries should be allocated mentors from the existing 
large-scale commercial agricultural sector. Beneficiaries need to learn from 
“… the people who have been in the game for quite some time” (B2, 2012), 
tapping into the skills and experience of these established farmers to 
increase their chances of succeeding (B3, 2012). While a respondent in this 
study (who was a land reform beneficiary) describes a very successful and 
mutually beneficial relationship with a white mentor (B1, 2012), others 
articulating this discourse express distrust of the true motives of white 
mentors, alleging that they seek the failure of those black farmers they 
mentor  (B2, 2012; Buthelezi, 2012). This is evidence of the low-trust 
environment in post-apartheid South Africa, and shows the effects of the 
informal institution of racism, inherited from the past, on the 
implementation of this policy.  
From probationary leasehold to private ownership   
Those in this discourse were also broadly united in arguing that 
beneficiaries should be given ownership of the land they access under PLAS 
after a period of probationary lease (AFASA, 2012; CS6, 2012; Mfuywa, 2012) . 
Many PLAS beneficiaries were extremely discouraged to learn that they 
would not gain ownership of land leased under this programme (B2, 2012). 
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They argue that the integration of black South Africans into the formal 
economy, and their empowerment, “… will never be complete without 
ownership of land …” (Ngqameni, 2012). In addition, knowing that they 
would own the land would encourage beneficiaries to invest in the land and 
develop it fully (B2, 2012).  
Providing land title to the rural landless  
There is some recognition that creating large-scale black commercial 
farmers will not benefit the vast majority of the rural landless poor, given 
the small number of existing farms available for transfer. Respondents 
suggested that the rural landless poor would still benefit from the creation 
of a few large-scale black commercial farmers, as it would create 
employment on those farms, encourage the growth of small businesses, and 
ensure the food security of the poor. In addition, the rural landless poor will 
be able to access jobs in the secondary processing and manufacturing 
industries that will arise around the increased production levels achieved on 
redistributed farms (ADA, 2013b; CS3, 2012; Ngqameni, 2012).  
In addition, this discourse suggested that the plight of the rural landless 
poor would be most improved by either providing them with title, or with 
some form of long-term secure tenure in the communal areas where they 
live. It is generally assumed that doing this will allow people living in these 
situations to invest in their small pieces of land and bring them to their full 
productive potential, or use the value of their land to access capital and so 
improve their socio-economic lot (Mfuywa, 2012; Pletts, 2012).  
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In summary, the main distinguishing feature of the AI discourse is the 
assertion that land reform should be a government-led process to create 
black large-scale commercial farmers. The AI discourse constructs the 
process of ‘development’ as the integration of black South Africans into the 
formal economy, and land reform is seen as only one of many potential 
ways of achieving this integration. In addition, some form of land reform is 
seen as being politically necessary, to avert large-scale public anger. To 
those drawing from the AI discourse, while existing large-scale farms were 
created by apartheid legislation, they are the most efficient form of 
agriculture possible, and guarantee food security. The policy prescriptions 
arising from this discourse focus on a government-led process to transfer 
existing farms to black individuals or small groups, to create black large-
scale commercial farmers. These beneficiaries are also to receive financial 
assistance from the government and technical advice from experienced 
mentors. Finally, to ensure the full integration of beneficiaries, they should 
gain ownership of redistributed land after a probationary lease period. The 
socio-economic conditions of the rural landless who do not gain farms from 
the government must be improved through the provision of title to the land 
they live on in the former bantustans.  
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Discourse Two: ‘Competitive Integration’ (CI)  
Development as integration through economic growth  
Table 9-2  
Summary of Competitive Integration (CI) discourse 
ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS 
"Development" Integration into the formal economy 
Place of land reform 
Politically necesssary 
Existing property rights must be respected 
Agriculture is a secondary development factor 
Adverse South African climate limits the potential 
of land reform 
Economies of scale limit the scale of land reform 
Existing large farms 
Survivors of post-apartheid deregulation 
Most efficient agricultural producers 
Guarantee food security 
Policy prescriptions 
Market-led redistribution of land 
Transfer existing farms 
Create black large-scale farmers 
Individuals, not groups 
Post-settlement 
Private sector financial support 
Mentorships to provide technical advice 
Title for beneficiaries Immediate on market purchase 
Communal areas 
Provide title to the rural landless in the former 
homelands 
Rural Landless Women Not mentioned  
 
 
Although ‘Discourse Two’ from Figure 9-1  (page 317) also advocates for the 
transfer of farms in their existing form, the reasons given for this by 
respondents, and the means to do this differs. Firstly, though, it is necessary 
to trace out how these respondents describe the process of ‘development’, 
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which is seen here as the integration of black South Africans into the formal 
established economy as full participants, so that they can share in its 
benefits (C1, 2012; Every, 2012; F1, 2012; La Marque, 2012; Madhanpall, 2012; 
Rossouw, 2012; Trollip, 2012). The leader of Umncunube (an NGO involved 
in the mentoring of aspiring black large-scale commercial farmers) 
elaborated that in post-apartheid South Africa, no matter their ethnic 
background, everyone “… should have a chance to prove themselves. But to 
prove themselves fairly and squarely … the world is there for you to make 
the best of it” (Kew, 2012). Within this discourse, this is recognised as being 
achievable by facilitating the growth of the existing formal economy, to 
create more jobs and opportunities for black South Africans. The founder of 
Amadlelo (an NGO devoted to training black large-scale commercial dairy 
farmers) explained that “… if you really want to do something about poverty 
alleviation, then jack the economy way beyond where it is now, and employ 
the people that are not employed” (Every, 2012). Another respondent 
explained that rather than cutting the existing economic cake into smaller 
slices for redistribution, “… ideally we should be baking a bigger cake, and 
there should be more to be able to go around” (CS4, 2012).  
Land reform politically necessary  
There is a general acceptance among those articulating this discourse that 
because of the history of South Africa, there is intense political pressure on 
the government to carry out some version of land reform. The interview 
respondent from the DA was explicit about the suffering of black South 
Africans in the apartheid and colonial eras, describing their systematic 
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dispossession “… either through wars, either through arbitrary land grabs, or 
through legislative land grabs, like the 1913 Land Act” (Trollip, 2012). 
Another agreed that “… the fact that land is taken away from people — I’m 
not even going to discuss it, it’s despicable” (Kew, 2012). The Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of Kwanalu stated that the white large-scale commercial 
farmers of KwaZulu-Natal “… are all, of course, acutely mindful of our 
country’s past and recognise the necessity to commit to land reform, land 
restitution and land redistribution …” (Agri SA & Kwanalu, 2008, p. 1). The 
leader of Agri-EC agreed that: “Unfortunately under the previous 
dispensations … the whole land issue had been racialised … Now one has to 
reverse, or try and reverse what … history left us” (Pringle, 2012). While 
some cynicism was expressed about African leaders turning to land reform 
as a way to cling on to waning power and popularity in other African 
countries (Kew, 2012), the general consensus within this discourse is that 
the government needs to be seen to be implementing some form of land 
reform, given the scale of past dispossessions in South Africa.  
Factors limiting land redistribution policy   
The need to respect existing property rights  
Having acknowledged that a land reform programme is politically 
necessary, most respondents articulating this discourse argued that the type 
of land redistribution that is feasible in South Africa is limited. As will be 
seen, the factors limiting land reform put forward by these respondents 
draw heavily from the ‘Large Farms’ and libertarian discourses identified in 
earlier chapters, or the neo-classical economics approach identified by 
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Cousins and Scoones (2010). Firstly, these respondents saw property rights 
as the basis of the entire formal economy in South Africa. Property rights 
are seen as important as they enable foreign and domestic investment, 
allow wealth in property to be transformed into other assets, and allow 
individuals to fully capture the fruit of their labours (Richardson, 2010). 
Most respondents linked the productivity of South Africa’s large-scale 
commercial farming sector directly to the property rights enjoyed by the 
owners of these farms. Likewise, the low productivity of the communal 
areas is linked to a lack of property rights (Aitken, 2012b; B1, 2012; Gevers, 
2011; Miller, 2012; Moorcroft, 2010; Pringle, 2012; Trollip, 2012). In addition, 
most respondents articulating this discourse saw the land restitution 
process as a threat to the property rights of large-scale commercial farmers, 
leading to uncertainty around the security of these rights (F1, 2012; 
Madhanpall, 2012; Pringle, 2012; Stewart, 2012). The CEO of Kwanalu argued 
that “… the majority of this province still remains under claims, which 
continues to play a negative role and which has undermined investor 
confidence in KwaZulu-Natal” (La Marque, 2012, p. 6). The then-President 
of the same organisation agreed that this means that farmers do not invest 
in their land, and do not take steps to increase their production, which “… 
can only worsen poverty and raise unemployment” (Aitken, 2012b, p. 2).  
Agriculture is a secondary development factor  
Secondly, it is argued that agriculture is a secondary development factor. A 
broader shift away from agriculture in the economy is assumed to be an 
inevitable accompaniment to the normal course of development. 
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‘Development’ always involves a process of urbanisation, as seen in the US 
and much of Europe (Miller, 2012). Both of these processes can already be 
seen in South Africa: the contribution of the agricultural sector has declined 
over time to only 2.5 per cent of the South African Gross Domestic Product 
(Aitken, 2012a), and there is already a general migration to the urban areas 
(Pringle, 2012). This implies that rural poverty is not resolved through land 
reform programmes, but through the creation of jobs in the towns and 
cities:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
What the poor need is not the right to run two cows on a commons, 
or to plough an acre of arable land. They need a permanent job with 
the security of a pay cheque at the end of the month. They need 
access to schools, shops and clinics, and not a hand-to-mouth 
existence in some dreary rural backwater without essential 
infrastructure (Moorcroft, 2010, pp. 14-15). 
This discourse, then, gives rise to assertions that rural poverty is not 
resolved through agricultural reforms, but rather through migration of the 
rural poor to the urban areas. This means that land reform policies cannot 
help the rural landless.  
Climatic drivers shaping land reform policy  
Thirdly, many respondents expressing this discourse argued that the natural 
environment in South Africa is highly variable and dry, thereby limiting the 
scope of land reforms. For example, “… only 30% of the country receives 
more than 500 mm of rainfall per annum. The remaining two thirds receives 
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less than this …” (Pringle, 2010c, p. 20). This means that “… there’s a limited 
potential in agriculture in South Africa, and it’s restricted to where the rain 
falls” (Pringle, 2012). Due to these climatic factors, small-scale commercial 
farming is not feasible in most of the country (Kew, 2012). Therefore land 
reform programmes and attempts to increase agricultural production are 
not going to solve South Africa’s rural poverty problems: “… there’s a limited 
amount you can do with a piece of semi-desert. Ask the Australians” 
(Pringle, 2012). Given the climate of the region, then, land redistribution 
involving the transfer of small pieces of land cannot be expected to improve 
the socio-economic position of beneficiaries.  
 
Efficiency factors shaping land reform policy  
Fourth, this discourse includes assertions that to make the best use of 
machinery and new technologies and to increase production efficiency, an 
increase in the average size of commercial farms can be seen in South Africa 
over time. This is because economies of scale are important in commercial 
‘First World’ agriculture around the world (F1, 2012; Kew, 2012). Farms are 
slowly getting bigger in the commercial farming areas of South Africa, and 
this is a natural process — “… farming is a marginal business all over the 
world. So people seek economies of scale …” (Trollip, 2012). As they grow, 
they compete for the limited amount of land available for commercial 
agriculture in South Africa. This means that only the most efficient 
commercial farmers are able to expand to achieve economies of scale. In 
South Africa’s formal agricultural sector, those farmers “… that made it, 
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bought the neighbour’s place or hired the neighbours place. The neighbour 
… moved on somewhere else, or used his rental to start a business 
somewhere else” (Trollip, 2012). In this way, large pieces of South Africa’s 
farmland have come under the control of those most able to use it 
efficiently. This is consonant with the dominant view noted by Hebinck, Fay 
and Kondlo (2011) in the Eastern Cape, which constructs small-scale farms 
as inherently inefficient and mandates leaving existing large-scale farms 
intact.  
Respondents articulating this discourse asserted that there is no better way 
of using South Africa’s agricultural resources than the example offered by its 
commercial farms (Gevers, 2011). Only the large-scale commercial farmers 
are able to “… get optimal production out of the environment, without 
sending it into the sea” (Kew, 2012). Existing farmers were depicted as 
flexible and lateral-thinking entrepreneurs who are at the same time “… 
subject to the discipline of the profit and loss account. And commercial 
farming can’t exist unless it is [environmentally] sustainable and 
economically viable” (CS4, 2012). It is made up of “… progressive individual 
farmers applying modern management techniques backed up by adequate 
financial facilities, effective research and relevant extension work” 
(Moorcroft, 2010, p. 5). In a deregulated, globalised and ultra-competitive 
agricultural marketplace, these farmers have been able to continue their 
operations (CS4, 2012; Every, 2012; F1, 2012; Naidoo, 2012; Rossouw, 2012). In 
addition, most large-scale commercial farmers are part of well-established 
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and lucrative value chains that guarantee the prosperity of many South 
Africans of all ethnic backgrounds (C1, 2012; Madhanpall, 2012).   
 
Thus, the large-scale commercial farms are portrayed as the guarantors of 
food security (Aitken, 2012a; B1, 2012; F1, 2012; Hulbert, 2012; Rossouw, 2012).  
The reality therefore is that not only does the commercial farming 
sector provide the food necessary to feed the country’s growing 
urban population, but that it provides food for the subsistence 
farming sector as well (Pringle, 2010b, p. 3). 
It follows that if the supply of food from the large-scale commercial farms 
were interrupted in any way, those affected the most and for the longest 
would be South Africa’s poor: “… the people who are going to die are the 
poor” (Kew, 2012).    
Not all large-scale commercial farms in South Africa produce basic food 
products, however. KwaZulu-Natal, for example, has long-established sugar 
and timber-production industries. SASA represents the interests of 
producers and processors in the sugar industry, while SAPPI and MONDI 
are both powerful corporations involved in the processing and export of 
timber and timber products. Respondents involved in these industries 
argued that in addition to securing the food security of South Africa, the 
large-scale commercial farms producing raw materials for these industries 
are part of long-lasting and lucrative chains of supply, which ensure the 
prosperity and employment security of millions of South Africans. 
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Therefore land reform cannot be carried out in a way which threatens the 
livelihoods and prosperity of so many ordinary South Africans (C1, 2012; 
Madhanpall, 2012; SASA).  
In addition, those expressing this discourse argue that the large-scale 
commercial farmers in South Africa today are the survivors of the 
deregulated post-apartheid agricultural environment: “… it’s tough here, 
there’s no subsidies in this country. So you either make it on your own or 
you don’t. So, those that are left behind, aren’t being molly-coddled by 
anybody” (Pringle, 2012). Surviving in this environment, the existing large-
scale commercial farmers in South Africa are “… super-intelligent people. 
Who live and thrive under the most difficult circumstances” (Rossouw, 
2012).  
Transfer of farms to be restricted to the existing large-scale form  
For these six reasons then, respondents articulating this discourse suggested 
that land reform can only transfer farms to beneficiaries in their existing 
form (C1, 2012; Every, 2012). They must not be broken up into smaller units 
when redistributed. In addition, land reform can only transfer large-scale 
commercial farms to individuals. Most of the respondents expressing this 
discourse were adamant about the dangers of settling large groups of people 
on redistributed land (B1, 2012; C1, 2012; F1, 2012; Kew, 2012; Madhanpall, 
2012; Pletts, 2012; Pringle, 2012). Large-scale commercial farmers speaking at 
the 2012 Kwanalu Annual Congress argued that individual black farmers are 
more likely to succeed, and that it is economically impossible for thousands 
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of people to make enough money to survive off one piece of land (Gumede, 
2012). This discourse gives rise to suggestions that land reform must 
therefore concentrate on creating black large-scale commercial farmers, and 
supporting their integration alongside the existing class of white large-scale 
commercial farmers (B1, 2012; F1, 2012; Gumede, 2012; Madhanpall, 2012). 
Land redistribution must facilitate the development of a multi-racial, 
mutually co-operating “… middle class agriculture community that wants to 
see the other man succeed” (Kew, 2012).  
Integration into the formal agricultural economy through the market  
This discourse, therefore, shares the AI conception that land can only be 
transferred in the form of large-scale mechanised farms, even if the reasons 
for this differ slightly. Where these two discourses differ seriously is in how 
these black large-scale commercial farmers are to be created. Those 
articulating this discourse began answering this question by arguing that 
the current government in South Africa lacks management and governing 
capacity, and is in many cases corrupt. Respondents argued that 
government “… by its very nature is inefficient, and also using other people’s 
money doesn’t force the operator to be as disciplined as if it were in the 
private sector” (CS4, 2012). Incompetent government officials were accused 
of contributing to the inflated prices paid for land by the government (F1, 
2012; Kew, 2012). Most of the extension officers employed by the 
government were portrayed as not knowing enough to help beneficiaries 
succeed as farmers (Kew, 2012). “Especially from a post-settlement 
 345 
 
sustainability point — you can’t expect the state to play this entire role. It’s 
never going to have that capacity to play that role”(Madhanpall, 2012).  
Respondents alleged that the land reform programme in KwaZulu-Natal “… 
has been plagued with mal-administration, nepotism, corruption, a total 
lack of transparency and disregard for the rule of law …” (La Marque, 2012, 
p. 4). Reference was made to a steady increase in the incompetence of the 
officials involved in land reform, resulting in increasing confusion around 
the process (Eshowe Entumeni Farmers Association, 2008). From this 
perspective, then, the incapacity and the corruption in the government have 
meant that, so far, land reform has done nothing more than take 
commercial land out of production in South Africa (C1, 2012; Kew, 2012; 
Pletts, 2012; ProAgri, 2012; Stewart, 2012).  
 
In contrast to the incapacity of the government, most respondents 
articulating this discourse expressed confidence that the market unfailingly 
transfers assets (like agricultural land) to their most efficient users in a 
‘natural evolutionary process’ (B1, 2012; C1, 2012; F1, 2012; La Marque, 2012; 
Pletts, 2012; Pringle, 2012; Rossouw, 2012; Stewart, 2012; Trollip, 2012). This 
means that the black South Africans who will succeed as commercial 
farmers are those who buy their farms themselves “… through bank loans. 
Through the normal processes. And those are the guys I think in the end 
will be the successful black farmers” (Pringle, 2012). Among the black South 
Africans who buy land will be those who can use resources on the market 
more efficiently than anyone else. Over time, they will be able to obtain 
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resources from the market, use them as efficiently as possible, and so enrich 
themselves. In the process, they will maintain or increase the levels of 
agricultural production achieved on South African farmland. In order for 
this process to happen as quickly and as effectively as possible, the market 
must be as open and as undistorted as possible. “All farmers must be 
expected to survive in a market-driven economy: those who cannot, must 
be permitted to fail” (Pringle, 2010a, p. 55). 
 
Market-based land reform has transferred large amounts of land   
Many respondents expressing this discourse go further, arguing that despite 
normal rises in the price of farmland (Pletts, 2012), South Africa’s market-
based land reform programme has “… in fact delivered handsomely in 
transferring previously white owned commercial farm land into the hands 
of black South Africans” (Kwanalu, 2012). While SASA argues that market 
processes have already transferred 21 per cent of all sugar-producing land to 
black South Africans (Madhanpall, 2012), others suggest that close to or 
more than 30 per cent of commercial farmland has already been transferred 
to black South Africans in the post-apartheid era (Aitken, 2012b; Kew, 2012; 
Pringle, 2012).  These assertions contradict government statistics quoted in 
chapter one, that by 2009 only 6.9 per cent of white-owned land had been 
transferred through land redistribution (Greenberg, 2010). A lack of any new 
statistics on the amount of land transferred being made available since 
then, however, has enabled those drawing from this discourse to make 
these assertions without fear of contradiction. This discourse is thus able to 
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maintain that there is no real problem with market-based land reform that 
needs to be addressed.  
Post-settlement support best delivered by the private sector  
Having obtained their land on the market, most respondents articulating 
this discourse agreed that land reform beneficiaries do not have the skills 
necessary to farm commercially (Rossouw, 2012). Most received a poor 
education during the apartheid period (Aitken, 2012a) and lack basic 
business management skills (Pletts, 2012), or have no experience of 
agriculture at any level (Madhanpall, 2012). Those articulating this discourse 
therefore agree that beneficiaries need some form of post-settlement 
support. Interview respondents expressing this discourse offered two 
different opinions on who should offer post-settlement support to new 
black large-scale commercial farmers. Some felt that businesses, commodity 
organisations or NGOs should provide this support. Others felt that new 
black large-scale farmers would learn all they need to under mentors from 
the existing large-scale commercial farming sector.  
 
Each of the interviewees from SAPPI, MONDI, SASA, Amadlelo and 
Umncunube expressed opinions strongly in favour of the government 
leaving the task of post-settlement support of land reform beneficiaries to 
themselves. SAPPI and MONDI would concentrate on new timber farmers, 
Amadlelo on new dairy farmers, SASA on new sugar producers, and 
Umncunube on new stock and food crop farmers. The representatives of 
SAPPI, MONDI and SASA frankly admitted that up to half of the farms 
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currently supplying them with materials for their mills were either 
redistributed, in the process of being redistributed, or under land claims. If 
these farms were to stop producing timber for SAPPI and MONDI’s mills, or 
sugar cane for SASA’s mills, all three industries would suffer catastrophic 
losses. The leaders of Amadlelo and Umncunube saw it as in the long-term 
interests of the existing large-scale farmers of South Africa to be involved in 
the process of creating new black large-scale farmers. Therefore these five 
interview respondents all indicated that their organisations were in the 
process of providing long-term, in-depth support to beneficiaries in their 
industries. This included extension advice, management training, access to 
capital and markets, and programmes to improve social cohesion in large 
groups. Therefore, these interviewees advocated that government should 
leave post-settlement support of land reform beneficiaries to private 
commodity organisations, businesses and NGOs (C1, 2012; Every, 2012; 
Madhanpall, 2012; Makhathini, 2012).  
All five respondents from SASA, SAPPI, MONDI, Amadlelo and Umncunube 
also argued that beneficiaries would be best served if the state set the 
regulatory framework for land reform and post-settlement support, and 
allowed the relevant corporations, commodity organisations or industry 
NGOs to do the implementation of their behalf. They were more than 
capable of developing “… the methodology, the tools, the programme. And 
say ‘government, here, we’ve done it. Now can you institutionalise it as a 
programme of your business …’” (Madhanpall, 2012). There is no need for 
the government to provide these new black large-scale farmers with any 
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form of support — the relevant agri-corporations, commodity organisations 
or NGOs operating in the open marketplace are able to provide access to 
the mentors, information, technology and capital new black farmers need to 
make efficient use of their land.   
You’ve got to have this partnership model between the claimants, or 
the grower, government, and organised agriculture. In whatever form 
it takes. It may be agribusiness directly. It may be an organised 
commodity like ourselves … for South Africa to succeed in this 
programme, you need that partnership model (Madhanpall, 2012).   
Various respondents reported that SASA had set a good example of doing 
this (B1, 2012; Pletts, 2012). It was suggested that therefore the other 
commodity organisations — those representing beef producers, maize 
producers and others, ought to follow suit (Every, 2012). In this way, land 
reform would contribute “… to the transformation of agri-business in South 
Africa through the training and mentoring of black farmers by entering into 
long term partnerships” (Amadlelo Agri, n.d.) 
The importance of farmer mentors  
As in the AI discourse, respondents argued part of the support given to 
beneficiaries needed to be experienced mentors from the established 
agricultural sector (CS4, 2012). “For any agricultural project to be successful 
we need three things, land, skills and access to finance. Remove any one of 
these and you will be doomed to failure. There is where we as farmers have 
the most valuable input of all, which is our skills” (Aitken, 2012b). The white 
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large-scale commercial farmers are “… the missing ingredient. You cannot 
start a business without management expertise” (Stewart, 2012). Given the 
low levels of trust expressed in the AI discourse towards mentors, however, 
it is not clear how the barriers created by the history of racism in the 
country can be overcome in the course of the transfer of this management 
expertise. While a respondent articulating the CI discourse insisted white 
farmers have successfully participated in mentorship programmes in the 
past, and are more than willing to help aspirant black farmers (Kew, 2012), 
other white farmers expressed doubt about the ability and willingness of 
beneficiaries to follow the advice their mentors provide (Every, 2012). This 
suggests that the mentorships required by PLAS are not generally easily 
implemented.  
A need to give title to the rural landless  
Finally, mirroring arguments put forward in the libertarian discourse and in 
line with the overall emphasis in the discourse on market processes and 
property rights, interview respondents expressing this discourse suggested 
that the best course of action to help the rural landless poor in the 
communal areas would be to give them title to the lands they live and work 
on (Miller, 2012; Pringle, 2010c; Trollip, 2012). This, more than anything else, 
will help them work themselves out of poverty, as it would enable them to 
borrow money from the banks, and bring their land to its full productive 
potential. As Pringle asserted, “It makes little sense to continue to squander 
our existing productive capacity by sacrificing our agricultural sector on the 
altar of Land Reform when the problem could be solved by making better 
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use of existing assets” (2010c, p. 22) in the communal areas. These assertions 
show strong parallels with assertions of the Large Farms and libertarian 
discourses, focused on the importance of creating property rights where 
they do not exist.  
Discourse summary  
The CI discourse, then, constructs the process of ‘development’ in the post-
apartheid context as the integration of black South Africans into the formal 
economy created prior to 1990. As a process of integration, the existing 
property rights of white farmers must be respected. Within this overall 
process, land reform is seen as politically necessary, to satisfy black voters. 
However, articulants of this discourse argue that it cannot be expected to 
solve the problem of rural poverty, as historically rural poverty has been 
solved by the migration of the rural poor to urban areas. In addition, the 
adverse climate prevailing in the region mean that very few people can 
expect to succeed at farming. Finally, land reform must not break up 
existing large farms for redistribution, as they are the result of economies of 
scale. They are the most efficient form of agriculture, and must not be 
interfered with. White large-scale farmers in this discourse are portrayed as 
most able to produce and thrive in the deregulated globalised agriculture 
economy. As such, they guarantee food security, and so must not be 
adversely affected by land reform.  
 
As a result of these assertions, the CI discourse advocates in favour of a 
market-led land reform programme, which creates individual black large-
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scale commercial farmers through the transfer of existing farms. 
Beneficiaries must receive post-settlement support from the private sector 
and commodity organisations, as well as mentors from the existing 
agricultural sector. Beneficiaries should immediately gain full ownership of 
the land they buy on the market, so they make full use of it. Similarly, the 
plight of the rural landless in the former ‘homelands’ would be best 
alleviated by giving them ownership of the land they live on in these areas. 
Finally, this discourse does not see any special role for rural landless women 
in this process.  
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Discourse Four: ‘Rural Support’ (RS)  
Development as poverty alleviation and capacity-building  
 
Table 9-3 
Summary of Rural Support (RS) discourse 
ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS 
"Development" Basic needs, Capabilities, Resources 
Place of land reform 
Justice 
Property rights inessential 
Food security 
Break dependence 
'Bottom-up' 
Existing large farms 
Created by apartheid 
Inefficient, Environmentally harmful 
Do not guarantee food security 
Policy prescriptions 
Government-led land reform 
Break up large farms 
Create commercial small-scale sector 
Groups or individuals 
Post-settlement 
Government 
NGOs 
Title for beneficiaries Not necessary 
Communal areas Infrastructure and investment 
 Rural Landless Women Must be the primary focus 
Basic conception of ‘development’ 
Many of the interviewees articulating this discourse gave responses 
corresponding in large part with the ideas around development and land 
reform found in the Critical discourse described in chapter five, and the two 
variants of the ‘livelihoods’ approach suggested by Cousins and Scoones 
(2010). Thus respondents expressing this discourse agreed that a minority of 
South Africans live comfortably and securely, in conditions that could be 
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called ‘First World’. The majority of South Africans have been excluded 
from attaining this socio-economic level, both before 1994 and up to the 
present day. The lives of these people are characterised by almost constant 
insecurity and uncertainty (NG1, 2012). These people do not necessarily 
need to be integrated fully into the First World Economy. However, they 
need to be lifted out of their present state of insecurity and poverty.  
To achieve this, a “… rights-based approach to land and agrarian reform” 
(Naidoo, 2005c, p. 6) is needed, as part of the creation of a ‘comprehensive 
safety mechanism’ (Naidoo, 2012). Whatever form this mechanism takes, it 
should include three main components: Firstly, members of the 
marginalised economy need to be given access to facilities that fulfil their 
basic needs — this includes a reasonable minimum wage, social grants, 
health facilities, decent housing, clean water and food security (Naidoo, 
2012; Stewart, 2012). Secondly, members of the marginalised economy need 
better access to extension services and educational opportunities to expand 
their capabilities to use what they have (Hulbert, 2012; Pletts, 2012; Stewart, 
2012). Thirdly, members of the marginalised economy need better access to 
capital and markets, giving them greater economic opportunities. In the 
communal areas, people need help in enterprise development (Stewart, 
2012). Once the economic position of the poor majority has been improved 
through these measures, these people can then decide for themselves what 
they want to do next — “… when you’ve got healthy people, that are well-
fed, then they can start thinking creatively” (Pletts, 2012).  
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Land reform as a matter of justice  
Turning to land reform, respondents articulating this discourse agreed that 
the current agrarian economy is the result of great injustices and 
dispossessions carried out against the black people of South Africa during 
the colonial and apartheid eras. Many of the respondents expressing this 
discourse participated in the effort to catalogue and publicise these 
injustices during the apartheid era (Hulbert, 2012). As a result, there is a 
strong strand of opinion arising from this discourse arguing that land 
reform is a matter of justice — no matter what else happens, the land taken 
from black South Africans prior to 1994 must be returned to them under 
land reform (Hulbert, 2012; NG1, 2012).   
In this light, some articulating this discourse argue that what beneficiaries 
do with the land is unimportant, as long as their land is given back to them 
(Hulbert, 2012). Others however point to the dependent position of the 
rural landless poor, who were forced into the bantustans under apartheid 
and colonial policies. These areas were created as part of a system of 
exclusion — and are areas that are excluded from the formal economy, 
where opportunities are fewer and the risk of slipping right out of its reach 
hovers (Del Grande & Hornby, 2010). Given the number of black South 
Africans forced into these small areas, they were never viable at more than a 
subsistence level at best. The people living in these areas were then forced 
into migrant labour by the imposition of cash taxes of various kinds. This 
had the effect of replacing South Africa’s peasantry with a ‘displaced 
proletariat’ (Wildschut & Hulbert, 1998). The rural landless poor were 
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forced into a dependence on employment at low wages on white-owned 
large-scale commercial farms. Today, despite the advent of a new political 
order, many sections of the rural population still live and work under the 
same conditions (Naidoo, 2005c). They remain on the periphery of the 
economy, unable to enter it (Del Grande, 2012).   
Those expressing this discourse argue that land reform must contribute to 
breaking this dependent relationship by giving the rural landless poor 
access to land, allowing them to work for their own benefit, and not only for 
the benefit of large-scale commercial farmers.  Giving them control of land 
will expand the resources of the rural landless poor, “… and provide buffers 
against poverty and complete dependency on farmers” (ECARP, 2011, p. 4). 
The transformation of the dependent conditions of the poor “… can only be 
addressed by a broader agrarian transformation that involves shifting the 
power relations …” (Naidoo & Manganeng, 2005, p. 113) created by apartheid 
policies. 
Land reform part of poverty alleviation  
Respondents articulating this discourse criticise the government for 
narrowly associating land redistribution only with the transfer of land for 
agricultural development (ECARP, 2011). But it is not only about putting 
people on farms — “… land reform should be about more than agriculture” 
(Del Grande, 2012). Land is in fact “… an integral part of socio-economic 
rights that enhances the capabilities and endowments of poor and landless 
members of society” (ECARP, 2011, p. 3). Land reform is therefore necessary 
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as part of the overall process of lifting the conditions of living of the rural 
landless. It is one of many actions that needs to be taken to enable people to 
access the “… means of social reproduction — housing, services, education, 
clinics …” (Naidoo, 2012). According to those articulating this discourse, 
land and agrarian transformation should see land as a means to give the 
rural landless “… the capacity to achieve socially accepted standards of 
living” (ECARP, 2011, p. 2). It must be part of a comprehensive package. So 
land reform must not only be about the transfer of land for agriculture, but 
also as a secure place to live.   
As part of the provision of a comprehensive social package, land reform can 
contribute significantly to creating food security. Giving people land would 
enable them to grow a greater proportion of their own food. This would 
mean that people would now have  
… money left over at the end of the month, because they weren’t 
buying certain things. And certain things that they couldn’t dream of 
buying like fruit they were now getting off their own trees. So, if you 
could pursue a sort of a food security approach towards agriculture … 
just using a small patch outside your house … I think it could 
contribute. If you could get from there to a point where people were 
growing reasonable surpluses, even if by commercial standards they 
[are] tiny (Hulbert, 2012). 
Those drawing from this discourse assert that once people have achieved 
food security, they “… can start thinking about how to progress beyond their 
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own little boundary” (Pletts, 2012). They can begin to access the 
infrastructure and inputs they need to begin improving others aspects of 
their lives.  
Land reform should be directed by the rural landless  
Those expressing this discourse argue that the process of planning and 
implementing land reform should be a ‘bottom-up’ process, directed by the 
rural landless poor themselves. As many as possible of the decisions around 
land reform “… should take place at a local level … the closer you can bring 
it down to the people the better” (Loest, 2012). Those drawing from this 
discourse assert that to ensure the success of any rural development 
programme, it must include the rural landless in the planning stages 
(ECARP, 2011).  
Property ownership not essential  
This discourse is particularly distinctive in the insistence of many of its 
adherents that property ownership is not an essential part of rural 
development. In contrast to the assertions of the AI and the CI discourses, 
the founder and leader of a prominent NGO asserted that “Just because 
people own land, does not necessarily make them more productive” 
(Stewart, 2012). Those articulating this discourse argued against the great 
respect accorded to property rights, and the resulting need to purchase land 
on the market (Del Grande, 2012). From this perspective, this has forced the 
rural landless to adjust to the existing property system. Large groups are, 
therefore, settled on commercial farms expected to run them as 
agribusinesses, which they inevitably cannot do. Doing this only ensures 
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that the rural landless poor remain on the periphery of the economy (Del 
Grande, 2012).  
Thus, the existing property ownership system maintains the denial of access 
to resources to the majority of the population of South Africa(Del Grande, 
2012). The solution is, therefore, not necessarily to give people ownership of 
land (inside or outside the communal areas). Rather, those drawing from 
this discourse ask how the existing tenure system can be reformed in a way 
that allows the rural landless to improve their lives, while not destabilising 
the wider economy (Del Grande, 2012). As private individual property 
ownership is so damaging to the wider society, various tiers of land tenure 
should be created, to allow more poor people to access land. The rights of 
rural land owners must be “… balanced with certain more public objectives” 
(Del Grande, 2012). The property rights of white landowners must not  be 
allowed to impede the ability of the rural landless poor to access land and 
improve their quality of life.  
Large farms inefficient, environmentally unsustainable and do not 
create food security  
Most white large-scale commercial farmers in South Africa received 
intensive state assistance during the apartheid era (Del Grande, 2012). 
“Alongside the development of labour repressive measures that insulated 
commercial farmers from competition for labour from mines and urban-
based industries, agriculture received massive state subsidies” (Naidoo 2011, 
73). Articulants of this discourse argue that this support from the apartheid 
government helped cement the superior position of large-scale commercial 
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farmers, so that today the country depends on large-scale farms for its food 
to an extent only seen in the global North. In contrast, the small-scale 
farmers in the communal areas have been almost completely ignored 
(Stewart, 2012).   
This discourse likewise gives rise to assertions that through apartheid 
subsidies, the large-scale commercial farm sector has also become over-
capitalised, inefficient and unsustainable. It also plays a smaller part in the 
economy, contributing less to the GDP and creating fewer jobs than might 
be expected. “This places South Africa amongst the worst three or four 
performers in a list of 70 comparable countries for which data are available” 
(Wildschut & Hulbert, 1998).   
In addition, articulants of this discourse argue that the large-scale 
commercial farms of South Africa are capital-intensive, and practice 
environmentally harmful types of farming. These include sustained mono-
cropping, water wastage and the heavy use of pesticides, chemical fertilisers 
and genetically modified organisms (Hulbert, 2012). Respondents from 
within this discourse referred to it as having a heavy carbon footprint, 
which is not environmentally sustainable (Naidoo, 2012).   
Respondents expressing this discourse also disputed the common assertion 
from other discourses that changing the existing agrarian system would 
negatively affect South Africa’s food security. One respondent pointed out 
that in 1994, after decades of strong state support for South Africa’s large-
scale farms, the majority of the population were starving (Del Grande, 2012).   
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Small farms rather than large  
Given all these factors, respondents drawing from this discourse argue that 
there is significant potential for the creation of small farms in South Africa, 
especially around the peripheries of the country’s towns and cities (Del 
Grande, 2012). However, despite this the government continues to equate 
small-scale labour-intensive farming with ‘backwardness’ (Wildschut & 
Hulbert, 1998). The government continues to mistakenly discriminate 
against small farmers (Stewart, 2012), assuming that the best small farmers 
become large farmers over time (Del Grande, 2012). This reflects a kind of 
linear pre-determined growth pattern reflective of particular ideologies and 
worldviews. Much more needs to be done to provide small farmers with 
extension services, infrastructure and market access. These respondents 
asserted that the small-scale farming sector is a potential creator of many 
jobs (Stewart, 2012).   
Those articulating this discourse argued that the government considers a 
failure any farm where “… they don’t see big capital-intensive equipment …” 
(Naidoo, 2012). Respondents asserted that any attachment to such ideas of 
what constitutes ‘real’ agriculture need to be abandoned. At present, land 
reform policies only promote “… large-scale capital intensive commercial 
farming to supply predominantly export markets ” (ECARP, 2011, p. 11). 
Rather, the government should ensure that land reform in South Africa 
contributes towards the creation of a small-scale commercial farming sector 
(ECARP, 2011). Many of the small-scale producers in the communal areas 
are already very good producers. Their main problem is the areas they live 
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in lack the infrastructure necessary to get their produce to the market 
(Hulbert, 2012). Government should therefore be acting to create 
opportunities for the emergence of a small-scale commercial farming sector.       
Government-led, not market-led  
Interview respondents expressing this discourse were clear in their criticism 
of the various government departments tasked with land reform, who were 
portrayed as lacking capacity due to a wide variety of factors including an 
inability to deal with the negative effects of affirmative action policies, 
factionalism and corruption (Del Grande, 2012; Hulbert, 2012; Naidoo, 2012; 
Stewart, 2012). However, like those drawing from the AI discourse, 
respondents argued that the market in South Africa has inherent 
characteristics inherited from the colonial and apartheid past which have 
enormous negative impacts on the lives and prospects of the rural landless 
poor (Del Grande, 2012). Thus the market-based land reform programme in 
South Africa has led to a situation where people “… who were disadvantaged 
in the previous political dispensation continue to be ignored, while those 
who benefited from the past continue to enjoy positions of power” (Naidoo, 
2005b, p. 74). The market-based ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ programme 
forces South Africa’s historically disadvantaged to compete with the 
historically advantaged for land (Naidoo, 2005a). Therefore, despite the 
many failings of the government, it must intervene in the market to ensure 
that the rural landless are able to access land.  
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Post-settlement assistance from the state   
This discourse gives rise to suggestions that the government should provide 
beneficiaries with all the assistance they need to access the land, the capital, 
the skills, and the markets in order to succeed. Respondents suggested that 
the government buy functioning farms and allow beneficiaries to use their 
government grants to buy into the existing enterprises on the farm 
(Hulbert, 2012). In addition, it was suggested that the government create 
regional centres to provide beneficiaries with the extension advice and the 
resources they would need to produce on their land (Pletts, 2012). 
Respondents also argued that the government should help beneficiaries 
access domestic markets for their produce, by protecting them from 
competition with cheap foreign food imports (Del Grande, 2012).  
Invest in the former ‘bantustans’  
In addition to facilitating the growth of a small-scale commercial farming 
sector in the former ‘white’ areas of apartheid South Africa, this discourse 
also gives rise to arguments that more resources and government attention 
must be directed to the small farmers in the communal areas. Agricultural 
production in these areas is limited today, as “… there’s an underinvestment 
there in training and in extension and in infrastructure and … in farming 
incentives …” (Stewart, 2012). Much more needs to be done to provide these 
small farmers with extension services, infrastructure, market access and 
business skills development. 
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The need to focus on rural landless women  
There is finally a strong strand of opinion among those articulating this 
discourse that land reform should concentrate primarily on rural landless 
women. Respondents argued that these women generally care for the 
children in the family and perform most of the agricultural labour in the 
communal areas. This means that they are generally better farmers than 
men, and more likely to succeed in land reform programmes. This is evident 
in the experience of a black female respondent, who has established herself 
as a successful large-scale commercial farmer operating two farms 
simultaneously (B1, 2012; NG1, 2012; Pletts, 2012). Providing land access to 
women would also contribute to creating greater gender equity in South 
Africa (Wildschut & Hulbert, 1998).  
Discourse summary  
Respondents articulating this discourse  construct the process of 
‘development’ as a process of providing the rural poor with their basic 
needs, expanding their capabilities and giving them access to a greater 
range of economic resources.  This discourse gives rise to assertions that 
land reform is a matter of justice, necessary to restore access to land to 
those dispossessed by apartheid policy. In addition, property rights are 
constructed here as inessential for economic improvement. Rather, the 
rural landless need access to land to improve their food security and break 
their dependence on farm and business owners. Thus, beneficiaries do not 
need to be given title to the land they access through land reform. Crucially, 
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respondents argued that land reform must be directed by the rural landless 
themselves.  
 
This discourse gives rise to assertions that existing large-scale commercial 
farms were created by apartheid policies, are economically inefficient, and 
environmentally harmful. Respondents argued that they do not, in fact, 
guarantee food security. In this light, the policy proposals arising from this 
discourse are that land reform must be a government-led process rather 
than market-led. The government should break up large farms into smaller 
units, as part of a broader effort to create a small-scale commercial farming 
sector. These smaller units can be redistributed to groups or individuals. 
Once the land has been transferred, the government should provide 
beneficiaries with the financial and technical resources they need, with the 
support of NGOs. More infrastructure and investment must be directed to 
the communal areas to improve the capabilities and access to resources of 
the rural landless in these areas. Finally, rural landless women must be the 
primary focus of land redistribution. 
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Table 9-4  
AI, CI and RS discourses 
 
ASSISTED INTEGRATION (AI) COMPETITIVE INTEGRATION (CI) RURAL SUPPORT (RS) 
"Development" Integration into formal economy Integration into formal economy Basic needs, Capabilities, Resources 
Place of land reform 
Politically necessary 
One of many methods of integration 
Politically necesssary Justice 
Existing property rights must be respected Property rights inessential 
Agriculture is a secondary development factor Food security 
Adverse climate limits the potential of land reform Break dependence 
Economies of scale limit the scale of land reform 'Bottom-up' 
Existing large farms 
Created by apartheid Survivors of post-apartheid deregulation Created by apartheid 
Most efficient form of agriculture Most efficient agricultural producers Inefficient, Environmentally harmful 
Guarantee food security Guarantee food security Do not guarantee food security 
Policy prescriptions 
Government-led land reform 
Transfer existing farms to beneficiaries 
Market-led redistribution of land 
Transfer existing farms 
Government-led land reform  
Break up large farms 
Create commercial small-scale sector 
Groups or individuals 
Create black large-scale farmers Create black large-scale farmers 
Transfer farms to small groups or individuals. Individuals, not groups 
Post-settlement 
Government financial support Private sector financial support Government financial and technical support 
NGOs in a supporting role Mentorships for technical support Mentorships for technical support 
Title for beneficiaries After probationary lease period Immediate on market purchase Not necessary 
Communal areas Provide long-term rights to land Provide title to the rural landless in the communal areas Infrastructure and investment 
Rural Landless Women Not mentioned Not mentioned Must be the primary focus 
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A minority of respondents drew from multiple discourses in the course of 
their interviews. However, based on their responses the majority of the 
respondents could be placed wholly within one or another discourse. All the 
respondents from the bureaucracies (bar one) articulated the AI discourse, 
showing the dominant direction of opinion in this group. Similarly, all the 
black farmers interviewed (large- and small-scale, and again bar one) 
expressed the AI discourse. All the consultants involved in land reform are 
also placed in this discourse. A clear pattern of opinion is also evident 
among the commodity organisations, the agricultural corporations and the 
white large-scale commercial farmers interviewed in the course of this 
research — all articulate the CI discourse. Much more variation is apparent 
among the NGO representatives interviewed. Four of the respondents 
express the RS discourse, one within the AI discourse, and one within the CI 
discourse. Based on the responses of their representatives, the DA 
articulates the CI discourse and the ANC expresses the AI discourse.   
Markets, state assistance and poverty alleviation  
The results of this discourse analysis support certain aspects and challenges 
others of previous studies of land reform discourses at the provincial level. 
As is discussed in chapter five, at the regional southern African level, a ‘neo-
classical economics’ discourse is identified, which focuses on the transfer of 
(larger) farms to efficient farmers through the market (Cousins & Scoones, 
2010). Similarly, a ‘technocratic discourse’ drawing on notions of national 
food security, sustainability and economic efficiency is noted (Du Toit, 1994, 
p. 376; 2013). A further study details apartheid-era efforts to incorporate 
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scientific advances into farming practices to stimulate the productivity of 
white Afrikaans-speaking farmers. The sole frame of reference of the 
agricultural experts trained to fill these roles came to be the white settler 
farm, pushing African farming practices to the periphery of knowledge and 
practice (Hebinck et al., 2011). Drawing on deeper assumptions that the 
market is the best institution for the exchange and allocation of resources 
(Jacobs, 2012), this discourse pits the economic efficiency of large-scale 
commercial farms against the inefficiency of low-input agriculture as 
practiced in the communal areas (Hall, 2004b). These powerful discourses 
were supported by the World Bank, the ANC and its aspirant bourgeois 
elements (James, 2000), along with white  landowners, powerful business 
interests and elements within the Department of Agriculture (Lahiff, 2007). 
All of these groups seek to maintain property prices and confidence in the 
land market, promote the inclusion of black commercial farmers in a de-
racialised agricultural sector (Hall, 2004b), and assume that the needs of the 
rural landless poor are best served not by restructuring the landownership 
patterns created prior to 1994, but by creating opportunities in the urban 
and communal areas (Lahiff, 2007). The discourses identified by these 
scholars all bear a close resemblance to the CI discourse discussed in this 
chapter.  
Similarly, various aspects of the RS discourse identified in this study are 
supported in previous studies of discourses around land reform in South 
Africa, including the ‘new institutional economics,’ which gives rise to 
efforts to create efficient small farmers through government and market 
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action (Cousins & Scoones, 2010). It is further noted that South Africa’s 
large-scale farms are inefficient thanks to decades of subsidies, 
protectionism and discriminatory policies, and should be restructured to 
allow the emergence of smaller, more ‘family-sized’ farms (Jacobs, 2012; 
Lahiff, 2007; Lipton, 1993a, 1993b, 2009; Lipton, Ellis, & Lipton, 1996). Such 
criticisms of large farms feature strongly in the RS discourse. 
Likewise, the RS focus on providing basic needs, increasing the capabilities 
of the poor and increasing their access to resources is noted in a number of 
studies of discourses around land reform in South Africa. The 
‘developmentalist livelihoods’ approach, the ‘welfarist livelihoods’ and the 
‘radical political economy’ discourses all show some similarities to aspects 
of the RS discourse, seeing land redistribution as part of government efforts 
to provide the rural poor with multiple and diverse livelihoods, constructing 
land redistribution as part of efforts to provide the rural poor with food 
security, and giving rise to assertions that land reform must secure the land 
and resources held by peasant farmers against a global corporate food 
regime (Cousins & Scoones, 2010). Similarly, aspects of the RS discourse are 
identified in  the ‘radical populist’ version of land reform, which frames the 
process in terms of restorative justice, and demands that the state 
redistributes land to the poor and landless with minimal compensation to 
landowners (Lahiff, 2007). Discourses situating land reform as part of the 
process of national reconciliation, restorative justice and reparation, and as 
necessary to protect and empower the marginalised and vulnerable are also 
identified (Du Toit, 2013). The tendency of  many NGOs to subscribe to a 
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discourse stressing the communal ownership of land, as a jointly-owned 
resource to be used for the common good is also noted (James, 2000).   
The RS discourse identified in this study similarly matches broadly with the 
discourse of ‘need’ and ‘historical justice’ suggested by MacDonald (2003). 
The RS advocacy of the redistribution of small pieces of land through 
government action, in order to provide food security and break the 
dependence of the rural landless poor harmonises broadly with the 
challenges posed to the ‘economic development’ discourse by local elites in 
the Estcourt region of KwaZulu-Natal in 1995–1996. In addition, references 
to the need for historical justice in the RS discourse suggest that it is at the 
very least similar to the ‘need’ discourse identified by MacDonald. The main 
difference between the RS and the ‘need’ discourse is that, according to 
MacDonald, this discourse was espoused by ‘local elites’ and ‘community 
leaders’. In contrast, the RS discourse is mainly the preserve of the NGOs 
involved in land reform. This could reflect the sample, and the fact that no 
interviews were carried out with ‘community leaders’ at the local level. If 
this had been achieved, the findings of MacDonald might have been 
corroborated in this respect. In addition, MacDonald does not appear to 
have analysed the discourse of local NGOs in KwaZulu-Natal province. 
Overall, however, this study supports MacDonald’s assertion of the 
existence of a discourse at the local level justifying land redistribution in 
terms of ‘need’ and ‘historical justice’.  
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Similarly, much of the CI discourse described in this study seems similar to 
the ‘economic development’ discourse proposed by MacDonald. Both 
discourses draw on the assumption that the existing large-scale commercial 
farms are the most efficient and productive form of agriculture. Both 
discourses advocate the redistribution of land mainly through the market, 
and both propose the creation of a class of black commercial farmers. This 
is where the similarities end, however. The CI discourse here gives rise to 
calls for the transfer of farms in their existing form, and those subscribing to 
it are strongly against the creation of smaller farms. In contrast, according 
to MacDonald in 1995–1996 those drawing from this discourse advocated 
the creation of a class of small-scale commercial black farmers. No 
respondents felt that land reform should be transferring small farms 
through market processes, and only those in the RS discourse supported the 
creation of a small-farm sector through government action. Among the 
majority of the discourses described in this chapter, there is very little 
support for the creation of a small-scale commercial farming sector, by 
whatever means. Rather, two of the three discourses described here favour 
the transfer of farms in their existing large-scale forms. Discourses at the 
provincial level seem to have undergone some change since 1996 — there is 
now drastically reduced support for the creation of small-scale commercial 
farms. In addition, where MacDonald identifies the then-Department of 
Agriculture as the main supporter of that discourse, the CI discourse 
identified here is mainly the domain of established white large-scale 
commercials farmers and agricultural corporations. The bureaucrats 
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interviewed subscribe to the AI discourse, which is not identified by 
MacDonald, and does not appear in the scholarly literature on land reform 
in South Africa.    
A new discourse?  
While the CI discourse identified in this study can be linked to the 
‘economic development’ discourse of MacDonald, the AI discourse shows 
sufficient differences from these two as they are described as to stand on its 
own as a separate discourse. Previous studies of discourses in South Africa 
have assumed that those advocating for the transfer of large farms all argue 
that this be done through the market. However, almost all the black large-
scale commercial farmers, the communal farmers and all the consultants 
differed from the CI and MacDonald’s ‘economic development’ discourse in 
their support for a strong government role in land reform. This seems to 
draw on aspects of the Dependency and liberationist discourses identified in 
chapters five and six.  
Similarly, these respondents argued that market-led approaches to land 
reform in South Africa have not worked, as the market for farmland is 
distorted in favour of a select few. Therefore they advocate that the 
government must step in to bring about the desired outcomes from land 
reform. Thus, the black South Africans seeking to become integrated into 
the established formal agricultural sector in South Africa felt that the 
government should aid them in achieving this, in much the same way that 
the apartheid and colonial governments assisted white commercial farmers 
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prior to 1994. The changes noted in the SLAG, LRAD and PLAS policies in a 
previous chapter, in which the government has given itself a greater and 
greater role in land reform, suggest that policymakers at the highest levels 
in the DRDLR tend to agree with those drawing from the AI discourse at the 
Operating level.  
These assertions that the government should lead the process of creating a 
new black commercial farming class do not appear in MacDonald’s analysis. 
Neither do any of the discourses suggested by Cousins and Scoones or other 
scholars bear any resemblance to the AI discourse as described here. The 
potential presence of such a discourse is only hinted at in the published 
literature. Bernstein noted the presence of black large-scale commercial 
farmers in former ‘white’ areas in the early 1990s, and commented that they 
“… may have a political significance far beyond their numbers” (1996, pp. 28-
29) and were likely to capture the limited land being made available for 
redistribution. Hall notes the presence of a small class of black commercial 
farmers, “… whose interests are to gain access to state resources and become 
beneficiaries of the deracialisation of the [large-scale commercial 
agricultural] sector …” (2004b, p. 224). Later, Walker (2006) suggests that 
LRAD was informed by the aspirations of the nascent black middle class in 
South Africa. Hall agrees, arguing that:   
LRAD was developed largely in response to the frustrations 
experienced by black farmers and bureaucrats with the white senior 
management of the DLA, who they maintained were only concerned 
 374 
 
with mitigating black poverty and not committed to the 
redistribution of land in order to provide opportunities for black 
farmers to accumulate wealth (Hall, 2010c, p. 183).  
Jacobs (2012) argues that the slogan of ‘de-racialising agriculture for 
profitable farmers’ serves to advance the interests of the aspirant black elite. 
Thus the AI discourse as described in this study is perhaps the product of 
the overall aim to create a black capitalist class in South Africa. The 
assertions of the liberationists (Du Plessis, 1994) during the negotiations 
around the Interim Constitution between 1990 and 1993 appear to have re-
emerged at the provincial level of the land reform policy arena in 2012. 
Eighteen years on from MacDonald’s study, and 12 years on from the 
creation of the LRAD programme, the black farmers and bureaucrats 
identified by Bernstein (1996), Hall (2004b) and Walker (2006), and in this 
chapter, articulate their point of view more fully and forcefully — that the 
government must intervene in the market to ensure that black large-scale 
farmers are able to accumulate wealth. Since the development of the LRAD 
policy in 2000, bureaucrats, beneficiaries and consultants involved in land 
reform have developed their own unique discourse, largely discrete from 
that of the established commercial interest and the NGOs — the AI 
discourse.   
Implications for land reform  
This study seeks to answer the question of why so little has been achieved 
by successive post-apartheid policy initiatives to address the inequitable 
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land ownership patterns created prior to 1990. This chapter focuses on the 
discourses drawn on by policy participants at the provincial level, and how 
these discourses how land reform policies are implemented. This chapter 
identifies three discourses drawn on by respondents — the AI, the CI and 
the RS discourses. While the AI discourse is a new discrete development at 
the local level, it still shares a number of assumptions and beliefs with the 
CI discourse. These shared assumptions have specific implications for the 
future course of land reform in South Africa, and for whom it will provide 
concrete benefits. As these two discourses are subscribed to by a majority of 
the respondents in this study, these shared assumptions are important for 
the way land reform policy is implemented at the provincial level. Both, for 
example, agree that land reform is a political necessity. No respondents in 
either discourse suggested that land reform is economically necessary, in 
order to ease the plight of the rural landless poor living in the communal 
areas, or to benefit the economy as a whole. This implies that land reform 
for them is more a symbolic policy than one that will deliver real economic 
benefits to the majority of the rural population. Further concurrences in 
opinion between these two discourses reinforce this conclusion.  
Both the AI and the CI discourses give rise to assertions that large-scale 
capital-intensive farms are in fact the most efficient form of agriculture. 
Both draw from Large Farms, libertarian and neo-classical economics 
assumptions that large-scale individually-owned farms, as seen in the US’s 
Midwest and UK’s East Anglia (Cousins & Scoones, 2010), produce the most 
food at the lowest cost. These assumptions also drove policy-makers in 
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apartheid South Africa (Hebinck et al., 2011) — the massive support directed 
to white farmers during this period was aimed at creating an imitation of 
this prototype in the South African context. The post-apartheid heirs of 
agricultural policy planners in South Africa at the local level in the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal thus accept the same assumptions and 
preconceptions. Both discourses additionally assume that these large farms 
guarantee South Africa’s food security. Respondents from both discourses 
assumed it was the large farms themselves that guarantee South Africa’s 
food security, and not the support systems (e.g. banks that will only lend to 
large farms, privatised extension advice and marketing facilities preferring 
to handle only large amounts of produce) that enable South Africa’s large 
farms to produce most of the country’s food.  
These two assumptions shared between the AI and the CI discourses thus 
lead to the argument evident in both discourses that land reform should 
transfer full ownership of farms in their existing large-scale capital-intensive 
form, to create black large-scale commercial farmers under the guidance of 
white mentors. As has  been discussed in chapter seven, if 45 000 of the 
large-scale farms that existed in South Africa in 2002 were eventually 
transferred to successful individual black large-scale farmers, this would 
mean a maximum of 45 000 black South African families would benefit 
concretely from land reform, out of a total of 19 million rural landless 
people. Such a land reform programme, as envisaged in the AI and the CI 
discourses, can therefore only ever provide concrete economic benefits to a 
tiny proportion of the rural landless poor in South Africa.  
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With so few actual beneficiaries, such a policy is, in essence, primarily 
symbolic. Voters will see land being transferred to black South Africans, but 
the essential architecture of ownership and control created during the 
apartheid and colonial eras, where large amounts of land are controlled by a 
tiny minority, remains unchanged. Ordinary black voters will see land being 
returned to black South Africans, but in a manner ensuring that the overall 
majority of the rural landless poor continue to live in the situation forced on 
them by apartheid policies. The only change most discourses are willing to 
envisage is a gradual increase in the number of male black large-scale 
commercial farmers, integrated into the existing white large-scale 
commercial farming sector created during the apartheid era.  
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion  
The establishment of a European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652 marked the commencement of a long process of land dispossession for 
the original inhabitants of what would become the Union of South Africa in 
1910. This process was intensified following the discovery of massive 
deposits of minerals in the interior of the region, and reached its 
culmination with the promulgation of the Native Lands Act in 1913. This Act 
formally dispossessed black South Africans of the vast majority of the land, 
forcing them to seek employment on white farms, mines and industries. In 
the agricultural sector, a complex set of laws, policies and regulations 
successfully directed immense resources towards individual white land-
owners, while simultaneously maintaining the ‘bantustans’ as reservoirs of 
cheap landless labour.  
 
The election of the ANC government to power in 1994 brought to an end 
this system, and ushered in a period of great anticipation. All citizens of the 
new post-apartheid South Africa awaited the implementation of a strong 
programme of action by the new government, aimed at reducing the 
inequalities created by colonial, segregation and apartheid policies. 
Encouraged by promises made as far back as 1955 that “… the land shall be 
shared among those who work it …” (Congress of the People, 1955), many of 
those forced into a situation of rural landlessness expected government 
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action aimed at reversing the process of land dispossession and a 
consequent improvement of their socio-economic situations. However, the 
policies formulated and implemented by successive post-apartheid 
governments have failed on both counts. Whilst articulating strong rhetoric 
around returning land to the dispossessed and restoring economic 
opportunities to the landless, the various iterations of land redistribution 
policy have ultimately focused on the creation of a small corps of large-scale 
black commercial farmers, or an ‘aspirant bourgeoisie’ (Drew, 1996), 
alongside the existing white large-scale commercial farmers. Today, the vast 
majority of the rural landless are ignored by these policies, or offered what 
could be described as token efforts to create opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. As articulated by a member of the ruling ANC, many 
South Africans believe that political freedom without economic 
empowerment is meaningless (Holomisa, 1994, pp. 2516-25176). Such a 
situation begs the question of why a government, elected with such a strong 
mandate to create social justice, economic and political equality, could (or 
would) do so little to change the lives of the rural landless.   
 
This outcome was not necessarily inevitable, but reflects time- and location-
specific decisions, that are culturally specific and institutionally contingent 
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). The constructivist institutionalism approach 
builds from this premise, focusing attention on how the institutions 
through which land reform policy in South Africa has been formulated and 
implemented have shaped and defined the limits of these policies. 
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Specifically, this approach directs attention to the ideas and social 
constructions, which both form the basis of these institutions and inform 
the actions of those working within these institutions (Hay, 2006). To 
understand the course taken by land redistribution policy, then, it is 
necessary to understand the ideas embedded in this institutional context, 
and the implications of these ideas for land reform.   
Review of findings  
The social constructions, ideas, and discourses that have both informed and 
have become embedded within the institutional context of post-apartheid 
South Africa have not originated in a vacuum. As becomes clear in chapter 
five, institutional actors and participants drew from international narratives 
around the process of development, and the place of land reform within this 
process, and adapted these ideas to their needs and goals. A first step to 
understanding the ideas influencing land reform in South Africa is, 
therefore, understanding these international narratives. This study revealed 
five broad discourses in the scholarship — the large farms, small farms, 
socialist, dependency and critical discourses. Each give rise to differing 
conceptions of ‘development’, and so to different policy proposals for land 
reform. As seen in the similarities between the recommendations of the 
World Bank and many aspects of SLAG, these discourses were influential in 
shaping what policymakers constructed as ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ in land 
reform policy after 1994.  
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As policy participants prepared to negotiate new policies around land 
ownership during the period of crisis in South Africa, then, the three most 
influential discourses provided three very different visions of the limits of 
the possible. The dominant discourse, articulated by a wide variety of 
international organisations such as the World Bank, was the ‘large farms’ 
discourse. Closely related to neoliberal narratives regarding the ideal 
relationship between governments and markets, the large farms discourse 
advocates allowing beneficiaries to purchase farms on the market with 
minimal government assistance. Any measures to remove the property 
rights of white farmers gained during apartheid was constructed as 
impossible, as was any substantial government role in any land reform 
programme.   
 
Positioned against this hegemonic approach, a range of alternative 
discourses offered different possibilities in land reform policy. The small 
farms discourse gives rise to recommendations that the government 
intervene in the market to transfer smaller units of land to the rural poor. 
This offered a substantial role for government in the process of land reform, 
and the possibility of access to land for a large number of the rural landless 
poor. A third discourse, labelled here as the ‘critical’ discourse, offered 
another alternative vision of possibilities, advocating policies driven by the 
rural landless themselves, with a focus on poor women as primary 
beneficiaries, and transferring smaller pieces of land to create food security 
and permanent places of residence.  
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Policymakers creating land reform policy in South Africa were thus 
informed by a wide variety of discourses and policy proposals. The large 
farms discourse included narratives favouring the preservation of the 
agrarian structure created during the colonial, segregation and apartheid 
eras. The critical discourse offered the possibility of greatly improved access 
to agricultural resources for the rural landless. The small farms discourse 
contained storylines presenting the possibility of the creation of a black 
small-scale commercial agricultural sector. Which of these discourses were 
drawn from, and by which policymakers, becomes clear through analysis of 
the discourses that contributed to and were enshrined in the primary 
institution governing land reform in South Africa — the final Constitution 
which enshrines the right to property. 
  
During the creation of the new South African Constitution between 1990 
and 1996, the long-standing apartheid policy consensus around land, which 
had been focused on the transfer of land and resources to whites, came to 
be renegotiated. Participants in this debate articulated the libertarian and 
the liberationist discourses, both of which echo themes and narratives 
found in the international discourses mapped out in this study. Many 
elements found in the libertarian discourse show strong similarities to those 
found in the large farms discourse — in many ways, the libertarian 
discourse can be seen as a practical application of the large farms discourse 
under the conditions prevailing in South Africa at the time. Accordingly, 
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land was assumed to be an economic resource, meaning that it was 
necessary to include a clause in the final post-apartheid Constitution 
guaranteeing the property rights of existing white land owners. In addition, 
it was argued that land reform should only give access to land to a select 
group of black agricultural entrepreneurs, rather than the rural landless 
poor.  
 
In contrast, many elements of the liberationist position echoed themes from 
the ‘dependency’ and ‘critical’ discourses discussed in chapter five — the 
liberationist discourse can in some ways be seen as an articulation of the 
dependency and critical discourses in South Africa. Liberationists 
constructed white South Africans as having achieved their wealth and 
security through dispossessing black South Africans of their land, and 
retarding their socio-economic development, much as the ‘metropoles’ and 
the ‘satellites’ of the dependency discourse. This meant that land reform 
must be central to the future progress of black South Africans. 
Liberationists asserted that there was no need for a property clause in the 
final post-apartheid Constitution as it would only entrench the existing 
disparities between whites and blacks in South Africa. Rather, those 
expressing this discourse argued in favour of a government-led land 
redistribution programme where land was expropriated and distributed to 
groups of black South Africans.   
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The property clause in the final Constitution was the result of a compromise 
between those articulating these two discourses. Through the influence of 
the liberationists, the new post-apartheid land policy allowed for the 
possibility of the restitution of land to those dispossessed between 1913 and 
1990, and the expropriation of land by the post-apartheid government in the 
name of land redistribution. However, under the similar influence of the 
libertarians, the new post-apartheid equilibrium mandated the payment of 
market prices for land expropriated for redistribution or ruled as subject to 
legitimate land claims. The institutions within which land reform policy is 
made and implemented at the national and the provincial levels therefore 
function within the boundaries set by the compromise in the Constitution 
between the libertarian and liberationist discourses.  
  
The dilemma posed by the compromise struck in the final Constitution 
resulted in three different responses at the national policy level (chapter 
seven). SLAG was aimed at helping as many as possible of the estimated 19 
million people potentially benefitting from this policy. Showing influence 
from the large farms and the libertarian discourses, this policy ignored the 
injustices associated with the process of creating the land market, and 
presented the problems of the rural landless poor as simply a lack of market 
access by rural black households. SLAG was based on the assumption that 
giving property rights to rural landless households would automatically 
improve their socio-economic conditions. This assumption has contributed 
to the preservation of the agrarian structure created by apartheid — the fact 
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that beneficiaries have had to buy land on the market legitimized the 
property rights of the white farmers selling on the market, and ignored the 
injustices committed in the gaining of those rights. In addition, requiring 
the rural landless to buy land in large groups minimized the benefits they 
would gain from accessing land.  
 
LRAD, likewise, showed a strong influence from the large farms and 
libertarian discourses — it also represented the problem of rural 
landlessness in South Africa as a lack of market access, and also assumed 
that providing black South Africans with access to land ownership through 
the market would automatically enable them to improve their socio-
economic position. This continued the preservation of the apartheid 
agrarian structure. In addition, the rural landless were largely excluded 
from benefitting from this policy. This policy iteration did not aim to 
provide land access to the poorest of the rural landless households, but 
rather selected and rewarded individual black entrepreneurs. LRAD was 
largely silent on how the vast majority of the rural landless poor who were 
not successful entrepreneurs would benefit from the policy, and was equally 
silent about the government support beneficiaries might need to succeed as 
commercial farmers.   
 
The current iteration in land redistribution policy, PLAS, shows a departure 
from the assumptions and problem representations derived from the large 
farms and the libertarian discourses evident in SLAG and LRAD. More 
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elements from the dependency and the liberationist discourses are evident 
in PLAS. For example, the injustices committed in the creation of the 
existing commercial agricultural economy are acknowledged. They are, 
however, constructed as being less important than South Africa’s food 
security, which is seen as being guaranteed by the country’s large-scale 
farms. This assumption provides a justification for continued post-apartheid 
government efforts to preserve the agrarian structure inherited from the 
colonial, segregation and apartheid eras.  
 
The focus on a few aspiring large-scale black commercial farmers, as a 
consequence, continued. Rather than a problem of a lack of market access 
to property ownership, PLAS represents landlessness in South Africa as a 
lack of access to land, as well as the skills and capital required to 
successfully earn a profit on a mechanised large-scale commercial farm. 
Therefore, PLAS assumes that it is not necessary to give land ownership to 
black South Africans — rather, aspirant black South African commercial 
farmers need access to commercial farmland and the skills and capital 
required to make a profit from it. There, they can build up the capital and 
skills necessary to buy their own land elsewhere later. The silence around 
the plight of the rural landless poor is ended in PLAS, which makes 
provisions to provide them with the skills and infrastructure needed to 
participate in the formal South African economy under another policy 
effort. Seeking to create employment and opportunities in the communal 
areas, this aspect of PLAS, ironically, mimics apartheid-era efforts to 
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stimulate economic development in the ‘bantustans.’ It has the same effect 
as these efforts, serving mainly to preserve the agrarian structure created to 
favour white large-scale commercial farmers.  
  
The focus of this study on social constructions included an examination of 
the way policies have implicitly represented the rural landless and land 
redistribution beneficiaries. The analysis showed that in SLAG, LRAD and 
PLAS, land reform beneficiaries are constructed as dependents. Moreover, 
the analysis of the positioning of the rural landless poor and land 
redistribution beneficiaries within these policies shows that their interests 
have not been identified with the interests of the wider nation. Instead, the 
policies construct the population of existing (white) large-scale commercial 
farmers as pivotal in maintaining South Africa’s national interest, 
particularly in relation to the guarantee of food security. As a result, the 
need of the rural landless poor to access land is seen as subordinate to the 
needs of the existing white large-scale commercial farmers. This core 
assumption, again, contributes to the lack of achievement evident in post-
apartheid land reform policies.  
 
Additionally, these policies assume that the rural landless poor and land 
reform beneficiaries are incapable of creating their own solutions to their 
own problems. SLAG assumed that beneficiaries would be incapable of 
negotiating to buy land themselves. LRAD assumed that applicants would 
be unable to create grant applications on their own. PLAS assumes that 
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beneficiaries cannot be trusted with land ownership, and must submit to 
the guidance of bureaucrats and established white farmers. This 
construction of beneficiaries and the rural landless resonates strongly with 
apartheid-era constructions of black South Africans, and once again 
provides insight into why so little has been done to change the agrarian 
structure inherited from the apartheid era.  
 
Finally, the analysis of land reform policies indicates that the rural landless 
poor are not seen as a politically significant group warranting concrete 
policy benefits. In fact, the policymakers who created SLAG saw the efforts 
of the rural landless to self-organise as a threat. LRAD policymakers silently 
excluded the vast majority of the rural landless poor from consideration as 
beneficiaries through the ‘own contribution’ requirement. PLAS 
policymakers do not offer land ownership rights to land redistribution 
beneficiaries. Such heavy policy burdens would not be placed on groups 
constructed by policymakers as politically powerful. The result of these 
constructions has been to free policymakers from the responsibility or need 
to carry out large-scale changes to the land-ownership structure inherited 
from the apartheid era.  
 
As important as the discourses at the constitutional and national policy 
levels are, they are not sufficient to provide a comprehensive answer to the 
question of how so little could have been done in post-apartheid South 
Africa to address the economic inequalities in the agricultural sector. 
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Equally important is an examination of the ideas, social constructions and 
discourses evident at the provincial level, amongst those implementing land 
redistribution policy. The account provided in chapter nine identified 
echoes of discourses of land reform identified at the international and 
constitutional levels. The ‘Assisted Integration’ discourse emulates themes 
in the dependency and liberationist discourses, constructing the process of 
development as the integration of black South Africans into the formal 
economy created during the colonial, segregation and apartheid eras. This 
implies that land redistribution policy must create large-scale black 
commercial farmers, integrated into the existing white large-scale 
commercial farming sector. These respondents additionally argued that the 
government should intervene in the land market to secure land for aspirant 
black large-scale commercial farmers, and provide them all the post-
settlement support they need to prosper. Crucially, this discourse does not 
call for the dismantling of the existing agrarian structure. Rather, it calls for 
the inclusion of a select few black beneficiaries into it.  
 
Many aspects of the ‘Competitive Integration’ discourse repeat aspects of 
the large farms and the libertarian discourses. Accordingly, interview 
respondents articulating this discourse also saw ‘development’ as the 
integration of black South Africans into the existing formal economy. 
Respondents drawing from this discourse argued that land redistribution 
should only transfer farms in their existing forms to beneficiaries, and 
through the market. Again, large-scale changes to the existing agrarian 
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structure are not envisaged in this discourse — it is assumed here that this 
apartheid-era structure must be preserved.  
 
The ‘Rural Support’ discourse echoes elements of the critical discourse. 
Respondents in this discourse constructed ‘development’ as a process of 
providing the rural landless with their basic needs, access to the 
information they need to increase their capabilities, and access to capital 
and markets. Those respondents articulating this discourse argued that 
large-scale mechanised farms are inefficient and environmentally 
destructive, implying that land redistribution should distribute smaller 
parcels of land to the rural landless through the government rather than the 
market. This is the only discourse found at the provincial level that 
envisages changes to the existing agrarian structure. Those drawing from 
this discourse, however, mostly had little to no access to key policy-making 
arenas, and the ideas they articulated had no effect on the agrarian 
structure.  
 
Previous discourse analyses of land redistribution in South Africa have 
assumed that all policy actors advocating for the transfer of large farms see 
this being done through the market (Cousins and Scoones, 2010; Hall, 
2004b). However, respondents articulating the Assisted Integration 
discourse understood the land market as distorted in favour of white large-
scale farmers. Black respondents seeking to become large-scale commercial 
farmers argued that the government should aid them to achieve this, as the 
 391 
 
colonial, segregation and apartheid governments had done for white 
farmers prior to 1994. The increasing role allocated to the government and 
the concomitant decreasing emphasis on the market in the progression 
from SLAG to PLAS suggests that DRDLR policymakers, likewise, might 
articulate something like the Assisted Integration discourse.   
 
Prior studies of land redistribution in South Africa have not noted a 
discourse similar to the Assisted Integration discourse. The assertions of the 
liberationists emerge at the provincial level — the beneficiaries, bureaucrats 
and consultants involved in land redistribution implementation in the 
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal forcefully articulated this new discourse 
— that the government must intervene in the market to enable an aspirant 
black agricultural bourgeoisie to accumulate wealth.   
 
While the Assisted Integration discourse is discrete from the Competitive 
Integration discourse, they share a number of assumptions, which have 
strong implications for the future course of land reform in South Africa. 
Neither discourse gives rise to suggestions that land redistribution could be 
beneficial to the overall economy of South Africa. In addition, both 
discourses agree that large-scale capital-intensive farms are the most 
efficient form of agriculture, and guarantee the food security of the country. 
As a result, respondents from both discourses proposed that land 
redistribution should transfer farms in their existing large-scale capital-
intensive form to aspirant black commercial farmers. Such a land reform 
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programme is unlikely to bring about changes to the existing agrarian 
structure, and can only provide concrete economic benefits to a small 
proportion of the rural landless poor in South Africa. It can never be more 
than a symbolic policy that will leave the vast majority of the rural landless 
poor in the situation forced on them by policies inspired by racism prior to 
1994.  
 
Review of theoretical approach  
The theoretical approach adopted and adapted for this study combined 
elements of ‘new institutionalism’ with a focus on discourse. The ‘new 
institutionalism’ approach provides a focus on the limited set of choices 
made available to policy actors, with the overall aim of protecting a pre-
determined principle, idea or set of ideas. The post-apartheid government 
inherited a full set of institutions from the colonial, segregation and 
apartheid governments. However, these had all been focused on preserving 
and maintaining the principle of white supremacy since 1652. To a greater 
or lesser extent, all these institutions changed this focus in post-apartheid 
South Africa.  
 
Historical Institutionalism is unable to explain such a significant 
institutional change without recourse to unexpected outside events (Hay, 
2006; Hira & Hira, 2000; Immergut, 1998; Lieberman, 2002; March & Olsen, 
2006; Schmidt, 2010; Weyland, 2008). However, from 1990 – 1996, South 
Africa underwent a period of large-scale institutional change that cannot be 
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explained only by unexpected outside events. While the fall of international 
Communism and subsequent changes to the international order were 
unexpected and impacted the strategic position of the apartheid 
government, the survival of the apartheid order was not directly threatened. 
To help explain this, elements from the ‘constructivist institutionalism’ 
(Hay, 2006) were included in this study. In this approach, institutions are 
understood as being created to protect and further certain principles, and 
can persist over long periods of time even within the context of major 
systemic upheavals. The crucial insight here is that the actors working 
within and around institutions may subscribe to different principles, ideas 
or discourses. There is, therefore, a dissonance between the discourses 
enshrined in institutions and the discourses articulated by many of the 
actors working within them. These actors may take advantage of periodic 
opportunities to change the institutions they interact with so that the 
institutions more closely embody the discourses the actors subscribe to.  
 
Evidence of such actor agency was observed in the course of this study. As 
described in chapter nine, the pre-existing informal institution of racism led 
both white farmers and black beneficiaries to express doubt about the 
potential success of the mentorships mandated by the PLAS programme. 
However, these sentiments were not universal. Countering dominant white 
narratives denigrating the abilities of black beneficiaries, one white 
respondent insisted that successful mentorship programmes have been 
achieved in the past, and white farmers are willing to do so again (Kew, 
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2012). Again as noted in chapter nine, countering black narratives casting 
doubt on the motives of white mentors, a black beneficiary described a very 
successfully relationship with a white mentor (B1, 2012). Finally, again in 
chapter nine, a black female respondent had established herself as a 
successful large-scale commercial farmer operating two large-scale 
commercial farms simultaneously, successfully countering hegemonic 
discourses disparaging the abilities of black women. These instances, at 
least, exemplify the articulation of different discourses to those drawn on by 
the majority, and the way they have led to the implementation of differing 
ideas. This study focuses on the broader discourses found in land reform 
policy, then, but it must be recognised that it is not inevitable that all actors 
will automatically obey the dictates of hegemonic discourses. While small 
and individualised, these examples of actor agency can potentially spark 
larger changes to hegemonic discourses and institutions.  
 
This theoretical approach of constructive institutionalism has been 
profitably used in the past to create greater insights into economic 
institutions in the US and Sweden (Blyth, 2002), globalisation and European 
integration (Hay & Rosamund, 2002), and the rise of ‘neoliberalism’ in the 
United Kingdom (Hay, 2001). While this approach has generated new 
insights in a broad range of studies of the developed world, the use of such a 
wide-ranging framework in the particular context of land reform policy in 
the South African context proved difficult. The incorporation of the insights 
of Bacchi (2009; 2012) and Schneider and Ingram (1993; 1997; 2005) into this 
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framework enabled a deeper and more fine-grained analysis of the SLAG, 
LRAD and PLAS policies. The resulting theoretical framework has proven to 
be robust, enabling a deeper understanding of the changes that have 
occurred in land redistribution policy in South Africa from 1990 to 2012. It 
has also proved highly flexible, allowing use of a wide range of empirical 
sources, including Parliamentary records, policy documents, interview 
transcripts and numerous secondary sources to gain new insights into land 
redistribution policy in South Africa. It has potential to facilitate future 
research into the discourses drawn on by groups not included in this study.  
 
Significance of the research   
These conclusions have extended understanding of the South African land 
redistribution programme in four ways. Firstly, this study has deepened 
understanding of the discourses drawn on by established white property 
owners and farmers in their quest to protect the wealth they accumulated 
prior to 1994. The published scholarship on land redistribution in South 
Africa frequently refers to the set of ideas drawn on by this section of the 
population in South Africa — Cousins and Scoones (2010, p. 32), for 
example, refer to the “implicit model of the large-scale commercial farm”, 
and others to a focus on the market and the importance of property rights 
(Hall, 2004b; Jacobs, 2012). There are few attempts, however, to clearly map 
out these beliefs, and what narratives and specific policy proposals they give 
rise to at the various levels of analysis used in this study. This study clearly 
maps out the dominant discourses at the international level (the large farms 
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discourse), the constitutional level (the libertarians) and the provincial level 
(the CI discourse), studying both the specific policy proposals for land 
redistribution from these discourses, and the justifications given for them.  
 
Secondly, this study has set out the discourses drawn on by the aspirant 
black agricultural bourgeoisie at the various levels. As discussed in chapter 
nine, fleeting reference is made to a ‘would-be black agrarian 
entrepreneurial class’ (Cliffe, 2000) by some scholars looking at land 
redistribution policy in South Africa. However, most writers assume that 
this aspirant black agricultural bourgeoisie exactly mimics the discourses of 
the established white agricultural bourgeoisie. Perhaps unconsciously 
confirming the contention of Ogundipe-Leslie (2001) that black South 
Africans are often spoken for by others, and are assumed to be unable to 
participate in the world on their own behalf, no published attempt has been 
made to ascertain if the narratives and policy proposals of this group differ 
in any way from other groups involved in this policy arena. A significant 
contribution of this study to the scholarship is to set out the discourses 
drawn on by this group. At both the constitutional and the provincial levels, 
these policy actors draw on aspects of the dependency discourse, depicting 
black South Africans as having been restricted and unjustly held in unequal 
economic relationships by white South Africans. The shifts in redistribution 
policy apparent in the LRAD and PLAS programmes, changing the focus of 
land redistribution to the creation of black large-scale commercial farmers, 
indicate that many policymakers in the DLA/DRDLR also articulate these 
 397 
 
ideas. In addition, the origin of features in PLAS that writers have found 
anomalous, such as hostile rhetoric against sales of land to foreigners 
(Jacobs, 2012), are made clear by examination of details of the liberationist 
and Assisted Integration discourses.  
 
Thirdly, the application of the discourse analysis methods developed by 
Bacchi and Schneider and Ingram, while enabling the operationalisation of 
the constructivist institutionalism framework, bring new insights to the 
scholarship on land redistribution policy in South Africa. Few studies of the 
various iterations of land redistribution policy have focused on the 
problematisations inherent in these three policy iterations, and the 
assumptions, histories, silences and effects of these particular 
problematisations. The application of these theoretical approaches deepens 
understanding of these issues and contributes to the scholarship by 
revealing the assumptions underlying SLAG, LRAD and PLAS, such as that 
the needs of the rural landless poor are less important than those of the 
established white farmers and the aspirant black bourgeoisie. In addition, 
this study adds the insight that policymakers in the DLA/DRDLR have seen 
the rural landless poor and land redistribution beneficiaries as dependents 
— as requiring only symbolic policy benefits and hidden policy burdens, 
and as being inherently incapable of solving their own problems.    
 
Finally, while much analysis of the SLAG and LRAD policies has been 
published, much less, if anything, has been published on the PLAS 
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programme. This study extends understanding of the issues around land 
redistribution, then, by extending the analysis to include PLAS policy 
documents. 
 
Contributions to policy and practice  
The deeper assumptions of the most important institutions and actors in 
this policy arena have been studied in the hope that the insights gained will 
contribute to the ongoing debate around land redistribution and land 
reform in South Africa. As it is clear that the needs of the rural landless poor 
are not prioritised by those they have repeatedly elected to power, perhaps 
space for a new debate can be opened amongst the citizens of South Africa. 
Do a majority of the citizens accept that the needs of the rural landless poor 
are in fact less important than the established white middle class, and the 
minority of black South Africans that have so far been able to join them? Is 
the best way to improve the socio-economic lot of the rural landless poor to 
create (a maximum of) 45, 000 black large-scale commercial farmers and to 
improve the physical infrastructure in the communal areas? This study is a 
contribution to clarifying the terms of such a debate.  
 
Future research   
This qualitative analysis of land redistribution in South Africa has been 
fruitful, uncovering a new series of discourses that have not been described 
in the published literature as yet. However, a number of important 
questions remain. Firstly, the analysis of the discourses at the constitutional 
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and the national policy levels concentrated on publicly-available records 
and policy documents. An important question arising from this research 
then would focus on the policy actors at this level — a series of interviews 
with key policy actors at these levels would be beneficial in building further 
on the understandings established in this study of the assumptions, 
narratives and policy proposals of actual policy actors at these levels. 
Secondly, the focus on qualitative analysis in this study prompts questions 
around what forms of quantitative analysis could be used to examine the 
conclusions of this study. A q-methodology survey29, for example, of 
participants at the provincial level would do much to develop 
understanding of the discourses drawn on by policy actors at this level as 
well as identify possible policy options that are likely to be broadly 
acceptable to the larger public.  
 
Finally, this study has shown how post-apartheid land redistribution policy 
in South Africa so far has been the outcome of the interaction of two 
powerful sets of discourses — the large farms/libertarian/competitive 
integration discourses, and the dependency/liberationist/assisted 
                                                 
29
 Q methodology combines qualitative and quantitative research methods (Addams, 2000, p. 
14), using statistical techniques to uncover the range of discourses held by groups of people 
(Barry & Proops, 2000, p. 22). A sample of statements on a chosen topic is applied to a group of 
research participants, who are asked to rank these statements according to importance of 
agreement from their individual perspective. By ordering them, respondents give their subjective 
meaning to the sample of statements, and reveal their subjective standpoints. Correlations 
between individual participant rankings of statements indicate similar viewpoints on the topic. If 
statistically significant clusters of correlations exist, they are identified by factor analysis and 
described as common viewpoints (Cramm et al., 2010, p. 160). This builds understanding of 
entrenched positions in a given debate, as well as creating the possibility of identifying areas of 
common ground and shared understandings.  
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integration discourses. Both sets of discourses have been drawn on and 
deployed by two small and powerful elites — the minority of white South 
Africans currently farming commercially in South Africa, and the minority 
of black South Africans who wish to join and/or replace them. Land reform 
policy so far has been a compromise between the established white farmers 
and an aspirant black bourgeoisie. This study has focused on the discourses 
drawn on by policy actors, rather than the discourses drawn on by the vast 
majority of the rural landless. Further research is, therefore, urgently 
needed to make clear the experiences, ideas and policy proposals of those 
who have so far been shut out of the conversation around land 
redistribution policy in South Africa — the rural landless poor living and 
working on large-scale commercial farms and in the communal areas today.    
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Appendix 
Interview documentation 
Request for interview 
 
Hi  
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Waikato in New Zealand, under the 
supervision of Dr. Patrick Barrett and Dr. Priya Kurian. My PhD thesis will 
examine land reform in South Africa after 1994. As part of the research for 
this project, I will be carrying out a number of interviews in the Eastern 
Cape in August and September 2012.  
 
Your organisation plays a vital role in the successful implementation of land 
reform. As a member of … , I anticipate that you will have some interesting 
insights into the land redistribution policy. I would really appreciate the 
opportunity to discuss some of these insights with you if at all possible.    
I do not anticipate the interview taking more than an hour. If you are 
willing to take part in my research, please feel free to send me a reply. We 
can then discuss where and when the interview could take place.  
 
Sincerely 
Graeme Mackenzie 
PhD Candidate, University of Waikato, New Zealand 
+64 (0)21 051 3591 
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Information for interview candidates 
  
 
 
 
                                  
 
Dear ______________ 
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Waikato in New Zealand, under the 
supervision of Dr. Patrick Barrett and Dr. Priya Kurian. My PhD thesis will 
examine land reform in South Africa after 1994. As part of the research for 
this project, I would like to interview you about this topic.   
 
I would like to explore what you see as being the best way to develop and 
strengthen the agricultural sector in South Africa. My aim will be to gain an 
understanding of the on-going debate over land reform policy and how best 
to proceed. I will have some questions to ask you, but my hope is that we 
can have an in-depth conversation about this. I anticipate that the interview 
will take about 60 minutes, and I will be happy to hold it at a time and a 
place most convenient to you.  
 
The transcript of this interview will not be read by anyone other than myself 
and my two supervisors in New Zealand. The information from this 
interview will be used in my thesis, and in any articles I publish derived 
from the thesis. In all the material I publish, your identity will be kept 
anonymous, unless you give your explicit permission otherwise. You will 
also be given the option of keeping the name of the organisation you belong 
to anonymous. The interview details will be kept on a password-protected 
computer, and the transcript will be kept by me in a safely locked place. 
Graeme Mackenzie                    
PhD Candidate  
Department Political Science & Public Policy 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand  
Phone +64 (07) 848 4466 Ext 6601 
graememackenzie73@gmail.com  
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They will be available only to my supervisors, and will be destroyed ten 
years after my thesis is published.  
 
If you agree to take part in this interview, you will have the following rights:  
a) To refuse to answer any particular questions, and to terminate the interview at 
any time.  
b) To ask any further questions about the interview or research project that occur 
to you, either during the interview or at any other time.  
c) To remain anonymous, if you wish.  
d) To keep the name of the organisation you work for anonymous.  
e) To withdraw your consent at any time until three weeks after your interview by 
contacting me (see below for contact details).  
f) To take any questions you have about the interview to my two supervisors.  
g) To take any enquiries about the ethical conduct of this interview project to the 
University’s Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences’ Human Research Ethics 
Committee (University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New 
Zealand, or fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz). This Committee has given approval for 
the interviews in this study to go ahead.  
You are welcome to contact me directly at graememackenzie73@gmail.com 
or at +64 21 051 3591. In addition, if you prefer you could contact one of my 
supervisors for this project: Dr. Patrick Barrett, pbarrett@waikato.ac.nz, +64 
7 838 4466 ext 5028; or Dr. Priya Kurian, pkurian@waikato.ac.nz, +64 7 838 
4466 ext 6109. 
Yours Sincerely 
 
Graeme Mackenzie 
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Consent form for interview candidates 
 
   
 
                                  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
In-Depth Interview for a PhD study at the University of Waikato 
Interview Topic: “The Politics of Land Reform Policy in South Africa: An Institutional 
Analysis” 
Student: Graeme Mackenzie 
Supervisors: Dr. Patrick Barrett and Dr. Priya Kurian 
CONSENT FORM - Interviews 
 
Description of Project: This research aims to develop an understanding of 
land reform in South Africa after 1994.    
 
“I consent to be interviewed for this research on the above conditions” 
 
Signed: 
Interviewee____________________________________Date:___________ 
“I agree to abide by the above conditions” 
 
Graeme Mackenzie, PhD Candidate  
Department Political Science & Public 
Policy 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand  
Phone +64 (07) 848 4466 Ext 6601 
graememackenzie73@gmail.com  
I agree to participate in an interview as specified in the introductory letter.  Yes No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions relating to my  
participation in the interview.                                                                             
Yes No 
I agree to this interview being audio-recorded.                                                 Yes No 
I understand that I can withdraw from this research project up to three weeks 
after the interview has taken place and that if I do so, the interviewer will 
delete the recorded interview and destroy the interview transcript.                  
Yes No 
I agree that the interview may be used in the thesis.                           Yes No 
I wish to remain anonymous.                                                                             Yes No 
I wish to keep the name of the organisation I am part of anonymous.                                                                               Yes No 
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Signed: 
Interviewer_____________________________________Date:___________ 
 
